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ABSTRACT 
This thesis investigates how federalism choices adopted by the Brazilian Constitution of 
1988 impacts judicial review. In order to address this central question, this work was 
structured in three sub-questions designed to study specific federalism constitutional 
options pertinent to all distinct levels of Brazilian federalism, namely: federal union, 
states, and municipalities. The first sub-question targets the inclusion of local 
governments as autonomous constitutional agents. It considers annexation law as a proxy 
for local powers, comparing the decisions of the Brazilian Supreme Court (STF) to its 
U.S. counterpart  (U.S.S.C.) in annexation cases. We conclude that the inclusion of 
municipalities in the Constitution of 1988, as of today, is not necessarily an example of 
successful design. We also find, counter-intuitively, that the USSC has been more active 
in the protection of rights than the STF. The second sub-question refers to the 
constitutional option granted to state supreme courts in creating specialized panels – and 
if differences across Brazilian state supreme courts when deciding cases of abstract 
review can be attributed to specialization. Using empirical methods, we find some 
evidence that the existence of specialized panels matters for the likelihood and rates of 
dissent as well as duration of procedures, but not for other variables. The final sub-
question addresses the constitutional mechanisms of appointing justices to the Brazilian 
Supreme Court (which was transplanted from the U.S. Constitution) and its consequences 
for the adjudication of federative conflicts. Our research focuses on the alignment 
between revealed judicial preferences when adjudicating cases and presidential 
appointments in Brazil. We find some empirical evidence that judicial preferences do 
matter, but the patterns of politicization are weaker than in other similar courts. Our 
findings are sufficient to dismiss legalist accounts as well as accounts based on the 
Roman-Germanic tradition. Federal dynamics and constitutional politics are intrinsically 
related to the three sub-sets of problems proposed and are considered in light of political 
economy factors. 
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CHAPTER ONE 
INTRODUCTION 
This thesis investigates how federalism choices adopted by the Brazilian 
Constitution of 1988 impacts judicial review. In order to address this central question, 
this work was structured in three sub-questions designed to study specific federalism 
constitutional options pertinent to all distinct levels of Brazilian federalism (federal 
union, states, and municipalities). The first sub-question targets the inclusion of local 
governments as autonomous constitutional agents. It considers annexation law as a proxy 
for local powers, comparing the decisions of the Brazilian Supreme Court to its U.S. 
counterpart in annexation cases. The second one refers to the constitutional option 
granted to state supreme courts in creating specialized panels – and if differences across 
Brazilian state supreme courts when deciding cases of abstract review can be related to 
specialization. The final inquiry addresses the constitutional mechanisms of appointing 
justices to the Brazilian Supreme Court (which was transplanted from the U.S. 
Constitution) and its consequences for the adjudication of federative conflicts. Federal 
dynamics and constitutional politics are intrinsically related to the three sub-sets of 
problems proposed. 
Two main motivations exist for studying the impact of the federalism choices 
adopted by the Constitution of 1988 to judicial review. First, there has been little research 
on the subject based on the interdisciplinary approach this thesis utilizes. Despite the 
influence of the U.S. model of federation and judicial review, the interaction between 
both are under-analyzed in Brazil. The second motivation considers that even when 
federalism and judicial review are specifically analyzed, the discussion tends to be 
limited to either topic. Even more problematic is the restriction of the debate to mere 
legalist accounts. This project departs from that tradition and concentrates in specific 
intersections motivated by the peculiar federal pact that currently exists in Brazil, with its 
hybrid system of judicial review (admitting both abstract and concrete review by state 
supreme courts as well as by the Brazilian Supreme Court). 
This thesis unites theoretical and empirical legal methods. From a methodological 
standpoint, the empirical work based on social sciences developed in the United States is 
recent and rare in the still incipient quantitative legal research in Brazil. The first four 
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chapters establish the necessary foundation for the development of our investigation. 
Each of the remaining chapters targets one of the sub-questions above referred. Chapter 
five specifically uses the comparative method to study the Brazilian reality in light of the 
U.S. federalism and decisions of the U.S.S.C. Overall, this project considers the broad 
influence of the U.S. federal system to the Brazilian one. This influence is relevant 
because the United States was the main inspiration for Brazilian federalism. The U.S. 
conception of judicial review significantly affected Brazil, where every single judicial 
organ is authorized to exercise judicial review.  
The principal interest is to answer our central question based on considerations of 
political economy and the interdisciplinary conceptions inherent to such field. It is 
commonplace to state that the paper accepts it all.1 Constitutional texts may have the 
same language and completely different interpretations. Culture, society, political 
organizations (including party systems), historical experiences, and institutions are 
relevant factors leading to such distinct understanding of what might be identical 
constitutional provisions. In this scenario, several factors (for instance: the Brazilian 
Portuguese colonization, different dictatorships, political conflicts, the influence of the 
German legal doctrines describing the neutrality of the judiciary) contribute to a culture 
of legalism. They also foster the general denial of politicization of courts.2  
Accounts based on political economy understand federalism choices in Brazil as 
being directly related to the concentration of powers in the federal union, which has been 
a distinct trait of the Brazilian experience. The democratic Constitution of 1988 tried to 
balance this scheme, but still displays a significant number of exclusive powers and 
competences attributed to the union. Those accounts, by considering political and 
economical forces, their impact on institutions, and historical experiences (such as the 
colonial administration and the transition from the military ruling), are instrumental to 
our assessment. 
                                                        
1 As affirmed, in 1848, by Ferdinand Lassalle, Qu’est-ce qu’une Constitution? (Paris: Sulliver, 1999), at 61. 
 
2 Theoretical studies emphasize the Brazilian system as an insufficiently autonomous social system or as an 
incompletely rational system. The systems’ failures, thus, have generally been attributed to “intentionally 
political misuse of institutions or to an institutional design incapable of providing the right incentives for 
people to comply with modernity’s requirement.” See: José Reinaldo de Lima Lopes and Roberto Freitas 
Filho, “Law and Society in Brazil at the Crossroads: A Review,” Annual Review of Law and Social 
Science 10 (2014): 91–103, at 96. 
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Political economy insights shed light on the uniqueness of the federal scheme 
designed by the current Constitution and their practical consequences. Among those: a 
Senate that is aligned with the President in office; state supreme courts which may 
determine, at their own discretion, if specialized panels should be created, providing 
some measure of autonomy to the state judiciary. Such accounts illuminate, in particular, 
why Brazil rejected the U.S. federal system of judicial review (concrete, in the vast 
majority of the cases) and the U.S. federalism (based on two distinct spheres of power, 
with states being very empowered). As the balance of powers shifted from the federal to 
regional and local forces during the writing of the Constitution of 1988, new 
constitutional provisions elevating local governments to federal actors (along the states 
and the federal union) were included.3 Political forces matter. At the same time, the 
Constitution extended the cases of abstract review, fostering democratic participation. 
In such context, legal doctrines cannot be used as a proxy to political affiliations 
in Brazil. The demarcation of ideology, thus, is not evident – in a significantly different 
arrangement than the existing scenario in the U.S. The legal issues debated in Brazil are 
framed differently than along party lines, because Brazilian legal doctrines are 
nonpartisan. Moreover, the fact that Brazil has a multiparty system with high 
fragmentation and a strong Presidency contributes to additional difficulties in interpreting 
regressions – in a sharp contrast with the strong U.S. bipartisan system. In addition, 
Brazilian President and Congress are politically aligned, in the overwhelming majority of 
cases.4 
The title of this project aims to define the scope of our research. It is no secret that 
judicial review and federalism are complex topics on their own, with each one easily 
being object of several dissertations, conceivably. Hence the need to limit our study to the 
interplay between federalism and judicial review, considering specific influences that one 
                                                        
3 For a recent study arguing that Presidents do not need to bargain on a case by case basis to approve 
legislation, and discussing evidence that governors cannot undermine the executive influence in Congress: 
José Antônio Cheibub, Argelina Figueiredo and Fernando Limongi, “Political Parties and Governors as 
Determinants of Legislative Behavior in Brazil’s Chamber of Deputies, 1988–2006,” Latin America 
Politics and Society 51 (2009): 1–30, at 23–25. 
 
4 Despite the multiparty system, parties are disciplined, with the President having vast approval of the bills 
proposed: Argelina Cheibub Figueiredo and Fernando Limongi, “Presidential Power, Legislative 
Organization and Party Behavior in Brazil,” Comparative Politics 32, N. 2 (2000): 151–170, at 163. 
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may have on the other. Judicial review is conceptualized broadly in this research, 
encompassing the power of the judiciary to review the constitutionality of legislative acts, 
statutes, executive decrees, and regulations, among others. This review power is 
exclusively exercised by the judicial branch. Judicial review has been traditionally 
marked by the notion of potential encroachment with the political branches. It has also 
been embedded in federalism concerns, namely, vertical division of powers.  
Chapter two addresses the federalism pact in the Brazilian constitutional order, 
concentrating in the relevant background for the main inquiries advanced in this thesis. It 
presents a historical account of Brazilian federalism, being centered on the division of 
powers between the federal union, the states, and municipalities, as implemented after the 
Constitution of 1988. It also confronts the general competences of the Senate and the 
pertinent constitutional provisions for nomination and approval of justices of the STF. 
Chapter three discusses judicial review, focusing on the case law of the Supremo 
Tribunal Federal – the STF, i.e., the Brazilian Supreme Court – after the Constitution of 
1988. It examines the general requirements for the constitutional actions that appear in 
the remaining chapters: direct action of unconstitutionality, declaratory action of 
constitutionality, and direct action of unconstitutionality by omission. Jurisdiction, 
standing, preliminary injunctions, and the composition of the docket of the STF are 
examined, considering the Court’s institutional role after the Constitution of 1988. 
Chapter four provides an overview of the main topics concerning federal judicial 
review in the United States. It refers to similar legal issues addressed in chapter three, 
such as general jurisdiction of the U.S. Supreme Court, standing and justiciability 
doctrines. It surveys the different conception of separation of powers and the 
consequences for different models of judicial review. The chapter concludes with the 
most recurrent arguments for the existence of abstract review in the United States.  
In chapter five, we venture in a comparative research about how the Brazilian 
Supreme Court and its U.S. counterpart decide annexation cases. Chapters two, three, and 
four of this thesis were instrumental in our understanding of both Supreme Courts. We 
examine the potential effects of the exclusion (or inclusion) of local governments in the 
Constitution, using annexation laws as proxy for local powers.  
  5 
Our contribution was first to map the main issues decided by the STF as well as 
by the U.S. Supreme Court with regard to annexation. In general, we searched for 
potential common topics that might have existed. In particular, we consider how each 
Supreme Court used judicial review in light of the local powers attributed to each level of 
the federation in the context of annexation laws and related lawsuits judged by each 
Supreme Court. We survey the interactions among the relevant actors: each Supreme 
Court, the regional and local legislatives, local forces, and the national legislative. The 
historical, political and institutional contexts are also examined being mindful that the 
Brazilian Constitution of 1988 belongs to the third wave of democratization.5 
Another contribution was the investigation referring to constitutional design, 
namely, if explicit provisions of powers and competences, as in the Brazilian case, were a 
successful experience. Finally, we compare how both Courts addressed the protection of 
fundamental rights – a protection that has been perceived as the core purpose of 
constitutionalism itself, and among the principal reasons of the current existence of 
constitutional review. 
Chapter six was written in light of the theoretical assumptions of chapters two and 
three. The chapter in comment addresses Brazilian judicial review at the state level, 
exploring possible variations in terms of constitutional review across those courts. We do 
note the use, at this point, of the expression constitutional review, because our research 
was centered on the abstract review exercised by the state supreme court or by a 
specialized court panel. 
Our study targets possible differences between decisions made by a 
nonspecialized court en banc or by a specialized court panel (órgão especial, i.e., special 
organ), the latter being frequent in the larger states. Importantly, the Brazilian 
Constitution of 1988 did not determine which states could have or not such specialized 
panels, granting discretion to each state supreme court to decide the best path in their own 
state. 
                                                        
5 Noting that the U.S. Constitution was a pioneer in the concept of written constitutions and related 
concerns with institutional design, and emphasizing the third wave constitutions began after 1975: Tom 
Ginsburg and Rosalind Dixon, Comparative Constitutional Law (Northampton: Edward Elgar, 2011), at 2–
3. 
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An original dataset was constructed to empirically test if there are significant 
variations in the decisions regarding abstract review across the Brazilian states. If so, our 
inquiry expands to include whether or not those variations can be attributed to the 
existence of specialized panels. The dataset comprises 630 cases of abstract review 
judged between January 1, 2006, and December 31, 2010, across twenty-five state 
supreme courts of the Brazilian federation.  
In the view of the above, the main contributions of this study for the interplay 
between judicial review and federalism are threefold. First, we studied how different state 
courts in Brazil are exercising their abstract review power, and how distinguished such 
review is in practice. Second, the Constitution of 1988 has given a considerable 
discretion to states with regard to the creation of the órgão especial. The manner in which 
this option has been exercised, and where it has been exercised, is considered in light of 
the literature on court specialization. Third, we investigate the influence of the STF – 
particularly after the Constitutional Amendment 45 of December of 2004, with provisions 
of binding effects of STF decisions – on state supreme courts. Specifically, we analyze 
the number of citations made by state supreme courts to the STF, and among other courts. 
Chapter seven was also developed considering the foundation established in 
chapters two and three, specifically. It studies the decisions of the Brazilian Supreme 
Court from 1988 to 2010 when a potential federal conflict was judged. We test the extent 
to which political variables can explain judicial behavior in the Brazilian Supreme Court 
(STF), when dealing with conflicts between the federal government (namely, the union) 
and the states. One view argues that we should expect some alignment between the 
political preferences of the justices and the success of the union primarily due to the 
appointment mechanism. The opposite view suggests that there should be no systematic 
alignment between the political preferences of the justices and the success of the union as 
a consequence of political insulation.  
In this scenario, we investigate the interaction between federalism and judicial 
review. The judicial review exercised by the Brazilian Supreme Court (STF) was 
expected to “police” the states, while controlling the union only occasionally. 
Furthermore, judicial review is, arguably, a way to reach equilibrium between state and 
federal spheres of powers. Therefore, our search was restricted to cases about potential 
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federative conflicts. We built an original dataset encompassing different types of 
constitutional actions judged between 1988 up to 2010 by the STF. Our research focuses 
fundamentally on the alignment between revealed judicial preferences when adjudicating 
cases and presidential appointments in Brazil.  
With regard to this last sub-question, this thesis offers three main contributions. 
First, we constructed a dataset that encompasses abstract and concrete actions in light of 
potential federative conflicts. Second, we found some evidence that judicial preferences 
do matter, contradicting previous findings grounded on mostly abstract review. 
Nevertheless, the patterns of politicization observed are weaker than in other similar 
courts. Third, from a theoretical standpoint, the fact that politicization was verified is an 
important contribution to the deconstruction of judges as completely impartial actors. 
This is innovative in the Brazilian legal literature, due to the dogma of judicial neutrality. 
This neutrality is based on the Roman-Germanic tradition, more specifically, in the 
Austrian-Germanic dogmatic as influenced by Kelsen. It generally contends that judges 
merely apply the law (the manifestation of the will of the people through the legislative 
branch) to a concrete case, with constitutional judges acting as negative legislators. 
Accordingly, our findings do not validate the traditional understanding of the judicial 
activity as dissociated from the political sphere.  
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CHAPTER TWO 
RELEVANT BRAZILIAN FEDERATIVE CHOICES 
I. INTRODUCTION 
 The present chapter provides an overview about the relevant constitutional 
provisions for our study about the impact of federalism choices implemented by the 
Constitution of 1988 to judicial review. Our study is based on the notion that federalism 
choices have changed during Brazilian history. Specific power dynamics exist and, from 
time to time, there is discontinuity with the previous arrangement.6 Notwithstanding this 
notion, there is and has always been a strong concentration of powers in the federal 
union.   
 The Brazilian Constitution of 1988 defines Brazil as a democratic republic 
founded on the rule of law and divided in states, municipalities and the federal district.7 It 
determines that all powers (executive, legislative, and judiciary) are independent and 
harmonic.8 The Brazilian federation is divided in twenty-seven states and the federal 
district. Brazil, as the United States, has a dual system of jurisdiction, encompassing state 
and federal courts. There are no local courts in Brazil, however, unlike in the United 
States. 
 Due to the concentration of powers and competences in the federal union, state 
and federal systems deal mainly with the same laws, which are national laws. Criminal 
law and criminal procedure law, civil law and civil procedural law, national code of 
taxes, traffic law, labor law, commercial law, maritime law, military law, immigration 
law, and energy law – among others – are all legislative monopoly of the federal union.9  
Usually, the distinction between a crime being prosecuted in federal courts or state courts 
revolves around the person or the affects involved. Along those lines, the distinction 
                                                        
6 For the importance of federalism and its impact in shaping the Brazilian political system, see, e.g.: 
Leandro Piquet Carneiro and Maria Herminia Tavares de Almeida, Shaping the Local Political Arena in 
Federalist Brazil, May 28, 2007, paper available for download at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1411486, 
last accessed September of 2011. 
 
7 Article 1 of the Constitution of 1988. 
 
8 Article 2 of the Constitution of 1988. 
 
9 Article 22 of the Constitution of 1988. 
  9 
between federal and state jurisdiction falls either on the nature of the revenue, the public 
officials or public enterprises litigating. Thus, the Brazilian Supreme Court (the STF) sits 
at the apex of pyramid that encompasses federal and state courts. Each state in the 
federation has its own state supreme court (also referred as state court of appeals). 
 This chapter addresses the constitutional provisions that were created with the 
goal of reducing inequalities among the Brazilian states. The chapter also explains the 
unbalanced representation of the states in the Senate, and the lack of such representation 
from municipalities. All of those issues are pertinent to the annexation of municipalities 
and our comparison with the U.S. constitutional design, both topics developed at chapter 
five. 
 The division of powers and the creation of the STF as a Supreme Court in Brazil 
are examined in this chapter. This study contributes to our understanding of chapter six, 
which discusses the existence of variation measures across Brazilian state supreme 
courts, focusing on whether or not those differences can be related to the existence of 
specialized panels. Accordingly, chapter six is grounded on the assumption that the 
existence of specialized panels (and the constitutional discretionary choice left to the state 
supreme court in creating such panels) is a direct consequence of the self-determination 
principle assured to the state judiciary, as a result of the federal choice that allocated 
those competences to the states.  
 The current chapter specifies the divisions of powers between the union and the 
states, providing the necessary background for the understanding of the cases litigated as 
federative conflicts. Those conflicts and how the Brazilian Supreme Court decided them, 
from 1988 to 2010, are addressed in chapter seven.  
 This chapter starts with a historical perspective of federalism in Brazil, followed 
by the federalism clause in the Constitution of 1988, which is further detailed in Part IV, 
when the competences of each of the federative spheres is addressed. Part V surveys the 
main federalism choices relevant for this thesis. 
II. HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE 
 We start with the colonial period, during which Brazil was part of the ultra-
centralized Portuguese administration. Further, we examine the loose federalist 
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arrangement that followed in the Republic and the alternation between democracy and 
dictatorships. 
 The constitutional history of Brazil has been traditionally divided in three periods: 
Colonialism (1500-1808), Imperial (1808-1889), and Republic (1889-1988). After 1988, 
we have the current phase: the Modern Republic. From 1822 until 1889, there has been 
the so-called federalist sentiment.10 Federalism was an ideal that was on the verge of 
becoming concrete during several legislative and political conflicts. Since the “capitanias 
hereditárias” – with its autonomous interests of power, their customary law and 
autonomy of the municipalities – it was possible to verify federalism ambitions.11 There 
were several federalist revolts, the most intense among them being the Revolta dos 
Farrapos, when the Piratini Republic in the South of Brazil (1835-1845) was founded.12  
 Nevertheless, those federalist ambitions have been severely punished by the 
Empire, due to its centralized power. Thus, the fall of the Empire was a result, in large 
extent, of the federalism movement that took place due to the economic development of 
the provinces that were anxious for more autonomy. The adhesion of Rui Barbosa (the 
main contributor of the Brazilian Constitution of 1891, and admirer of the American 
constitutional paradigm) was crucial to the end of Monarchy.13 
 By the end of the 1880s, the U.S. federal experience seemed to be very successful 
for a country with vast geographical dimensions like Brazil. The federalism debate was 
the center of the discussions at the time prior to the Constitution proclamation (1890-
                                                        
10 Idem, at 410. 
 
11 This was the case, despite the fact that municipalities were instrumental for collecting revenues for the 
Crown, as noted by: Raymundo Faoro, Os Donos do Poder: Formação do Patronato Político Brasileiro (São 
Paulo: Globo, 2001), at 170. 
 
12 José Afonso da Silva, Constitucionalismo Federal no Brasil nos Últimos Setenta Anos, last accessed 
February, 2011, and available online at: http://www.biblio juridical.org/ libros/ 2/648/21.pdf , at 411, cites 
the speech of one of the main leaders of this revolution: Bento Gonçalves. In his speech, he urged that it 
was time for the king to be banished from the lands of Santa Cruz, in order to allow the South to strength 
the federal relation with the Brazilian nation. Importantly, our findings in chapter six (with the State 
Supreme Court of Rio Grande do Sul being among the most cited) and the rising of the  “Direito 
Alternativo” movement can be attributed to this remarkable historical experience by people in the South. 
 
13 Rui Barbosa admitted that the Brazilian Constitution was inspired by the American federalism – 
although, in his view, the Constitution of 1891 did his own adaptations to the Brazilian reality, considering 
distinct geographic conditions, and the freedom of slaves. In this direction and for references used in this 
paragraph: Silva, Constitucionalismo federal no Brasil nos últimos setenta anos, at 411–413. 
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1891). The Brazilian Constitution of 1891 had the U.S. federalism as a model, despite the 
unclear division of competences adopted by the Brazilian Constitution – which ultimately 
led to conflicts, such as those arising out of tax powers.14  
 The federalism model then adopted benefited from and contributed to the 
existence of centers of interests in the region. The creation of those centers was a legacy 
of the “capitanias hereditárias” and was maintained for centuries by the governors of the 
provinces. These provinces were powerful, but not enough to achieve a total separation as 
in the Spanish America.15 Therefore, the strength of the central power – particularly the 
way it was exercised by the Moderator branch, i.e., the Emperor16 – enabled to foster a 
national unity in Brazil in contrast to the fragmentation that occurred in the non-
Portuguese colonization in South America.  
 With regard to colonization, a digression should be made. In 1807, Napoleon 
declared that he would invade Portugal. The Portuguese Emperor and several members of 
the Portuguese elite moved to Brazil. In this context, Brazil was raised to Imperial status 
– no longer being an ordinary colony.17 By 1808, the monarch, D. João VI, the royal 
family, and the bureaucracy – including members of the Portuguese Judiciary – were 
already in Rio de Janeiro, which became the new capital of the Brazilian-Portuguese 
Empire.18 Had D. João VI decided to stay in Portugal, the Brazilian territory would be 
doomed to a similar fate of the Spanish colonies, where monarchs were in exile and the 
                                                        
14 Celso Antônio Bandeira de Mello, Curso de Direito Administrativo (São Paulo:  Malheiros, 2009), at 
1017, where the author informs that article second of the Constitution of 1891 stated that the new Republic 
shall be called United States of Brazil; that its third article authorized each state to promulgate its own 
Constitution; and, finally, that its article 67 guaranteed the autonomy of municipalities in everything that 
touched the peculiar local interest. A clarifying note: municipalities were not entitled to autonomy, back 
then.  
 
15 Silva, Constitucionalismo federal no Brasil nos últimos setenta anos, at 414. 
 
16 Charles D. Cole, Comparative Constitutional Law: Brazil and the United States (Florida: Vandeplas, 
2008), at 28. 
 
17 Although D. João VI and the royal family only arrived in Rio de Janeiro in 1808: José Luís Cardoso, The 
Transfer of the Court to Brazil, 200 years afterwards, at 7, last accessed November, 2011, and available 
online at: http://www.brown.edu/Departments/Portuguese_Brazilian_Studies/ejph/html/issue13/pdf/ 
jcardoso.pdf 
 
18 Idem, at 8. 
 
  12 
Imperial organization collapsed with the division of the territories of the former Spanish 
colonies in several countries.19  
 The centralization in the Brazilian-Portuguese Empire also led to differences 
among several provinces. On the one hand, Rio de Janeiro became much more developed, 
hosting the elite of all bureaucrats. On the other hand, other provinces were suffering 
with severe taxation to support the Court that has moved to Brazil, reducing the local 
power of the remaining provinces.20 Hence, the existence of a strong central power, first, 
because Brazil was the capital of the Portuguese Empire; and then, with the moderator 
power of the Imperial Constitution of 1824, were significant factors contributing towards 
the solid formation of a centralized and strong federal union.  
 The Brazilian Constitution of February 24, 1891 inaugurated the Republic and 
consolidated the federalist system proclaimed under the Executive Order (Decree) 
Number 1, from November 15, 1889.21  It had as paradigm the U.S. federalism, 
introducing the federalism clause that would be constantly contained in the future 
Brazilian Constitutions.22  
 With the Brazilian proclamation of the Republic (and its approach to federalism), 
there was a need for a new balance of powers that avoided the mistakes experienced in 
previous years. In practice, that appropriate balance lied on the union and on the “politics 
of governors” (“política dos governadores,” a manner of state politics). This “politics” 
was led by the states of Minas Gerais and São Paulo, both defending the autonomy of the 
other states, although allowing the use of federal intervention in states based on article 6 
                                                        
19 José Murillo de Carvalho, “D. João VI e as histórias dos Brasis,” Revista Brasileira de História 28, N. 56 
(2008): 551–572, at 555–557. 
 
20 Noting that, for some authors, there is little to celebrate about D. João VI: Idem, at 557–558. 
 
21 For constitutional history: Silva, Constitucionalismo Federal no Brasil nos Últimos Setenta Anos, at 408. 
 
22 The Constitution of 1891 named the new Republic as the United States of Brazil. For criticism toward 
the process that incorporated the federalism, among others: Luís Roberto Barroso, O Direito Constitucional 
e a efetividade de suas normas: Limites e possibilidades da Constituição Brasileira (Rio de Janeiro: 
Renovar, 2003), at 15. When commenting the federalism model adopted by the Constitution of 1891, 
Professor Barroso concludes that it ignored the previous Brazilian experience of centralization. For a 
discussion of how the regional oligarchies were able to control national elections in 1891 and until 1985: 
James Holston, Insurgent Citizenship: Disjunction of Democracy and Modernity in Brazil (New Jersey: 
Princeton University Press, 2008), at 102–103. 
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of the Constitution of 1891.23 In reality, such arrangement was a deterioration of 
federalism because Minas Gerais and São Paulo altered in power protecting solely their 
own interests.24 
 A common classification of the Brazilian federalism experience understands it as 
being centrifugal (from the centralized unity of the Portuguese crown to the “capitanias 
hereditárias,” then provinces, which later became the states, in a “top-down” movement). 
In the United States, however, the federation departed from the states toward the federal 
union.25  
 The founding states were already organized,26 with the central union being created 
as a government with “limited power, in a scheme where residual and police powers were 
reserved to the states.”27  In Brazil, member states still had to be created, departing from 
the provinces. Hence, the U.S. federalism occurred as a centripetal movement – from the 
borders to the center; whereas the Brazilian experience resulted from a centrifugal 
movement. Regardless of the inception of the federation (if centrifugal or centripetal), the 
federal government that is formed is a constitutional one, because it originated from a 
constitutional pact.28 
                                                        
23 Silva, Constitucionalismo Federal no Brasil nos Últimos Setenta Anos, at 409. 
 
24 For an analysis of the Old Republic and its conflicts: Faoro, Os Donos do Poder: Formação do Patronato 
Político Brasileiro, at 627–649. 
 
25 The power of the states was clear even before 1774, which is to say: even before the movements toward 
the Independence from Great Britain became more intense. During the First Continental Congress, when 
fifty-five delegates representing all the states except Georgia wrote “the Declaration and Resolves of 
October 14, 1774,” stating that Parliament has the power to regulate the foreign affairs of the colonies, “but 
nevertheless set forth the essential American constitutional position,” as stated in Kermit L. Hall, Paul 
Finkelman, James W. Elly, Jr., American Legal History (New York: Oxford University Press, 2005), at 86–
87. 
 
26 The Articles of Confederation (1781), known as the first American national constitution, was a “hybrid 
document (…) clearly establishing a federalism more than a nation, (…) clearly being more a league 
organized for defense than a true nation-state.” The Articles gave each state a vote in the Senate, which was 
a major problem for the interests of the bigger states. The Constitution of 1787 tried to solve this problem 
with the provision of the three-fifths compromise about the slaves’ population, as the debates on the 
Philadelphia Convention (1787) shows: Hall, Finkelman and Elly, Jr., American Legal History, at 108–115. 
 
27 Cole, Comparative Constitutional Law: Brazil and the United States, at 182. 
 
28 Noting that even in the United States, the federation was created by the people: Cristiano Franco Martins, 
Princípio Federativo e Mudança Constitucional: Limites e Possibilidades da Constituição Brasileira de 
1988 (Rio de Janeiro: Lumen Juris, 2003), at 61–62. 
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 Brazilian constitutional pacts have been marked by different degrees of federalism 
after the Republic. The Constitution of 1891 experienced federalism based on states 
power. The Constitutions of 1934 and 1946 had federalism based on cooperation,29 and 
nominal federalism, as under the Constitutions of 1937, 1967 and its Amendment 1, of 
1969.30  
 Such nominal federalism is a reference to the ultra-centralized administration in 
the federal Union during the military dictatorship that started in 1964 and lasted – in our 
view – until the Constitution of 1988.31   
 The first directly elected President – Fernando Collor de Mello, in 1989 – 
assumed the presidency after more than two decades of military ruling. It is worth 
mentioning that Tancredo Neves (1985) and José Sarney (from 1985 until 1990) were 
indirectly elected President and Vice-President, respectively, and despite not being 
considered military members, both belong to a transition phase from the military ruling to 
the Republican Constitution of 1988.32 
III. FEDERALISM CLAUSE IN THE  CONSTITUTION OF 1988 
 The Constitution of 198833  adopts the republican form of government, the 
presidentialism as a system of government, and the federation as a form for organizing 
                                                        
29 The Senate was a “mere collaborating organ,” as remarked by Cole, Comparative Constitutional Law: 
Brazil and the United States, at 29. 
 
30 Silva, Constitucionalismo federal no Brasil nos últimos setenta anos, at 410, contends  that the 
Constitution of 1937 established a federalism of cooperation. The doctrine, however, splits about the 
classification of the federalism of the Constitution of 1937 (imposed during the presidency of Getúlio 
Vargas and also known as “Polish Constitution”). For other constitutionalists it may also be classified as a 
nominal federalism, such as the Constitutions of 1967 and 1969. The latter trend, in our view, is the most 
appropriate, given the fact that the Constitution of 1937 had powers deeply concentrated in the President, as 
pointed out by: Cole, Comparative Constitutional Law: Brazil and the United States, at 30. 
 
31 Different dates have been generally pointed to the end of military ruling. The indirect election of 
Tancredo Neves in 1985 is one of them. Nevertheless, this work considers the Constitution of 1988 as the 
actual ending of the military ruling, because for the first time since 1967 a constitution was not imposed by 
a military coup, but enacted with popular participation. 
 
32 Despite not being sworn in, Tancredo is deemed as President for legal effects. His Vice-President was 
José Sarney, who became President after Tancredo’s death. Information available at the official website of 
the Brazilian Presidency, last accessed September, 2011: http://www.biblioteca.presidencia.gov.br/ex-
presidentes/jose-sarney 
 
33 We relied on the English translation of the Brazilian Constitution in the instances that we thought that 
having the actual text of the Constitution of 1988 would contribute to our work. We implemented the 
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the state.34 The Federative Republic of Brazil35 is the sovereign entity in the international 
level, whereas the federal union, the states, the federal district, and the municipalities are 
autonomous among themselves in the domestic scenario.  
 Federalism refers to the projection of powers inside the territorial sphere, 
considering as criteria: the existence, the intensity, and the contents of political and 
administrative decentralizations of each member.36 Along those lines, there is a triple 
order for structuring the government in Brazil: the federal order (central), the states order 
(regional), and the municipalities order (local). Interestingly, the Constitution of 1988 
created a second degree of federalism because municipalities have to obey the national 
degree, the Republic Constitution, as well as the Constitution of the states.37 
 The principle of indissolubility of the federative pact has been presented in the 
totality of the republican constitutions of Brazil.38 It has a dual role: it confers the 
national unity and it accommodates the necessary decentralization. According to this 
essential principle, the secession of member states, federal district, and municipalities 
                                                                                                                                                                     
necessary corrections, and the basic text used is available at: http://www.v-brazil.com/government/laws/ 
titleIII.html, last accessed: April, 2012. 
 
34 Constitution of 1988, article 18: The political and administrative organization of the Federative Republic 
of Brazil comprises the Union, the States, the Federal District and the Municipalities, all of them 
autonomous, as this Constitution provides: Paragraph one: Brasília is the federal capital. Paragraph two: 
The federal territories are part of the Union and their establishment, transformation into States or 
reintegration into the State of origin shall be regulated by a supplementary law. Paragraph three: The States 
may merge into each other, subdivide or dismember to be annexed to others or to form new states or federal 
territories, subject to the approval of the population directly concerned, by means of a plebiscite, and of the 
National Congress, by means of a supplementary law. Paragraph four: The establishment, merger, fusion 
and dismemberment of municipalities shall be effected through state law, within the period set forth by 
complementary federal law, and shall depend on prior consultation, by means of a plebiscite, of the 
population of the municipalities concerned, after the publication of Municipal Feasibility Studies, presented 
and published as set forth by law. 
 
35 Constitution of 1988, article first:  The Federative Republic of Brazil, formed by the indissoluble union 
of the states and municipalities and of the Federal District, is a legal democratic state and is founded on: I - 
sovereignty; II – citizenship; III - the dignity of the human person; IV - the social values of labor and of the 
free enterprise; V - political pluralism.  Sole paragraph: All power emanates from the people, who exercise 
it by means of elected representatives or directly, as provided by this Constitution. 
 
36 Manoel Gonçalves Ferreira Filho, Curso de Direito Constitucional (São Paulo: Saraiva, 1999), at 57, for 
instance. 
 
37  The formulation of those distinguished degrees is referred by Ferreira Filho, Curso de Direito 
Constitucional, at 60. 
 
38 Idem, at 58. 
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from the federal union is impermissible, and the mere attempt of a given state to pursuit a 
separation from the Union is included among the very limited hypotheses of federal 
intervention.39 
  The federal district first appeared in the Republican Constitution of 1891.40 The 
Constitution of 1988 determined that Brasília is the capital, that the Federal District is the 
federative member where the capital is situated, and that it cannot be divided into 
municipalities. 41  The political and administrative organization of the states is not 
absolute.42 The Brazilian Constitution determines that states may be modified through 
incorporation, subdivision, or dismemberment, if three requirements are met. Those 
requirements are the approval by the National Congress of the new organization through 
Complementary Law,43 the previously acquiescence of the direct involved population of 
the states, and the agreement (mere opinion) to the new organizational structure by each 
of the legislative assembly of the involved states.44 
 
 
                                                        
39 Constitution of 1988, article 34: The Union shall not intervene in the States or in the Federal District, 
except: I - to maintain national integrity. 
 
40 Alexandre de Moraes, Direito Constitucional (São Paulo:  Atlas, 2012), at 273, stresses that the 
constitutional text expressly determined the particular area of fourteen thousand and four hundred square 
kilometers to be delimitated as the federal capital. 
 
41 Article 32, caput, of the Constitution of 1988 states: The Federal District, which may not be divided into 
municipalities, shall be governed by an organic law, voted in two readings, with a minimum interval of ten 
days, and approved by two-thirds of the Legislative Chamber, which shall enact it, in accordance with this 
Constitution. 
 
42 Moraes, Direito Constitucional, at 292. 
 
43 Article 18 of the Constitution of 1988 determines: The political and administrative organization of the 
Federative Republic of Brazil comprises the Union, the States, the Federal District and the Municipalities, 
all of them autonomous, as this Constitution provides: (...) Paragraph three: The States may merge into 
each other, subdivide or dismember to be annexed to others or to form new states or federal territories, 
subject to the approval of the population directly concerned, by means of a plebiscite, and of the National 
Congress, by means of a Complementary Law. 
 
44 Article 48 of the Constitution of 1988 affirms: The National Congress shall have the power, with the 
sanction of the President of the Republic (...) to provide for all the matters within the competence of the 
Union and especially on: (...) VI- incorporation, subdivision or dismemberment of areas of territories or 
states, after consulting with the respective State Legislative Assembly. 
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IV. FEDERALISM IN THE CONSTITUTION OF 1988:  UNION, STATES, AND 
MUNICIPALITIES 
 At this stage, we turn our attention to the division of competences between the 
federal union, states, and municipalities as developed by the Constitution of 1988. 
Starting with the material, i.e., non-legislative competences of the federal union, the 
Constitution determines that exclusive competences cannot be delegated.45 The non-
legislative competences that can be delegated are named common competences and may 
be exercised by states and municipalities in cooperation with all the three levels as 
determined by Complementary Law.46 If the cooperation process is not successful, the 
preponderance criteria shall determine who is authorized to act. Despite the absence of 
hierarchy among municipalities, states, and the union, it is worth noting that the 
Constitution of 1988 located municipalities at the same level of the states, not as inferior. 
Notwithstanding this arrangement, the Constitution also determined that the 
municipalities shall obey the state Constitution.47  
                                                        
45 The exclusive non-legislative competences of the Union are found in article 21 of the Constitution, that 
states: The Union shall have the power to: I - maintain relations with foreign states and participate in 
international organizations; II - declare war and make peace; III - ensure national defense; IV - allow 
foreign forces, in the cases provided for in a complementary law, to pass through the national territory or to 
remain therein temporarily; V - declare a state of siege, a state of defense and federal intervention; VI - 
authorize and control the production and trade of military material; VII - issue currency; VIII - manage the 
foreign exchange reserves of the country and control financial operations, especially those of credit, 
exchange and capitalization, as well as insurance and private security; IX -prepare and implement national 
and regional plans for the ordaining of the territory and for economic and social development; X-maintain 
the postal service, (...). 
 
46 The common non-legislative competences of the Union are found at article 23 of the Constitution: The 
Union, the States, the Federal District and the municipalities, in common, have the power: I - to ensure that 
the Constitution, the laws and the democratic institutions are respected and that public property is 
preserved; II - to provide for health and public assistance, for the protection and safeguard of handicapped 
persons; III - to protect the documents, works and other assets of historical, artistic or cultural value, the 
monuments, the remarkable landscapes and the archaeological sites; IV - to prevent works of art and other 
assets of historical, artistic and cultural value from being taken out of the country, destroyed or from being 
deprived of their original characteristics; V - to provide the means of access to culture, education and 
science; VI - to protect the environment and to fight pollution in any of its forms; VII - to preserve the 
forests, fauna and flora; (...) X - to fight the causes of poverty and the factors leading to substandard living 
conditions, promoting the social integration of the unprivileged sectors of the population; etc. Sole 
paragraph: Complementary Law shall establish rules for the cooperation among the Union and the States, 
the Federal District and the municipalities aiming the achievement of balanced development and well-being 
on a nationwide scope. 
 
47  Franco Martins, Princípio Federativo e Mudança Constitucional: Limites e Possibilidades da 
Constituição Brasileira de 1988, at 151. Arguing that they have different and autonomous spheres, and 
stating that member states have to respect the powers and competences established in the federative pact: 
  18 
 Considering the non-legislative competences of the municipalities, besides the 
common competences, municipalities have privative competences to tax in the specific 
cases authorized by the Constitution and to provide public services of local interest.48 
Regarding the non-legislative competences of the member states, they may exercise the 
common competences as well as the residual competences.49 The residual competences of 
the states are the administrative competences that are not prohibited and the remaining 
residual competences that does not belong to the union nor to the municipalities, and that 
are not common competences. 
 We briefly turn our focus to the legislative competences. Among the legislative 
competences of the Union  – i.e., authorizing the union to promulgate laws – there are the 
so-called privative competences.50  
                                                                                                                                                                     
Cláudio Pereira de Souza Neto and Daniel Sarmento, Direito Constitucional: Teoria, História e Métodos de 
Trabalho (Rio de Janeiro: Forum, 2013), at 337. 
 
48 The privative non-legislative competences of the municipalities are found at article 30, III to IX of the 
Constitution. For a more detailed discussion about the competences and their modalities: Moraes, Direito 
Constitucional, at 315–333. 
 
49 The non-legislative (material or administrative) competences of the states are located at article 25, 
paragraph one:  of the Constitution: Article 25: The States are organized and governed by the Constitutions 
and laws they may adopt, in accordance with the principles of this Constitution. Paragraph one: All powers 
that this Constitution does not prohibit the States from exercising shall be conferred upon them. 
 
50 Article 22 of the Constitution: The Union has the exclusive power to legislate on: I - civil, commercial, 
criminal, procedural, electoral, agrarian, maritime, aeronautical, space and labor law; II - expropriation; III 
- civil and military requisitioning, in case of imminent danger or in times of war; IV - waters, energy, 
informatics, telecommunications and radio broadcasting; V- the postal service; VI - the monetary and 
measures systems, metal certificates and guarantees; VII - policies for credit, foreign exchange, insurance 
and transfer of values; VIII - foreign and interstate trade; IX - guidelines for the national transportation 
policy; X - the regime of the ports and lake, river, ocean, air and aerospace navigation; XI - traffic and 
transportation; XII -mines, other mineral resources and metallurgy; XIII- nationality, citizenship and 
naturalization; XIV - Indian populations; XV - emigration, immigration, entry, extradition and expulsion of 
foreigners; XVI - the organization of the national employment system and conditions for the practice of 
professions; XVII - the judicial organization of the Public Prosecution and of the Public Legal Defense of 
the Federal District and of the territories, as well as their administrative organization; (...) XX-consortium 
and lottery systems; (…) XXIV-directives and basis of public education; XXV- public registers; XXVI -
nuclear activities of any nature; XXVII - general rules for all types of bidding and contracting, with 
observance of the art. 37, XXI, in the case of the direct public administration, autarchies and foundations of 
the Union, States, Federal District and municipalities, and of the art. 173, paragraph 1, III, in the case of 
public companies and public corporations; XXVIII - territorial defense, aerospace defense, maritime 
defense, civil defense, and national mobilization; XXIX- commercial advertising. Sole paragraph: 
Complementary Law may authorize the States to legislate upon specific questions that are related to the 
matters listed in this article. 
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 The legislative competences of the union may also be concurrent, which is to say 
that they are simultaneously exercised with the states and federal district, but the union 
shall limited its power to edit general rules. It is worth noticing that in the absence of 
general rules edited by the union, states, and federal district shall be able to enact laws in 
their full competence.51 However, this legislation shall loose effect as soon as the union 
legislates about the matter. Additionally, articles 153 and 154 deal with the cases of tax 
competences that are exclusive of the union. For our purposes, we should note that the 
residual competence to create taxes that are not established in the Constitution belongs to 
the federal union, and not to the states. 
 In this scenario, the legislative competences of the states can be express (with its 
self-organization and state constitutions), residual, or reserved.52 It may also be delegated 
from the union, as discussed above, requiring Complementary Law.53 The legislative 
competences of the states are also concurrent, when the union legislates about general 
laws, and the states, at the same, enact specific norms. 54  The state’s legislative 
competence may be also supplementary, if the union has not yet edited the general rules, 
or even if the union enacted those general rules, states are authorized to legislate 
regarding the precise discipline of the topic whose general rules were set by the union. 
                                                        
51 Article 24 of the Constitution proclaims that: The Union, the States and the Federal District have the 
power to legislate concurrently on: I - tax, financial, penitentiary, economic and urbanistic law; II - budget; 
(…) XV - protection of childhood and youth; XVI – organization, guarantees, rights and duties of the civil 
policies. Paragraph one: Within the scope of concurrent legislation, the competence of the Union shall be 
limited to the establishment of general rules. Paragraph two: The competence of the Union to legislate upon 
general rules does not exclude the supplementary competence of the States. Paragraph three:  If there is no 
federal law or general rules, the States shall exercise full legislative competence to provide for their 
peculiarities. Paragraph four: The supervenience of a federal law over general rules suspends the 
effectiveness of a state law to the extent that the two are contrary to each other. 
 
52 Express competences are located in article 25 and the residual competences are located at its paragraph 
first. Please note that those are the same of the states non-legislative competences that we have already 
stated in our footnote supra. 
 
53 According to article 22 of the Constitution, as cited in footnote 50, supra. This delegation is extremely 
rare. 
 
54 This is quite complex and the distinction of general and specific rules is made on a case by case basis by 
the Court. This discussion resembles the American constitutional law discussion about preemption. 
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 The federal district has hybrid competences of states and municipalities. In 
contrast with states and territories, the Federal District is not authorized to be divided in 
municipalities, due to express constitutional prohibition.55 
 The legislative competences of the municipalities can be express,56 with their self-
organization capacity57 based on the local interest,58 or supplementary.59 We also should 
note that the local interest is not a clear guideline, due to the abstract nature intrinsic to 
this concept.60 
 Finally, it is worth stressing the broad scope of powers concentrated in the federal 
union, including its legislative and non-legislative competences. The current Constitution 
was quite generous with the municipalities. Competences of the states, however, face 
substantial challenges, and states tend to struggle with the federal union and 
municipalities. 61 In addition, a distinction between the United States and Brazil is the 
fact that the presidency in Brazil has a vast scope of powers as compared to the United 
                                                        
55 Article 32: The Federal District, which may not be divided into municipalities, shall be governed by an 
organic law (...) Paragraph one: The legislative powers reserved to the States and municipalities are 
attributed to the Federal District. 
 
56 Article 29: Municipalities shall be governed by organic law, voted in two readings, with a minimum 
interval of ten days between the readings, and approved by two-thirds of the members of the Municipal 
Chamber, which shall promulgate it, observing the principles established in this Constitution, in the 
Constitution of the respective state and the following precepts: election of the Mayor, etc. 
 
57 The self-organization and the related competence of enacting its own law are direct consequences of the 
municipality being listed as federal actor: Souza Neto and Sarmento, Direito Constitucional: Teoria, 
História e Métodos de Trabalho, at 337. 
 
58 Article 30, I, of the Constitution: The municipalities have the power to: I - legislate upon matters of local 
interest. 
 
59 Under the combination of constitutional article 24, already cited supra, with the constitutional article: 30, 
II: The municipalities have the power to: (…) II - supplement federal and state legislations where pertinent. 
 
60 Criticizing the broad aspect of “local interest”: Franco Martins, Princípio Federativo e Mudança 
Constitucional: Limites e Possibilidades da Constituição Brasileira de 1988, at 152. 
 
61 This struggle is a complex one, particularly in tax matters, as occurs, for instance, when a given state 
disputes the taxable event that might be considered as service – which is relevant for ICMS purposes. 
Another example refers to the division of the income levied by the state that must be shared with its 
municipalities, as determined by the content of article 158, III and IV, establishing fifty and twenty five 
percent, respectively, of transfers of the total amount levied by particular state taxes to its municipalities. 
Article 159, paragraph three:  also determines the transfer of the amount levied by the union to the states, 
whose mandatory transfers to the municipality must also be of twenty five percent. 
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States. 62  The Brazilian presidency, thus, encompasses a broad scope of legislative 
powers,63 including decree powers.64  
 
 V. FEDERALISM CHOICES UNDER THE CONSTITUTION OF 1988  
 
A. General Disparities and the Senate 
 
 Brazilian federalism is marked by social and economic distinctions among the 
states. Those lead to an unbalanced federation, with states located at the Southeast and 
South regions contributing more significantly to the gross domestic product (GDP), while 
states located at the remaining regions – particularly, the North – contributing the least.65  
 The current Constitution mentions the reduction of inequalities among regions and 
the national development among the fundamental goals of Brazilian Republic.66 The 
reduction of economic and social disparities among the national regions of the country, in 
                                                        
62 Although the extremely limited legislative powers of the American Presidency are the exception, not the 
rule worldwide: José Antônio Cheibub, Presidentialism, Parlamentarism and Democracy (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2007), at 100–124. 
 
63 For an analysis of the presidency in Latin America taking in to account the American influence and 
concluding that that presidency tends to be different from the original model based on a empirical study: 
José Antônio Cheibub, Zachary Elkins, Tom Ginsburg, “Latin American Presidentialism in Comparative 
and Historical Perspective,” Texas Law Review 89, N. 7 (2011): 1707–1740. The Professors analyze 
particular features of the Executive lawmaking power in Latin American presidencies, such as: emergency 
powers; decree powers; Constitutional Amendment, and initiation of legislation: at 1722–1728, 
specifically.  
 
64 Here, we can also broadly include the so-called “provisory measures” of Article 62, caput, of the 
Brazilian Constitution of 1988, determining that: “In important and urgent cases, the President of the 
Republic may adopt provisory measures with the force of law and shall submit them to the National 
Congress immediately.” For a study encompassing such provisional decrees between 1989 and 1997 and 
concluding that only three percent were rejected – with these rejections having occurred during the 
government of Sarney and Collor: Argelina Cheibub Figueiredo and Fernando Limongi, “Presidential 
Power, Legislative Organization and Party Behavior in Brazil,” Comparative Politics 32, No. 2 (2000): 
151–170, at 155. 
 
65 For general information about each federative state, reference is made to the website of the Brazilian 
Institute for Geographic and Statistics: IBGE, last accessed: November, 2013, and available online at: 
http://www.ibge.gov.br/home/ 
 
66 Article 3 of the Brazilian Constitution of 1988 determines that: The fundamental objectives of the 
Federative Republic of Brazil are: (...) II -to guarantee national development; III - to eradicate poverty and 
substandard living conditions and to reduce social and regional inequalities. 
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conjunction with the general determinations for the economic order,67 embraces the 
constitutional duty to build a more balanced and equal federation.68 In light of this duty, 
the Senate participation in acting jointly with the Presidency and the House of 
Representatives in order to achieve the appropriate policies was expected to be more 
effective. 
 Traditionally, the representation of states in the Senate has not been disputed 
because, as the argument goes, the Senate represents the states, with the House of 
Representatives – whose members are elected proportionally69 – representing the people. 
In fact, the bicameralism of the federal legislature is a consequence of the federation,70 
having the Senate as the representative of the member states and Federal District (hence, 
the equilibrium and the same number of Senators71 representing each state and the 
Federal District).72 It is worth noting that the paradigm for Brazil, which was the U.S. 
                                                        
67 Article 170 of the Brazilian Constitution of 1988 affirms that: The economical order (…) shall observe 
the following principles: (…) VII- reduction of social and regional inequalities. 
 
68 Technically, the principle of reduction of regional inequalities is also the founding principle of the 
economical order, as mentioned in article 170 of the Constitution. Therefore, it demands that public 
policies are target toward this goal of a more equal society. In this direction: Eros Roberto Grau, A Ordem 
Econômica na Constituição de 1988 (São Paulo: Malheiros, 2004), at 208–209. 
 
69 The Constitution did not adopt the pure proportionality principle in the House of Representatives, since 
territories are entitled to a fixed number of four representatives – regardless of its population. Article 45 
determines that: The House of Representatives is composed of representatives of the people, elected, by the 
proportional system, in each state, territory and in the Federal District. Paragraph one:  The total number of 
representatives, as well as the representation of the States and of the Federal District shall be established by 
a supplementary law, in proportion to the population, and the necessary adjustments shall be made in the 
year preceding the elections, so that none of those units of the Federation has less than eight or more than 
seventy Deputies. Paragraph second: Each territory shall elect four representatives. 
 
70 Moraes, Direito Constitucional, at 420.  
 
71 The composition of the Senate, having a total of eighty one members elected by majoritarian system, is 
determined in article 46 of the Republican Constitution:  The Federal Senate is composed of representatives 
of the states and of the Federal District, elected by a majority vote. Paragraph one: Each state and the 
Federal District shall elect three Senators for a term of office of eight years. Paragraph two: One-third and 
two-thirds of the representation of each state and of the Federal District shall be renewed every four years, 
alternately. Paragraph three: Each Senator shall be elected with two substitutes. 
 
72 This is not the case in comparative experience. The federal system of Germany, for instance, considers 
the representation of each state in their Senate (Bundesrat) according to the state’s size of population. 
According to article 51, paragraph two, of the Basic Law, each Land has at least three votes; Länder with 
more than six million inhabitants five, and Länder with more than seven million inhabitants six votes. For 
this updated information in English, see, among other sources, the official website of the Bundesrat: 
http://www.bundesrat.de/cln_320/nn_11596/EN/organisation-en/stimmenverteilung-en/stimmenverteilung-
en-node.html?__nnn=true 
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Constitution,73 also determines that each state should have the same number of Senators 
in the Senate.74  
 Notwithstanding this traditional understanding, we emphasize that federalism75 
would admit a different scheme of representation because it shall not be mandatory that 
all the states have the same number of representative members in the Senate, in our 
view.76 This is so, to the extent that the political interests in the Brazilian Senate became 
galvanized77 by political parties.78  
                                                        
73 According to article One, Section Five of the Constitution of the United States. 
 
74 It has been remarked that also in the United States there is disparity with regard to the number of 
constituencies per each Senator: e.g., Robert C. Cooter, The Strategic Constitution (New Jersey: Princeton 
University Press, 2002), at 175. Illustrating his view, the Professor states that California, with much more 
than thirty million inhabitants, has the same number of senators as North Dakota, that has fewer than one 
million or so. Agreeing with this criticism, emphasizing the overrepresentation in the United States Senate 
by less populous states, such as Wyoming, noting that such overrepresentation violates the democratic 
principle of “one-person one vote,” and citing the Germany and Indian models as more attractive than the 
American one: Arend Lijphart, “Constitutional Design for Divided Societies,” Journal of Democracy 15 
(2004): 96–109, at 105. Addressing that equal representation in the Senate among the undemocratic 
features of the American Constitution – along with slavery, for example:  Robert Dahl, How Democratic is 
the American Constitution? (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2001), at 17–18. Agreeing with all the 
criticism above and adding that small states as North Dakota, South Dakota, Vermont, Delaware, Alaska, 
Montana and Wyoming have one Senator more than their number in the House: Sanford Levinson, Our 
Undemocratic Constitution (New York: Oxford University Press, 2006) at 6, 29, and 50, respectively. 
 
75 Germany is a federation and it does not have the same number of state representatives across the nation – 
despite being a much more uniform nation than Brazil today. This is the case, albeit the former division of 
the German territory. 
 
76 In this direction and stressing that the Brazilian Constitution of 1891 did not have the same number of 
representatives in the Senate per state: Direito Constitucional: Teoria, História e Métodos de Trabalho, at 
302. 
 
77 Pointing out that political parties have captured political interests: Gilmar Ferreira Mendes and Paulo 
Gustavo Gonet Branco, Curso de Direito Constitucional (São Paulo: Saraiva, 2013), at 783. 
78 The constitutional regime of political parties are located at article 17 of the Republican Constitution: The 
creation, merger and extinction of political parties is free, with due regard for national sovereignty, the 
democratic regime, the plurality of political parties, the fundamental rights of the individual, and must be 
observant of the following precepts: I - national character; II - prohibition from receiving financial 
assistance from a foreign entity or government or from subordination to that foreign government; III - 
rendering of accounts to the Electoral Courts; IV - operation in the National Congress in accordance with 
the law. Paragraph one: Political parties are ensured of autonomy to define their internal structure, 
organization and operation, and to adopt the criteria of selection and regime of their electoral coalitions, 
without obligation of repetition between the candidacies in national, State, Federal District or municipal 
levels, and their by-laws shall establish rules of party loyalty and discipline. Paragraph two. After acquiring 
corporate legal status under civil law, political parties shall register their by-laws at the Superior Electoral 
Court. Paragraph three: Political parties are entitled to monies from the party fund and to free-of-charge 
access to radio and television, as established by law. Paragraph four: Political parties are forbidden to use 
paramilitary organizations.  
  24 
 Because these political parties are national,79 the argument of equal representation 
in the Senate loses its main justification.  
 In practice, the Brazilian Senate does little to represent the interests of the states 
working as second Chamber of popular representation.80 Senators are elected based on 
political parties,81 exactly as the House of Representatives (Chamber), and a candidate to 
the Senate can be against the governor of a state – with this opposition being quite 
common in the Brazilian reality.82 In this scenario, a senator can approve a law that is not 
necessarily coincident with the interest of the Governor of his or her State. The general 
assumption that both governors and senators ought to be jointly protecting state interests 
simply leads to more questions. If the Governor chooses to challenge the federal law in 
courts,83 the judiciary has to decide the dispute in light of the current constitutional pact. 
 Despite the fact that the Constitution of 1988 considers municipalities, the union, 
and states as federal actors, only the states are represented at the senate. Accordingly, 
there has been authorized legal doctrine arguing that municipalities should also be 
represented in the Senate.84 In this scenario, although the Constitution of 1988 granted 
significant strength to states and municipalities under the federal principle, it lacks the 
decentralization that is necessary to achieve balance in a federation that is so unequal. 
                                                        
79 The Republican Constitution determines that political parties must be of national character, being 
concerned with the country, and not with particular social segments. Along those lines, representation of 
political parties that did not match a minimum threshold of votes shall not be denied. With this scheme, the 
minorities can indicate their own candidates to the highest offices, including the Presidency. 
 
80  Uadi Lammêgo Bulos, Curso de Direito Constitucional (São Paulo: Saraiva, 2012), at 1084. 
 
81 Note that it is not argued here that presidentialism reduces party discipline, since such understanding did 
not survive empirical testing: Cheibub, Presidentialism, Parlamentarism and Democracy, at 118–125, in 
particular. 
 
82 Lammêgo Bulos, Curso de Direito Constitucional, at 1084. 
 
83 This may be done, for instance, through a Direct Action of Unconstitutionality (Adin), if the Governor 
opts for the abstract review in the federal level. 
 
84 Deyse Filgueiras Batista, Juliana Cristina dos Reis Freire and Thiago Vieira Mathias de Oliveira, “Pacto 
Federativo Brasileiro e Autonomia Municipal: Análise da Representação dos Municípios Diante da 
Atuação do Senado Federal,” in Desafios da Constituição: Democracia e Estado no Século XXI, ed. Flavia 
Martins de Carvalho and José Ribas Vieira (Rio de Janeiro: Faperj, 2011), at 327–329. 
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 The representation in the Senate is relevant, due to several reasons related to the 
specific powers exercised by this upper house.85 Among the main powers exercised by 
the Senate and that are directly related to this thesis: approval of the justices of the STF; 
determination of the general debt ceiling of the union, member states, and municipalities 
(including authorizing the increase of that debt or not), in accordance with the initiative 
of the President of the Republic; periodically evaluation of the structure and performance 
of the national tributary system, also considering the revenues levied by the federal 
union, states, and municipal administrations; decisions regarding the global limits of 
external and internal credit operations of the union, states, and municipalities, their public 
entities and government-owned or controlled entities by the federal government; approval 
and dismissal of the Attorney General of the Republic.  
 
B. Federalism and the Brazilian Supreme Court 
 
 The idea of a particular court at the top of the hierarchy of the judiciary power is 
not new in Brazil, dating back to the Casa de Suplicação do Brasil of 1808. The 
denomination of Supremo Tribunal Federal (STF) is more recent, as it appeared in the 
provisory Constitution published with the Decree no. 510, of June 22, 1890, and later 
reappearing in the Decree no. 848, of October11, 1890.86 The Constitution of 1891 – the 
one that created judicial review in Brazil87 – also designated the court as “Supremo.” 
 The Brazilian Constitution of 1988 allows autonomy to the federal union, to 
states, and to its municipalities. Sovereignty belongs to the Brazilian Republic.88 Most of 
                                                        
85 For a complete list of the competences of the Senate: article 52, I to XV, of the Republican Constitution. 
 
86 For the historic information about the STF in this paragraph and for further details, including its previous 
denominations as Supremo Tribunal de Justiça: http://www.stf.jus.br/ portal/cms/ verTexto.asp? 
servico=sobreStfConhecaStfHistorico, last accessed: February, 2012. 
 
87 Noting that the Constitution of 1891 adopted the incidental and diffuse control of constitutionality in 
Brazil, because any judge was able to declare the unconstitutionality of the norm and to solve the conflict: 
Gustavo Binenbojm, A Nova Jurisdição Constitucional Brasileira: Legitimidade Democrática e 
Instrumentos de Realização (Rio de Janeiro: Renovar, 2004), at 123–124. 
 
88 Constitution of the Brazilian Republic, article first: The Federative Republic of Brazil, formed by the 
indissoluble union of the states and municipalities and of the Federal District, is a legal democratic state 
and is founded on: I - sovereignty; II – citizenship; III - the dignity of the human person; IV - the social 
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the powers are centralized in the federal union.89 States are entitled to self-organization, 
being governed by their own state constitution.90 States also have self-government, 
because they have the power to set the rules for the division of powers in their own 
territory.91 Municipalities – although very empowered after the Constitution of 1988, 
because they were mentioned along with the states and the federal union in its article first 
– still have to be organized in accordance with the state constitution of the state where 
they are located.92 States are also entitled to political representation in the Senate, which 
does not occur with the municipalities, as earlier explained. 
 Despite the current federal pact, the case law of the STF has been consistent 
toward the non-inclusion of municipalities93 as federal independent members to attract 
the jurisdiction of the Court with regard to federative conflicts strictly determined. The 
Brazilian Constitution of 1988 determines the STF as the guardian of the federation.94 
                                                                                                                                                                     
values of labor and of the free enterprise; V - political pluralism. Sole paragraph: All power emanates from 
the people, who exercise it by means of elected representatives or directly, as provided by this Constitution. 
 
89 For a list of the exclusive non-legislative powers of the Union: article 21 of the Constitution. Article 23 
lists the common powers that are shared between the Union, the states, federal district and municipalities. 
The privative legislative powers of the Union are determined at article 22, and can be transferred to the 
states through Complementary Law. Concurrent legislative powers are determined in article 24. For the 
Union taxes powers: articles 153, 154, I, and 154, II.  
 
90 Constitution of the Brazilian Republic, article 25: The States are organized and governed by the 
Constitutions and laws they may adopt, in accordance with the principles of this Constitution. Paragraph 
one: All powers that this Constitution does not prohibit the States from exercising shall be conferred upon 
them. The legislative competence of the states shall be read in conjugation with the others express 
legislative competences (Union, Federal District and Municipalities), due to the states residual legislative 
competence (article 25, paragraph one). The legislative competence that is explicit in the caput of article 25 
assures the self-organization capacity. 
 
91 State judiciary, state legislative and state government, as read in conjugation of articles 27, 28 and 125, 
respectively, all from the Constitution of the Brazilian Republic of 1988. 
 
92Franco Martins, Princípio Federativo e Mudança Constitucional: Limites e Possibilidades da Constituição 
Brasileira de 1988, at 152. 
 
93As, for instance, in the following decisions: AC 1006 QO, of 04.09.2008; MI 708, of 10.25.2007; RCL 
331, of  09.21.2006. All decisions are available online at: www.stf.jus.br.  
 
94 Constitution of the Brazilian Republic, article 102: The Supremo Tribunal Federal is responsible for 
safeguarding the Constitution, and it is within its competence to judge: I- to institute legal proceeding and 
trials, in the first stage of: (…) f) disputes and conflicts between the Union and the states, the Union and the 
Federal District, or between one another, including the respective indirect administration bodies. 
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According to the reiterative jurisprudence of the Court,95 whenever a potential conflict 
among federation members may happen, the STF shall have exclusive jurisdiction to 
decide.  
 The Brazilian federalism is quite particular because powers tend to be 
concentrated in the federal union, as emphasized previously. The cooperative mechanism 
of appointment for justices of the Supremo includes Senate’s approval, due to federalism 
constitutional choices. The cooperation in these appointments includes the participation 
of the President and the Senate. This cooperation is being associated with more 
independent courts.96 Our next chapter examines related questions concerning judicial 
review, while chapter seven addresses political influences under the current constitutional 
design. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                        
95 As exemplified by the following cases of the jurisprudence of the STF: RCL 2769, of 09.23.2010; PET 
3388, of 03.19.2009; AC 2032 (QO): 05.15.2008; ADI 2832, of 05.07.2008.  All decisions are available 
online at: www.stf.jus.br. 
 
96 Tom Ginsburg, “Economic Analysis and the Design of Constitutional Courts,” Theoretical Inquiries at 
Law 3 (2002): 49–85, at 65–68. 
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CHAPTER THREE 
JUDICIAL REVIEW IN BRAZIL 
 This chapter focuses on the development of judicial review in Brazil at the federal 
level, while also addressing the state judicial review in general.97 This chapter is divided 
in four parts. It starts with the historical constitutional background of judicial review. Part 
II further develops it in light of specific provisions of the Constitution of 1988. Part III 
provides an overview of judicial review in Brazil, and Part IV details the main 
constitutional actions that the remaining chapters of this thesis focus on. 
 
I. HISTORICAL EXPERIENCE OF JUDICIAL REVIEW IN BRAZIL 
 Judicial review was not present in the text of the Imperial Constitution of 1824.98 
Under the Constitution of 1824, the Emperor perceived it as an actual limitation of his 
powers in a semi-absolute ruling. The parliamentary form of state – despite not present in 
the constitutional text – depended more on the Emperor than on Parliament.99 This was 
the case, due to the adoption of the principle of separation of powers based on a peculiar 
interpretation of the theory of Benjamin Constant and his conception of four branches of 
government: the executive, legislative, judiciary, and moderator.100 The moderator power 
was exercised solely by the Emperor who was, in practice, the one responsible for 
                                                        
97 The present section limits itself to the Constitution of 1988, and to the most recurrent topics of 
constitutional issues that appeared in the three original datasets developed for this thesis. Appointments to 
the STF are detailed in chapter five. State courts appointments and state judicial review are addressed in 
chapter six. 
 
98 Firly Nascimento Filho, Da Ação Direta de Declaração de Inconstitucionalidade (Rio de Janeiro: Lumen 
Juris, 1996), at 16–17, where the author remarks that the review was generally attributed to the legislative 
branch. The Supremo Tribunal de Justiça – then the highest organ of the judicial branch in the Brazilian 
Empire – did not have the power to refuse the applications of laws that were contrary to the constitutional 
text. 
 
99 Luís Roberto Barroso, O Direito Constitucional e a Efetividade de suas Normas: Limites e Possibilidades 
da Constituição Brasileira (Rio de Janeiro: Renovar, 2004), at 9–10. For an important survey of all the 
Brazilian Constitutions: Idem, at 7–45. Note that here and after, all the references are made to the 
Constitution of the Brazilian Republic of October, the fifth of 1988, unless stated otherwise. 
 
100 Cláudio Pereira de Souza Neto and Daniel Sarmento, Direito Constitucional: Teoria, História e Métodos 
de Trabalho (Rio de Janeiro: Forum, 2013), at 99. 
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promoting the harmony among all the branches of government. This scheme of 
separation of powers had significant impact in reducing regional and local powers.101 
Judicial review was inaugurated in Brazil with the Republic’s proclamation,102 
being expressly determined in articles 59 and 60 of the Constitution of 1891.103  The U.S. 
model was adopted, with federal and state judges able to exercise judicial review in the 
incidental, concrete, and diffuse forms,104 despite controversial understandings that would 
argue that solely the federal justice would have jurisdiction to exercise such review.105  
In that sense, the inception of judicial review in Brazil was embedded with the 
federalism concerns, namely, if state supreme courts would also have jurisdiction to 
review the constitutionality of laws or normative acts. Rui Barbosa famously defended 
the jurisdiction of the federal justice as well as of the states in exercising the diffuse, 
concrete and incidental review of norms that were arguably in violation of the 
Constitution of 1891.106 He also enumerated the potential violations to the principle of 
separation of powers, while considering the possibility of judicial review in direct 
actions, ultimately concluding that only the incidental form was authorized in the 
Brazilian constitutional scheme at that time.107  
                                                        
101 Charles D. Cole, Comparative Constitutional Law: Brazil and the United States (Florida: Vandeplas 
Publishing, 2008), at 27–28. 
 
102 The proclamation of the Republic in Brazil did not count with popular support, as José Murilo de 
Carvalho notes. According to the professor, there were several “proclamations”, since elites tried to 
construe narratives and myths surrounding the event of November 15, 1889: José Murilo de Carvalho, A 
Formação das A lmas: o Imaginário da República no Brasil (São Paulo: Cia das Letras, 1990), at 22–59. 
 
103 Luís Roberto Barroso, O Controle de Constitucionalidade no Direito Brasileiro (Rio de Janeiro: Saraiva, 
2012), at 85, where the author informs that there were judicial review provisions in the Provisory 
Constitution of 1890, article 58, first paragraph, a and b, – that was not proclaimed; and the Decree 848, of 
October 11, 1890, article 9, sole paragraph, a and b. 
 
104 Noting that the Constitution of 1891 brought three significant transformations inspired by the U.S. 
model: the form of government – from monarchy to republic; the system of government – from 
parliamentary to presidential; and the form of organizing the State – from unitary to federal: Barroso, O 
Direito Constitucional e a Efetividade de suas Normas: Limites e Possibilidades da Constituição Brasileira, 
at 13. 
 
105
 Barroso, O Controle de Constitucionalidade no Direito Brasileiro, at 85. 
 
106 Rui Barbosa, Os Actos Inconstitucionaes do Congresso e do Executivo ante a Justiça Federal (1893), at 
56–59, last accessed September 2013, available online at: http://www2.senado.leg.br/bdsf/item/id/224197 
 
107 Idem, at 99–101. 
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In Brazil, judicial review was inaugurated by legal norms,108 whereas in the 
United States, it was created by the case law of the Supreme Court.109 The Brazilian 
Decree 848, of October 11,1890, article 387 declared that: “the laws of the 
knowledgeable people, in particular those applicable in United States of the North 
America, the common law cases and equity shall be subsidies of our case law and federal 
procedure.” 110  Likewise, the judicial review admitted so far was the exercised 
incidentally and in a concrete case because abstract review was perceived as a violation 
of the separation of powers.111  
It is necessary to clarify that this thesis generally uses the following terms as 
synonyms: “judicial review,” “constitutional review,” and “control of constitutionality,” 
unless differently emphasized.112 
 The Constitution of 1934 introduced the intervention representation, a specific 
case of principal and concentrate control. It was under the exclusive jurisdiction of the 
Brazilian Supreme Court – hereinafter STF.113 The law that decreed the intervention of 
the federal Union in a given state due to a violation of one of the so-called sensitive 
principles (constitutional principles whose observance are mandatory for the states) had 
to be previously submitted to the STF by the Attorney General of the Republic. This was 
                                                        
108 Nascimento Filho, Da Ação Direta de Declaração de Inconstitucionalidade, at 18. 
 
109 Most famously in the case Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, (1803), as further discussed in 
chapter four. 
 
110 Barbosa, Os Actos Inconstitucionaes do Congresso e do Executivo ante a Justiça Federal, at 16. 
 
111 Noting the existence of attempts to introduce judicial review through direct actions in the Constitutional 
Commission of the Congress and how those attempts were dismissed on the grounds of arguable violation 
of the principle of separation of powers: Nascimento Filho, Da Ação Direta de Declaração de 
Inconstitucionalidade, at 19. 
 
112 Control of constitutionality is a common translation from Portuguese to judicial review – with the term 
control being attributed to the presence of a superior court. Regarding the distinction between judicial 
review and constitutional review, Professor Tom Ginsburg remarks that: “Technically, there is a distinction 
between judicial review, in which ordinary judges play the role of constitutional check, and constitutional 
review, in which the function is given to specialized judges or political actors”, in Tom Ginsburg, Judicial 
Review in New Democracies: Constitutional Courts in Asian Cases (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 2003) at 15. We use the terms interchangeably in this thesis, unless distinguished otherwise. 
 
113 Barroso, O Controle de Constitucionalidade no Direito Brasileiro, at 85. 
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the single procedure available for the constitutionality to be pronounced if arising out of 
an intervention action.114 
Regarding the incidental and diffuse controls, the Constitution of 1934 
inaugurated the requirement of the absolute majority of the tribunals or courts (the so-
called principle of reserve of plenary)115 as well as the suspension ordered by the Senate 
of the law or normative act judged unconstitutional by the STF.116 Deeper alterations in 
the system of control of constitutionality occurred only during the dictatorship ruling 
through the Constitutional Amendment no. 16, of November 26, 1965, that modified the 
Constitution of 1946. This Constitutional Amendment, hereinafter CA, introduced the 
generic action of unconstitutionality, on its article 101, I, k, according to which the STF 
had jurisdiction to rule state or federal laws that were deemed as unconstitutional, 
through representation commenced by the Attorney General of the Republic. It also 
authorized the state supreme courts (Tribunais de Justiça) to judge the potential 
unconstitutionality of municipal law or normative acts arguably conflicting with the state 
constitution.117 Thus, the dictatorship built a system to control the local acts. 
In this scenario, the Constitution of 1946 presented a control of constitutionality 
that was similar to the one of the Continental European tradition, i.e., exercised in a 
principal action, that was direct, with the review being exercised in light of the abstract 
norm and concentrated in the STF. The diffuse control, meanwhile, did not suffer 
modifications, so both types of review coexisted in the Brazilian legal order.118 It is 
noteworthy that the introduction of the abstract model of judicial review was done 
                                                        
114 Idem, at 86. 
 
115 The requirement of plenary was – and remains today – a constitutional command determining that only 
the absolute majority of all the judges of a given court can declare the unconstitutionality of a law or 
normative act. Thus, only the full bench or the court en banc can declare the unconstitutionality.  Details 
about this principle and its current applicability are developed in chapter six. 
 
116 Barroso, O Controle de Constitucionalidade no Direito Brasileiro, at 86. 
 
117 Idem. 
 
118 Idem. 
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without any modification, contributing to a permanent dialectic tension between the two 
foreign matrixes of review.119 
The Constitution of 1967 removed the provision of direct action of 
unconstitutionality at the state level, which was present in the Constitutional Amendment 
no. 16 of 1965. By contrast, the Constitution of 1969 had a special provision authorizing 
the action of intervention of the state in its municipality.120 
The Constitutional Amendment no. 7, of April 13, 1977 explicitly authorized the 
possibility of in limine decisions by the STF, when exercising the review of 
representations commenced by the Attorney General of the Republic, thus ending a 
significant controversy.121 That amendment introduced the provision of representation 
toward the interpretation of federal or state law or normative act. In light of such 
representation the STF, through provocation of the Attorney General, was authorized to 
determine in theory and with binding effect the interpretation of the norm. 
 
II. JUDICIAL REVIEW IN THE CONSTITUTION OF 1988 
The Republican Constitution of October 5, 1988 maintained the hybrid system of 
judicial review, combining mechanisms inherently associated with the European 
constitutional control (principal and concentrate forms of review) and the U.S. model 
                                                        
119 In this direction and criticizing article 52, X, of the current Constitution, which determines the 
suspension by the Senate of a law declared unconstitutional by the STF: Gustavo Binenbojm, A Nova 
Jurisdição Constitucional Brasileira: Legitimidade Democrática e Instrumentos de Realização (Rio de 
Janeiro: Renovar, 2004), at 127. This suspension is only pertinent in systems without precedents and 
should, at most, be applicable within the scope of the diffuse control exercised by the STF. After the 
súmula vinculante, there has been positions of the STF considering that the article 52, X, as of being of 
limited applicability, despite the official comments to Constitution, edited by the STF itself, still determines 
the complete applicability of the suspension by the Senate – as long as the unconstitutionality is declared 
through incidental review. For an example of applicability of article 52, X, even after the introduction of 
súmula vinculante, see: AI 677.191- AgR, Rapporteur Min. Ellen Gracie, judged in June 8, of 2010; 
Second Panel, and published in June 25, 2010. It is worth noting that Justice Gilmar Mendes understands 
article 52, X, as currently obsolete, in light of the most updated interpretation of the principle of separation 
of powers: Gilmar Ferreira Mendes and Paulo Gustavo Gonet Branco, Curso de Direito Constitucional (São 
Paulo: Saraiva, 2013), at 1091. The modern interpretation is not deferential to the legislative branch that 
acted in violation of constitutionality. 
 
120 Barroso, O Controle de Constitucionalidade no Direito Brasileiro, at 87. 
 
121 Idem, where he remarks that the Constitution of 1988 suppressed that possibility. 
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(incidental and diffuse forms).122 The Constitution of 1988 brought several innovations. 
Among the most relevant modifications, this work highlights five of them.123 The first 
refers to the extension of the legitimate people and bodies to have standing in the direct 
action of unconstitutionality – as stated in article 103.  The second innovation was the 
review of omission, which can occur either in a direct action of unconstitutionality by 
omission or lack of a required measure – article 103, paragraph 2; or in the mandamus of 
injunction – mandado de injunção, in article 5, LXXI. The other relevant alteration was 
the re-inclusion of the direct action of unconstitutionality in the state level. The fourth 
innovation refers to the so-called action of noncompliance with a fundamental precept 
(Ação de Descumprimento de Preceito Fundamental: ADPF, in article 102, paragraph 
first, with its current infra-constitutional requirements at federal law no. 9882, of 
December 3, 1999). The final innovation was the restriction of the extraordinary appeals 
to constitutional questions, only (article 102, III).124 
 The Republican Constitution determines the judicial review in concentrate and 
diffuse modalities indirectly in the text of the Constitution.125 The principal control – 
namely the one exercised through direct actions – occurs in two forms.126 In the first one, 
the direct action is commenced in the STF, when the unconstitutionality refers to federal 
                                                        
122 Idem. In Brazil, an act that violates the Constitution is void and invalid – despite being existent. The 
question of the declaration of unconstitutionality as nullity instead of being potentially voidable was among 
the distinctions between the U.S. judicial review – where the norm contrary to the Constitution does not 
produce valid effects, thus being ex tunc; and the Kelsenian review, understanding that the unconstitutional 
act was merely voidable, hence ex nunc, i.e., without retroactive effects. For a detailed study and 
justifications of the Kelsenian theory, in Portuguese, see: Hans Kelsen, Teoria Pura do Direito (São Paulo: 
Martins Fontes, 1997), at 296–297. For discussions in the light of the Brazilian system: Barroso, O 
Controle de Constitucionalidade no Direito Brasileiro, at 39–41.   
 
123 This work analyses each of the innovations when discussing the constitutional actions, with the pertinent 
constitutional text being quoted at that particular section. Hence, at this stage, this work limits itself to cite 
the provisions that will be further considered. 
 
124 For references about those innovations, see, generally: Barroso, O Controle de Constitucionalidade no 
Direito Brasileiro, at 87–88. 
 
125 Article 102 of the Brazilian Constitution of 1988: The Supremo Tribunal Federal is responsible, 
essentially, for safeguarding the Constitution, and it is within its jurisdiction: III - to judge, on extraordinary 
appeal, cases decided in a sole or last instance, when the decision appealed: a) is contrary to a provision of 
this Constitution; b) declares a treaty or a federal law unconstitutional; c) considers valid a law or act of a 
local government contested in the light of this Constitution; d) considers valid local law contested in the 
light of federal law.  
 
126 Barroso, O Controle de Constitucionalidade no Direito Brasileiro, at 88. 
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or state laws (or normative acts) arguably in conflict with the Republican Constitution.127 
The second form refers to direct actions commenced in state supreme courts, having as 
objects the unconstitutionality of state or municipal laws (or normative acts) that are 
potentially contrary to the Constitution of a given federative state.128 
 The Constitution of 1988 significantly enlarged the judicial review in Brazil, in 
particular the abstract form of review. It ended the monopoly of the Attorney General of 
the Republic to commence and to have standing in the direct actions of 
unconstitutionality,129 which, as stressed earlier, is among the most important innovations 
of the current Constitution.130  
 According to article 103 of the Constitution of 1988, the list of people and bodies 
authorized to have standing to sue has been extended to include: (1) the President of the 
Republic; (2) the Directing Board of the Federal Senate; (3) the Directing Board of the 
Chamber of Deputies; (4) the Directing Board of a State Legislative Assembly or of the 
Legislative Chamber of the Federal District; (5) a State Governor or the Governor of the 
Federal District; (6) the Attorney-General of the Republic; (7) the Federal Council of the 
Brazilian Bar Association; (8) a political party represented in the National Congress; (9) a 
                                                        
127 Article 102 of the Brazilian Constitution of 1988: The Supremo Tribunal Federal is responsible, 
essentially, for safeguarding the Constitution, and it is within its jurisdiction: I - to institute legal 
proceeding and trial, in the first instance, of: a) direct actions of unconstitutionality of a federal or state law 
or normative act, and declaratory actions of constitutionality of a federal law or normative act; (With the 
final writing modified by CA 3, March 17, 1993, that created the declaratory actions of constitutionality). 
Article 103, paragraph two: When the unconstitutionality is declared on account of lack of a measure to 
render a constitutional provision effective (by omission), the competent power shall be notified for the 
adoption of the necessary actions and, in the case of an administrative body, must do so within thirty days. 
 
128 Article 25 of the Brazilian Constitution:  The states are organized and governed by the Constitutions and 
laws they may adopt, in accordance with the principles of this Constitution. Paragraph one - All powers that 
this Constitution does not prohibit the states from exercising shall be conferred upon them. Article 125 of 
the Brazilian Constitution of 1988: The states shall organize their judicial system, observing the principles 
established in this Constitution. (…) Paragraph two - The states have the competence to institute actions of 
unconstitutionality of state or municipal laws or normative acts in the light of the Constitution of the state, 
it being forbidden to attribute legitimation to act (standing) to a sole body. 
 
129  We translated Procurador Geral da República as Attorney General of the Republic, who is in charge of 
the federal public prosecution in Brazil. By contrast, we translated Advogado Geral da União as Advocate 
General of the Union, who is the chief responsible for the unified legal defense of the federal union, 
nationally. 
 
130 Barroso, O Controle de Constitucionalidade no Direito Brasileiro, at 88. 
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confederation of labor unions or a professional association of a nationwide nature.131 The 
infra-constitutional legislation referring to the lawsuit started in the STF of direct action 
of unconstitutionality as well as of declaratory actions of constitutionality is determined 
in the federal law no. 9868, of November 10, 1999. 
 The Constitution of 1988 maintained the action of intervention as a concrete form 
of judicial review – not abstract, as in the generic action of unconstitutionality. This is the 
case because the direct action of intervention of article 36, III, of the Constitution132 has 
the main goal of solving a federative problem, without judgment in abstract of a 
particular norm.133 
 Hence, in Brazil, there is the incidental control, exercised for all the judges and 
courts; and the main control, exercised through direct action, whose jurisdiction is 
concentrate in the STF, encompassing the following actions: direct action of 
unconstitutionality (generic, under article 102, I, a, of the Constitution); direct action of 
unconstitutionality by omission (lack of particular measure, in article 103, paragraph 
second, of the Constitution); declaratory action of constitutionality (article 102, I, a, of 
the Constitution); direct action of intervention (article 36, III, of the Constitution) and 
action of noncompliance with a fundamental precept (ação de descumprimento de 
preceito fundamental: ADPF, in article 102, paragraph 1). From this list, we should 
emphasize, once again, that the enlargement of the direct and abstract review in Brazil, 
                                                        
131 Originally, the constitutional text did not have the Declaratory Action of Constitutionality. After its first 
inclusion in the text with the Constitutional Amendment 03, of March18, 1993, the former writing of 
paragraph four of article 103 included a limited number of people authorized to commence the Declaratory 
Action of Constitutionality: only the Attorney General of the Republic, the President of the Republic, and 
the Direct Board of the House or of the Senate were authorized to commence such action and to have 
standing. The Constitutional Amendment 45, of December 8, 2004 leveled the Declaratory Action of 
Constitutionality to the Direct Action of Unconstitutionality, by authorizing the same actors (persons and 
bodies) to commence and to have standing in both actions. 
 
132 Article 36, III, of the Constitution of 1988: The decree of intervention shall be depended upon: (…) III- 
on the granting of a petition from the Attorney General of the Republic by the STF, in the case of article 34, 
VII (violation of the so-called sensitive principles), and in the case of refusal of the enforcement of federal 
law. 
 
133 Barroso, O Controle de Constitucionalidade no Direito Brasileiro, at 89. Also classifying such action as 
concrete: Clèmerson Merlin Clève, A Fiscalização Abstrata da Constitucionalidade no Direito Brasileiro 
(São Paulo: Editora Revista dos Tribunais, 2000), at 76. Other authors, however, do not classify such action 
as concrete, but as abstract, as contended by Rodrigo Lopes Lourenço, Controle da Constitucionalidade `a 
Luz da Jurisprudência do STF (Rio de Janeiro: Forense, 1998), at 13. 
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with the newly authorized actors to file the direct actions; the inclusion of the declaratory 
action of constitutionality and the action of noncompliance with a fundamental precept of 
the Constitution.134 
 It is important to contextualize the constitutional provisions concerning the 
judiciary in Brazil. The Constitution Assembly that met from 1986 to 1988 was particular 
focused on securing the political independence of the judicial branch, after the recently 
ended military regime.135  
Consequently, the final text guaranteed independent budget136 for the judiciary 
and provided that state and federal judges – except those in the highest ranking 
hierarchy137 – must be admitted to the career through a civil service entrance examination 
consisting on written or written and oral tests.138  
                                                        
134 Barroso, O Controle de Constitucionalidade no Direito Brasileiro, at 89–90. 
135 There is a significant effort in making the judicial function as neutral and as dissociated from politics as 
possible. In Brazil, for instance, magistrates shall not be engaged in partisan activities, in light of the 
prohibition of article 95, sole paragraph, III, combined with the exigency of Complementary Law of article 
93, both from the Constitution. The current Complementary Law is LC 60/89 (commonly named “Estatuto 
da Magistratura”).  
 
136 The provision conferring financial and administrative independence to the judiciary is basically 
determined at article 99 of the Constitution, that states: The judicial power is ensured of administrative and 
financial autonomy. §1 - The courts shall prepare their budget proposals, within the limits stipulated jointly 
with the other Powers in the law of budgetary directives. §2 - The proposal shall, after hearing the other 
interested courts, be forwarded: I - at the federal level, by the presidents of the Supreme Federal Court and 
of the Superior Courts, with the approval of the respective courts; II - at the level of the states and of the 
Federal District and the territories, by the presidents of the Courts of Justice, with the approval of the 
respective courts. §3 - If the bodies mentioned in paragraph 2 do not forward the respective budgetary 
proposals within the time established by the law of budgetary directives, the executive power shall 
consider, for the consolidation of the annual budgetary law, the amounts authorized for the current 
budgetary law, adjusted in accordance with the limits set forth in the manner prescribed by the paragraph 1 
of the present article. §4. If the budgetary proposals are forwarded in disobedience with the limits set forth 
in the manner prescribed by paragraph 1, the executive power shall perform the necessary adjustments in 
order to consolidate the annual budgetary law. §5. During the execution of the budget, there shall not be 
realization of expenditures or assumption of commitments which exceed the limits established by the law 
of budgetary directives, except if previously authorized, by means of creation of special or supplementary 
credits. 
 
137 Political appointments are the only access to the STF. 
 
138 According to article 93 of the Constitution: A Complementary Law, proposed by the Supremo Tribunal 
Federal, shall provide for the Statute of the Judicature, observing the following principles: I - admission 
into the career, with the initial post of substitute judge, by means of a civil service entrance examination of 
tests and presentation of academic and professional credentials, with the participation of the Brazilian Bar 
Association in all phases, it being required for the law bachelors a minimum of three years experience in 
juridical activities, obeying the order of classification for appointments; II - promotion from level to level, 
based on seniority and merit alternately (…). Article 96 complements the system of independence, stating 
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It is noteworthy that those exams are highly competitive, but the prospects of 
future tenure are very attractive. After two years, judges are entitled to such tenure, 
coupled with irreducibility of their payments, and irremovability.139  
 The mechanism of appointments for justices of the STF was transplanted from the 
U.S. Constitution. Although the STF counts with eleven justices that are subject to 
mandatory retirement at the age of seventy years old, the remaining provisions are similar 
to the U.S. Constitution. Thus, in Brazil, as in the United States, justices of the Supreme 
Court are entitled to life tenure; and they are appointed by the President subject to 
approval by the Senate.140  
 In Brazil, however, the constitutional requirements for members of the Supreme 
Court refer solely to the age of the justice being between thirty-five and sixty-five; 
notorious legal knowledge and spotless reputation; in addition to solely Brazilian born 
                                                                                                                                                                     
that: It is of the exclusive competence of: I - the courts: a) to elect their directive bodies and to draw up 
their internal regulations, in compliance with the rules of proceedings and the procedural guarantees of the 
parties, and regulating the competence and the operation of the respective jurisdictional and administrative 
bodies; b) to organize their secretariats and auxiliary services, as well as those of the tribunals connected 
with them, guaranteeing the exercise of the respective inspection activities; c) to fill, under the terms of this 
Constitution, offices of career judges within their respective jurisdiction; d) to propose the creation of new 
courts of first instance; e) to fill, by means of a civil service entrance examination of tests, or of tests and 
presentation of academic and professional credentials (…); f) to grant leave, vacations and other absences 
to their members and to the judges and employees who are immediately subordinated to them; II - the 
Supremo Tribunal Federal, the Superior Courts and the Courts of Justice, to propose to the respective 
Legislative Power (...): a) alteration in the number of members of the lower courts; b) creation and 
extinction of offices and establishment of pay for the auxiliary services and for the courts connected with 
them, as well as establishment of subsides of their members, for the judges, including those of the lower 
courts, if existing, for; c) creation or extinction of inferior courts; d)alteration of the judicial organization 
and division (…). 
 
139 Those guarantees are explicitly determined in article 95 of the current Constitution: judges enjoy the 
following guarantees: I - life tenure, which, at first instance, shall only be acquired after two years in office, 
loss of office being dependent, during this period, on deliberation of the court to which the judge is subject, 
and, in other cases, on a final and non appealable judicial decision; II - irremovability, save for reason of 
public interest, under the terms of article 93, VIII; III - irreducibility of pay, observing, as regards 
remuneration, the provisions of articles 37, X and XI, 39, paragraph 4, 150, II, 153, III, and 153, paragraph 
2, I. Sole paragraph - Judges are forbidden to: I - hold, even when on paid availability, another office or 
position, except for a teaching position; II - receive, on any account or for any reason, court costs or 
participation in a lawsuit; III - engage in political or party activities; IV - receive, on any account or for any 
reason, payments or contributions from persons, public or private entities, with exception of the cases 
determined by law; V - exercise lawyer activities in the jurisdiction or court in which they had worked, 
before the elapsing of three years of leaving office by retirement or dismissal. 
 
140 In the United States, mere simple majority in the Senate is required. The Brazilian scheme formally 
demands more for justices to be approved, because an absolute majority in the Senate is required. 
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citizens being allowed to be appointed for the Supreme Court.141 Therefore, the Brazilian 
Supreme Court tends to have important features of the archetypal recognition judiciary.142 
Regarding the approval of presidential appointments for the Supreme Court, the Brazilian 
Senate is not as active as the U.S. one. In Brazil, the Senate is very deferential toward the 
candidate soon to be justice because the Senate tends to avoid political controversies.143 
 In a related perspective, this study is relevant for the interplay between federalism 
and judicial review because in Brazil all the states must follow the same procedure and 
method regarding how one becomes a state judge. There is no substantive distinction 
between the procedures. It is all unified under the above-referred constitutional 
provisions.  
 At the opposite spectrum of federal choices we have the U.S. experience, where 
states have different mechanisms for allowing judges to sit in their state supreme courts – 
also named Court of Appeals in some states – by election or by appointment. In Brazil, 
by contrast, only those approved in a public civil service entrance examination are 
allowed to become state judges, and judiciary members are never directly elected. The 
mechanisms of appointment of justices of the Brazilian Supreme Court are an exception 
                                                        
141 Article 101 of the Constitution determines that: The Supremo Tribunal Federal is composed of eleven 
justices, chosen from among citizens older than thirty-five and younger than sixty-five years of age, of 
notorious legal knowledge and spotless reputation.  Sole paragraph: The justices of the Supremo Tribunal 
Federal shall be appointed by the President of the Republic, after their nomination has been approved by 
the absolute majority of the federal Senate. Article 12, I of the Constitution determines as being Brazilian 
by birth: a) those born in the Federative Republic of Brazil, even if of foreign parents, provided that they 
are not at the service of their country; b) those born abroad, of a Brazilian father or a Brazilian mother, 
provided that either of them is at the service of the Federative Republic of Brazil; c) those born abroad, of a 
Brazilian father or a Brazilian mother, provided that they come to reside in the Federative Republic of 
Brazil and opt for the Brazilian nationality at any time; (...) paragraph third: The following offices are 
exclusive of  born Brazilians: (...) IV - that of justice of the Supremo Tribunal Federal. 
 
142 We use the term as defined by Professor Georgakopoulos, for whom the archetypal career judiciary has 
members appointed in an early age, starting in lower courts and with expectation of promotion conditioned 
on performing properly. In contrast, members of the archetypal recognition judiciary have already had a 
previous career in law, and once nominated to the bench, have the possibility of promotion quite reduced. 
Nicholas L. Georgakopoulos, “Discretion in the Career and Recognition Judiciary,” Chicago Law School 
Roundtable 7 (2000): 205–225, at 208–210. 
 
143 Maria Angela Jardim de Santa Cruz Oliveira and Nuno Garoupa, “Choosing Judges in Brazil: 
Reassessing Legal Transplants from the United States,” The American Journal of Comparative Law 59 
(2010): 529–561, at 547–548. The authors emphasize, at 547, that: “no presidential nominee in Brazil has 
been forced to withdraw or has been formally rejected by the Senate since the end of the military 
dictatorship.” 
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to the general rule of public examination entrance criterion and those mechanisms are 
quite similar to those adopted in the United States.   
In Brazil, no an external body – i.e., outside the judicial branch monitoring the 
judicial decisions – exists.144 Hence, concerns were raised in terms of the political impact 
of the legitimacy of the judiciary decisions in Brazil. This research argues, however, that 
this legitimacy is derived from the public entrance examination itself, stressing that 
accountability of the judiciary is required.145 Overall, there is a sense that the Constitution 
guaranteed the independence of the judiciary: “By any standard, the Brazilian judiciary 
enjoys extraordinary levels of independence. Judicial independence is both nominal, 
enshrined in extensive constitutional guarantees, and substantive, in terms of the powers 
granted to the courts and the willingness of judges to exercise them.”146 
 
III. OVERVIEW OF JUDICIAL REVIEW IN BRAZIL 
 The control of constitutionality – or judicial review – in Brazil is classified 
considering two main criteria: subjective and procedural.147 The first criterion is called 
                                                        
144 The Constitutional Amendment 45, of 2004, recently implemented the National Council of Justice:  
Conselho Nacional de Justica - CNJ, that is not outside the judiciary itself, since members of this power 
integrate the majority of the composition of the CNJ, as determined by article 103-B, of the Republican 
Constitution. Thus, out of the fifteen members of the CNJ, only four are not members of the Public 
Prosecution nor career magistrates; and out of those four, two must be lawyers appointed by the National 
Bar Association; and the remaining two must have remarkable legal knowledge, being one appointed by the 
Senate, the other one by the House. 
 
145 For this idea in the Brazilian case, as well as an important question if the Brazilian Judiciary was so 
“autonomous that it has become devoid of all accountability, a 'power above the law':” Carlos Santiso, 
“Economic Reform and Judicial Governance in Brazil: Balancing Independence with Accountability,” 
Democratization and the Judiciary, ed. Siri Gloppen, Roberto Gargarella and Elin Skaar (London: Frank 
Cass Publishers, 2004), at 177. 
 
146 Idem, at 164. Even when executive federal ministers visit the STF building, which is rare, it is not 
perceived as an offense of the Court’s legitimacy: Diana Kapiszewski, High Courts Economic Governance 
in Argentina and Brazil (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012), at 172. 
 
147 There are different uses, depending on the constitutionalist one follows. For instance, Justice Gilmar 
Mendes uses the nomenclature incidental and concrete as synonyms: Mendes and Branco, Curso de Direito 
Constitucional, at 1063. Professor Alexandre de Moraes, on the other hand, confines his writings to the 
distinction between concentrate and diffuse: Alexandre de Moraes, Direito Constitucional (São Paulo: 
Atlas, 2012), at 744–776. Others differentiate judicial review between diffuse and incidental – and the 
related concentrate and principal – emphasizing that the diffuse and incidental are often coincident in 
Brazil, despite not being the same, as explained in Barroso, O Controle de Constitucionalidade no Direito 
Brasileiro, at 72–73. According to this Professor, the ação de descumprimento de preceito fundamental: 
ADPF should be understood as a hypothesis of incidental and concentrate controls – as opposed to the 
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subjective because it refers to the judicial organs that exercise the control and is divided 
in diffuse or concentrate.148 The judicial review is named diffuse when any judge or 
tribunal – provided that the actor has the jurisdiction power – can pronounce the 
unconstitutionality, as it happens in the United States. By contrast, in the concentrate 
modality, judicial review is restricted to a strictly limited number of organs with original 
jurisdictional power and, as addressed earlier, has its origins generally attributed to the 
Kelsenian conception of review.149 
 The second criterion for judicial review is procedural and it centers in the form 
under which the control is exercised. It occurs in an incidental form, focusing on the 
concrete case,150 as in the United States; as opposed to occurring in a principal form. In 
the latter one, there is not a specific concrete case, and the court has to rule considering 
abstract arguments and possible effects of the arguable unconstitutional act. In the 
incidental form, the Court has to rule on the constitutionality of an incidental question of 
the merits of the case. In the principal form, however, the judgment on the 
constitutionality is core and exclusive merit of the case.151   
 The judicial review model adopted by the Brazilian Constitution of 1988 is  
hybrid, combining the incidental and diffuse models (also known as the U.S. system) 
                                                                                                                                                                     
ordinary scheme of concentrate and diffuse. Notwithstanding the existence of distinct classifications, the 
term judicial review is broadly used in this session as the power and duty of any member of the judiciary 
(court or single judge) to invalidate a law or normative act that is conflicting with the constitutional text. In 
this sense, emphasis is given to the object of review, namely, those of public acts. 
 
148 In Brazil, the diffuse form is frequently exercised concretely, i.e., within a lawsuit with proper 
conflicting parties. In the extraordinary appeal to the STF (recurso extraordinário), we have the most 
common example of diffuse review exercised concretely – thus, the application of the general requirement 
that such award must be notified by the STF to the Senate. This occurs in order to allow the former to 
authorize the suspension of the norm judged unconstitutional by STF: art. 52, X, of the Republican 
Constitution. For details about this procedure: Fredie Didier Jr., Paula Sarno Braga and Rafael Oliveira, 
Ações Constitucionais (Rio de Janeiro: Jus Podium, 2009), at 409–486. In addition, there have been 
mistakes with regard to the scope of the STF’s decision, and whether or not the Senate had expanded the 
scope of the unconstitutionality as ruled by the STF, as justice Gilmar Mendes notes in Mendes and 
Branco, Curso de Direito Constitucional, at 1090–1091. 
 
149 Barroso, O Controle de Constitucionalidade no Direito Brasileiro, at 69–71. 
 
150 As previously noted, Justice Gilmar Mendes uses the control incidental and concrete as synonyms: 
Mendes and Branco, Curso de Direito Constitucional, at 1063. 
 
151 Barroso, O Controle de Constitucionalidade no Direito Brasileiro, at 72. 
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with the principal and concentrate forms (continental European model). 152  Judicial 
review153 in Brazil under the principal control – namely, the one exercised through direct 
actions – and concentrate occurs in two forms.154 In the first one, the direct action is 
commenced in the STF when the unconstitutionality refers to federal or state laws (or 
normative acts) arguably in conflict with the Republican Constitution.155 
 The second form is the focus of chapter five and refers to direct actions 
commenced in state supreme courts, and having as objects the unconstitutionality of state 
or municipal laws (or normative acts) that are potentially violating the Constitution of a 
given state.156 The jurisdiction of state supreme courts is perceived as a manifestation of 
the federalism pact established in the Brazilian Constitution of October 5, 1988.157 This 
federalism is deeply protected in the Republican Constitution, being among the subject 
matters forbidden to be abolished or reduced by Constitutional Amendments. This 
protection is located at article 60, § 4, I, of the Constitution, among the exclusive 
hypotheses referring to the perennial or immutable clauses of the constitutional pact.158 
                                                        
152 Idem, at 87. The author also emphasizes that, in Brazil, the principal control is associated with 
concentrate and abstract reviews; while the incidental control is associated with diffuse and concrete: at 73. 
Noting that in some European countries there is the possibility of the diffuse control to be exercised in the 
concentrate form by a Constitutional Court: Clève, A Fiscalização Abstrata da Constitucionalidade no 
Direito Brasileiro, at 76. 
 
153 Arguing that the Brazilian system of judicial review is vastly decentralized – particularly in comparison 
to other civil law jurisdictions: Matthew M. Taylor, Judging Policy: Courts and Policy Reform in 
Democratic Brazil (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2008), at 15. 
 
154 Barroso, O Controle de Constitucionalidade no Direito Brasileiro, at 88. 
 
155 Article 102 of the Brazilian Constitution of 1988: The Supremo Tribunal Federal is responsible, 
essentially, for safeguarding the Constitution, and it is within its jurisdiction: I- I - to institute legal 
proceeding and trial, in the first instance, of: a) direct actions of unconstitutionality of a federal or state law 
or normative act, and declaratory actions of constitutionality of a federal law or normative act. (…) Article 
103, paragraph two: When unconstitutionality is declared on account of lack of a measure to render a 
constitutional provision effective (by omission), the competent power shall be notified for the adoption of 
the necessary actions and, in the case of an administrative body, to do so within thirty days. 
 
156 For reference to Article 25 of the Brazilian Constitution and its text: footnote 128, supra. 
 
157 Noting that the self-govern is protected in article 125 of the Republican Constitution: Moraes, Direito 
Constitucional, at 291. 
 
158 Article 60 of the Brazilian Constitution of 1988: The Constitution may be amended on the proposal of: 
(...)  §4 - No proposal of amendment shall be considered which is aimed or aimed at abolishing: I- the 
federative form of state. 
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IV. GENERAL REQUIREMENTS CONCERNING THE CONSTITUTIONAL ACTIONS 
 At this point, we introduce the main classifications referring to the judicial review 
system in Brazil in order to further analyze each of the general requirements of particular 
constitutional actions in the federal level. We analyze with the concentrate, principal, and 
abstract control, encompassing the direct action of unconstitutionality, the declaratory 
action of constitutionality, and the direct action of unconstitutionality by omission.  
 The control of constitutionality under the principal form is exercised through 
direct actions commenced in the STF (or in state supreme courts, if the norm is arguably 
offending the state constitution). This control is said to occur in abstract because there is 
no requirement of case or controversy; within an objective lawsuit, technically without 
interested parties. Along those lines, this control occurs without having the protection of 
subjective rights as the main objective of the lawsuit. The direct action aims to protect the 
legal order – including its hierarchy, by voiding an act that is conflicting with the 
Constitution. Even in the case of the direct action of unconstitutionality by omission, the 
final decision occurs in abstract, with the determination acknowledging the illegitimate 
inertia of the organ that was supposed to enact the legal measure, according to the 
Constitution.159 
 In the direct action, it is mandatory for plaintiffs to indicate the infra-
constitutional act that are arguably in violation of the Constitution, specifying the 
constitutional norms that are allegedly being offended.  Generally, the STF understands 
that it shall not extend the declaration of unconstitutionality to articles that were not 
mentioned by the plaintiff – even when the legal reasoning would be the same. The 
traditional understanding of the STF is that the Court shall only act as a negative 
legislator, by paralyzing the efficacy of an existing rule but not as positive legislator, 
innovating in the legal order by creating a norm previously nonexistent. Nevertheless, the 
prohibition for the STF to act as a negative legislator was moderated by the Court itself in 
the cases that the constitutional norms are particularly open.160 
 
                                                        
159 Barroso, O Controle de Constitucionalidade no Direito Brasileiro, at 180. 
 
160 Idem, at 180–181. 
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A. Direct Action of Unconstitutionality161 
 The jurisdiction to decide direct actions of unconstitutionality that are potentially 
conflicting with the Republican Constitution belongs to the STF, 162  which acts 
analogously to the original conception of Kelsenian constitutional court when exercising 
such abstract control.163 
 The Brazilian federative system also contains provisions securing the abstract and 
principal control of constitutionality to be exercised at the state level.164 Despite the lack 
of express determination, it is embedded within the logic of the constitutional system that 
state supreme courts have jurisdiction to decide the direct actions of unconstitutionality 
arising out of state or municipal laws and normative acts potentially in conflict with the 
state Constitution.165 The Brazilian constitutional system accepts the simultaneously 
filing of direct actions in the state and federal spheres having the same state law or state 
normative act: one filed in the STF, under the assumption of violation of norms of the 
Republican Constitution. The other action is filed in the state level, and is arguably 
conflicting a given norm of the state Constitution. Thus, when two direct actions are filed 
contemporaneously in state and federal levels, with the state constitutional provision 
deemed as one of mandatory reproduction from the Republican Constitution, the state 
action is suspended, until the STF rules on the constitutionality of the state law or based 
                                                        
161 This overview is limited to the special claims that appear significantly in all the specific chapters 
relating to this thesis:  the decisions of the STF regarding potential conflicts involving federalism, 
specialized panels in state courts, and the rulings of the STF addressing the constitutionality or 
unconstitutionality in cases referring to the annexation of municipalities. 
 
162 Brazilian Constitution of 1988: article 102, I, a: The Supremo Tribunal Federal is responsible, 
essentially, for safeguarding the Constitution, and it is within its jurisdiction: I - to institute legal 
proceeding and trial, in the first instance, of: a) direct actions of unconstitutionality of a federal or state law 
or normative act, and declaratory actions of constitutionality of a federal law or normative act. 
 
163 Barroso, O Controle de Constitucionalidade no Direito Brasileiro, at 183. 
 
164 Brazilian Constitution of 1988: article 125: The states shall organize their judicial system, observing the 
principles established in this Constitution. Paragraph second: The states have the competence to institute 
actions of unconstitutionality of state or municipal laws or normative acts in the light of the Constitution of 
the state, it being forbidden to attribute legitimation to act to a sole body. 
 
165 Barroso, O Controle de Constitucionalidade no Direito Brasileiro, at 183. 
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on the Republican Constitution.166 The rationale here is that the STF’s decision is binding 
on the state supreme court. This occurs because the state constitutional norm, which is 
also object of direct action on the state level based on the state constitution, is the same as 
the norm contained in the Republican Constitution.167 
 There was some controversy regarding the admission of review of municipal law 
that presented as parameter of control state Constitution norms that were deemed as 
norms of mandatory repetition of the Republican Constitution. The STF solved the 
controversy, deciding that such review is admissible to be exercised in abstract control by 
the state supreme courts. Nevertheless, the STF might review those judgments, if an 
extraordinary appeal is filed.168 Therefore, the STF examines such norm in the concrete 
control. 
 Next, we proceed to the determination of who is capable of being plaintiff and 
defendant in the direct action of unconstitutionality. It is worth reiterating that, strictly in 
a technical sense, there is no defendant, as it is generally understood as the party against 
the lawsuit is proposed. This is the case because direct actions do not have the protection 
of subjective rights as their main objective. In a related note, only those who are the 
organs and authorities from which the unconstitutional norm emanated can figurate as 
defendants. Accordingly, solely organs of the public administration – no private persons 
or private entities – are allowed to be included as defendant. The defense of the allegedly 
unconstitutional law or normative act – regardless of its state or federal nature – belongs 
to the Advocate General of the Union.169 The rationale for this provision is the fact that 
the Advocate General is viewed as a protector of the general legal assumption of 
                                                        
166 Hely Lopes Meirelles, Arnoldo Wald and Gilmar Ferreira Mendes, Mandado de Segurança e Ações 
Constitucionais (São Paulo: Malheiros, 2010), at 429.  
 
167 Barroso, O Controle de Constitucionalidade no Direito Brasileiro, at 184. 
 
168Idem, at 185. 
 
169 Brazilian Constitution of 1988: article 103, paragraph third: When the Supremo Tribunal Federal 
examines the unconstitutionality in abstract of a legal provision or normative act it shall first summon the 
Advocate General of the Union, (Advogado Geral da União), who shall defend the impugned act or text. 
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constitutionality of the norms. After all, any public act carries the presumption of 
validity.170 
 Since the inception of the generic direct action of unconstitutionality, dating back 
to 1965, until the Constitution of 1988, the exercise of the abstract and principal control 
on the federal level was a monopoly of the Attorney General of the Republic. The 
jurisprudence of the STF understood that the act of filing a direct action – or abstention to 
do so – by the Attorney General was at his or her complete and exclusive discretion. 
Importantly, the position of Attorney General was subject to free dismissal by the 
President.171 
 The exclusive prerogative of the Attorney General in filing the Direct Action of 
Unconstitutionality disappeared under the current constitutional text of 1988. 
Nevertheless, there is a general determination in the first paragraph of article 103 for the 
Attorney General of the Republic to be previously heard in actions of unconstitutionality 
and in all lawsuits under the STF jurisdiction. The number of authorized entities or 
organs to file such action has dramatically increased, as inferred from the current list of 
authorized parties in the Constitution, also in article 103 of the Constitution.172  
 The case law of the STF created a distinction between two categories of 
authorized filing parties for the direct action of unconstitutionality, and also the 
declaratory action of constitutionality. The case law of the Court formulated such 
differentiation, albeit the absence of constitutional provisions. The first category refers to 
the so-called universally authorized actors, i.e., those who can file such actions without 
the necessity of proving compliance with further requirements.173 They are the President 
                                                        
170
 Barroso, O Controle de Constitucionalidade no Direito Brasileiro, at 186, and at 197. 
 
171Idem, at 187, where the author notes that the direct action review used to have its exercise very limited to 
hypotheses which were not embarrassing for the executive branch, in practice. 
 
172 Article 103 of the Republican Constitution: The following may file an action of unconstitutionality and 
the declaratory action of constitutionality: I - the President of the Republic; II - the Directing Board of the 
Federal Senate; III - the Directing Board of the Chamber of Deputies; IV - the Directing Board of a State 
Legislative Assembly or of the Legislative Chamber of the Federal District; V - a State Governor or the 
Governor of the Federal District; VI - the Attorney General of the Republic; VII - the Federal Council of 
the Brazilian Bar Association; VIII - a political party represented in the National Congress; IX - a 
confederation of labor unions or a professional association of a nationwide nature.  
 
173 Barroso, O Controle de Constitucionalidade no Direito Brasileiro, at 188. 
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of the Republic, the Directing Board of the federal Senate or the one of the Chamber of 
Deputies, the Attorney General of the Republic, the Federal Council of the Brazilian Bar 
Association, and any political party represented in the National Congress, regardless if 
the political party merely has a single member in the Chamber of Deputies or in the 
Senate. 
 The second category refers to the specially authorized actors: the state Governor, 
the Directing Board of the State Legislative Assembly, and confederation of labor unions 
or a nationwide professional association. The case law of the court requires that all those 
actors shall prove the specific repercussion of the juridical question in their legal sphere, 
or of theirs of its associates. In addition, it also demands that they act with adequate 
procurement and pertinent powers of attorney. Those restrictions were created by STF in 
order to implement particular limitations on the number of direct actions of 
constitutionality, aiming to lighten its busy dockets.174 It is important to note that the STF 
is not authorized to exercise the writ of certiorari, as it is strictly defined.175 
 We next turn our focus to each of the universally authorized parties to file abstract 
actions of constitutionality, in the exact order that they are mentioned in article 103 of the 
Constitution. The President of the Republic may provoke the abstract control when his or 
her veto was overridden by the legislative, even in cases where the President has 
previously sanctioned the norm. The sanction, therefore, does not have the power to cure 
the unconstitutionality of the norm.176 The Directing Board of the federal Senate or the 
one of the Chamber of Deputies177 are also universal actors and are authorized to file 
                                                        
174 Clève, A Fiscalização Abstrata da Constitucionalidade no Direito Brasileiro, at 162–163. 
 
175 The Constitutional Amendment 45, of December of 2004, brought the súmula vinculante (biding case 
law) and the general requirement of the repercussão geral, which might actually approach the STF – when 
judging extraordinary appeals – to the United States certiorari. For an in depth discussion: Maria Angela 
Jardim de Santa Cruz Oliveira and Nuno Garoupa, “Stare Decisis and Certiorari arrive to Brazil: A 
Comparative Law and Economics Approach,” Emory International Law Review 26 (2012): 555–598. 
 
176 Barroso, O Controle de Constitucionalidade no Direito Brasileiro, at 188. The author also stresses that 
the Enunciado de Súmula No. 5 of the STF, stating that the veto would cure the unconstitutionality, is no 
longer effective.  
 
177 Barroso, O Controle de Constitucionalidade no Direito Brasileiro, at 189. 
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direct actions having as object their own acts or those that the National Congress would 
be able to prohibit by exclusive deliberation.178  
 The Attorney General of the Republic is among the universal parties and remains 
with complete discretion in deciding whether to exercise the abstract control.179 The 
Attorney General of the Republic is also entitled to be heard in his or her required legal 
opinion,180 regardless if the Attorney General was the one who filed the abstract action or 
not.181 
 The federal Council of the Brazilian Bar Association is mentioned separately in 
the constitutional text. Therefore, it is interpreted as being distinguished from the other 
general nationwide professional associations. This particularization led the STF to confer 
to the federal Council of the Brazilian Bar Association the universal authorization for 
filing actions of constitutionality.182 Also among the universal authorized parties in the 
STF case law are the political parties represented in the National Congress. The rationale 
of this provision is that the minorities are able to question the constitutionality in 
abstract183 with the verification of the representation of the political party done when the 
action is filed.184 
 Having analyzed the universal authorized parties, we turn our focus to the 
specially authorized parties. The STF understands that the Directing Board of the State 
assembly is only authorized to file actions of abstract control if there exists a particular 
                                                        
178 Article 49, V of the Republican Constitution: It is exclusively the competence (among the powers) of the 
National Congress: V - to stop the normative acts of the Executive Power which exceed their regimental 
authority or the limits of legislative delegation. 
 
179 Barroso, O Controle de Constitucionalidade no Direito Brasileiro, at 189. 
 
180 Article 103 of the Republican Constitution: Paragraph 1 - The Attorney General of the Republic shall be 
previously heard in actions of unconstitutionality and in all lawsuits under the power of the STF. In similar 
determination: article 8 of the federal law no. 9,868, of 1999. 
 
181 Barroso, O Controle de Constitucionalidade no Direito Brasileiro, at 197. 
 
182 Idem, at 189. 
 
183 Noting that the choice for political parties instead of a percentage of the members of the House or the 
Senate was an explicit refutation of foreigner models of abstract review, such as in Spain, Portugal, Austria 
and Germany: Mendes and Branco, Curso de Direito Constitucional, at 1117. 
 
184 Barroso, O Controle de Constitucionalidade no Direito Brasileiro, at 190. 
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link between the thematic pertinence of the arguable unconstitutionality of the law or 
normative act and the competences or powers of the legislative assembly or of the state to 
which it belongs as a representative organ. Along these lines, the unconstitutionality 
might be argued even when the law or normative act emanated from the State Assembly 
itself.185 
 State governors are similarly required to prove the thematic pertinence between 
the law (or normative act) arguably in violation of the Republican constitutional text and 
the interests (including the powers) that the governor shall protect.186 In the light of 
recurrent decisions of the STF, the governor is authorized to file direct actions when the 
law emanates from its own state, the federal union, or even other states, as long as the law 
or normative act is interfering illegitimately with the interests or powers of the 
governor.187 The governor – and not the state nor the State Attorney General – is the one 
authorized to file the claim in this abstract control.188  
 The most controversial topic in the case law of the STF is the special requirements 
for professional association of nationwide nature. The STF ruled that in order to be 
characterized as a nationwide professional association, it must have associates in at least 
nine states of the Brazilian federation. 189  Considering the concept of professional 
association, the Court understands that there must be the same professional exercise 
among the associates or the exercise of the same economic activity linking the 
associates.190 
                                                        
185 Barroso, O Controle de Constitucionalidade no Direito Brasileiro, at 190–191. 
 
186 Idem, at 191. 
 
187 Arguing that this exigency of thematic pertinence of Governors to exercise the abstract control of 
constitutionality of laws or normative acts of governors of other states is not aligned with the nature of the 
abstract control and stating that it is not correct: Mendes and Branco, Curso de Direito Constitucional, at 
1116–1117. 
 
188
 Barroso, O Controle de Constitucionalidade no Direito Brasileiro, at 191. 
 
189 As justice Gilmar Mendes clarifies: One third of the unities of the Brazilian Federation, i.e., nine. They 
reach that number through analogical application of article 7, paragraph first, of the federal law 9,096, of 
1995, also known as the Organic Law of Political Parties: Mendes and Branco, Curso de Direito 
Constitucional, at 1114, where the author criticizes that analogical application was aimed at to reduce those 
authorized to provoke the abstract review. 
 
190 Barroso, O Controle de Constitucionalidade no Direito Brasileiro, at 192. 
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 Specific discussions about the complexity of the STF case law are beyond the 
purpose of this research. It is worth mentioning, however, that the National Students 
Association is not considered a professional association. Also excluded are associations 
including enterprises (juridical persons) in the association, instead of merely natural 
persons. Remarkably, the case law of the Supremo is evolving and has admitted 
associations including enterprises, provided that their objective is the protection of the 
same social category.191 Another requirement regarding the professional associations 
refers to the verification of thematic pertinence between the impugnation of the arguable 
unconstitutional law and the particular objectives of the association.192 
 The last specially authorized actor to file action of abstract review is the 
confederation of labor unions. The STF also demands from them thematic pertinence. It 
has been argued that the Court tries to balance adequate representation with the excessive 
number of direct actions of unconstitutionality.193 Initially, mere federations of labor 
unions were admitted as professional associations. This understanding was superseded by 
a more restricted one, according to which only confederations194 would be authorized to 
initiate the abstract control.195 
 With the promulgation of the federal law 9,868 of 1999, cases of direct action 
were granted the participation of specific organs or entities who are representative of a 
particular segment of the society in order to promote relevant discussions about the case 
at bar, in an analogous manner to the U.S. amicus curiae.196 The decision regarding the 
                                                        
191 Barroso, O Controle de Constitucionalidade no Direito Brasileiro, at 193. In this direction: Mendes and 
Branco, Curso de Direito Constitucional, at 1112. 
 
192 Barroso, O Controle de Constitucionalidade no Direito Brasileiro, at 194. Criticizing this requirement in 
light of the nonexistence of constitutional and legal provisions for that: Mendes and Branco, Curso de 
Direito Constitucional, at 1116. 
 
193 Barroso, O Controle de Constitucionalidade no Direito Brasileiro, at 195. 
 
194 According to the Brazilian labor law, confederations are formed by three or more federations (whose 
scope of representation is a federal state): as stated in articles 533 to 537 of the Consolidation of Labor 
Laws: Decree-law no. 5,452, of 1943 (CLT). 
 
195 Mendes and Branco, Curso de Direito Constitucional, at 1114–1115. 
 
196 Barroso, O Controle de Constitucionalidade no Direito Brasileiro, at 197. 
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admission of the amicus curiae (or its denial) is exclusive of the justice rapporteur in the 
Supremo, without appeals.197 
 At this point, we turn to the direct actions of unconstitutionality. At the federal 
level, as outlined above, the arguably unconstitutional norms are measured against the 
Republican Constitution. Under article 59 of the Constitution, the following normative 
species compromises the legislative process: (1) amendments to the Constitution; (2) 
complementary laws; (3) ordinary laws; (4) delegated laws; (5) provisional measures; (6) 
legislative decrees; and (7) resolutions. Regarding constitutional amendments,198 the STF 
has already acknowledged the admissibility of their control in abstract review.199 It is 
worth noting that the unconstitutionality may be material if referring to the content of the 
amendment.200 It may also be formal, when there is a procedural violation.201 There are 
also circumstantial limitations of the amendment power, which bar any modifications of 
the Constitution when particular events occur.202 
                                                        
197 Article 7, paragraph two, of the federal law no. 9,868, of 1999: The justice rapporteur, considering the 
relevance of the subject matter and the degree of representation of those requesting to intervene, may, in 
interlocutory decision that is not subject to appeal, (…) admit the manifestation of distinct organs and 
entities.” 
 
198 For references to the classification of limitations of constitutional amendments: Barroso, O Controle de 
Constitucionalidade no Direito Brasileiro, at 200. 
 
199 The most famous case being, perhaps, the Constitutional Amendment no. 3, about the tax called IPMF, 
judged by the STF en banc on March 17, 1994, when the Court ruled the article two of that amendment as 
unconstitutional, according to information last accessed on January, 2014, and available at: 
http://www.stf.jus.br/portal/peticaoInicial/verPeticaoInicial.asp?base=ADIN&s1=939&processo=939 
 
200 As the limitation of the so-called stone clauses of paragraph four of article 60: No proposal of 
amendment shall be considered which is aimed at abolishing: I - the federative form of State; II - the direct, 
secret, universal and periodic vote; III - the separation of the Government Powers; IV - individual rights 
and guarantees. 
 
201 As determined in article 60 of the Republican Constitution: The Constitution may be amended on the 
proposal of: I - at least one-third of the members of the Chamber of Deputies or of the Federal Senate; II - 
the President of the Republic; III - more than one half of the Legislative Assemblies of the units of the 
Federation, each of them expressing itself by the relative majority of its members. (…) Paragraph two: The 
proposal shall be discussed and voted upon in each House of the National Congress, in two readings, and it 
shall be considered approved if it obtains in both readings, three-fifths of the votes of the respective 
members. 
 
202 Article 60 of the Republican Constitution, paragraph one: The Constitution shall not be amended while 
federal intervention; a state of defense; or a state of siege is in force. 
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 Complementary laws – sometimes referred as supplementary laws – are 
legislative species that only occurs when explicit mention in the constitutional text exists. 
It requires a particular quorum for deliberation.203 If an ordinary law invades the sphere 
of competence that the Constitution particularly allocated to the complementary law, it is 
a case for constitutional control based in such constitutional violation – not due to the 
existence of hierarchy between the two legislative species. 204  Technically, each 
legislative species of law has its own sphere of competences, defined according to the 
constitutional text itself. 
 It is important to emphasize that the most frequent object of direct actions of 
unconstitutionality refers to ordinary laws because it is the principal tool used to innovate 
in the legal order. The most common violation concerns invasions of initiative, i.e., the 
organ or power that is not empowered to initiate the legislative procedure regarding that 
particular subject matter. The unauthorized power, therefore, exceeds its own sphere of 
action and conflicts with the Constitution. 205  Hence, those violations of initiative 
encompass actions of actors who are not empowered to be involved in the legislative 
procedure of the legislative act. There are several constitutional provisions determining 
that the initiative to legislate in a particular topic does not belong to a member of the 
Congress, but to other branches.206 
 Delegated law is legislative specie that is in currently in disuse, but it is subject to 
a dual possibility of review of its constitutionality.207 First, when referring to the 
resolution of the Congress delegating the matter; second, to the delegated law itself.208 
                                                        
203 Article 69 of the Republican Constitution: Supplementary laws shall be approved by absolute majority. 
 
204 Barroso, O Controle de Constitucionalidade no Direito Brasileiro, at 201–202. 
 
205 For the statistical references mentioned in this paragraph: Idem, at 202. 
 
206 For an example of the STF being empowered to start legislation: Article 96 of the Republican 
Constitution: It is of the exclusive competence of: II - the Supreme Federal Court, the Superior Courts and 
the Courts of Justice, to propose to the respective Legislative Power (…): a) alteration in the number of 
members of the lower courts. 
 
207 Barroso, O Controle de Constitucionalidade no Direito Brasileiro, at 202. 
 
208 Article 68 of the Republican Constitution: Delegated laws shall be elaborated by the President of the 
Republic, who shall request the delegation from the National Congress. Paragraph one - There shall be no 
delegation of acts falling within the exclusive competence of the National Congress, of those within the 
exclusive competence of the Chamber of Deputies or the Federal Senate, of matters reserved for 
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Provisional measures are subject to dual constitutional review, considering its formal 
requirements as well as the contents of such legislative specie.209 The STF ruled that the 
formal exigencies of relevance and urgency shall preponderantly be the object of political 
control by the President, when enacting the measure. Equally, it shall be object of such 
control by the National Congress when the measure is submitted.210 When abuse of 
legislating power, or in the case of clear absence of reasonability of the provisional 
measure, it shall be reviewed by the judiciary. As for the contents of the provisional 
measure, the Supremo understands that the reenactment of the provisional measure or its 
conversion in law, as long as the same writing is maintained, are not obstacles to the 
direct action filed against the originally provisional act impugned. In this sense, mootness 
would not bar the direct action to continue.211 
 Legislative decrees and resolutions are normative species enacted exclusively by 
the Congress  – or by one of its houses – having the force of law. Hence, they are also 
subject to the dual constitutional review based on the material and formal requirements. 
There is precedent in the STF regarding legislative decrees that approved treaties as being 
subject to the abstract control, and similarly, there has been invalidation of executive 
normative acts.212 There are also normative species that are subject to the abstract control 
                                                                                                                                                                     
supplementary laws and of legislation on: I - the organization of the Judicial Power and of the Public 
Prosecution, the career and guarantees of their members; II - nationality, citizenship, individual, political 
and electoral rights, III – pluriannual plans, budgetary directives and budgets. Paragraph two - The 
delegation to the President of the Republic shall take the form of a resolution of the National Congress, 
which shall specify its contents and the terms of its exercise. Paragraph three - If the resolution calls for 
consideration of the bill by the National Congress, the latter shall do so in a single voting, any amendment 
being forbidden. 
 
209 Article 62 of the Republican Constitution: In relevant and urgent cases, the President of the Republic 
may adopt provisional measures with the force of law and shall submit them to the National Congress 
immediately. 
 
210 For the discussion of those requirements as well as the case law of the STF, we referred to: Barroso, O 
Controle de Constitucionalidade no Direito Brasileiro, at 203. 
 
211 References relating to the mootness doctrine present in the American constitutional law were based on 
the concepts explained by Erwin Chemerinsky, Constitutional Law: Principles and Policies (New York: 
Aspen, 2006), at 124–125, specifically addressing future modifications altering the text of the arguably 
unconstitutional law that is being examined by the judiciary. 
 
212 Discussing the precedents of the Supremo in terms of legislative decrees and resolutions: Barroso, O 
Controle de Constitucionalidade no Direito Brasileiro, at 204. 
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exercised in direct actions, but that are not mentioned in article 59 of the Constitution. 
Those types are: autonomous decrees, state legislation, and international treaties.  
 We start with the autonomous decrees. The validation of such decrees is not in an 
ordinary law. Hence, they are primary normative acts, i.e., capable of directly innovating 
in the legal order. In this sense, the autonomous decree may be subject to abstract review, 
and commonly is so, due to possible violations of the legality principle.213 By contrast, 
ordinary decrees are unable to autonomously innovate in the legal order because they are 
secondary acts. Ordinary decrees have their validity based on a primary legislative act, 
thus, not enacted with the force of law.214  
 State legislation is also subject to the abstract control of constitutionality of direct 
actions started in the Supremo, as expressly mentioned in the Republican Constitution.215 
The concept of state legislation includes the state constitution, state ordinary legislation, 
and autonomous decrees of the state.216 States have self-organization capacity, while 
being subject to the limitations of the Republican Constitution.217 Several precedents in 
the Supremo have declared dispositions of state constitutions invalid in light of the 
Republican Constitution. Importantly, as previously mentioned, state laws and state 
normative acts are subject to a dual control of constitutionality. The first control occurs in 
the STF, with the review exercised based on the Republican Constitution. The second 
happens in the state Supreme Court, when the unconstitutionality is verified based on the 
state constitution.218 
 International treaties and conventions are incorporated in the Brazilian legal order 
with the status of ordinary rule. The STF decided that when an international treaty refers 
                                                        
213 Idem, at 205, where the author also notes that the internal procedural regulations of the tribunals 
(regimentos internos) are also subject to the abstract review. 
 
214 Idem. 
 
215 Article 102 of the Republican Constitution is quoted supra, footnote 162. 
 
216 Barroso, O Controle de Constitucionalidade no Direito Brasileiro, at 205. 
 
217 Article 25 of the Republican Constitution is referred supra, footnote 128. 
 
218 Barroso, O Controle de Constitucionalidade no Direito Brasileiro, at 205–206. The jurisdiction to decide 
the constitutionality of a state law that is arguably violating the state constitution belongs to the state Court 
of Appeals (also referred as state Supreme Courts). 
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to human rights, it is hierarchically superior to ordinary laws but is below the 
Constitution. Therefore, supervening ordinary law cannot revoke such treaty. 219  In 
addition, the Constitutional Amendment 45, of 2004, introduced the possibility that 
international treaties about human rights might be incorporated to the Republican 
Constitution as long as the procedure for amending the Constitution is obeyed.220 In this 
case, the constitutional review applicable will be the one previously addressed regarding 
the process of reviewing amendments to the Constitution.221 
 The focus is now on the main legal claims that the STF considers as not being 
subject to abstract review exercised in direct actions. The first hypothesis refers to the so-
called normative secondary acts,222 which encompasses regulations, regulatory decrees, 
and declaratory acts, among others. Such acts are not capable of innovating in the legal 
order and, thus, are not immediately conflicting with the Constitution. In this case, the 
pertinent control is the one of legality – not constitutionality.223 
 The second hypothesis considers laws that were enacted previously to the current 
Constitution. The reiterative case law of the Supremo does not accept abstract review in 
direct actions of laws that were promulgated in accordance with the previous 
Constitution. For the Supremo, the abstract control shall only occur in relation to laws 
and normative acts that are posterior to the current Constitution.224 Accordingly, possible 
conflicts between legislative acts enacted before the current Constitution and the 
                                                        
219 Noting that, technically, the constitutional review operates to invalidate the legislative decree that 
approved the treaty and the presidential decree that promulgates the treaty – not upon the treaty itself:  Luís 
Roberto Barroso, Interpretação e Aplicação da Constituição (Rio de Janeiro: Saraiva, 2004), at 15–33. 
 
220 Article 5, paragraph three of the Republican Constitution: The international treaties and conventions on 
Human Rights which are approved, in each House of National Congress, in two rounds, by three fifths of 
votes of the respective members, will be equivalent to Constitutional Amendments. 
 
221 Barroso, O Controle de Constitucionalidade no Direito Brasileiro, at 207. 
 
222 In principle, Enunciate of Súmulas of the Tribunals (enunciates reflecting a true compilation of the 
jurisprudence of a given tribunal in a specific ruling) are not object of Adin, due to its lack of innovation in 
the legal system. In this sense and for a related discussion about this topic: Barroso, O Controle de 
Constitucionalidade no Direito Brasileiro, at 210–211. 
 
223Idem, at 208. 
 
224
 For a deeper discussion – which is beyond our scope at the present work–, including different theoretical 
formulations as well as the evolution of the case law of the Supremo with regard to the distinction between 
illegality and unconstitutionality: Barroso, Interpretação e Aplicação da Constituição, at 67–90. 
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Constitution itself can solely be settle incidentally, in the concrete control of 
constitutionality.225 
 The third unauthorized hypothesis of abstract review in direct action is the one of 
revoked laws. Those laws shall not be object of such control because they are no longer 
effective.226 Hence, if a direct action is filed against a particular law and such law is later 
revoked during the lawsuit, there is the loss of the object of the direct action that 
consequently shall end.227 
 The fourth inadmissible hypothesis of direct action is the one based on municipal 
law.228 The express provision of the Constitution only mentions as objects of direct 
actions state or federal law or normative acts.229 Therefore, municipal laws and normative 
acts are excluded. The STF not only rules as inadmissible direct action to declare the 
unconstitutionality of municipal law or normative act arising out of conflicting provisions 
with the Republican Constitution, but forbids that state constitutions attribute this 
jurisdiction to the state supreme courts. Such bar is justified under theoretical concerns of 
usurpation of the original jurisdiction of the Supremo itself.230 
 The fifth unauthorized case of direct action refers to norms whose formation is not 
completed: amendments to the Constitution and proposed bills (proposed legislation). 
The Republican Constitution of 1988 does not have a preventive abstract constitutional 
                                                        
225 Barroso, O Controle de Constitucionalidade no Direito Brasileiro, at 208. 
 
226 Idem, at 209. 
 
227 In the parlance of the United States Supreme Court, the Brazilian procedural doctrine of “losing the 
object of a claim,” in the particular sense discussed here, would be equivalent to mootness. For definition 
of mootness: Chemerinsky, Constitutional Law: Principles and Policies, at 124–125. 
 
228 The federal district has competences and powers of state as well as those peculiar of municipalities, 
according to article 32, paragraph l of the Republican Constitution: The legislative powers and 
competences reserved to the states and municipalities are attributed to the Federal District.  In order to 
determine if the direct action based on violation of the Republic Constitution is admissible, one shall look 
to the exercise of such competence and powers. If those relate to the exercise of municipal competences 
and powers, then no Adin is admissible. Along those exact lines, the STF edited the Enunciate of Súmula 
No. 642, of 2003: It is not admissible direct action of unconstitutionality of law or normative act of the 
Federal District that are derived from its municipal competence and powers. 
 
229 Article 102 of the Republican Constitution is quoted at footnote 162, supra. 
 
230 This is so, because the STF is the court whose jurisdiction based on abstract review encompasses direct 
actins that are arguably in violation of the Republican Constitution: Barroso, O Controle de 
Constitucionalidade no Direito Brasileiro, at 210. 
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review.231 Importantly, when a member of the Congress commences a specific injunction 
(mandado de segurança), the claim arises out of possible violations of the material 
limitations of the procedures of amendments to the Constitution. Hence, the political 
actor does so based on the exercise of his or her prerogatives under the concrete 
review.232 
 The last inadmissible case of direct actions is intuitive, nevertheless deserves 
comments. It encompasses the súmulas. Those are juridical propositions about 
controversial legal topics that integrate the reiterative jurisprudence of a tribunal and 
therefore lack the primary force that is generally required to file a constitutional review 
claim.233 
 The nature of the norm according to which the constitutional review is exercised 
is often called paradigm in Brazil. Paradigm of constitutionality refers to the 
constitutional norms or group of constitutional norms that might have been violated and 
that are suffering control in its abstract form.234 Existence of two trends in the STF should 
be noted.235 The majoritarian approach considers that only principles and norms, even 
though not express, may be utilized as a constitutional parameter. The second, less 
restrictive, trend considers that general principles that are not positive may also be 
deemed as paradigm. Ultimately, it admits general principles of natural law as a 
parameter for judicial review.236 Therefore, in the Brazilian case, all the dogmatic 
constitutional norms (articles 1 to 250) and the Act of the Transitory Dispositions 
                                                        
231 Barroso, O Controle de Constitucionalidade no Direito Brasileiro, at 210. 
 
232 Idem. Similarly, there have been occasions in the U.S. constitutional experience that only a member of 
Congress had standing, due to violation of his or her prerogatives. For instance: when Senator Kennedy 
successfully argued that his prerogative to vote has been denied by a pocket veto used by Nixon: Louis 
Fisher and Katy J. Harriger, American Constitutional Law: Constitutional Structures (Durham: Carolina 
Academic Press, 2013), at 15.  
 
233 Barroso, O Controle de Constitucionalidade no Direito Brasileiro, at 211. 
 
234 See chapter six of this thesis: Do Specialized Constitutional Courts make a Difference? 
 
235 As pointed out by Paulo Roberto de Figueiredo Dantas, Direito Processual Constitucional (São Paulo: 
Atlas, 2013), at 179. 
 
236 As, for instance, defended by STF Justice Celso de Mello, in the transcripts of Informative n. 258, at 2 
(Informativo do STF no. 258, of February 18, 2002). 
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(articles 1 to 97) are considered as parameters of constitutionality. The preamble is not a 
parameter because it does not have normative character, but merely interpretative 
force.237 It is noteworthy that when the Constitution mentions law or normative act as 
objects of the abstract control of constitutionality, it includes provisional measures 
(medidas provisórias), as well as constitutional amendments. It encompasses even 
concrete laws, as those disciplining the annual budget.238 
 Our focus shifts to the most relevant procedural questions for this thesis involving 
Adins. The general procedural rules are established in the federal law 9,868, of 1999, and 
in the case law of the Supremo. Notwithstanding previous decisions, recent case law 
purports as inadmissible Adins whose unconstitutionality has already been declared by 
the STF in an Extraordinary Appeal.239 Once the Adin is filed, the plaintiff is no longer 
capable of ending the lawsuit.240 As argued in the previous sections, it is an objective 
procedure,241 namely, without a specific concrete case or controversy, as defined under 
the U.S. Constitutional Law parlor.242 
 The possibility of preliminary injunctions (also addressed as decisions in limine) 
is explicitly defined in the Constitution,243 while being detailed at federal law 9,868, of 
1999. This law determines that the minimum quorum for the concession of preliminary 
injunctions in the case of Adins is the so-called absolute majority – hence, the necessity 
                                                        
237 Moraes, Direito Constitucional, at 18. 
 
238 As stated by Justice Gilmar Ferreira Mendes, in Meirelles, Wald and Mendes, Mandado  de  Segurança  
e Ações Constitucionais, at 413–414. 
 
239 Barroso, O Controle de Constitucionalidade no Direito Brasileiro, at 213, where the author remarked 
that the case law of the STF considers as exceptions to this general rule circumstances that have modified 
the social context or the legal order. Thus, the newer Adin shall be admissible, if at least one of the 
exceptions is verified. 
 
240 Article 5 of law 9,868, of 1999: Once filled the Adin, it is not admissible the desistence by the plaintiff. 
 
241 Also for that reason it is not applicable the double time period for the public parties to file the defense, 
as generally stated in article 188 of the Code of Civil Procedure, as stressed in Barroso, O Controle de 
Constitucionalidade no Direito Brasileiro, at 217.    
 
242  For references about standing in American Constitutional law experience, see, among others: 
Chemerinsky, Constitutional Law: Principles and Policies, at 60–82, in particular. 
 
243 Article 102: The Supremo Tribunal Federal is responsible, essentially, for safeguarding the Constitution, 
and it is within its competence: I - to institute legal proceeding and trial, in the first instance, of: p: 
preliminary injunctions and petitions of provisional remedy in direct actions of unconstitutionality. 
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of having six members of the Court.244 Doctrinally, the preliminary injunction in Adin 
should be an exceptional measure given the general legal presumption of constitutionality 
of the acts of the government (encompassing all the branches and levels of government). 
This presumption includes laws and normative acts. Nevertheless, due to the crowded 
dockets of the STF, the suspension of the effects caused by conceding an injunction 
against the arguably unconstitutional act has important consequences. It ultimately turns a 
provisional measure to have effects as if it were definitive, in light of the long period that 
such injunction may last. Similarly, the denial of the concession of such injunction 
postpones the final decision to an undetermined future.245  
 The case law of the STF has established several requirements to be fulfilled in 
order to grant preliminary injunctions in Adins. The requirements generally mentioned by 
the STF and legal scholars are the plausibility of the legal claim (fumus boni iuris), the 
likelihood of harm if the injunction is denied (periculum in mora), the irreparability or the 
endurableness of the nature of the damages that will arise out of the arguably 
unconstitutional act, and the necessity to secure the posterior efficacy of the award. The 
Court has occasionally mentioned the relevance of the claim, which would encompass the 
plausibility and the convenience of the measure, and ultimately involves a judgment 
made by balancing the onus and benefits of conceding the injunction in that abstract 
control.246 It also bears emphasis the understanding that when the Adin is filled after a 
longer period of time, such lapse may disavow the concession of the provisional measure. 
Consequently, the STF tends to hold that the full efficacy of the law was not causing 
irreparable harm if a long time elapsed without constitutional challenges.247 
 The refusal of a preliminary injunction shall not have biding effect, whereas its 
concession shall suspend any transiting lawsuit filed in the Supremo until the final 
                                                        
244 Article 10 of law 9,868, of 1999: Except for the official period of recess, the injunction shall be granted 
in Adin by an absolute majority of the members of the Court, which must rule within five days, subject to 
the provisions of art. 22, after hearing the organs or authorities from which emanated a challenged law or 
normative act. 
 
245 Barroso, O Controle de Constitucionalidade no Direito Brasileiro, at 217. 
 
246 In this direction, among other authors, see: Mendes and Branco, Curso de Direito Constitucional, at 
1138–1140; Barroso, O Controle de Constitucionalidade no Direito Brasileiro, at 218. 
 
247 Barroso, O Controle de Constitucionalidade no Direito Brasileiro, at 218. 
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decision of the Court regarding the Adin. Likewise, there is precedent stating that the 
same shall occur to lawsuits commenced in different judicial spheres, as long as those 
lawsuits involve a law whose efficacy has been suspended in limine by the STF.248 There 
are no appeals from the decision that grants the injunction to suspend the (arguably) 
unconstitutional act. If the injunction is denied, such decision may be the object of 
reconsideration, once the occurrence of supervening facts capable of justifying a new 
judgment is verified.249 
 The federal law 9,868, of 1999, also determined the effects of the injunction as 
biding and generally applicable against all (erga omnes), without retroaction (ex nunc).250 
Retroactive effects may occur, however, if the STF decides it is appropriate in particular 
cases.251 Generally, once the injunction is granted, the previous legislation becomes 
applicable, unless the Court decides otherwise.252 This general rule is based on the overall 
presumption that invalid acts shall not produce invalid effects.253 The current law allows 
the tribunal to anticipate the final decision considering the exceptional circumstances of 
the case.254 The federal law 9,868, of 1999, addresses jointly the final decision in direct 
                                                        
248 Idem, at 218–219. 
 
249 Idem, at 219. 
 
250 Article 11 of law 9,868, of 1999: paragraph 1: The injunctive relief shall be provided with efficacy 
against all, and shall be granted with effect ex nunc, unless the Court decided that the efficacy shall be 
retroactively.  Paragraph 2: The concession of the injunction shall turn applicable the previous existent 
legislation – if there is one –, except when the Court expressily decides differently. 
 
251
 Barroso, O Controle de Constitucionalidade no Direito Brasileiro, at 220, noting that the law above 
referred is consistent with the previous case law of the Court. In cases that the article which was the object 
of the preliminary injunction has ordered the revocation of a particular norm, according to reiterative 
decisions of the Court, such injunction shall have retroactive effect in order to allow that previous norm to 
remain valid. 
 
252 Barroso, O Controle de Constitucionalidade no Direito Brasileiro, at 220. 
 
253 Idem. 
 
254 Also considering the peculiar necessities of the case, the judge rapporteur may submit the claim to a 
faster procedure, as stated in article 12 of law 9,868, of 1999: If there is a request for preliminary injunctive 
relief, the rapporteur, given the relevance of the material and its particular significance to the social order 
and juridical safety, will be able, after provision of information, within ten days, and the manifestation of 
the Attorney-General of the Republic and the Advocate General Office, successively, within five days, 
refer the case directly to the Court, which will have the power to award a final judgment in the abstract 
action. 
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actions of unconstitutionality and declaratory actions of constitutionality. Such law 
understands both actions as a unitarian system.255  
 Hence, once the direct action of unconstitutionality is admitted and ultimately 
declared unconstitutional, other eventual declaratory actions of constitutionality are 
deemed inadmissible. Importantly, there are no appeals from the final decision,256 except 
eventual motion for clarification.257 
 At this point, we turn our attention to the effects of the final decision in direct 
actions of unconstitutionality. As a rule, such decision produces retroactive effects.258 
Remarkably, the STF has sparsely utilized the so-called modulation of effects of the final 
decision – the faculty of the Court to determine the effects of the unconstitutionality 
decision to be reduced (or not being retroactive at all) in final decisions of the abstract 
control.259   
 Final decisions of the Supremo in abstract control are binding toward all (erga 
omnes) the organs of the judiciary and the public administration in the three (federal, 
state, and municipal) spheres.260  
                                                        
255 Barroso, O Controle de Constitucionalidade no Direito Brasileiro, at 221. 
 
256 For the specific deliberation quorum about the final decisions in direct actions of unconstitutionality and 
declaratory actions of constitutionality, article 22 of law 9,868, of 1999, states the following: The final 
decision about constitutionality or unconstitutionality shall only be made in the presence of eight justices, 
at least. 
 
257 Article 26 of law 9,868, of 1999: The decision declaring the constitutionality or unconstitutionality of 
the law or normative act in direct action or declaratory action is unappealable, except for the filing of 
motion of clarification,  and it cannot be subject to rescission action. 
 
258 Article 27 of law 9,868, of 1999: By declaring the unconstitutionality of the law or normative act, and in 
view of legal security and exceptional social interest, the Supremoo Tribunal Federal will be able to, by a 
majority of two thirds of its members, restrict the effects of that declaration or decide that it has 
effectiveness from the final decision or other time as may be prescribed by the STF.   
 
259
 For examples in the case law of the STF (including declaration of unconstitutionality incidentally, 
declaration of constitutionality in abstract, and modifications of the case law of the STF), while noting that 
other courts also used such modulation: Barroso, O Controle de Constitucionalidade no Direito Brasileiro, 
at 241–242. 
 
260 The first norm regulating this matter was the federal law 9,868, of 1999, article 28, sole paragraph: The 
declaration of constitutionality or unconstitutionality – even the interpretation in accordance with the 
Constitution and the partial declaration of unconstitutionality without reduction of the text – shall have 
binding effect and efficacy against all the organs of the judicial power and the public admnistration on the 
federal, state and municipal spheres. With the  Constitutional Amendment 45, of 2004, and the inclusion of 
the paragraph second of article 102 of the Constitution, such effect is now provided in the constitutional 
text: Final decisions on judgments, pronounced by the Supremo Tribunal Federal, in direct actions of 
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 It is worth stressing that the legislative branch is not included in this binding 
effect of final decisions reached in abstract review.261 
 There is a particular hypothesis concerning the effects of the declaration of 
unconstitutionality. For the hypothesis that the law declared unconstitutional by the STF 
also revokes a previous norm, such revocation stops existing upon the declaration of 
unconstitutionality that operates retroactively. The revoked norm becomes valid again, 
with the legal order returning to the status quo ante262 – although the Court may decide 
differently, considering the particular impact in a given case.263 
 The law 9,868, of 1999, distinguishes between the interpretation in accordance 
with the Constitution and the partial declaration of unconstitutionality without reduction 
of the text.264 We agree with the understanding that conceives the interpretation in 
accordance with the Constitution as encompassing the following actions by the 
interpreter: (1) the reading of the infra-constitutional norm in a manner that best suits the 
sense and the reach of values and goals of the Constitution that are directly related to 
such norm; (2) the declaration of nonoccurence of the norm in a particular factual 
hypothesis; or (3) the partial declaration of the norm without reduction of the text, which 
shall exclude a conceivable interpretation of the norm – often, the most obvious sense –
                                                                                                                                                                     
unconstitutionality and in declaratory actions of constitutionality, shall have force against all, as well as a 
binding effect, as regards the other bodies of the judicial power, as well as direct and indirect public 
administration, at federal, states and municipalities levels. 
 
261 Understanding that the legislative branch may edit and promulgate a new norm that would bear, in 
theory, the same unconstitutionality and explaining that the sole defense would be a new Adin based on the 
most recent legislation: Barroso, O Controle de Constitucionalidade no Direito Brasileiro, at 233; and 
Clève, A Fiscalização Abstrata da Constitucionalidade no Direito Brasileiro, at 241–242, who advocated at 
that moment, de lege ferenda, the extension of the binding effects to all abstract decisions of the STF. It is 
noteworthy that the STF has already decided that the legislative branch is not bound by this effect, due to 
its impact in potentially jeopardizing the principle of separation of powers, as contended by Moraes, Direito 
Constitucional, at 794, where the Professor also criticizes the understanding of the Supremo. 
 
262 Barroso, O Controle de Constitucionalidade no Direito Brasileiro, at 229. 
 
263 Prior to the existence of the federal law 9,868, of 1999, it was widely accepted that if the plaintiffs in a 
abstract action did not want the previously revoked norm to resurrect, they would have to make a specific 
request stating so in the initial petition of the direct action: Clève, A Fiscalização Abstrata da 
Constitucionalidade no Direito Brasileiro, at 250.  
 
264 As stated in the sole paragraph of article 28. The law makes this distinction. Although there have been 
positions arguing that they are the same, according to the case law of the STF. An in depth discussion about 
this controversy is besides the topic of our research. 
 
  62 
therefore determining an alternative interpretation as being the one compatible with the 
Constitution.265 The binding effect shall only occur in the last two hypotheses because 
they exclude possible interpretations. 266  The legal text remains the same but its 
interpretation can only be the one that the STF determines.267 
 A note referring to the declaration of constitutionality in Adin is necessary. When 
the decision of an Adin declares that a given act or norm is constitutional, it does not 
prohibit future actions of unconstitutionality based on different arguments or factual 
circumstances. In this sense, there is no material effectiveness of the res judicata.268 On 
the other hand, it does have the so-called formal effectiveness of the res judicata (the 
organ who made the final decision cannot review the same case) and the erga omnes 
effect (the organ who decided the lawsuit can decide other lawsuits differently, if 
circumstances are modified, but other organs of the judiciary are bound to the decision of 
the STF and to its reasoning).269 Hence, judicial organs in the concrete review shall be 
bound to decide in accordance with the determination made by the Supremo in the 
abstract review of constitutionality and, if judicial organs violate this rule, there may be a 
reclamation action270 started in the Supremo.271 It is worth stressing that there is no 
application of the suspension of the unconstitutional law by the Senate,272 because direct 
                                                        
265 Barroso, O Controle de Constitucionalidade no Direito Brasileiro, at 234. 
 
266 Idem. 
 
267 Barroso, Interpretação e Aplicação da Constituição, at 189. 
 
268 For an analysis of this subject matter, including the possibility of constitutional norms that are 
constitutional in a historical moment but are progressively moving towards unconstitutionality, see, among 
others: Barroso, O Controle de Constitucionalidade no Direito Brasileiro, at 227–228. 
 
269 Idem, at 231. It is worth noticing that the author also emphasizes that judicial organs are bound not only 
to the final order of the STF, but also to its reasoning: at 235. In this sense: Moraes, Direito Constitucional, 
at 794. 
 
270 Article 102 of the Brazilian Constitution: The Supremo Tribunal Federal is responsible, essentially, for 
safeguarding the Constitution, and it is within its competence: I - to institute legal proceeding and trial, in 
the first instance, of: l) claims for the preservation of its powers and guarantee of the authority of its 
decisions. 
 
271 Barroso, O Controle de Constitucionalidade no Direito Brasileiro, at 232.  
 
272 Article 52 of the Constitution of 1988: It is exclusively the competence of the Federal Senate: (…) X - to 
stop the application, in full or in part, of a law declared unconstitutional by final decision of the STF.  
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actions are a form of principal control of constitutionality.273 Therefore, the reiterative 
case law of the STF did not require such suspension for claims based on the principal 
review exercised by the STF – even before the Constitution of 1988.274  
 
  B. The Declaratory Action of Constitutionality 
 The declaratory action of constitutionality – abbreviated ADC275 – has no rigorous 
counterpart in comparative experience.
276
 It has been argued that the declaratory action of 
constitutionality has its origins in the Brazilian constitutional history, to the extent that 
the direct action of unconstitutionality would also be an action of constitutionality. This 
understanding is due to the fact that the STF is able to declare the constitutionality of the 
law or normative act under scrutiny.
277
 The declaratory action of constitutionality 
originated after a general reaction against the reintroduction of the avocatória action in 
Brazil.
278
 Under the previous Constitution, the avocatória allowed the STF to avocate 
actions that had final judgments pending in lower courts and decide them.
279 
                                                        
273 Determining that the public administration (direct and indirect) and all its agents shall obey the 
constitutional decisions of the STF that were made within the scope of a direct action as well as in the 
incidental cases (as long as the Senate has suspended the norm): Decree 2.246, of October ten, of 1997, 
article first; and the current article 1-A, as introduced to the Decree 2.246 by the Decree 3.001, of March 
26, of 1999, which also added that injunctions granted in Adin by the STF shall also be obeyed by such 
agents. 
 
274 Barroso, O Controle de Constitucionalidade no Direito Brasileiro, at 230. 
 
275 This action is also sometimes referred to as direct action of constitutionality – as, for instance, occurs 
with Clève, A Fiscalização Abstrata da Constitucionalidade no Direito Brasileiro, at 272, and at 285, for 
example.  
 
276 Barroso, O Controle de Constitucionalidade no Direito Brasileiro, at 258. 
 
277 Clève, A Fiscalização Abstrata da Constitucionalidade no Direito Brasileiro, at 290.  
 
278 The tentative reintroduction of the avocatória occurred in 1991, during the presidency of Fernando 
Collor de Mello. For reference of the date of the failed project: Clève, A Fiscalização Abstrata da 
Constitucionalidade no Direito Brasileiro, at 293. 
 
279 The avocatória was introduced by the first time in Brazil during the Constitution of 1967/69 (during the 
military ruling) by the Constitutional Amendment 7, of 1977. It authorized the STF to avocate any claim, 
upon request of the General Advocate of the Union, and as long as the Court verified the following:  
existence of an impending threat to public order, or public health, or public security or public finances in 
order to suspend lower courts decisions whose appeals were pending. The avocatória devolved to the STF 
the complete examination of the subject matter, enabling the Court to decide the factual and legal basis of 
the claim. Clève, A Fiscalização Abstrata da Constitucionalidade no Direito Brasileiro, at 282, noting that 
  64 
 In principle, the necessity of a declaratory action of constitutionality might be 
striking in light of the general presumption of constitutionality of all acts of the 
government. Nevertheless, in the Brazilian system that admits both concentrate and 
diffuse manifestations of control of constitutionality, the ADC has an important goal, 
namely, the achievement of a faster and unified interpretation, when conflicting 
interpretations of federal law or normative acts exists in the judiciary.280 Accordingly, it 
allows the STF to solve the controversy in a definitive manner, with efficacy erga omnes 
(binding towards all) and determinative effect.  
 The constitutionality of the Constitutional Amendment no. 3 of 1993, which 
introduced the declaratory action of constitutionality, was subject of large controversy. 
The object of the first declaratory action of constitutionality (ADC Number One, of 1993) 
referred to the constitutionality of the ADC itself.281 The main arguments attacking the 
constitutionality of the Constitutional Amendment 3 – and the introduction of the ADC in 
the Brazilian system – were the following:282 offense to the principle of separation of 
powers, violation of the principle of the due appreciation of the Judiciary and the citizens 
access to court,283 violation of the principle of the due process of law,284 and potential 
violations of the principle of ample defense, dual degree of jurisdiction, securing that at 
least one appeal shall be granted.285  
                                                                                                                                                                     
the avocatória jeopardizes the constitutional order due to potential offenses to constitutional principles of 
due process of law and of the natural judge, mainly. 
 
280 Clève, A Fiscalização Abstrata da Constitucionalidade no Direito Brasileiro, at 279–280; and at 293. 
  
281 Idem, at 289.  
 
282 For arguments against the ADC and the pertinent counter arguments, see, among others: Clève, A 
Fiscalização Abstrata da Constitucionalidade no Direito Brasileiro, at 282–290.  
 
283 Article 5 of the Brazilian Constitution of 1988: All persons are equal before the law, without any 
distinction whatsoever, with Brazilians and foreigners residing in the country being ensured of inviolability 
of the right to life, to liberty, to equality, to security and to property, on the following terms: XXXV- the 
law shall not exclude any injury or threat to a right from the consideration of the Judicial Power. 
 
284 Article 5 of the Brazilian Constitution of 1988: LIV- no one shall be deprived of freedom or of his assets 
without the due process of law. 
 
285 Article 5 of the Brazilian Constitution of 1988: LV- litigants, in judicial or administrative processes, as 
well as defendants in general, are ensured of the adversary system and the guarantees of ample and 
complete defense, with the means and resources inherent to it. 
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 The Supremo, who ruled that the ADC was another form of abstract review, thus, 
not violating the constitutional text, rebuked all the arguments above.286 According to the 
STF, the ADC provided for a more effective protection to the rights secured by the Court. 
At this point, it is worth stressing that the STF is the highest court of the Judiciary, 
namely, it is within the judicial branch, an important distinction of the European 
Constitutional Courts.287 
 The original text of the Constitutional Amendment no. 3 was much more 
restricted than the current text because it only authorized the President of Republic, the 
Mesas (Directing Boards) of the Senate and Deputies Chamber, and the Attorney General 
of the Republic. Currently, there is no distinction between the authorized parties to file 
the Adin and ADC, with both parties being the same for standing purposes in accordance 
with the reformed text of the Constitution, introduced by the Constitutional Amendment 
45 of 2004.288  
 Considering the federalism implications of such an amendment, the inclusion of 
the Directing Board of a State Legislative Assembly or of the Legislative Chamber of the 
Federal District as well as of State Governor or of the Governor of the Federal District 
provide an example of an open avenue for states to question federal norms – despite such 
questioning being centralized in the STF. 
 We proceed next to the analysis of the object of the declaratory action of 
constitutionality. The ADC can only be filled having as object a federal norm or federal 
legislative act. Hence, state norms and state legislative acts cannot be the base of such 
                                                        
286 The Court held so in a decision en banc, from October 27, of 1993, when ruling in the first ADC (ADC 
1 QO-DF). This decision also determined that the procedure of the declaratory action of constitutionality 
shall be the same as the one of the direct actions of unconstitutionality as show the copy of the decision 
available online at: http://www.stf.jus.br/portal/jurisprudencia/listarJurisprudencia.asp?s1=% 28ADC+e+1 
+e+1993%29&pagina=4&base=baseAcordaos&url=http://tinyurl.com/mdolovt 
 
287 Citing France, Belgic and Portugal as constitutional courts that are not situated within the judiciary: 
Clève, A Fiscalização Abstrata da Constitucionalidade no Direito Brasileiro, at 288. 
 
288 Article 103 of the Republican Constitution: The following may file an action of unconstitutionality and 
the declaratory action of constitutionality: I - the President of the Republic; II - the Directing Board of the 
Federal Senate; III - the Directing Board of the Chamber of Deputies; IV - the Directing Board of a State 
Legislative Assembly or of the Legislative Chamber of the Federal District; V - a State Governor or the 
Governor of the Federal District; VI - the Attorney General of the Republic; VII - the Federal Council of 
the Brazilian Bar Association; VIII - a political party represented in the National Congress; IX - a 
confederation of labor unions or a professional association of a nationwide nature. 
 
  66 
declaratory action.289 Exception being made to state norms and state normative acts, the 
object of the Declaratory Action of Constitutionality is the same as the previously 
discussed object for the Direct Action of Unconstitutionality.290  
 Importantly, the generic Adin and the ADC are very similar actions, whose main 
difference – for our purposes291 – is the requirement for the existence of a prior judicial 
controversy about the constitutionality to file the declaratory action. The justification for 
that specific requirement for ADC is based on the general presumption of 
constitutionality of the norms.292 It is worth emphasizing that the existence of relevant 
controversy refers to judicial controversies – not merely doctrinal divergences.293 
 We turn to the analysis of the procedural elements of the declaratory action of 
constitutionality. First, the Constitution does not explicitly authorize injunctions in ADC 
– despite providing so in direct actions of unconstitutionality. 294  The STF has 
traditionally authorized preliminary injunctions in ADC since the inception of such 
action.295 The federal law 9,868, of 1999 specifically authorizes such remedy.296   
                                                        
289 Criticizing this restriction and exemplifying that a state Governor can have interest in seeing the 
declaration of constitutionality (in light of the federal Constitution) of a state norm which has been object 
of judicial controversy (diffuse review): Clève, A fiscalização Abstrata da Constitucionalidade no Direito 
Brasileiro, at 296. 
 
290 Clève, A Fiscalização Abstrata da Constitucionalidade no Direito Brasileiro, at 297; and Barroso, O 
Controle de Constitucionalidade no Direito Brasileiro, at 264. 
 
291 Technically, the other difference concerns the object of the abstract actions. In order to avoid possible 
misinterpretation, we reiterate that only federal norms and legislative acts can be controlled in the ADC – 
as opposed to state and federal norms (and state legislative acts) that might be impugned through Adin. 
 
292 Considering this objective requirement as too restrictive: Justice Gilmar Ferreira Mendes, in Meirelles, 
Wald and Mendes, Mandado de Segurança e Ações Constitucionais, at 470. 
 
293 Barroso, O Controle de Constitucionalidade no Direito Brasileiro, at 264. 
 
294 Article 102 of the Brazilian Constitution: The Supremo Tribunal Federal is responsible, essentially, for 
safeguarding the Constitution, and it is within its competence: I - to institute legal proceeding and trial, in 
the first instance, of: p: injunctions/petitions of provisional remedy in direct actions of unconstitutionality. 
 
295 Emphasizing that since the Declaratory Action of Constitutionality no. 4 of May 1999, the case law of 
the STF authorizes injunctions: Mendes and Branco, Curso de Direito Constitucional, at 1150. 
 
296 Article 21 of federal law 9,868, of 1999: The Supremo Tribunal Federal, by decision of the absolute 
majority of its members, may determine the concession of injunctions in declaratory actions of 
unconstitutionality, that shall consist that judges and courts suspend the trial of cases involving the 
application of the law or normative act whose constitutionality is discussed until the final judgment of the 
declaratory action. Sole paragraph: Once granted the injunction, the Supremo Tribunal Federal  shall 
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 There are no appeals from the final decision 297  in declaratory actions of 
constitutionality – exception being made for motions toward clarification of the award.298 
In practice, rarely would be the case that a declaratory action of constitutionality is filed 
without a direct action of unconstitutionality being also intended.299 In any event, once 
verified the existence of direct action of unconstitutionality and the declaratory action of 
constitutionality attacking the same provisions, both abstract actions will be judged 
jointly.300 
 As for the final effect of the declaratory action of constitutionality, if such 
decision considers the normative act or law as being constitutional, there is no application 
of the retroactive effect. This is so because those acts were presumed valid and, after the 
decision of the Court, they merely have this assumption renewed.301 The declaration of 
constitutionality, as the one of unconstitutionality, is binding against all (erga omnes 
effect) and must be obeyed.302 Nevertheless, later rulings of the Court do not have to be 
                                                                                                                                                                     
publish in ten days in a special section of the National Official Press (Diário Oficial da União) the holding 
of the case and the Court shall proceed to the final judgment of the ADC within a hundred and eighty days 
– otherwise the injucntion is revoked. 
 
297 Article 22 of law 9,868, of 1999: The final decision about constitutionality or unconstitutionality shall 
only be made in the presence of eight justices, at least.  
 
298 Article 26 of law 9,868, of 1999: The decision declaring the constitutionality or unconstitutionality of 
the law or normative act in direct action or declaratory action is unappealable, except for the filing of 
motion of clarification,  and it cannot be subject to rescission action. 
 
299 As noted by Justice Gilmar Ferreira Mendes, in Mendes and Branco, Curso de Direito Constitucional, at 
1147. 
 
300 According to article 24 of law 9,868, of 1999, once the constitutionality of a given law or normative act 
is proclaimed by the STF, the eventual Adin shall be judged as inadmissible, whereas the (if existing) ADC 
be granted. The same article determines that if the Court rules such law or act as unconstitutional, the Adin 
shall be admitted, with the ADC being denied. This occurs assuming the existence of other pertinent 
actions, which is frequent in the Court.  In addition, article 24 is applicable to both direct actions: Adin as 
well as ADC. 
 
301 Barroso, O Controle de Constitucionalidade no Direito Brasileiro, at 268. Nevertheless, another current 
justice of the STF, Gilmar Ferreira Mendes, makes no distinction, defending the exact same consequences 
of the decisions made in Adin and ADC: Mendes and Branco, Curso de Direito Constitucional, at 1151. 
 
302 The first norm regulating this matter was the law 9,868, of 1999, article 28, sole paragraph: The 
declaration of constitutionality or unconstitutionality (…) shall have binding effect and efficacy against all 
the organs of the judicial power and the public admnistration on the federal, state and municipal spheres. 
With the  Constitutional Amendment 45, of 2004, and the inclusion of the paragraph second of article 102 
of the Constitution, such effects were placed in the Constitutional text, as stated previously in footnote 149. 
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bound necessarily by such decision, as we discussed in the direct action of 
unconstitutionality. The rationale being that new circumstances may arise from the 
application of the previously examined law or normative act thus leading to a 
distinguished award.303 
 The text of the Republican Constitution of 1988 is silent regarding the existence 
of the declaratory action of constitutionality on the state level. Despite such omission, 
there is specialized legal doctrine contending its admissibility,304 with several state 
constitutions openly foreseeing such action.305  
 
C. Direct Action of Unconstitutionality by Omission 
 Before the Constitution of 1988, there has been a continuous struggle between the 
text of the Constitution and the effectiveness of the rights secured by it.306 There is no 
field of law that is so intimately linked to the normative strength of the facts – with those 
facts being of utmost importance for the final decision of the Court. Those same facts 
would often determine which written provisions in the Constitution are actually 
applicable in practice.307 Due to the long Brazilian experience of ineffectiveness of 
constitutional norms, – namely, with its practical application being disregarded –, the 
native legal doctrine developed several classifications for constitutional norms.308 It is 
                                                        
303 Barroso, O Controle de Constitucionalidade no Direito Brasileiro, at 269. 
 
304 Citing the support of the legal community and also advocating for the admissibility of the Declaratory 
Action at the state level: Barroso, O Controle de Constitucionalidade no Direito Brasileiro, at 261, and at 
264; and Moraes, Direito Constitucional, at 811; Uadi Lammêgo Bulos, Curso de Direito Constitucional 
(São Paulo:  Saraiva, 2012), at 318; Clève, A Fiscalização Abstrata da Constitucionalidade no Direito 
Brasileiro, at 396. 
 
305  It is the case of the Constitution of the State of Rio de Janeiro. For a complete survey of the twenty- 
seven state constitutions, see table six (three sets) of the chapter about specialized panels in state supreme 
courts (chapter six).  
 
306 For a historical account about the topic, including how the Imperial Constitution of 1824 commanded 
the equality of all while also embracing slavery, which was lately abolished in Brazil in 1888: Barroso, O 
Direito Constitucional e a Efetividade de suas normas, at 11–12. 
 
307 José Afonso da Silva, Aplicabilidade das Normas Constitucionais (São Paulo: Malheiros, 2002), at 16. 
 
308 For particular classifications, see, among others: José Afonso da Silva, Aplicabilidade das Normas 
Constitucionais; Barroso, O Direito Constitucional e a Efetividade de suas normas; Celso Ribeiro Bastos e 
Carlos Ayres de Brito, Interpretação e Aplicabilidade das Normas Constitucionais (São Paulo:  Saraiva, 
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noteworthy that the U.S. experience used to have its own general classifications, such as 
mandatory and directory provisions, 309  and self-executing, and not self-executing 
provisions310 that inspired the Brazilian categorization. 
 During the elected constitutional assembly of 1986, legal authors and politicians 
debated the problem of unconstitutional omissions and it is generally pointed out that, as 
a result, two mechanisms of protection found their way to the text.311 Such mechanisms 
are the mandado de injunção 312  and the direct action of unconstitutionality by 
omission.313 The first one aims to grant effectiveness to particular rights that are 
inapplicable due to the lack of a legislative measure. Hence, it creates a specific norm for 
                                                                                                                                                                     
1982); Lammêgo Bulos, Curso de Direito Constitucional. The detailed study of those classifications is 
beyond the scope of this thesis. 
 
309
 The distinction between mandatory and directory provisions is presented in Constitutional Law reprinted 
from Ruling Case Law, Vol. Six (1915), Edward Thompson Company, at 55, available online at: 
http://books.google.com/books/reader?id=yEVOAAAAYAAJ&printsec=frontcover&output=reader&pg=G
BS.PR3, last accessed November, 2013. Also at 55, it is noted that courts generally were hesitant to declare 
constitutional provisions directory, in light of the potential disregard for the legislature. 
 
310 Idem, at 57, where it is remarked that self-executing propositions require no legislation to give effect to 
them, whereas the opposite occurs with not self-executing norms. Intent and to whom the provisions were 
addressed (courts or legislature) were factor considered in order to classify those constitutional norms. For 
a classic passage referring to self-executing provisions: “But although none of the provisions of a 
constitution are to be looked upon as immaterial or merely advisory, there are some which, from the nature 
of the case, are as incapable of compulsory enforcement as are directory provisions in general. The reason 
is that, while the purpose may be to establish rights or to impose duties, they do not in and of themselves 
constitute a sufficient rule by means of which such right may be protected or such duty enforced. In such 
cases, before the constitutional provision can be made effectual, supplemental legislation must be had; and 
the provision may be in its nature mandatory to the legislature to enact the needful legislation, though back 
of it there lies no authority to enforce the command. Sometimes the constitution in terms requires the 
legislature to enact laws on a particular subject; and here it is obvious that the requirement has only a moral 
force: the legislature ought to obey it; but the right intended to be given is only assured when the legislation 
is voluntarily enacted,” from Thomas Cooley, updated by Victor Hugo Lane, A Treatise on the 
Constitutional Limitations which rest upon the Legislative Power of the States of the American Union 
(Boston: Little, Brown and Company,1903), at 119–20. 
 
311 Barroso, O Controle de Constitucionalidade no Direito Brasileiro, at 276. 
 
312 Constitution of 1988, article 5, LXXI: a writ of injunction (mandado de injunção) shall be granted 
whenever the absence of a regulatory provision disables the exercise of constitutional rights and liberties, 
as well as the prerogatives inherent to nationality, sovereignty and citizenship. 
 
313 Article 103 of the Constitution of 1988: The following may file an action of unconstitutionality and the 
declaratory actions of constitutionality: (…) Paragraph second: When the unconstitutionality is declared on 
account of lack of a measure to render a constitutional provision effective (omission), the competent power 
shall be notified for the adoption of the necessary actions and, in the case of an administrative body, it shall 
be determined to do so within thirty days.  
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the case at bar whose effects are limited to the parties in the lawsuit. The decision is not 
an order determining the edition of the lacking measure, but the measure itself in that 
concrete case.314 The second mechanism is truly an abstract action that is originally and 
solely judged by the STF315 and whose effect is general and biding toward all.316 The 
same parties authorized to file direct actions of unconstitutionality317 and declaratory 
actions of constitutionality are also authorized to file direct actions of unconstitutionality 
by omission.318 
 We turn our attention to the object of the direct action of unconstitutionality by 
omission.319 There are three basic types of unconstitutionality by omission. The first 
refers to the one lacking a political-administrative measure; the second refers to a judicial 
measure; and last one to a legislative measure. 320  The main challenge regarding 
                                                        
314 Barroso, O Controle de Constitucionalidade no Direito Brasileiro, at 164–165. 
 
315 Article 102 of the Brazilian Constitution is quoted supra, at footnote 155. 
 
316
 Article 12-H of federal law 9,868, of 1999, as included by federal law 12,063, of 2009, determines that 
shall be applicable to the final decision in direct actions by omission, when possible, the provisions of 
direct action of unconstitutionality and declaratory action of constitutionality. Hence, articles 26 and 28 of 
law 9,868, of 1999, are applicable, i.e., the decision shall have biding effects and must be obeyed by all. 
Importantly, article 12-H, paragraph first of the current text of law 9,868 authorizes, in exceptional 
circumstances, that the thirty days constitutional deadline (the thirty day period is mentioned in article 103, 
paragraph second of the Constitution and it is cited in footnote 203 of the current work) may be extended. 
There are comments arguing the constitutionality of this provision, despite enlarging the time frame 
originally set in the constitutional text. In this direction, among others: Barroso, O Controle de 
Constitucionalidade no Direito Brasileiro, at 293. 
 
317 The case law of the STF always approaches the general direct action of unconstitutionality to the direct 
action of unconstitutionality based on omission – even before the law 12,063, of 2009. The website of the 
Court itself, in its search mechanisms, did not distinguish both actions, until October of 2008, as noted by: 
Mendes and Branco, Curso de Direito Constitucional, at 1156, pointing out the difficulties if a researcher 
wants to even know the number of the direct actions of unconstitutionality arising out of omissions. 
 
318
 This is the exact writing of article 12-A added by law 12,063, of 2009, to the law 9,868, of 1999. 
Nevertheless, for criticism in light of the peculiarities of the legislative omission in the cases that the 
judiciary is involved in the omission – as, e.g., when it has exclusive initiative to propose a particular law: 
Mendes and Branco, Curso de Constitucional, at 1156–1157. Despite those specificities, our discussion 
about standing in direct actions of unconstitutionality remains applicable here. In this sense: Lammêgo 
Bulos, Curso de Direito Constitucional, at 341. 
319 As a general rule, the procedure of the direct action by omission is the same as the one pertinent to direct 
actions of unconstitutionality and declaratory action of constitutionality, as stated in article 12-E of law 
12063, of 2009. 
 
320 Clève, A Fiscalização Abstrata da Constitucionalidade no Direito Brasileiro, at 322, where the author 
clarifies that the lacking of political-administrative measures is solved in the political; whereas the absence 
of a judicial measure is solved within the judiciary branch itself – with its procedures of appeals and 
particular actions for effectiveness of the constitutional text.  
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unconstitutional omissions in Brazil concerns to the absence of a legislative measure – 
with law and normative acts considered in material and formal conceptions.321 Such 
absence constitutes a deeper concern, to the extent that the Brazilian Constitution 
contains several commands directed to the legislator – and any measure of nonobservance 
of the fundamental law, by omission or commission, diminishes the constitutional 
conscience.322   
 Consequently, the specific requirement for filing direct action of 
unconstitutionality by omission is the inaction of the legislative (or executive) that must 
have acted editing a normative measure, as demanded in a particular disposition of the 
Constitution. Despite the constitutional command, the legislative (or executive) remained 
still. Remarkably, there is no general requirement of a mandatory minimum period to 
elapse in order to characterize the inertia of a given branch.323 
 The omissions that can be object of the specific direct action of unconstitutionality 
are divided in total or partial.324 The first type refers to the omission arising out of the 
disobedience of an autonomous duty to legislate. The second one exists when such duty 
is not entirely fulfilled, or when there is a breach of the general clause of isonomy.325 It is 
worth noting that regardless of the type of omission, it must have a normative character, 
i.e., concrete and specific cases are excluded from such action. Still referring to the object 
of such actions is the possibility of state omissions being rendered unconstitutional in 
light of the Republican Constitution, which would also be within the competence of the 
STF. 326  There are constitutionalists 327  as well as state constitutions 328  foreseeing 
                                                                                                                                                                     
 
321 Idem, at 323. 
 
322 Idem, at 323–324. 
 
323 Clève, A Fiscalização Abstrata da Constitucionalidade no Direito Brasileiro, at 340. 
 
324 It is worth stressing that any direct action of unconstitutionality based on omission provides a legal 
remedy that traditionally has been treated as a typical political question. Along those lines: Mendes and 
Branco, Curso de Direito Constitucional, at 1155. 
 
325 For distinction about the two types of omission, see, among others: Clève, A Fiscalização Abstrata da 
Constitucionalidade no Direito Brasileiro, at 328. 
 
326 From all the authors surveyed, only Justice Gilmar Mendes emphasized explicitly such possibility: 
Mendes and Branco, Curso de Constitucional, at 1158. 
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explicitly the possibility of a direct action of unconstitutionality by omission having as 
parameter the state constitution, not the federal fundamental norm. 
 The finality of the direct action of unconstitutionality by omission is to notify the 
Legislative of the omission, and nothing beyond such notification,329 according to the 
traditional case law of the Supremo. This limitation is due to potential violations of the 
principle of separation of powers.330 Nevertheless, in cases where the omission is caused 
by the absence of a normative act by an administrative organ, the decision of the STF is 
actually an order.331  
 It is noteworthy that current justices are eager to change the Court’s current 
position referring to a legislative omission based on the jurisdictional power of the STF 
itself. This is the case because the judgment that determines the unconstitutionality by 
omission ultimately also orders the legislature to eliminate such omission by acting 
within a reasonable time.332 The first understanding about the nature of the omission is 
still dominant in the Court and was the main justification for the denial of preliminary 
injunctions.333 The federal law 12,063, of 2009, departed from that understanding and 
authorized such remedies in its article 12-F.      
 Finally, having established the framework under which judicial review occurs in 
Brazil, we turn our focus to the pertinent application of those concepts and procedures in 
                                                                                                                                                                     
327 As argued, for instance, by the following constitutionalists: Lammêgo Bulos, Curso de Direito 
Constitucional, at 342–343; Clève, A Fiscalização Abstrata da Constitucionalidade no Direito Brasileiro, at 
392–395; Barroso, O Controle de Constitucionalidade no Direito Brasileiro, at 283. 
 
328 For a complete survey of all the state constitutions in Brazil and whether or not the provision of direct 
action by omission exists: see chapter six of this thesis. 
 
329 Criticizing emphatically such understanding and stating this line of interpretation by the STF ultimately 
removed the practical importance of the action on point: Lammêgo Bulos, Curso de Direito Constitucional, 
at 340–341. 
 
330 Article 2 of the Constitution of 1988: The Legislative, the Executive and the Judiciary, independent and 
harmonious among themselves, are the powers of the Union.   
 
331 Barroso, O Controle de Constitucionalidade no Direito Brasileiro, at 286. 
 
332 As contended by: Mendes and Branco, Curso de Direito Constitucional, at 1172–1173, where the 
Professors defend the definition of deadlines to be enforced by the Court determining the Legislative to act. 
 
333 Mendes and Branco, Curso de Direito Constitucional, at 1169. 
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the following chapters. Our next (immediate) chapter, however, provides an overview of 
the U.S. system of federal judicial review. 
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CHAPTER FOUR 
OVERVIEW OF FEDERAL JUDICIAL REVIEW IN THE UNITED STATES 
 This chapter outlines the U.S. practice of judicial review focusing on the national 
level. It starts with the historical constitutional background of judicial review. Part II 
describes the main characteristics of federal judicial review in the United States, whereas 
Part III addresses some of the implications of federal judicial review to the states. Part IV 
considers the justiciability doctrines, and Part V surveys the recurrent arguments in the 
debate about the existence of abstract review in the United States.  
 
I. GENERAL BACKGROUND 
The origins of judicial review are attributed to the Greek experience and the 
necessity of subordinating particular acts of the lawmaking power to higher principles.334 
Formulation and general conceptions with regard to the doctrine of supremacy of the 
laws and of the illegality of the unjust law are found in Aristotle.335 The necessity of 
those doctrines has been linked to the perennial struggle for permanence in humankind.336 
The common-law experience of judicial review dates back to the famous British 
decision in the Dr. Boham’s Case.337 In the United States, it was first recognized by the 
                                                        
334
 Mauro Cappelletti, Judicial Review in the Contemporary W orld (Indianapolis: The Bobbs-Merrill 
Company, Inc., 1971), at 28, where we also find the following passage: “In Athenian law, for example, 
there was a distinction made between a nómos, corresponding to law in the strict sense, and a pséphisma, 
which in our times might be called a decree. In fact nómoi might in a certain sense be compared to modern 
constitutional laws, for they often concerned the organization of the State and could be amended only by a 
special procedure which would remind a modern lawyer of the procedure for revision of the Constitution."  
 
335
 Idem, at 29. 
 
336 In this sense: “Written constitutions, and the subordination by the courts of statutory law to those 
constitutions, represent innovations with deep philosophical roots. From the earliest times men have sought 
to create or discover a hierarchy of laws and to guarantee this hierarchy. Indeed, this search is one aspect of 
man’s never-ending attempt to find something immutable in the continuous change which is his destiny. 
Laws change, but the Law must remain, and with it the fundamental values; a law which contravenes that 
Higher Law is not a law at all.” Idem, at VII. 
 
337  In the Dr. Bonham's Case, dated from 1610, Sir Edward Coke affirmed that: “ (…) when an act of 
Parliament is against common right or reason or repugnant, or impossible to be performed, the common 
law will control it and adjudge such act to be void.” Sir Coke contended that the common lawyer has 
“artificial reason of the law” and that “ (…) this capacity elevated him to nearly equal footing with king and 
Parliament” and, in this sense, the expertise necessary to interpret the law positioned it above politics, as 
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Supreme Court in its the unanimous decision written by Chief Justice Marshall, in 
Marbury v. Madison.338  
Judicial review as a manifestation of the particular system of separation of powers 
in the United States – namely, checks and balances – had already been subject of much 
debate. Most remarkably, Alexander Hamilton stated in the Federalist Papers (No. 78) the 
following often cited quote: 
Whoever attentively considers the different departments of power 
must perceive that, in a government in which they are separated 
from each other, the judiciary, from the nature of its functions, will 
always be the least dangerous to the political rights of the 
Constitution; because it would be least in capacity to annoy or 
injure them. The executive not only dispenses the honors but holds 
the sword of the community. The legislature not only commands 
the purse but prescribes the rules by which the duties and rights of 
every citizen are to be regulated. The judiciary, on the contrary, 
has no influence over either the sword or the purse; no direction 
either of the strength or of the wealth of the society, and can take 
no active resolution whatever. It may truly be said to have neither 
force nor will but merely judgment; and must ultimately depend 
upon the aid of the executive arm even for the efficacy of its 
judgments.339 
That particular conception of separation of powers has already been defended in 
France, based on the argument that the legislative power is the one susceptible to 
                                                                                                                                                                     
stated by Kenneth L. Karst, revised by James E. Pfander, ed. Kermit L. Hall, in The Oxford Companion to 
the Supreme Court of the United States (New York: Oxford University Press 2005), at 536.  
 
338 The role of Chief Justice Marshall was very important for the implementation of the practice of judicial 
review in the United States. Nevertheless, even before the independence, there have been arguments 
supporting such review. Among those, James Otis advocated, in 1761, challenging an act of Parliament 
granting general search warrants: “ (…) As to Acts of Parliament. An act against the Constitution is void; 
an act against natural equity is void; and if an act o Parliament should be made, in the very words of this 
petition, it would be void. The executive Courts must pass such acts into disuse.” Louis Fisher and Katy J. 
Harriger, American Constitutional Law: Constitutional Structures (Durham: Carolina Academic Press, 
2013), at 35. The authors emphasize that such enthusiastic view supporting judicial review was disputable. 
There were positions that would agree with Blackstone’s Commentaries, defending the supremacy of the 
Parliament: Idem. In addition, between 1791 and 1799, several federal courts challenged and stroke down 
states laws; whereas state judiciaries also exercised judicial review over state statutes, before Marbury: 
Kermit L. Hall, Paul Finkelman and James W. Ely, Jr., American Legal History (New York: Oxford 
University Press, 2005), at 140–141. 
 
339 Alexander Hamilton, James Madison and John Jay, The Federalist Papers, ed. Clinton Rossiter, (New 
York: Penguin Books, 1999), at 464, with emphasis in the original. 
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overthrow existing laws due to unstable political majorities. As far this argument goes, to 
avoid such danger, the United States developed a strong constitutionality control 
exercised by the judiciary, which is not considered a political power. It is that fine, albeit 
delicate, balance of powers that constitutes, in practice, the rule of law.340 
 
II. SIGNIFICANT PROVISIONS ABOUT JUDICIAL REVIEW IN THE UNITED STATES 
Article III of the U.S. Constitution341 is silent about judicial review, which 
contributed to controversies about the decision in Marbury v. Madison.342 The Court 
understood that it had original jurisdiction to hear the mandamus, as argued by Marbury, 
under § 13 of the Jurisdiction Act of 1789.343 Later, the Court had to examine whether or 
not this jurisdictional provision was compatible with Article III of the Constitution.344  
                                                        
340 The arguments referred in this paragraph were all claimed by Maurice Hauriou, Précis Élémentaire de 
Droit Constitutionnel (Paris: Librairie du Recueil Sirey, 1930), at 27: “ (… ) c’est le pouvoir législatif qui 
peut bouleverser les lois existantes au gré de majorité politiques changeantes; c’est contre ce danger que les 
citoyens des Etats-Unis d’ Amérique ont organisé fortement le contrôle judiciaire de la constitutionnalité 
des lois.” Later, the constitutionalist also affirms that: “le régime de la legalité tend ainsi `a créer `a 
l'intérieur de l'Etat, au point de vue spécial de l'observation du droit établi, un équilibre constitutionnel entre 
les pouvoirs politiques, d'une part, et, d'autre part, le pouvoir juridictionnel, qui est considéré comme ne 
devant pas être un pouvoir politique. C'est cet équilibre de pouvoirs, trés délicat et susceptible de plusieurs 
modalités, qui constitue pratiquement ' l'etat de droit'.” The author further stresses that the previous control 
exercised in the Parliament are subject to political passions: at 195. 
 
341 Article III, Section 1, of the Constitution of the United States: The judicial Power of the United States, 
shall be vested in one Supreme Court, and in such inferior Courts as the Congress may from time to time 
ordain and establish. The remaining provisions of Article III do not address judicial review expressly. 
 
342
 Fisher and Harriger, American Constitutional Law: Constitutional Structures, at 33. 
 
343 Erwin Chemerinsky, Constitutional Law: Principles and Policies (New York: Aspen Publishers, 2006), 
at 43. Nevertheless, the constitutionalist remarks that a careful reading of that provision may cast doubts 
about the original jurisdiction of the United States Supreme Court to hear the case. 
 
344 Idem, at 44.  The author emphasizes, at 44–45, the following: “Irrespective of possible alternative 
interpretations, the Court’s holding that Congress cannot increase the Supreme Court’s original jurisdiction 
remains the law to this day. However, the Court’s statement that the categories of original and appellate 
jurisdiction are mutually exclusive has not been followed. The Supreme Court subsequently held that 
Congress could grant the district courts concurrent jurisdiction over matters within the Court’s original 
jurisdiction. More generally, by viewing Article III as the ceiling of federal jurisdiction, Marbury helped 
establish the principle that federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction, and that Congress may not 
expand the jurisdiction granted in Article III of the Constitution.” 
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Marshall had the difficult task to establish the two assumptions necessary for 
judicial review: the Constitution as law, and that it is law that courts are able to 
expound.345 The Court developed those arguments in the excerpt below:346 
The Constitution is either a superior, paramount law, unchangeable 
by ordinary means, or it is on a level with ordinary legislative acts, 
and, like other acts, is alterable when the legislature shall please to 
alter it. If the former part of the alternative be true, then a 
legislative act contrary to the Constitution is not law; if the latter 
part be true, then written Constitutions are absurd attempts on the 
part of the people to limit a power in its own nature illimitable. 
Certainly all those who have framed written Constitutions 
contemplate them as forming the fundamental and paramount law 
of the nation, and consequently the theory of every such 
government must be that an act of the Legislature repugnant to the 
Constitution is void. This theory is essentially attached to a written 
Constitution, and is consequently to be considered by this Court as 
one of the fundamental principles of our society. . . . It is 
emphatically the province and duty of the Judicial Department to 
say what the law is. 
 The Court further emphasized the connection between written constitutions, its 
supremacy, and the fact that all were bound by the Constitution, including the judicial 
branch.347 As illustrated in the quote of Marbury v. Madison referred above, judicial 
review was established as a corollary of the supremacy of the constitution.348 The often 
                                                        
345 Lawrence H. Tribe, American Constitutional Law (New York: Foundation Press, 2000), at 213. 
 
346 Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, (1803), at 177. Importantly, all internal citations by the 
United States Supreme Court to other decisions in this thesis are omitted, unless stated otherwise. 
 
347 Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, (1803). This decision concluded addressing the supremacy 
of the constitution with the following words, at 180: “Thus, the particular phraseology of the constitution of 
the United States confirms and strengthens the principle, supposed to be essential to all written 
constitutions, that a law repugnant to the constitution is void, and that courts, as well as other departments, 
are bound by that instrument.” Noting that the real question at bar was actually who could decide if the act 
was repugnant to the Constitution and emphasizing the absurdity that courts were not elected:  Alexander 
M. Bickel, The Last Dangerous Branch (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1986), at 3–4; and at 23–28, 
the Professor justifies why courts are suited for judicial review. 
 
348 The supremacy of the Constitution has been previously argued. Hamilton had already discussed it on the 
Federalist Papers (No. 78): “Some perplexity respecting the rights of the courts to pronounce legislative 
acts void, because contrary to the Constitution, has arisen from an imagination that the doctrine would 
imply a superiority of the judiciary to the legislative power. It is urged that the authority that can declare 
the acts of another void must necessarily be superior to the one whose acts may be declared void. As this 
doctrine is of great importance in all the American constitutions, a brief discussion of the grounds on which 
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named as the most important case of U.S. constitutional law established the power of the 
judiciary to review the constitutionality of executive and legislative acts.349 In authorized 
words: 
The American version of judicial review was the logical result of 
centuries of European thought and colonial experiences, which had 
made western man in general willing to admit the theoretical 
primacy of certain kinds of law and had made Americans in 
particular ready to provide a judicial means if enforcing that 
primacy. This is not to minimize the importance of American 
contribution, since prior to the formation of the American system 
of judicial review, nothing similar had been created in other 
countries. The reason for this is readily understandable, as it was 
the Constitution of the United States which initiated an era of 
“constitutionalism,” with the notion of supremacy of the 
constitution over ordinary laws. The American Constitution 
represented the archetype of so-called “rigid” constitutions in 
contrast to “flexible” ones. That is to say that it was the model of 
those constitutions not subject to change or revision through 
ordinary laws, but changeable, if at all, only by a special amending 
procedure. (…) Marshall’s decision, with its enunciation of the 
supremacy of the constitution over other laws and of the judicial 
power to disregard unconstitutional laws, has certainly been a 
grand innovation.350 
                                                                                                                                                                     
it rests cannot be unacceptable. (…) It is not otherwise to be supposed that the Constitution could intend to 
enable the representatives of the people to substitute their will to that of their constituents. It is far more 
rational to suppose that the courts were designed to be an intermediate body between the people and the 
legislature in order, among other things, to keep the later within the limits assigned to their authority. The 
interpretation of the laws is the proper and peculiar province of the courts. A constitution is, in fact, and 
must be regarded by the judges as a fundamental law. It therefore belongs to them to ascertain its meaning 
as well as the meaning of any particular act proceeding from the legislative body. If there should happen to 
be an irreconcilable variance between the two, that which has the superior obligation and validity ought, of 
course, to be preferred; or, in other words, the Constitution ought to be preferred to the statute, the intention 
of the people to the intention of their agents.” Hamilton, Madison and Jay, The Federalist Papers, at 465–
466, with emphasis in the original. 
 
349 Chemerinsky, Constitutional Law: Principles and Policies, at 39. The Professor contends, at 45, that 
Marbury has been criticized to the extent that the language of the decision does not necessarily determine 
that “ (…) the Court is the authoritative interpreter of the Constitution or just one among many.” Emphasis 
in the original. 
 
350 Cappelletti, Judicial Review in the Contemporary W orld, at 25–27, with emphasis in the original. The 
quote is particularly relevant to the uniqueness of the American experience, because other European 
countries had written constitutions, but that did not empower the judiciary to nullify laws that were 
conflicting with the constitution. In this direction, specifically: Idem, at 26. 
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 It is not to say that judicial review has been fully and unanimously embraced. 
Judicial review suffered attacks over time. More recently, it has been contended that 
constitutional judicial review does not provide effective achievements toward social 
change, and some went even further, arguing that it should be abolished.351 
 We turn next to the federal jurisdiction. The Constitution in Article III, § 1, 
specifically addresses the creation of the U.S, Supreme Court but does not similarly 
provide for lower federal courts.352 In addition, § 2 of the same Article confers the 
original jurisdiction to the Court.353 The latter is the apex of a pyramid in which federal 
district courts sit in the base; and the U.S. Court of Appeals is level at the intermediary.354
 Article III of the Constitution, thus, limits the jurisdiction of federal courts to 
“cases” or “controversies,” with jurisdiction being granted by the Constitution and 
statutory provisions.355 Importantly, in 1988, the U.S. Supreme Court mandatory appeal 
jurisdiction disappeared due to Congress action.356 Similarly, Supreme Court review 
became discretionary in almost all the cases.357 Despite the broad jurisdiction over federal 
                                                        
351  As exemplificative references contending the potential abolition of judicial review: Gerald N. 
Rosenberg, The Hollow Hope: Can Courts Bring About Social Change? (Chicago: The University of 
Chicago Press, 1991); and Mark Tushnet, Taking the Constitution Away from the Courts (New Jersey: 
Princeton University Press, 1999), respectively. For a fierce criticism about Professor Tushnet’s work: 
Erwin Chemerinsky, “Losing Faith: America without Judicial Review?,” Michigan Law Review 98 (2008): 
1416–1435. For historical context of judicial activism in the late nineties and how the critique was divided 
in partisan lines: Barry Friedman, The W ill of the People: How Public Opinion has Influenced the Supreme 
Court and Shaped the Meaning of the Constitution (New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 2009), at 344–
346. 
 
352 Tribe, American Constitutional Law, at 267. 
 
353 Article III, section 2, of the United States Constitution: In all cases affecting ambassadors, other public 
ministers and consuls, and those in which a state shall be party, the Supreme Court shall have original 
jurisdiction. In all the other cases before mentioned, the Supreme Court shall have appellate jurisdiction, 
both as to law and fact, with such exceptions, and under such regulations as the Congress shall make. 
 
354 Tribe, American Constitutional Law, at 268. 
 
355 Fisher and Harriger, American Constitutional Law: Constitutional Structures, at 75. In addition, the 
Evarts Act of 1891 determined the basic outline regarding the pyramid we referred above, whereas the 
Judges’ Bill of 1925 provided for the discretionary character of the Supreme Court review, according to: 
Tribe, American Constitutional Law, at 268.  
 
356 Idem. 
 
357 Tribe, American Constitutional Law, at 269. At the same page, the Professor notes that refusals of the 
Court to hear matters pertaining to its original exclusive jurisdiction have been criticized in terms of 
judicial policy.  
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claims granted by Congress to federal courts, federal courts may still be threaten by the 
legislative because federal jurisdiction is not self-executing, i.e., Congress may 
withdrawal federal jurisdiction.358 Nevertheless, federal courts have jurisdiction to rule 
about the constitutionality of such withdrawals.359 The composition of the Court is 
another instance that has been subject to modifications. The number of justices has 
fluctuated during the nineteenth century, but legislation in 1869 established the current 
number of nine justices in the Court, which, since then,360 has been constant.361 Article II, 
§ 2, of the Constitution determines that the President shall nominate and shall appoint 
justices of the Supreme Court, upon advice and consent of the Senate.362 Federal judges 
are subject to presidential nomination and confirmation by the Senate, which creates a 
highly politicized process.363         
 With regard to the access to the U.S. Supreme Court, five avenues lead to it. The 
first refers to the original jurisdiction of the Court, having its own separate docket.364 The 
                                                        
358 Tribe, American Constitutional Law, at 271. 
 
359 Idem. Noting the case law and judicial debate over the limitations – if any – about the withdrawal of 
federal courts’ jurisdiction by Congress: Idem, at 274–278, in particular. 
 
360 Fisher and Harriger, American Constitutional Law: Constitutional Structures, at 117–118. 
 
361 This does not mean that the composition of the Court was sheltered from possible attacks. Most 
famously, the so-called Court-Packing Plan attempt to increased the number of justices in order to have the 
New Deal’s policies approved by the Court. For a detailed description of the Plan and how states and “big 
business” were against such plan: William E. Leuchtenburg, The Supreme Court Reborn: The 
Constitutional Revolution in the Age of Roosevelt (New York: Oxford University Press, 1995), at 104–130. 
 
362 Article II, section two, when referring to the President, states: “He shall have power, by and with the 
advice and consent of the Senate, to make treaties, provided two thirds of the Senators present concur; and 
he shall nominate, and by and with the advice and consent of the Senate, shall appoint ambassadors, other 
public ministers and consuls, judges of the Supreme Court, and all other officers of the United States, 
whose appointments are not herein otherwise provided for, and which shall be established by law: but the 
Congress may by law vest the appointment of such inferior officers, as they think proper, in the President 
alone, in the courts of law, or in the heads of departments.” 
 
363 Fisher and Harriger, American Constitutional Law: Constitutional Structures, at 123. 
 
364 28 U.S. Code § 1251, Original jurisdiction: (a) The Supreme Court shall have original and exclusive 
jurisdiction of all controversies between two or more States; (b) The Supreme Court shall have original but 
not exclusive jurisdiction of: (1) All actions or proceedings to which ambassadors, other public ministers, 
consuls, or vice consuls of foreign states are parties; (2) All controversies between the United States and a 
State; (3) All actions or proceedings by a State against the citizens of another State or against aliens. For a 
discussion about the original jurisdiction, its general requirement of the state itself being a litigant, and the 
restriction of b.3 requiring that only a state can be plaintiff: Erwin Chemerinsky, Federal Jurisdiction (New 
York: Aspen Publishers, 2007), at 667–671. 
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Court has always been concerned in becoming a fact-finding trial court because it does 
not have the necessary structure. Hence, the Court avoids exercising its own original (and 
discretionary) jurisdiction.365  The second avenue is statutory rights, with Congress 
enacting statutes that authorize direct appeal, preferred treatment, or expedited action. 
Remarkably, Congress has accepted the Court’s request and has granted broad discretion 
in those subjects.366 The third (and the most common) avenue is the writ of certiorari. 
According to the Rule 10 of the Rules of the U.S. Supreme Court, review by certiorari “is 
not a matter of writ, but of judicial discretion.”367      
 The writ of certiorari is limited to the hypotheses listed in such Rule. The fourth 
avenue is quite limited. It addresses petitions for review submitted by indigents, 
encompassing prison inmates.368 The fifth route to the Court is initiated by an appellate 
court, which submits a writ of certification to seek instruction on a question of law.369 
This is not commonly used, because it “forces the Court to decide questions of law 
                                                        
365 Fisher and Harriger, American Constitutional Law: Constitutional Structures, at 142. 
 
366 Idem. Another striking aspect concerning appeals is the one referring to the case law of the Court, who 
held that it will only hear an appeal if it has a substantial federal question, i.e., if the legal issue is not 
settled in prior decisions: Chemerinsky, Federal Jurisdiction, at 674–675. 
367 Rule ten of the Rules of the Supreme Court of the United States: “Review on a writ of certiorari is not a 
matter of right, but of judicial discretion. A petition for a writ of certiorari will be granted only for 
compelling reasons. The following, although neither controlling nor fully measuring the Court's discretion, 
indicate the character of the reasons the Court considers: (a) a United States court of appeals has entered a 
decision in conflict with the decision of another United States court of appeals on the same important 
matter; has decided an important federal question in a way that conflicts with a decision by a state court of 
last resort; or has so far departed from the accepted and usual course of judicial proceedings, or sanctioned 
such a departure by a lower court, as to call for an exercise of this Court's supervisory power; (b) a state 
court of last resort has decided an important federal question in a way that conflicts with the decision of 
another state court of last resort or of a United States court of appeals; (c) a state court or a United States 
court of appeals has decided an important question of federal law that has not been, but should be, settled 
by this Court, or has decided an important federal question in a way that conflicts with relevant decisions of 
this Court. A petition for a writ of certiorari is rarely granted when the asserted error consists of erroneous 
factual findings or the misapplication of a properly stated rule of law.” 
368 Fisher and Harriger, American Constitutional Law: Constitutional Structures, at 143. For criticisms 
regarding the limitation of federal courts through inclusion of fees: the Louise Weinberg, “The New 
Judicial Federalism,” Stanford Law Review 29 (1977): 1191–1244, at 1193.  
 
369 Certification is only admitted if the issues are limited to questions of law and as long as the questions are 
not very general, with the certification not being use as disguised appeals: Chemerinsky, Federal 
Jurisdiction, at 679. 
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without the guidance of findings and conclusions by the lower courts.”370 Thus, it is too 
abstract, potentially.         
 The most effective route to the U.S Supreme Court, the writ of certiorari, requires 
lawyers to demonstrate the importance of the issue at bar.371 The importance of the 
lawsuit is reflected on the fact that certiorari is often granted when the federal 
government is seeking review because the Solicitor General would only petition in cases 
that would merit an appeal.372 Related factors in granting certiorari are the presence of a 
civil liberty claim, conflict between circuits, a lower court decision in which the votes of 
the deciding judges were split, flagrant abuse of justice in the lower courts, interpretation 
of an important federal statute, state or federal court’s holding a congressional statue 
unconstitutional,373 among others.374       
 After having discussed the jurisdiction and how the Court rules in a lawsuit, we 
pass now for the effects of the decision. As for the effects of the declaration of 
unconstitutionality, there are two main assumptions. The first one refers to the fact that 
the Constitution operates in its own force – the judicial acknowledgement of that is what 
may be delayed. The second assumption focuses on the context of litigation. Thus, the 
declaration of unconstitutionality is not the result of the lawsuit itself, since this 
declaration comes as the outcome of a judgment aiming at the resolution of the litigation 
                                                        
370 Fisher and Harriger, American Constitutional Law: Constitutional Structures, at 143. 
 
371 Chemerinsky, Federal Jurisdiction, at 673, notes that since the statute 662, of 1988 (responsible for 
virtually eliminating the differences between appeal and certiorari regarding the review of the Supreme 
Court), almost all the cases heard by the Court are so under the writ of certiorari. It is emphasized that 
under appeals, the Court was obliged to listen the case; whereas in the writ of certiorari the Court has 
discretion. 
 
372 Fisher and Harriger, American Constitutional Law: Constitutional Structures, at 143, where the author 
refers to this process as the “cue theory”. 
 
373 Idem, at 144. 
 
374 Charles R. Epp, The Rights Revolution: Lawyers, Activists and Supreme Courts in Comparative 
Perspective, at 36, noting: “… justices have developed an institutionalized reluctance to decide issues that 
have been subject of little sustained litigation in lower courts.” The Professor also contends that the justices 
are further constrained by the sua sponte doctrine, which requires that issues shall be raised by at least one 
party in the litigation, i.e., with the Court avoiding to decide on its own motion, generally. In addition, at 
37, emphasis is made to the fact that early certiorari petitions usually are declined on the rationale that if an 
issue is actually important, it will re-appear in the Courts’ dockets again. 
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among the parties.375 Despite the decision being biding immediately on the parties, it 
shall become a norm of vast applicability, which must not be ignored in future cases.376 
There are exceptions to this premise, to the extent that the Government may relitigate 
issues – regardless if those are of statutory or constitutional nature –, as long as different 
parties are involved in a succession of cases.377      
 In light of the assumptions made above, we move to the analysis of the strict 
effects concerning the declaration of unconstitutionality.378 The U.S. Supreme Court has 
distinguished the effects within criminal and civil cases. Initially, the court would deny 
retroactive effect to criminal laws ruled unconstitutional based on policy reasons;379 
whereas in civil cases, nonretroactivity was the exception and could only be authorized to 
avoid injustice or hardship.380 The Court first dismissed the general bar of retroactivity in 
criminal cases. Departing from the previous understanding were concerns of separation of 
powers and equality because selective retroactive effects would ultimately lead to similar 
situated parties being treated differently.381 The Court later solved the retroactivity 
controversy concerning civil cases.382 In Harper, the Court did not state that all the 
                                                        
375 Tribe, American Constitutional Law, at 214. 
 
376 Idem, where it is stressed: “The degree to which a constitutional norm announced in an individual case 
will bind those involved in future situations calling for a constitutional choice thus depends in large parts 
on issues of (…) the degree to which the internal structure of the norm admits of value judgments contrary 
to the thrust of the Court’s opinion; the degree to which the Supreme Court views differing interpretations 
by other courts and branches as a threat to its judicial supremacy; whether future courts will have 
jurisdiction to reinforce the norm; whether the norm is properly presented in a justiciable lawsuit; and 
whether future courts will refrain, for equitable reasons, from imposing the norm on parties to other 
lawsuits.”  
 
377 Idem, at 215. 
 
378 We survey the main cases. 
 
379 Tribe, American Constitutional Law, at 218. The rule was announced in Linkletter v. Walker, 381 U.S. 
618 (1965). 
 
380 Idem, at 219. 
 
381 Idem, at 219–220. The case at bar was Griffith v. Kentucky, 479 U.S. 314 (1987). 
 
382 Tribe, American Constitutional Law, at 220–221, reference is made to the existence of different 
conceptions of retroactivity in civil cases. Different conceptions were based on retroactivity occurring as a 
choice of law rule or as a remedial principle. This distinction is particular relevant for cases arising out of 
state court or federal courts. In the latter, substantive and procedural laws are both within the federal 
sphere. In cases arising out of state law, by contrast, the federal Constitution secures a minimum remedy 
that shall be granted by state courts, but those remedies are subject, first, to state law. 
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decisions of federal law shall be applied retroactively.383 It also bears emphasis that the 
Constitution does not state, for the most part, the remedies that shall be granted in a given 
case. Accordingly, state courts still have some room of maneuver when a decision 
determines retroactive effects.384            
 A related topic to the retroactivity effect of a decision is the one of stare decisis. 
Constitutional law in the United States is based on the text of the Constitution itself, as 
well as on the decisions of the U.S. Supreme Court interpreting that document.385 More 
significantly, it has been contended that:  “the bare words of the Constitution’s text and 
the skeletal structure on which those words were hung, only begin to fill out the 
Constitution as a mature, ongoing system of constitutional law.”386 The Court may depart 
from prior understandings, despite the existence of stare decisis. It has already done so in 
issues concerning the core of the U.S. tradition. The interpretation of federalism and the 
powers granted to states, slavery and, later, racial segregation during the Jim Crow era, 
the Court stoke a balance between constitutional precedents and constitutional values 
being protected. In this sense, the decision of the Court not to confer retroactivity to a 
given unconstitutional law is also based in respect to previous precedents and the sense of 
legitimate expectations that attached to the interpretation of the law.387 
 Constitutional determinations that the Supreme Court deem mistaken should be 
easier to be modified by the Court itself than through an amendment to the 
Constitution.388 The Court has stated that when it reexamines prior decisions, it often 
refers to “a series of prudential and pragmatic considerations designed to test the 
                                                        
383 The case was Harper v. Virginia Department of Taxation, 509 U.S. 86 (1993). Tribe, American 
Constitutional Law, at 225, where the author explains that decision: “ (…) The Court held that, when a 
federal court applies a substantive rule of federal law to the parties before it, that rule must be given full 
retroactive effect in all cases still pending on direct review and as to all occurrences, including those that 
predate the rule’s announcement.”   
 
384 Tribe, American Constitutional Law, at 226. 
 
385 Idem, at 78. 
 
386 Idem, at 81–82, with emphasis on the original. 
 
387 Idem, at 235–251. The discussion of stare decisis in the United States, although fascinating, is not within 
the delimitations established at our Introduction. 
 
388 Idem, at 84. 
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consistency of overruling a prior decision with the ideal of the rule of law, and to gauge 
the respective costs of reaffirming and overruling a prior case.”389 It is noteworthy that 
those concerns are particular related to the interpretation of constitutional stare decisis. 
By contrast, in statutory stare decisis, those concerns are made more acute because the 
legislative power is directly involved.390  
III. JUDICIAL REVIEW OF STATE LAW FROM A FEDERAL PERSPECTIVE 
First, we address issues related to federalism before developing the review of state 
laws. The Constitution, it has been contended, presumes the existence of states as 
lawmakers and governmental institutions that are different from the national 
government.391 There is a fine balance between the federal government and the power 
granted to the states. Federalism consequences are innumerous and very controversial. 
This work outlines the main limitations with regard to constitutional review of state 
action, considering that federalism has supported judicial supremacy.392 Despite not being 
exhaustive, this part aims to discuss potential issues raised in the comparison of chapters 
concerning local governments and the pertinent implications of judicial review itself. 
 State sovereignty is protected in different constitutional provisions. Article IV, § 3 
protects their territorial integrity,393 whereas Article V protects the equal representation of 
                                                        
389
 Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992), at 854. The Court also held, at 854–855, that: “ (…) 
whether the rule has proven to be intolerable simply in defining practical workability; whether the rule is 
subject to a kind of reliance that would lend a special hardship to the consequences of overruling and add 
inequity to the cost of repudiation; whether related principles of law have so far developed as to have left 
the old rule no more than a remnant of abandoned doctrine; or whether facts have so changed, or come to 
be seen so differently, as to have robbed the old rule of significant application or justification.” 
 
390 Tribe, American Constitutional Law, at 251. 
 
391 Idem, at 464. 
 
392 Barry Friedman and Erin F. Delaney, “Becoming Supreme: The Federal Foundation of Judicial 
Supremacy,” Columbia Law Review 111 (2011): 1137–1194, at 1182, contend that the U.S. historical 
experience shows how federalism fostered judicial supremacy. 
 
393 Article IV, Section three, of the Constitution of the United States: New states may be admitted by the 
Congress into this union; but no new states shall be formed or erected within the jurisdiction of any other 
state; nor any state be formed by the junction of two or more states, or parts of states, without the consent 
of the legislatures of the states concerned as well as of the Congress. 
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each state in the Senate.394 The Tenth Amendment determines the states and the people 
remain with all the powers not delegated to United States nor prohibited to the states.395 
The Eleventh Amendment396 protects states from particular lawsuits in federal courts by 
textually limiting federal power in light of the interests of the states as independent 
entities.397 It is noteworthy that the Supreme Court affirmed that sovereign immunity, 
being derived from the scheme of the original Constitution bars lawsuits against state 
governments in federal and state courts.398 The Supreme Court, however, has established 
three main avenues to circumvent the Eleventh Amendment, thus enabling the 
compliance of state law with federal law.399        
                                                        
394 Article V: The Congress, whenever two thirds of both houses shall deem it necessary, shall propose 
amendments to this Constitution, or, on the application of the legislatures of two thirds of the several states, 
shall call a convention for proposing amendments, which, in either case, shall be valid to all intents and 
purposes, as part of this Constitution, when ratified by the legislatures of three fourths of the several states, 
or by conventions in three fourths thereof, as the one or the other mode of ratification may be proposed by 
the Congress; provided that no amendment which may be made prior to the year one thousand eight 
hundred and eight shall in any manner affect the first and fourth clauses in the ninth section of the first 
article; and that no state, without its consent, shall be deprived of its equal suffrage in the Senate. 
 
395 The Tenth Amendment says: “The powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor 
prohibited by it to the states, are reserved to the states respectively, or to the people.” 
 
396 The Eleventh Amendment determines: “The judicial power of the United States shall not be construed to 
extend to any suit in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted against one of the United States by citizens 
of another state, or by citizens or subjects of any foreign state.” The decision in Hans v. Louisiana, 134 
U.S. I (1890), interpreted that this amendment also encompassed suits by a citizen of the same state – as 
clarified by: Louise Weinberg, “The New Judicial Federalism,” Stanford Law Review 29 (1977): 1191–
1244, at 1200. The author remarks, at the same page, the following about the decision in Ex parte Young, 
209 U.S. 123 (1908): “ (…) laid down the principle that a federal court has power, despite the amendment, 
to override state sovereignty upon a showing of state unconstitutionality. Because the action was not 
against the state as party of record but only against the official, upon a showing that the defendant had 
violated the plaintiff’s constitutional rights, he was ‘stripped of his official or representative character and 
(…) subjected in his person to the consequences of his individual conduct’.”  
 
397 Tribe, American Constitutional Law, at 465. The author further remarks, at 519–520, that the Eleventh 
Amendment and the related state immunity were founded in a “ (…) anachronistic fiction – that the King 
can do no wrong – the concept of sovereignty immunity is an established part of our law.” The Supreme 
Court, according to the same author, at 520, was not able to develop a consistent interpretation of such 
amendment and the relation with federalism, separation of powers and fundamental rights that shall be 
protected. 
 
398 Chemerinsky, Federal Jurisdiction, at 406, stressing the importance of the decision in Alden v. Maine, 
527 U.S. 706 (1999). Professor Chemerinsky notes, also at 406, that if a broad interpretation of the 
sovereign immunity was authorized, federal and constitutional rights (civil rights litigation, for example) 
would not be enforced.  
 
399 Chemerinsky, Federal Jurisdiction, at 407. 
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 The three main circumvention avenues that the Court has authorized are: (1) 
lawsuits against state officers; (2) states are authorized to waive their sovereign immunity 
and consent to suit; and (3) litigation sanction against the states based on statutes adopted 
to secure guarantees of the Fourteenth Amendment.400 In addition, the amendment does 
not bar lawsuits against a state by another state, as long as the state is suing to protect its 
own interest and not merely interests of its citizens.401 It does not prohibit suits in federal 
courts by the U.S. government against a state, and it does not apply to municipalities or to 
subdivisions of a state.402          
 The Eleventh Amendment bars only the original jurisdiction of the Supreme 
Court, but is ineffective with regard to the appellate jurisdiction.403 Federalism concerns 
informs the Supremacy Clause,404 which has been interpreted as to establish that state 
laws and state constitutions must be in accordance with the federal laws and the 
Constitution.405 The Supreme Court famously decided, in 1796, that in a conflict between 
                                                        
400 Idem. The discussion of detailed limitations of the Eleventh Amendment is beyond the scope of this 
work.  
  
401 Chemerinsky, Federal Jurisdiction, at 424. 
 
402 Idem, at 426, where he points out: “The ability to sue local governments in federal court is significant 
because it is tis level of government that provides most social services in this country, such as police and 
fire protection, education, and sanitation.” The Professor underlines that, at 427, the Eleventh 
Amendment’s state immunity extends to local governments when there is “so much state involvement in 
the municipalities’ actions that the relief, in essence, runs against the state.” Among such examples are 
when funding of a giving activity comes almost completely from the state and state statute provided for 
cooperation.  
 
403 Idem, at 424–425. 
 
404 Article VI, Paragraph 2, of the Constitution, the so-called Supremacy Clause, says: “This Constitution, 
and the laws of the United States which shall be made in pursuance thereof; and all treaties made, or which 
shall be made, under the authority of the United States, shall be the supreme law of the land; and the judges 
in every state shall be bound thereby, anything in the Constitution or laws of any State to the contrary 
notwithstanding.” 
 
405 Noting that state courts are entitled to exclusive or concurrent jurisdictions over significant federal-
question litigation, with the role of state courts being to protect and enforce all the rights determined by the 
United States Constitution: Paul M. Bator, “The State Courts and Federal Constitutional Litigation,” 
W illiam and Mary Law Review 22 (1981): 605–637, at 606. The author also stresses, at 607, and at 624, 
that federal judges are more competent in solving conflicts arising out of federal law. Along this line of 
reasoning, explaining the independence of federal judges from political and popular interests, and 
contenting that there is no parity between state and federal instances: Burt Neuborne, “The Myth of Parity,” 
Harvard Law Review 90 (1977): 1105–1131. 
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a state law and a treaty, the treaty shall prevail.406 The power of the U.S. Supreme Court 
over the highest courts of the state has increased along the years.407 State power has 
suffered specific limitations as well. It has been qualified under the Property Clause,408 
with Congressing exercising its power over some public land inside the states, mainly 
western states.409 Another qualification is expressed in the Privileges and Immunities 
clause of Article IV, § 2.410 This clause, in connection with the Commerce Clause, aimed 
at the creation of a national economic union.411     
 In light of the federalism delimitations, we address important concepts of the 
federal jurisdiction in relation to the states. Preliminary, the fact that federal courts 
engaged, albeit in a limited fashion, in the so-called common law powers bears 
emphasis.412 The first example of such engagement refers to Article III, § 2, of the 
Constitution.413 Technically, Congress shall grant federal courts jurisdiction concerning 
                                                        
406 Fisher and Harriger, American Constitutional Law: Constitutional Structures, at 315, where reference is 
made to the decision in Ware v. Hylton, 3 U.S. (3Dall.) 198 (1796). 
 
407 Friedman and Delaney, Becoming Supreme: The Federal Foundation of Judicial Supremacy, at 1152, 
noting that the power to review state highest courts has been originally limited to the situations of the 
Judiciary Act of 1789. The Act determined, in its section 25, that the USSC has jurisdiction to review the 
decisions of the highest court of the state if the validity of a treaty or statute of the United States was 
questioned and the decision refused such validity. At 1165, emphasis is made to the increase in the 
discretion of the Court, upon the Judiciary Act of 1914, based on concerns of uniformity, to the extent that 
“ the U.S. Constitution could mean one thing in one State and the reverse in another,” and the fact that the 
control over the Court’s docket only came with the Judiciary Act of 1925. 
 
408 Article IV, Section three, clause two: The Congress shall have power to dispose of and make all needful 
rules and regulations respecting the territory or other property belonging to the United States; and nothing 
in this Constitution shall be so construed as to prejudice any claims of the United States, or of any 
particular state. 
 
409 Fisher and Harriger, American Constitutional Law: Constitutional Structures, at 315, citing: Kleppe v. 
New Mexico, 426 U.S. 529 (1976). 
 
410 The citizens of each state shall be entitled to all privileges and immunities of citizens in the several 
states. Privileges and immunities also appear in Section 1, of the Fourteenth Amendment: No state shall 
make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States. 
We do note that the Court has differentiated the application of such clauses in its case law. 
 
411 Fisher and Harriger, American Constitutional Law: Constitutional Structures, at 315. 
 
412 Tribe, American Constitutional Law, at 466. 
 
413 Article III, section two states, in the relevant part: “The judicial power shall extend to all cases, in law 
and equity, arising under this Constitution, the laws of the United States, and treaties made, or which shall 
be made, under their authority; (…) to all cases of admiralty and maritime jurisdiction.” 
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admiralty before they exercise it; but once empowered by such jurisdiction, federal courts 
do not depend of Congress for the deciding rules.414 The second manifestation of 
common law powers refers to the so-called diversity jurisdiction, also found in Article 
III,415 which was conceived to protect nonresidents of a given state from possible state 
court bias.416           
 We turn next to examine the judicial review by the U.S. Supreme Court of state 
laws. Such authority is not expressly mentioned in the Constitution but was contained in 
§ 25 of the 1789 Judiciary Act.417 The rationale of such review was determined in Martin 
v. Lessee, with Justice Joseph Story’s powerful assumption that review of state law by 
the U.S. Supreme Court was presumed by the Constitution.418 The decision detailed to a 
great length the provisions of Article III, particularly § 2, in order to establish the original 
and appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court as the only correct interpretation of the 
Constitution.419 The Court emphasized the following as pragmatic reasons for having 
such review of state law:  
                                                        
414 Tribe, American Constitutional Law, at 468. 
 
415 Article III, in the pertinent part: “ (… ) to controversies (…) between citizens of different states.” 
 
416 Tribe, American Constitutional Law, at 469. For a discussion often presented in federal courts and civil 
procedure courses encompassing the exact scope of federal common law, the implied rights of action, 
enforceable rights under section 1983, and the relation of federal common law and Congress: Idem, at 477–
501. 
 
417 Chemerinsky, Federal Jurisdiction, at 658, where the author notes that Section 25 authorized the 
Supreme Court to review state court decisions by a writ of error to the highest court of the state in 
particular hypotheses. Hence, such review did not encompass all the cases of Article III, of the 
Constitution; nor all the federal questions. Professor Chemerinsky, at 658, argues: “ In general, Section 25 
granted the Supreme Court authority to review state courts decisions that ruled against federal law or 
federal government interests. For example, the Act granted the Court power to hear cases where the state 
court declared invalid a federal statute or treaty or an act of the United States government or ruled against 
any title, right, privilege or exception claimed under federal law. Also, Section 25 provided for review 
where the highest state court ruled in favor of a state statute or state authority when there was a challenge 
based on federal law.” We clarify that, in accordance with historical and revision notes available at: 
http://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/28/1251, the Act Jan. 31, 1928, ch. 14, § 2, amended Apr. 26, 
1928, ch. 440, June 25, 1948, ch. 646, § 23, determines that: “All Acts of Congress referring to writs of 
error shall be construed as amended to the extent necessary to substitute appeal for writ of error.”  
 
418 Chemerinsky, Constitutional Law: Principles and Policies, at 48. 
 
419 Martin v. Lessee, 14 U.S. 304 (1816), at 326–331. This understanding that the state courts shall be 
bound to the Supreme Court decisions and related mandates in a specific case has been reiteratively 
reassured by the latter, as observes: Weinberg, The New Judicial Federalism, at 1197. 
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The constitution has presumed (…) that state attachments, state 
prejudices, state jealousies, and state interests, might sometimes 
obstruct, or control, or be supposed to obstruct or control, the 
regular administration of justice. Hence, in controversies between 
states; between citizens of different states; between citizens 
claiming grants under different states; between a state and its 
citizens, or foreigners, and between citizens and foreigners, it 
enables the parties, under the authority of congress, to have the 
controversies heard, tried, and determined before the national 
tribunals. No other reason than that which has been stated can be 
assigned, why some, at least, of those cases should not have been 
left to the cognizance of the state courts.420 
 In that decision, the Court remarked that the appellate jurisdiction was also 
justified under uniformity matters across the states.421 Technically, the Court affirmed 
that appellate jurisdiction was the “only adequate remedy” capable of harmonizing 
potentially conflicting decisions across different state supreme courts.422 The Court 
further confirmed its authority to review state court judgments on a different occasion.423 
                                                        
420 Martin v. Lessee, 14 U.S. 304 (1816), at 347. The Court, at the same page, went further with regard to 
its original jurisdiction: “In respect to the other enumerated cases – the cases arising under the constitution, 
laws, and treaties of the United States, cases affecting ambassadors and other public ministers, and cases of 
admiralty and maritime jurisdiction – reasons of a higher and more extensive nature, touching the safety, 
peace, and sovereignty of the nation, might well justify a grant of exclusive jurisdiction.” The Court 
continues, at 348, specifically mentioning the necessity of uniformity of decisions across the United States. 
Referring to uniformity as an attribute of the American judicial federalism, Justice Sandra Day O’Connor, 
“Our Judicial Federalism,” Case W estern Reserve Law Review 35 (1985): 1–12, at 4, affirms: “ The goal 
of national uniformity rests on a fundamental principle: that a single sovereign’s laws should be applied 
equally to all – a principle expressed by the phrase, ‘Equal Justice Under Law,’ inscribed over the great 
doors to the United States Supreme Court.” 
 
421 General arguments supporting uniformity were presented in earlier occasions, as, e.g., by Madison, in 
Alexander Hamilton, James Madison and John Jay, The Federalist Papers, No. 80, at 475: “If there are such 
things as political axioms, the propriety of the judicial power of a government being coextensive with its 
legislative may be ranked among the number. The mere necessity of uniformity in the interpretation of the 
national laws decides the question.  Thirteen independent courts of final jurisdiction over the same causes, 
arising upon the same laws, is a hydra in government from which nothing but contradiction and confusion 
can proceed.” 
 
422 Martin v. Lessee, 14 U.S. 304 (1816), at 347–348: “ (…) the importance, and even necessity of 
uniformity of decisions throughout the whole United States, upon all subjects within the purview of the 
constitution. Judges of equal learning and integrity, in different states, might differently interpret a statute, 
or a treaty of the United States, or even the constitution itself: If there were no revising authority to control 
these jarring and discordant judgments, and harmonize them into uniformity, the laws, the treaties, and the 
constitution of the United States would be different in different states, and might, perhaps, never have 
precisely the same construction, obligation, or efficacy, in any two states.”  
 
423 Chemerinsky, Constitutional Law: Principles and Policies, at 49. 
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In this case, Chief Justice John Marshall emphasized that “ (…) in many States the judges 
are dependent for office and for salary on the will of the legislature.”424   
 Federal courts also have jurisdiction to review the constitutionality of state laws 
and actions of state officials.425 The Supremacy Clause does not bind, if literally read, 
other state officers than state judges.426 Nevertheless, several constitutional provisions – 
the Fourteenth Amendment among them – are referred to all state officials and frequently 
are not dependent upon state courts ruling on the validity of their acts.427 Article VI of the 
Constitution commands all members of State Legislatures and all executive and judicial 
officers to be bound by oath or affirmation to support the Constitution.428 The decision of 
the Court in Cooper v. Aaron429 mentioned the Supremacy Clause and such oath, thus 
obliging the Governor of Arkansas to obey the judicial desegregation order.430  
                                                        
424 Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. 264 (1821), at 386–387. The case also involved the Tenth Amendment. This 
amendment will be mentioned, infra. 
 
425 Chemerinsky, Constitutional Law: Principles and Policies, at 49, referring to Martin v. Lessee, supra. 
 
426 Article VI, Paragraph 2 of the Constitution is quoted supra. 
 
427 For the line of reasoning argued in this paragraph: Tribe, American Constitutional Law, at 255. 
 
428 Article VI of the United States Constitution: “ (…) The Senators and Representatives before mentioned, 
and the members of the several state legislatures, and all executive and judicial officers, both of the United 
States and of the several states, shall be bound by oath or affirmation, to support this Constitution; but no 
religious test shall ever be required as a qualification to any office or public trust under the United States.” 
 
429 Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1 (1958), at 18–19: “No state legislator or executive or judicial officer can 
war against the Constitution without violating his undertaking to support it. Chief Justice Marshall spoke 
for a unanimous Court in saying that: ‘If the legislatures of the several states may, at will, annul the 
judgments of the courts of the United States, and destroy the rights acquired under those judgments, the 
constitution itself becomes a solemn mockery.’ A Governor who asserts a power to nullify a federal court 
order is similarly restrained. If he had such power (…) ‘it is manifest that the fiat of a state Governor, and 
not the Constitution of the United States, would be the supreme law of the land; that the restrictions of the 
Federal Constitution upon the exercise of state power would be but impotent phrases’." As a historical fact 
that helps to illustrate the opposition to the desegregation order and the concerns of the Court with the 
effectiveness of its decision, each Justice signed the award in Cooper, as observed by Tribe, American 
Constitutional Law, at 255. 
 
430 For an interesting discussion about members of the legislative and executive being bound by the 
interpretation of the Supreme Court and how the Presidential oath of Article II, Section 1, clause 8, might 
be distinct: Tribe, American Constitutional Law, at 258–267. 
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In addition, state courts are the final interpreters of state laws and state 
constitutions.431 The general common sense approach is that the Supreme Court is the 
final arbiter of federal law, whereas state supreme courts are entitled to this role with 
respect to state law. 432  Issues related to judicial federalism, however, have been 
interpreted differently.433 
We turn to the review by the U.S. Supreme Court of the final judgments of the 
highest court of a state. The appellate jurisdiction is detailed in a statutory provision434 
with all the Supreme Court review of the highest court of a state being by the 
discretionary writ of certiorari.435 The main issues arising out of this jurisdiction are the 
following: definition of the final judgment of the state’s highest court, and determination 
of what constitutes independent and adequate state grounds.436  
With regard to the first issue, an individual has to exhaust all potential appeals in 
a given state system – not including another appeal to the same court – in order to have 
his or her case heard by the Supreme Court.437 Informed by federalism concerns, 
                                                        
431 As noted by Chemerinsky, Federal Jurisdiction, at 661, citing the leading case of the United States 
Supreme Court:  Murdock v. City of Memphis 87 U.S. (20 Wall.) 590 (1875). Along those lines, the 
highest court in a given state “ (…) is the authoritative interpreter of state law and the Supreme Court’s 
power to review state courts is limited to the later decisions as to federal questions,” – as contended by 
Chemerinsky, Federal Jurisdiction, at 705.  
 
432 Idem, at 661. 
 
433 There have been criticisms of the deference to state powers as well as to state adjudication protected by 
the Supreme Court in the end of the sixties. The criticism intensified in the seventies, after National League 
of Cities v. Usury, 426 U.S. 833 (1976). This case invalidated an act of Congress based on the Commerce 
Clause and the arguable violation of state powers of the Tenth Amendment for the first time since the 
Thirties: Weinberg, The New Judicial Federalism, at 1193–1194. 
434 28 U.S. Code § 1257: (a) Final judgments or decrees rendered by the highest court of a State in which a 
decision could be had, may be reviewed by the Supreme Court by writ of certiorari where the validity of a 
treaty or statute of the United States is drawn in question or where the validity of a statute of any State is 
drawn in question on the ground of its being repugnant to the Constitution, treaties, or laws of the United 
States, or where any title, right, privilege, or immunity is specially set up or claimed under the Constitution 
or the treaties or statutes of, or any commission held or authority exercised under, the United States. (b) For 
the purposes of this section, the term “highest court of a State” includes the District of Columbia Court of 
Appeals. 
435 Chemerinsky, Federal Jurisdiction, at 676. 
 
436 Idem. 
 
437 Idem, at 685. 
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particularly comity, the Court prefers to rule on final judgments of the highest court of a 
given state.438 Concerning the second issue, the general rule is that if a state court 
decision is based on two grounds, one of which is federal law and the other is state law, 
the Supreme Court will not review the decision when the state law ground is independent 
of the federal law ground and is sufficient, by itself, to support the decision.439   
There is a general policy against federal court review of state court decisions 
resting on “adequate and independent state grounds.”440 The Court has held that it will 
accept the state court interpretations of state laws and state constitutional provisions, 
instead of reviewing those state acts.441 Along with federalism concerns (avoiding 
reversals of state laws tend to reduce tensions between the federal and state spheres),442 
another justification for such interpretation is the prohibition of advisory opinions.443  
                                                        
438 Chemerinsky, Federal Jurisdiction, at 684. Generally, the Court waits for the decision of the highest 
state court to be final, i.e., not an interlocutory one. For potential exceptions: Chemerinsky, Federal 
Jurisdiction, at 685–697. It is worth noting that federalism and comity are also cited as main reasons to 
justify abstention doctrines: Tribe, American Constitutional Law, at 568–569. Abstention, however, was 
not directly targeted for the main discussions of the cases further addressed on chapter seven. Nevertheless, 
we do note that the goal of abstention doctrines is to authorize federal courts to dismiss or remand cases in 
which parties seek redress based on equitable or discretionary relief from federal courts. According to such 
doctrines, federal courts are authorized to abstain (ultimately not judging) in very particular circumstances 
that require the protection of state law in its totality, and the related autonomy of the state judiciary: Tribe, 
American Constitutional Law, at 568–569. For a detailed analysis of the normative discretion regarding 
jurisdiction, i.e., hypothesis in which the federal courts were completely free in exercising their choice of 
considering the exercise of their jurisdiction: David L. Shapiro, “Jurisdiction and Discretion,” New Y ork 
Law Review 60 (1985): 543–589, at 546–570. 
 
439 Chemerinsky, Federal Jurisdiction, at 707. Hence, there is a threshold that the state ground for the 
decision must also being authorized by federal laws, as claimed by: Tribe, American Constitutional Law, at 
506. 
 
440 Tribe, American Constitutional Law, at 501. 
 
441 Idem, at 502, where it was emphasized that even when there are legal controversies about the state law, 
federal courts should predict the outcome of the case as if it was tried by the highest state court. Federal 
courts, however, shall not follow such procedure and shall review de novo a district court decision 
concerning state law, as explained at 503. 
 
442 Also stating that review by the Supreme Court shall not be too limited: Tribe, American Constitutional 
Law, at 508. 
 
443 Chemerinsky, Federal Jurisdiction, at 707–708, where it is stressed that this being the case, because if 
the review of the federal law will not alter the outcome of the case, such review by the Supreme Court will 
tantamount to an advisory opinion. 
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It has been remarked that the federal Constitution provides a floor with regard to 
the protection of individual rights and liberties.444 Accordingly, when states clearly 
express their own independent view, the U.S. Supreme Court does not review it.445 The 
Court held that:  
The principle that we will not review judgments of state courts that 
rest on adequate and independent state grounds is based, in part, on 
“the limitations of our own jurisdiction.” The jurisdictional 
concern is that we not “render an advisory opinion, and if the same 
judgment would be rendered by the state court after we corrected 
its views of federal laws, our review could amount to nothing more 
than an advisory opinion.” Our requirement of a “plain statement” 
that a decision rests upon adequate and independent state grounds 
does not in any way authorize the rendering of advisory opinions. 
Rather, in determining, as we must, whether we have jurisdiction 
to review a case that is alleged to rest on adequate and independent 
state grounds, we merely assume that there are no such grounds 
when it is not clear from the opinion itself that the state court relied 
upon an adequate and independent state ground and when it fairly 
appears that the state court rested its decision primarily on federal 
law.446 
 
This rationale, which rests on the prohibition of advisory opinions, has been 
criticized for allowing incorrect interpretations of federal law to continue and, potentially, 
remain influencing other decisions.447 Importantly, it belongs to the U.S. Supreme Court 
the authority to determine what is “adequate and independent state grounds,” not to the 
highest court in a given state.448 
The general rule is that state supreme court decisions based on state law 
procedures are considered as adequate and, thus, capable of preventing U.S. Supreme 
Court from reviewing substantive constitutional issues of the decision.449 The Court has 
                                                        
444 Fisher and Harriger, American Constitutional Law: Constitutional Structures, at 21. 
 
445 Idem. 
 
446 Michigan v. Long, U.S. 1032 (1983), at 1041–1042. 
 
447 Chemerinsky, Federal Jurisdiction, at 708. 
 
448 Idem, at 709. 
 
449 Idem, at 711. 
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enacted limitations concerning the definition of what is an adequate state ground of 
decision. The first among those limitations refers to the unconstitutionality of the state 
law itself.450 Another limitation is the hypothesis when state law is considered inadequate 
due to the lack of support for the decision of the state court in the record.451  
In addition, state procedural rules are not adequate if the state law denies due 
process guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment.452 It has been argued that a state 
procedure that bars state or federal judicial consideration of any question, federal or state, 
shall meet the “fundamental fairness requirement” of such amendment. 453 Another 
condition settled is that state procedural rules only preclude review by the Supreme Court 
as long as those rules serve an important state interest.454 State procedural rules are not 
considered as adequate ground if such rule is designed to circumvent review of the 
federal issue by the Supreme Court – even if there is a legitimate state interest.455 Another 
requirement for a state law to bar review is that the procedural state law shall be 
mandatory (instead of discretionary) in order to qualify as adequate state ground.456 
                                                        
450
 Along those lines and for a complete discussion about the issue and the pertinent case law: 
Chemerinsky, Federal Jurisdiction, at 710. 
 
451 See footnote above for the case Ward v. Board of Commissioners of Love County, Oklahoma, 253 U.S. 
17 (1920), where the Indians who received federal lands were forbidden to sue based on state law that 
would not authorize review, if taxes were paid voluntarily. The state court has found that the Native 
Americans had paid the land taxes “voluntarily,” despite knowing that they only have paid such taxes due 
to threats of forced sale by the state. Hence, the United States Supreme Court considered that the state law 
was inadequate in light of the absence of support for the decision in the record.  
 
452 Chemerinsky, Federal Jurisdiction, at 712. 
 
453 Tribe, American Constitutional Law, at 508. 
 
454 Chemerinsky, Federal Jurisdiction, at 713, where the explanation of Henry v. Mississippi (1965) is 
detailed. At 714–715, the author stresses that the Court in of Henry v. Mississippi specifically emphasized 
that procedural rules must serve a “legitimate state interest” in order to bar review – while distinguishing 
that state substantive rules were always deemed as adequate if reversal determined on the federal law 
ground would not modify the final decision of the case. The controversial issue is what is a legitimate state 
interest and how it is reconciled with the Supremacy Clause of article VI. That Clause determines to which 
extent state law may limit the impact of a federal – which is, on itself, a federal question, thus authorizing 
review by the Supreme Court, as observed in: Tribe, American Constitutional Law, at 509. 
 
455 Developing those main arguments, see: Chemerinsky, Federal Jurisdiction, at 717–719. 
 
456 Tribe, American Constitutional Law, at 509. 
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The Supreme Court, as a rule, does not review state law if the state decision is 
independent from federal law. State ground is considered independent as long as it is in 
its totality based on state law, and it is not related to federal law.457 The Supreme Court 
has interpreted that the decisions lack independence when the state law incorporates 
federal law.458 Significant controversies have arisen if a state law was unclear, because in 
some cases it was difficult to determine when the state law decision intended to 
incorporate federal law instead of being an independent ground for the decision.459  
Uncertainty reigned until 1983, when the Supreme Court settled the issue in 
Michigan v. Long.460 According to the decision in the case, the Court held that it would 
assume the absence of independent state ground if the state supreme court said nothing on 
the contrary. 461  Hence, a compromise between federalism concerns and pragmatic 
considerations was reached: the Court would not review the decision if the state court has 
clearly mentioned that state law was the ground. At the same time, the Court decided to 
review issues in which the decision was not clear, thus fostering federalism because it 
supported states to develop their own state law doctrines, such as state constitutions.462 It 
has also been argued that if a state court relies on federal law and the Supreme Court later 
judges such decision, it would provide an opportunity for the state court to be corrected 
because there might be no actually applicable federal law.463  
                                                        
457 Chemerinsky, Federal Jurisdiction, at 721–722. 
 
458 Idem, at 722 and related case law. 
 
459 Chemerinsky, Federal Jurisdiction, at 723. 
 
460 463 U.S. 1032 (1883). Procedural analyses are not our focus. 
 
461 Chemerinsky, Federal Jurisdiction, at 725. For arguments emphasizing how Michigan v. Long and the 
“plain statement” rule supported federalism by fostering the development of state law doctrines: Tribe, 
American Constitutional Law, at 510. 
 
462 Chemerinsky, Federal Jurisdiction, at 726. 
 
463 Idem. There are, however, severe criticisms to the decision in Michigan v. Long. The criticism is rooted 
in the general and strong legal presumption favoring review by the Supreme Court. Such presumption had 
as side effects the potential to jeopardize states as laboratories to test solutions to new legal problems, while 
being a burden for the Supreme Courts’ dockets. For detailed criticism and famous arguments developed by 
Justices Stevens and Ginsburg: Chemerinsky, Federal Jurisdiction, 727–729; Tribe, American 
Constitutional Law, at 510–512. 
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It has been contended464 that the Supreme Court has used and modified the 
doctrine of adequate and independent grounds according to their own interests in 
allowing or barring review.465 
 
IV. STANDING REQUIREMENTS 
At this point, it is worth discussing the general requirements for a case to be 
judged on the merits or dismissed.466 The justiciability doctrines were developed by the 
U.S. Supreme Court to encompass the prohibition against advisory opinions, standing 
requirements, ripeness, mootness, and political question.467 The justiciability doctrines 
can be strictly constitutional, as it is the case referring to standing requirements based on 
the textual “cases and controversies.”468 Justiciability can be also derived from the 
interpretation of the Constitution in a given time period, when they are considered 
prudential requirements. Determining the precise scope and extent of prudential or 
constitutional requirements has been controversial for the Court.469  
                                                        
464 Chemerinsky, Federal Jurisdiction, at 730–731. 
 
465 A note regarding habeas corpus is necessary, despite not being the scope of our research. Relief based 
on federal habeas corpus generally arises out of arguable violations of state court proceedings that led to the 
defendant’s incarceration, notwithstanding the violation of the federal constitution. Technically, the federal 
court is not modifying the judgment of the state court when ruling on a federal habeas based on 28 U.S.C. § 
2254. The Supreme Court verifies if the prisoner who is in custody is so in violation of the Constitution or 
laws or treaties, as explained in: Tribe, American Constitutional Law, at 512–518. 
 
466 Helen Hershkoff, “State Courts and the Passive Virtues: Rethinking the Judicial Function,” Harvard 
Law Review 114 (2001): 1833–1941, at 1836, where the Professor clarifies that justiciability doctrines are 
a product of the federal constitution and, as so, they are based on separation of powers and federalism 
issues that do not have necessarily to be mandatory to state courts.  
 
467 Chemerinsky, Federal Jurisdiction, at 44, where the author notes that those doctrines were not present at 
the constitutional text nor were they considered by the Framers. 
 
468 For relevant considerations regarding the principle of separation of powers as well as the importance of 
the Court not declaring an act unconstitutional, but merely resorting to the justiciability doctrines to not 
decide the unconstitutionality in a specific case: Bickel, The Last Dangerous Branch, at 201–207, 
specifically. 
 
469 For the distinction between constitutional and prudential requirements, and how the Court has switched, 
for instance, in the general prohibition of generalized grievances from a prudential requirement to later 
classify it as a constitutional one: Chemerinsky, Federal Jurisdiction, at 44–45. The Professor also stresses 
the relevance of the distinction, because Congress can change prudential, but it cannot modify  
constitutional requirements. Ripeness is another example in which it is difficult to precisely determine in 
the Court’s view if prudential reasoning or constitutional provisions informed the decision. The Court has 
decided that some cases were ripe, despite being too abstract: David L. Shapiro, “Jurisdiction and 
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Justiciability requirements are based on widely ranging policy considerations. 
Separation of powers (commonly referred as tripartite allocation of powers protected by 
the prerequisite of cases and controversies), the conservation of judicial resources 
(mootness and ripeness preserve an optimum time component), the necessity of concrete 
controversies for federal courts to provide an improved judicial making, which is also 
promoted through fairness, particularly in light of individuals who are not litigants in a 
case.470 The reiterative concern regarding justiciability doctrines is to balance restraint 
and review, which is informed by the normative consideration of the “proper role of the 
federal courts,” questioning whether or not courts have been consistently applying 
justiciability.471  
The ban on advisory opinions is a consequence of the constitutional requirement 
of existing case or controversy under Article III of the Constitution,472 which the Court 
interpreted as a bar on “abstract, hypothetical or contingent questions.”473 This ban is 
complemented by the other justiciability doctrines, despite the Supreme Court not 
addressing the prohibition as often it mentions other doctrines.474  
                                                                                                                                                                     
Discretion,” New Y ork Law Review 60 (1985): 543–589, at 553. Mootness has also been subject of debate 
and the Professor underlines that it is common for justiciability (and the related discretion rationale) to 
overlap, so mootness, for example, may complement a ripeness argument: Idem, at 554–555. 
 
470 Chemerinsky, Federal Jurisdiction, at 45–46. Moreover, it has been remarked that the necessity of 
concrete case or controversy advances the Court (and the separation of powers principle), since the Court 
shall decide after a given statute was enacted, thus having an advantage in comparison to the abstract 
considerations of the political branches: Bickel, The Last Dangerous Branch, at 115–116. 
 
471 Chemerinsky, Federal Jurisdiction, at 47. It has been stressed that if courts had a mandatory obligation 
to decide an issue, it would lead to the judiciary second-guessing the legislative and the executive, 
jeopardizing, potentially, the legitimacy of the judiciary: Bickel, The Last Dangerous Branch, at 200. 
 
472 It is worth noting that the case or controversy requirement exists, as earlier referred, to protect the 
separation of powers. Along those lines, even in the states where advisory opinion were historically 
admitted (Colorado, Florida, Massachusetts, Maine, New Hampshire, Rhode Island and South Dakota), 
state judges often wrote that such opinions are rendered in an extrajudicial function, thus  not being subject 
to stare decisis: Tribe, American Constitutional Law, at 329. The Professor further contends, Idem, that this 
absence of stare decisis jeopardizes the principal function of advisory opinions, namely: reduce the 
uncertainty as to the matter brought to judgment. 
 
473 Tribe, American Constitutional Law, at 328, citing Alabama State Fed. of Labor v. McAdory, 325,  U.S. 
450, 461 (1945), according to United  States v. Evans, 213 U.S. 297, 300 (1909). 
 
474 Chemerinsky, Federal Jurisdiction, at 57. 
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For a case to fulfill the prohibition against advisory opinions, it must meet a two-
part test.475 First, the dispute must be an actual one among adverse litigants.476 The 
second requirement refers to the effectiveness of the judgment itself because there shall 
be a “substantive likelihood that a federal court decision in favor of a claimant will bring 
about some change or have some effect.”477 Therefore, federal courts must not issue a 
mere recommendation, without practical effects, regardless of the remedy pursued by the 
claimant (i.e., monetary, injunctive, or declaratory relief).478 
Standing is another justiciability doctrine. It primarily focuses on the party 
seeking relieve in federal courts with the question of which issues could ancillary.479 
Standing refers to the case or controversy requirement of Article III of the 
Constitution,480 but commentators and the Court itself had acknowledged the difficulties 
inherent to this particular subject matter.481 The constitutional requisites of Article III 
                                                        
475 Note, Advisory Opinions, at 1302, defining advisory opinions as “answers given by the justices of the 
highest court of a state to questions of law submitted by a house of the legislature or by the chief 
executive.” 
 
476 Chemerinsky, Federal Jurisdiction, at 49. 
 
477 Idem, at 51. 
 
478 Chemerinsky, Federal Jurisdiction, at 54. It is worth quoting the following: “ … the fact that a judgment 
adverse to one of the litigants removes only one of the lawful option available to that litigant does not 
render such a judgment impermissibly advisory,” as clarified at: Tribe, American Constitutional Law, at 
332. 
 
479 Tribe, American Constitutional Law, at 385–386. The Professor stresses, at 390, that standing 
requirements are verified at the time the lawsuit is commenced, so before evidence has been gathered, and 
with courts being required to assume that these statements are true, construing the most favorable 
interpretation to plaintiff as possible. 
 
480 Idem, at 386. 
 
481 Chemerinsky, Federal Jurisdiction, at 57. The Professor underlines, at 58, that there is a sense that the 
Court has modified its interpretation according to its willingness to adjudicate (or not) particular cases. 
Discussing that at the end of the Warren Court, more than forty years ago, the standing requirements were 
interpreted to ensure that federal courts did not exceed their Article III powers by adjudicating abstract 
claims, and the further shift in that rationale to emphasize separation of powers, in particular: Tribe, 
American Constitutional Law, at 387–388. At 392, the Professor emphasizes that the shift in the 
interpretation of the Court regarding standing demonstrates different conceptions of the role of federal 
courts: “ … the continuing debate over whether federal courts exist primarily to resolve concrete disputes 
among individual litigants, with the power to make constitutional decisions only a necessary incident to this 
role, or whether federal courts have a special responsibility, as the branch of government best able to 
develop a coherent interpretation of the Constitution, to engage in the exposition of constitutional norms, 
limited primarily by the requirement that they do so in the context of reasonably concrete disputes 
presented to them for review.” 
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have been interpreted by the Court as to include, generally, the following: (1) plaintiff 
must have suffered or will imminently suffer an injury; (2) such injury is “fairly 
traceable” to the defendant’s conduct (causation); and (3) the decision of the federal court 
will likely redress the injury (redressability).482 
Furthermore, the Court has formulated three prudential requisites to supplement 
the constitutional commands of Article III. The former might be modified by Congress 
through statues, whereas the latter cannot.483 The Court has previously held: 
Beyond the constitutional requirements, the federal judiciary has 
also adhered to a set of prudential principles that bear on the 
question of standing. Thus, this Court has held that “the plaintiff 
generally must assert his own legal rights and interests, and cannot 
rest his claim to relief on the legal rights or interests of third 
parties.” In addition, even when the plaintiff has alleged 
redressable injury sufficient to meet the requirements of Art. III, 
the Court has refrained from adjudicating “abstract questions of 
wide public significance” which amount to “generalized 
grievances,” pervasively shared and most appropriately addressed 
in the representative branches. Finally, the Court has required that 
the plaintiff's complaint fall within “the zone of interests to be 
protected or regulated by the statute or constitutional guarantee in 
question.”484 
 
Along those lines of reasoning, plaintiffs have to demonstrate the injury-in-fact 
requirement, being precluded to seek relieve if they do not have an interest at stake. This 
is justified based on the case and controversy constitutional command, as well as the 
general separation of powers.485 The latter prohibits advisory opinions, and the former 
advances that the person who brought suit uses the federal court system as efficiently as 
possible.486 In addition, the Court has also established that causation must be verified, 
                                                        
482 Chemerinsky, Federal Jurisdiction, at 60. 
 
483 Tribe, American Constitutional Law, at 386. 
 
484 Valley Forge Christian College v. Americans United for Separation of Church & State, 454 U.S. 464 
(1982), at 474–475.  
 
485 Tribe, American Constitutional Law, at 395–396, for the specific requirement of injury in fact and the 
separation of powers principle. 
 
486 Chemerinsky, Federal Jurisdiction, at 62.  
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namely that the plaintiff must argue that the conduct of the defendant caused the harm.487 
The third related requisite is redressability, which is met when plaintiff contends that a 
decision of the court in his or her favor would probably remedy the injury, therefore 
making a difference. 488  Unsurprisingly, causation and redressability have not been 
immune from criticisms.489 
Standing has also been subject to prudential considerations that the plaintiff must 
meet in addition to the constitutional requirements. Within the prudential considerations, 
there is a general prohibition against third-party standing because a plaintiff can only 
claim if she or he has suffered the alleged injuries.490 Other prudential requisites are the 
ban on generalized grievances491 and the requirement that plaintiff must be within the 
zone of interests protected by the statute.492  
                                                        
487 Chemerinsky, Federal Jurisdiction, at 75. For criticisms concerning causality as an independent 
requirement, and how it may be easily manipulated by courts: Tribe, American Constitutional Law, at 426–
427. 
 
488 Chemerinsky, Federal Jurisdiction, at 75. Specifically addressing the requirements for standing: Lujan v. 
Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555 (1992), at 560: “Over the years, our cases have established that the 
irreducible constitutional minimum of standing contains three elements. First, the plaintiff must have 
suffered an ‘injury in fact’ – an invasion of a legally protected interest which is (a) concrete and 
particularized, and (b) ‘actual or imminent’, not ‘conjectural’ or ‘hypothetical’, there must be a causal 
connection between the injury and the conduct complained of the injury has to be ‘fairly (…) traceable to 
the challenged action of the defendant, and not (…) the result of the independent action of some third party 
not before the court’. Third, it must be ‘likely,’ as opposed to merely ‘speculative’, that the injury will be 
‘redressed by a favorable decision’." 
 
489 For an overview about the criticisms: Chemerinsky, Federal Jurisdiction, at 79–84; and Tribe, American 
Constitutional Law, at 431–434.  
 
490 Chemerinsky, Federal Jurisdiction, at 84. There are exceptions for this bar on third-party claims. The 
first one refers to situations in which the third party is unlikely to be able to sue; the second exception is 
based on the close relationship between the plaintiff and the third party who brings the claim; and the final 
exception refers to the so-called overbreadth doctrine. Such exceptions are merely cited here, since further 
examination is outside the purpose of this work. As reference, we do cite, for instance, Idem, at 84–91. 
 
491 Chemerinsky, Federal Jurisdiction, at 92, where the Professor clarifies: “… a generalized grievance is 
where the plaintiffs sue solely as citizens concerned with having the government follow the law or as tax 
payers interested in restraining allegedly illegal government expenditures. (…) the bar against generalized 
grievance standing is inapplicable if a person claims that he or she has been denied freedom of speech or 
due process of law, even if everyone else in society suffered the same harm.” Also significant is the fact 
that the limitations regarding taxpayer standing are a manifestation of the prohibition against generalized 
grievances: Tribe, American Constitutional Law, at 421. 
 
492 Chemerinsky, Federal Jurisdiction, at 100, emphasizing that all those prudential requirements are 
cumulative. At 101, stating how the Court has been inconsistent: if a plaintiff sues based on a statutory 
provision, this plaintiff will only have standing if s/he is within the group intended to benefit from the law. 
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In addition, standing requirements have been subject to particular problems when 
involving organizations, government entities, and legislators as potential plaintiffs.493 
Regarding the standing of organizations, the organization or its members must face 
repercussions in a “tangible way by the challenged action,” with the organization solely 
having standing on its own behalf if it had suffered injuries.494 The organization (or 
association) may sue in its representative capacity, i.e., on behalf of its members, as long 
as it meets a three-part test determined by the Court.495 The first part states that the 
organization has standing when its members would be authorized to sue on their own 
capacity. Second, the interests that the lawsuit aims to protect are “germane to the 
organization’s purpose.” Third, participation of individual members of the organization is 
not required for the claims proposed or for the remedy that it seeks.496  The last 
requirement is the most difficult to meet because it cannot be easily verified if the 
presence of the litigation can fully secure adequate representation of the interests of its 
members.497         
 Government entities (federal government, states, and municipalities) may have 
standing denied if they sue on behalf of their own citizens,498  but are ordinarily 
                                                                                                                                                                     
For a discussion about the unequal application of the zone of interest requirement: Tribe, American 
Constitutional Law, at 445–450. 
 
493 Chemerinsky, Federal Jurisdiction, at 106. This has been referred as supra-individual legal capacity, as 
well. Tribe, American Constitutional Law, at 450, stating that the litigant “ … might plausibly be said to be 
asserting, rather than or in addition to the litigant’s own interests, the interests of others whom the litigant 
purports to have a special role in representing.” 
 
494 Chemerinsky, Federal Jurisdiction, at 106. This is perceived as a general application of the ordinary 
standing requirements, because organizations, in this hypothesis, will be suing in their own capacity, not in 
their representative capacity: Tribe, American Constitutional Law, at 450. 
 
495 Chemerinsky, Federal Jurisdiction, at 107. 
 
496 Tribe, American Constitutional Law, at 450, quoting the requirements and the Court’s language in New 
York State Club Association v. City of New York, 487 U.S. 1, 9 (1988), in which the Court referred to the 
test set on: Hunt v. Washington States Commission, 432 U.S. 333, 343 (1977). In that case, a state agency 
had standing in order to challenge other state’s regulatory policies, as explained Idem, at 452. The Court 
has declared that people joined organizations to advance their interests, with the third part of the test to be 
prudential: Chemerinsky, Federal Jurisdiction, at 108. 
 
497 Tribe, American Constitutional Law, at 452. 
 
498 The exception to the rule is when the state is suing in a parens patriae capacity in order to promote a 
quasi-sovereignty interest: Tribe, American Constitutional Law, at 453. The Court decided that the parens 
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authorized to proceed if suing asserting the entities’ own interests.499 Legislators have 
standing to sue in cases arising out of injuries that they personally suffered – as it is the 
case in a potential reduction of salary – and there is no controversy.500 The disputable 
topics refer to representatives based on claims arising out of injuries to their capacity as 
representatives and thus jeopardizing such perform.501 The general prohibition of general 
grievances bars legislators to sue as representatives of the interests of their 
constituents.502 The Court has dismissed cases based on political questions, but had 
reiterated that legislators have standing if they have been “singled out for specially 
unfavorable treatment as opposed to other members of their bodies or that their votes 
have been denied or nullified.”503  
Among the remaining justiciability doctrines, ripeness and mootness directly refer 
to when review is appropriate. The first is concerned with whether review might be 
premature, whereas the latter addresses if it is already “too late” in litigation terms.504 
Ripeness has been pointed out as interrelated to standing (and the injury in fact requisite) 
                                                                                                                                                                     
patriae exception is not applicable to lawsuits against the federal government – a controversial 
understanding, as argued by: Chemerinsky, Federal Jurisdiction, at 115–116. 
 
499 Tribe, American Constitutional Law, at 452. For instance, the federal government has standing to sue 
state governments who were violating the Voting Rights Act, as exemplified by: Chemerinsky, Federal 
Jurisdiction, at 113. 
 
500 Chemerinsky, Federal Jurisdiction, at 108. 
 
501 Idem, at 109. The general principles articulated in cases of standing regarding members of Congress are 
valid for state legislators, but the latter do not involve issues of separation of powers: Tribe, American 
Constitutional Law, at 456. 
 
502 Tribe, American Constitutional Law, at 457. This prohibition, the Professor argues, remains valid even 
if the representatives frame their claim as a violation of their constituents’ interests in their representatives’ 
official power. 
 
503 Chemerinsky, Federal Jurisdiction, at 110, where the author explains that the Court has previously 
denied review under the principle of equitable discretion, i.e., the Court understood that review must be 
avoided, potentially on separation of powers implications. For a discussion about this requirements and 
development of policy implications: Idem, at 111–113. 
 
504 Tribe, American Constitutional Law, at 334, and further at 344, where the author emphasizes that 
ripeness cannot easily be categorized or orderly deducted to a predictable outcome, due to the discretion 
that is inherent to it. Also following this line of reasoning: Chemerinsky, Federal Jurisdiction, at 119. 
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and to the ban on advisory opinion (and the abstract questions it involves).505 When 
considering ripeness of a case, the Supreme Court examines “the fitness of the issues for 
judicial decision” as well the “hardship to the parties of withholding court 
consideration.”506 This inquiry about the fitness of the issue encompasses constitutional 
(live case and controversy requirement of Article III of the Constitution) and prudential 
considerations.507  
Ripeness is particularly relevant when pre-enforcement challenges cast doubts on 
the applicability or the effect of the law under review to the plaintiff.508 The plaintiff must 
show a minimum enforcement of the law if he or she is contending a constitutional right 
that is subject to a “chilling effect,” even though such effect is usually confined to free 
speech cases.509  Mootness is also another justiciability doctrine that relates to the 
necessity of a live case or controversy (Article III of the Constitution) in all phases of the 
federal process.510 It has also been justified under the prohibition of advisory opinions,511 
and as such can be raised at any time during the procedure, including sua sponte, i.e., by 
the court’s own motion.512 The Supreme Court conferred to the mootness doctrine a 
flexible character, based on Article III of the Constitution, and has carved out four 
general exceptions.513 Cases are not considered moot if there are “collateral or secondary 
injuries,” the conduct is capable of repetition, yet evading review, if the practice that is 
                                                        
505 For the arguments, see, respectively: Chemerinsky, Federal Jurisdiction, at 117; and Tribe, American 
Constitutional Law, at 334. 
 
506 Tribe, American Constitutional Law, at 334; and Chemerinsky, Federal Jurisdiction, at 118. Both 
Professors quoted the language from Abbot Laboratories v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136 (1967). 
 
507 Tribe, American Constitutional Law, at 334–335. 
 
508 Idem, at 338. 
 
509 Tribe, American Constitutional Law, at 339, where the Professor states that ripeness is also present, 
even if a law’s effective date is from years of now, as long as it is certain that the law would be applicable 
to the plaintiff who is challenging it. 
 
510 Chemerinsky, Federal Jurisdiction, at 129. 
 
511 Tribe, American Constitutional Law, at 344. 
 
512 Chemerinsky, Federal Jurisdiction, at 131. 
 
513 Idem. 
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arguably illegal is ceased voluntarily by defendant who is capable to resume it at any 
moment, or if the case is a class action that has been properly certified.514 
The final justiciability doctrine that we shall mention is the political question. It is 
founded in a residual analysis, so even if the case at bar meets all the previously 
discussed requirements for justiciability, it can still be dismissed under the political 
question.515 This doctrine has been subject to strong criticisms516 and arguably is the most 
controversial among the doctrines of justiciability.517 The political question doctrine is 
based in constitutional considerations embedded in Article III but also in prudential 
concerns that involve the discretion of the Court.518 
The modern test for political question was enunciated in Baker v. Carr, where the 
Court held: 
                                                        
514 Idem. For the pertinent exceptions: Tribe, American Constitutional Law, at 347–361. 
 
515 Commenting on the necessity of a political question doctrine in a case involving state secrets, Professor 
Bickel affirms, in The Last Dangerous Branch, at 184–185: “Such is the foundation, in both intellect and 
instinct, of the political-question doctrine: the Court’s sense of lack of capacity, compounded in unequal 
parts of: (a) the strangeness of the issue and its intractability to principled resolution; (b) the sheer 
momentousness of it, which tends to unbalance judicial judgment; (c) the anxiety, not so much that the 
judicial judgment will be ignored, as that perhaps it should but it would not be; (d) finally (‘in a mature 
democracy’), the inner vulnerability, the self-doubt of an institution which is electorally irresponsible and 
has no earth to draw strength from. The case does not exist in which the power of judicial review has been 
exercised without some such misgivings being applicable in some degree. But the differences of degree can 
on occasion be satisfyingly conclusive. There are cases of which no more need be said than what Maurice 
Finkelstein said of Dred Scott v. Sandford: ‘A question which involved a Civil War can hardly be proper 
material for the wrangling of lawyers’.”  
 
516 The main criticism is directly related to the conception of the legitimacy of the Court itself. Arguing that 
it is considerable fragile, for example:  Bickel, The Last Dangerous Branch, at 183–198, where the 
Professor provides an historical overview of cases about political question. For an opposing view of this 
understanding, see, among others: Tribe, American Constitutional Law, at xvi, where he writes: “ … I 
reject the assumptions characteristic of (…) scholars like Alexander Bickel: the highest mission of the 
Supreme Court, in my view, is not to conserve judicial credibility, but in the Constitution’s own phrase, ‘to 
form a more perfect Union’ between rights and rights within that charter’s necessarily evolutionary 
design.” 
 
517 Chemerinsky, Federal Jurisdiction, at 147. Moreover, the position of the Court has changed over the 
years. In Marbury v. Madison, political questions were limited to subject matters in which the President had 
unlimited discretion, without allegations of constitutional violations; whereas the Court modernly 
understands that political question encompasses violations of individual rights, as contended by: 
Chemerinsky, Idem, at 148–149. In this sense, the Professor argues that such test is, in practice, not very 
useful: Idem, at 150. 
 
518 Tribe, American Constitutional Law, at 385. 
 
  106 
Prominent on the surface of any case held to involve a political 
question is found a textually demonstrable constitutional 
commitment of the issue to a coordinate political department; or a 
lack of judicially discoverable and manageable standards for 
resolving it; or the impossibility of deciding without an initial 
policy determination of a kind clearly for nonjudicial discretion; or 
the impossibility of a court's undertaking independent resolution 
without expressing lack of the respect due coordinate branches of 
government; or an unusual need for unquestioning adherence to a 
political decision already made; or the potentiality of 
embarrassment from multifarious pronouncements by various 
departments on one question. Unless one of these formulations is 
inextricable from the case at bar, there should be no dismissal for 
nonjusticiability on the ground of a political question's presence. 
The doctrine of which we treat is one of “political questions,” not 
one of “political cases.” The courts cannot reject as “no law suit” a 
bona fide controversy as to whether some action denominated 
‘political’ exceeds constitutional authority.519 
In general, the doctrine of political question has been used in different contexts. 
The Court has decided that the clause establishing the Republican form of government is 
not justiciable,520 but that challenges based on reapportionment to election districts are 
justiciable, and that issues involving foreign affairs are not; neither issues directly 
relating to Congressional self-governance.521 Recently, the relevant inquiry of political 
                                                        
519 Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962), at 217. Professor Lawrence contends that three different lines of 
thoughts, at minimum, can be found in the test enunciated in Baker v. Carr regarding the role of the 
Supreme Court and federal courts, generally. The first one is a classical view, from Marbury v. Madison, in 
which the Court has to decide cases, unless it interprets that the Constitution itself has determined the 
decision of the particular matter to other branches. The second view is prudential, and it is founded on the 
idea that the Court should not decide the case, if the decision of the merits would lead to a compromise in 
particular constitutional principle or could jeopardize the legitimacy of the Court. The last view is 
functional and arises out of pragmatic concerns as to the access of the information, uniformity and the 
responsibilities of the Courts to other branches of the government. For the development of this reasoning: 
Tribe, American Constitutional Law, at 366. 
 
520 Article IV, section four of the United States Constitution establishes that: “ The United States shall 
guarantee to every State in this Union a Republican form of government.” The seminal case is Luther v. 
Borden, in which the Court held that the Congress has to decide which state government was established in 
a given state. Chemerinsky, Federal Jurisdiction, at 154–155. 
 
521 Chemerinsky, Federal Jurisdiction, at 157–166. In other areas, such as the ratification of constitutional 
amendments, the Court has been inconsistent. Further developments of the political doctrine include its use 
to avoid intrusive interference with coordinate branches of government, impeachments, and removal 
procedures from office: Idem, at 168–172.  
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question is no longer based on political considerations only, but in the content of the law 
itself,522 which ultimately reduced the application of such doctrine.523 
V. SEPARATION OF POWERS AND RECURRENT ARGUMENTS ABOUT THE EXISTENCE 
OF ABSTRACT REVIEW IN THE UNITED STATES 
Judicial review has been understood as the most controversial task of the judiciary 
because it blurs the distinction between the political and legal spheres.524 In light of the 
previous discussion, constitutional review in the United States is, as a rule, concrete. 
There are, however, exceptions.525 This Part contextualizes the distinct origins for the 
U.S. and continental systems of judicial review (German, Italian, and French have 
                                                        
522 Arguing the demise of the political question doctrine, and specifically mentioning how the re-apportion 
cases after Baker v. Carr established equal protection as a constitutional ordinary challenge, dismissing the 
applicability of the political question doctrine: Mark Tushnet, “Justiciability and the Political Thicket: Law 
and Jurisprudence in the Law of Justiciability: The Transformation and Disappearance of the Political 
Question Doctrine,” North Carolina Law Review 80 (2002): 1203–1235, at 1208. 
 
523  Ming-Sung Kuo, “Discovering Sovereignty in Dialogue: is Judicial Dialogue the Answer to 
Constitutional Conflict in the Pluralist Landscape?,” The Canadian Journal of Law and Jurisprudence 26 
(2013): 341–376, at 372–374. The author contends, based on the decision in Baker v. Carr, that there is no 
longer an absolute political sovereignty, with constitutional sovereignty rising grounded on judicial 
dialogue. 
 
524 Martin Shapiro and Alec Stone Sweet, On Law, Politics & Judicialization (New York: Oxford 
University Press, 2011), at 142, where the authors refer to constitutional judicial review, excluding the 
mere judicial review that ordinarily opposes to the supremacy of parliament principle. In this sense, 
constitutional judicial review is even more controversial, because it authorizes the judicial organs to 
interpret the validity of an act based on the Constitution itself – not only an act of parliament, but an act 
which is the product of the constitutional convention that in some countries is even directly approved by the 
people through referendum.  
 
525 We do note that the classification between abstract and concrete review may be understood in a 
spectrum, starting with  “pure” abstract review evolving to concrete review. Under such understanding, 
abstract review could be achieved through flexible standing rules – as it would be the case of article 38 of 
the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, where authorized parties could sue, regardless if they 
suffered the injury when the legislation was enforced: Michael C. Dorf, “Abstract and Concrete Review,” 
Global Perspectives on Constitutional Law, ed. Vikram David Amar and Mark Tushnet (New York: Oxford 
University Press, 2009), at 4–8. This is relevant because we classified one of the modalities of the Brazilian 
judicial review as abstract, even though it is not exercised for pre-enforcement of legislation. Concrete 
review is perceived as more accurate than pure abstract (including pre-enforcement review), to the extent 
that there will exist factual concrete elements for a court to evaluate, despite being more expensive: Tom 
Ginsburg, “Economic Analysis and the Design of Constitutional Courts,” Theoretical Inquiries at Law 3 
(2002): 49–85, at 69. 
 
  108 
inspired others), considering the principle of separation of powers.526 It also surveys the 
recurrent arguments regarding the existence of abstract judicial review in the United 
States.  
Preliminarily, it is worth locating the relevance of the distinction between 
concrete and abstract as being inherent to how different jurisdictions understand the 
principle of separation of powers. Judicial review, as previously noticed, has been openly 
initiated in the United States with the case of Marbury v. Madison.527 Judicial review in 
the United States is decentralized based on the assumption that every judge has to 
interpret the law so he or she can apply it to concrete cases. When facing a conflict 
between a superior norm, i.e., the Constitution and an ordinary norm, the latter is 
disregarded and the judge applies the constitutional one.528 Hence, in the decentralize 
system – also called the U.S. system – every judicial organ of a legal system is authorized 
to exercise the constitutional control.529 Because courts are not directly elected, judicial 
review itself (and its related countermajoritarian difficulty) 530  has been subject of 
criticisms.531 
                                                        
526 For specific examples of controversial decisions of those continental – i.e., civil law – constitutional 
courts in France, Italy and Germany, see: John Ferejohn and Pasquale Pasquino, “The Countermajoritariam 
Opportunity,” Journal of Constitutional Law (2010): 353–395, at 378–393. 
 
527 Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, (1803). See our discussion supra, for the origins of judicial 
review and for the rationale of Marshall in this classical decision, namely: that judicial review is solved on 
terms of statutory interpretation. Along those lines: Hamilton, in the Federalist 78: Hamilton, Madison and 
Jay, The Federalist Papers, at 465–466, with direct quotes, supra. 
 
528
 Cappelletti, Judicial Review in the Contemporary W orld, at 50–53. 
 
529
 Idem, at 46. 
 
530 Emphasizing that such difficulty is not exclusive to the American experience, because judicial review 
forces the majority (“either the parliamentary or popular majority to revisited an issued it had tried to 
settle”): Ferejohn and Pasquino, The Countermajoritariam Opportunity, at 354. 
 
531 For a classical conceptualization about judicial review and the countermajoritarian nature of it, see, 
among others: Bickel, The Last Dangerous Branch, at 16–23, in particular. For strong arguments against 
countermajoritarian theories based on the fact that judicial review enhances popular sovereignty by 
reducing principal-agent potential problems, while enhancing monitoring and coordinating functions: 
David S. Law, “A Theory of Judicial Review Power and Judicial Review,” Georgetown Law Journal 97 
(2009): 725–801, at 744–764. Arguing that judicial review may actually foster democratic deliberations, 
specially in the external deliberation used by the United States Supreme Court – in light of the use of 
concurrence and dissent opinions, and media attention: Ferejohn and Pasquino, The Countermajoritariam 
Opportunity, at 360–367.  
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By contrast, in the centralized system, one single judicial organ is authorized to 
exercise such control.532 This occurs because, in civil law jurisdictions, the doctrines of 
separation of powers and supremacy of statutory law are interpreted more rigidly.533 It 
has been remarked that: 
Originally, those doctrines meant, to Montesquieu, Rousseau and 
others haunted by fears of a self-seeking anti-democratic judiciary, 
that any judicial interpretation or, a fortiori, invalidation of statutes 
was a political act, and therefore an encroachment on the exclusive 
power of the legislative branch to make the law. (…) Although the 
advisability of some sort of control over the constitutionality of 
legislation is admitted, the essentially political aspects of this 
function are recognized. Thus, the centralized systems refuse to 
grant the judiciary in general the power to review legislation; in 
fact, the ordinary judges must accept and apply the law as they find 
it. (…) A genuine presumption of legislative validity. The only 
attenuation of these notions lies in the power of ordinary judges to 
suspend concrete litigation pending a reference to the 
Constitutional Court of a constitutional issue which has been 
raised.534 
 
Considering the traditional division of state functions in legislative, jurisdictional, 
and executive in continental systems, there must be a differentiation when the annulment 
is made inside the power structure from which the invalid act emanated and or not.535 The 
                                                        
532 Cappelletti, Judicial Review in the Contemporary W orld, at 47, where the Professor notes that 
traditional synonyms for centralize and decentralize would be concentrate and diffuse, respectively. There 
is another classification that the Professor does not mention, but it is noteworthy. Such classification 
addresses if the review is exercised previously or after the enactment of a given law. France was the famous 
example where there was the monopoly of the ex ante constitutional review. Before the constitutional 
amendment of July 23, 2008, there was no challenge of the constitutionality of a statute which had come 
into force. After such amendment, under the application for a priority preliminary ruling, any person who is 
involved in legal proceedings before a court is authorized to argue that a statutory provision infringes rights 
and freedoms guaranteed by the French Constitution, according to information available at the website of 
the French Conseil Constitutionnel (last accessed July, 2014): http://www.conseil-constitutionnel. 
fr/conseil-constitutionnel/english/priority-preliminary-rulings-on-the-issue-of-constitutionality-qpc-/texts-
and-presentation/12-questions-to-begin-with.47857.html. For an analysis of the judicial review model 
adopted by France, their strong resistance to judicial review, and primacy of legislative law as the general 
will of the people: Alec Stone Sweet, “Why Europe rejected American Judicial Review – and Why it may 
not matter,” Michigan Law Review 151 (2003): 2744–2780, at 2746–2765. 
 
533
 Cappelletti, Judicial Review in the Contemporary W orld, at 54.  
 
534 Idem. This general presumption of legality of acts shall not be confused with the general assumption of 
validity and biding force of the administrative acts in general. For the latter: Hans Kelsen, Jurisdição 
Constitucional (São Paulo: Vmf Martins Fontes, 2013), at 141. 
 
535 Kelsen, Jurisdição Constitucional, at 147. 
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annulment of a legislative act exercised by an organ that is not legislative constitutes an 
intromission with “the legislative power.”536  However, in Kelsen’s conception, the 
constitutional court would not be a judicial body, albeit organized as a tribunal, due to its 
composition (nomination of specialists, including academics, through joint appointments 
involving the executive and legislative).537 The other factor why the constitutional court 
could be characterized as legislative is that annulling a norm is actually a legislate act 
exercised negatively,538  with the court acting as a negative legislator in Kelsenian 
parlance.539  
In addition, the centralized system of judicial review was founded on the absence 
of stare decisis by the judiciary. So, Kelsen, when creating the Austrian Constitution, had 
to consider the necessity of the decisions of that court to be erga omnes, i.e., with a 
                                                        
536 Idem, at 151. Stone Sweet, W hy Europe rejected American Judicial Review – and W hy it may not 
matter, at 2766–2767, where the Professor argues that Kelsen emphasized the distinction between positive 
and negative legislator as a preventive measure, due to potential attacks from two main different groups: 
politicians (who were generally suspicious of the judiciary) and academics favoring the American 
(decentralized) model.  
 
537 Kelsen, Jurisdição Constitucional, at 154. For a contemporary discussion about the topic, see, for 
instance, the controversy about the nature of the constitutional court and theoretical claims that the French 
Conseil Constitutionnel was not a legislative body – as its own pronouncement contending that “its review 
authority does not confer upon it a general power of judgment and decision making identical to that 
possessed by parliament:” Alec Stone Sweet, “The Politics of Constitutional Review in France and 
Europe,” International Journal of Constitutional Law (2007): 69–92, at 73–74. Other distinguished features 
of European constitutional courts are: appointment for long time periods – but not life tenure; the avoidance 
of oral arguments made by the parties, and the fact that deliberations occur in secret, with the court 
speaking in a single voice: John Ferejohn and Pasquale Pasquino, “Constitutional Adjudication: Lessons 
from Europe,” Texas Law Review 82 (2004): 1671–1704 at 1677–1678. 
 
538 Victor Ferreres Comella, “Comparative Avenues in Constitutional Law: Constitutional Structures and 
Institutional Designs: The Consequences of Centralizing Constitutional Review in a Special Court: Some 
thoughts on Judicial Activism,” Texas Law Review 82 (2004): 1705–1736, at 1722–1723, stating that 
courts should either invalidate or uphold statutes; but should not render interpretative decisions dictating a 
single form to interpret the norm, because doing so the court acts a positive legislator in the Kelsenian 
view. As far this argument goes, the court would be activist, in a sense that it will authorize an 
interpretation that is different from the original understanding upon the legislative branch had when passing 
the legislative act. 
 
539 Kelsen, Jurisdição Constitucional, at 151–152, where the Professor notes that the annulment of a norm is 
the establishment of a general norm, akin to a legislative effect; but not a concrete and individual norm, 
which is the limited realm of the judicial activity. Kelsen claims, at 153, that legislators acted almost freely, 
despite in conformance with the procedures and directives of the Constitution; while constitutional courts 
can only act in the limited scope to invalidate a law that is incompatible with the Constitution. In addition, 
the Professor stresses that the principles applicable to the creation and organization of the judiciary shall 
encompass the constitutional court, since it also applies the law – being in a very restrict parcel of 
legislative creation.  
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general binding effect,540 but also with uniformity,541 thus conferring legal certainty.542 
The decisions of constitutional courts were generally conceived to be abstract, in a sense 
that such decisions would be made before the law was enforced.543 Although the original 
Kelsenian conception of constitutional courts544 would exclude the review of rights, this 
review is the core of the jurisprudence of constitutional courts nowadays.545 
U.S. judicial review is concrete, in general, because it arises out of a claim of an 
unconstitutional act whose enforcement brought an actual injury to the plaintiff.546 The 
concreteness of such review is based on the requirements of case and controversy of 
Article III as well as the particular doctrines of justiciability for denying judicial 
                                                        
540
 Cappelletti, Judicial Review in the Contemporary W orld, at 60. 
 
541 Hans Kelsen, “Judicial Review of Legislation: A Comparative Study of the Austrian and the American 
Constitution,” The Journal of Politics 4, No. 2 (1942): 183–200, at 185, where Kelsen emphasizes the 
necessity of uniformity, and the lack of it under the decentralized model of review which exists in the 
United States. 
 
542  Ferreres Comella, Comparative Avenues in Constitutional Law: Constitutional Structures and 
Institutional Designs: The Consequences of Centralizing Constitutional Review in a Special Court: Some 
thoughts on Judicial Activism, at 1706. 
 
543 Shapiro and Stone Sweet, On Law, Politics & Judicialization, at 343. Nevertheless, this is no longer the 
rule. In Brazil, for instance, the classification remains abstract when there is no pre-enforcement of 
legislation, mainly because only political parties can trigger the review that happens without a case or 
controversy, as stated in chapter two of this thesis.  
 
544 Kelsen, Jurisdição Constitucional, at 153, where the Professor further cautions that each jurisdiction 
shall consider its own peculiarities when creating their own constitutional court. 
 
545 Stone Sweet, The Politics of Constitutional Review in France and Europe, at 83–84, where he stresses 
that Kelsen equated review of rights with natural law and, if such review were authorized, the distinction 
between positive and negative legislation would collapse. Nevertheless, constitutional adjudication was 
adopted in Europe in a centralized fashion in post authoritarian regimes, where there was a need for the 
protection of such rights; while in “old democracies” there were no constitutional courts created – as it was 
the case in the Netherlands, the United Kingdom, and Luxembourg. These countries did not see a valuable 
trade off in weakening their parliaments to rights that were already generally protected, as noted by 
Ferejohn and Pasquino, Constitutional Adjudication: Lessons from Europe, at 1674. 
 
546 Shapiro and Stone Sweet, On Law, Politics & Judicialization, at 344. The authors notice, at the same 
page, that constitutional courts have their own particular space, thus not being attached to the legislative 
nor the judiciary. Noting that the constitutional courts are a quasi-legislative power, holding more political 
capital than the American judge: Rebecca R. Zubaty, “Foreign Law and the U.S. Constitution: Delimiting 
the Range of Persuasive Authority,” University of California Los Angeles Law Review 54 (2007): 1414–
1461, at 1450–1451. 
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review. 547  Among such doctrines, there are advisory opinions, 548  standing (usually 
referred to the necessity of a live case or controversy that shall be concrete, i.e., have an 
injury in fact, for instance),549 ripeness (often founded in the rationale of the case being 
too abstract).          
 Accordingly, the general orthodoxy doctrine understands that the case or 
controversy requirement authorizes concrete judicial review at the federal level, while 
barring the abstract one, based on the peculiar separation of powers of the U.S. system.550  
In light of the above, the requirement of case or controversy allows judicial review in its 
concrete modality,551 prohibiting abstract review on the federal level due to potential 
violations of their principle of separation of powers.     
 In Europe, however, abstract and concrete reviews coexist, but the latter remains 
largely abstract because generally exercised through a reference procedure.552 Another 
                                                        
547 Limiting the concreteness of the American judicial review to the requirements of case or controversy 
stated in article III, section 2, of the United States Constitution and the fact that the unconstitutionality is 
declared in the course of ordinary litigation: David S. Law and Mila Versteeg, “The Declining Influence of 
the United States Constitution,” New Y ork University Law Review 87 (2012): 762–858, at 795. 
 
548 Helen Hershkoff, “State Courts and the ‘Passive Virtues;’ Rethinking the Judicial Function,” Harvard 
Law Review 114 (2001): 1833–1941, at 1836–1837, underlying that the case or controversy of article III of 
the Constitution does not apply to states, with state judiciaries having authorized standing to taxpayers who 
had alleged abuse of public funds; and having also decided cases that federal courts would deem as being 
moot. In addition, the Professor remarks, at 1845–1846, that there are states where the state Constitution 
authorizes advisory opinions; in others this authorization occurs in state statues; and, in others, as it was the 
case of North Carolina, the state supreme court would issue advisory opinions – despite lacking provisions 
authorizing so. Noting that English courts also rendered advisory opinions: Bickel, The Last Dangerous 
Branch, at 115. 
 
549 Noting the discussion of third party standing being command to meet the minimum of Article III case or 
controversy requirement with regard to access to the judiciary: Hershkoff, State Courts and the “Passive 
V irtues:” Rethinking the Judicial Function, at 1842.  
 
550 Shapiro and Stone Sweet, On Law, Politics & Judicialization, at 345. 
 
551 Zubaty, Foreign Law and the U.S. Constitution: Delimiting the Range of Persuasive Authority, at 1449–
1452, emphasizing that concrete review (with the live case or controversy requirement) does have a greater 
level of specificity, and was instrumental to the separation of powers principle, excluding judges from a 
blatant role as policymaking. 
 
552 Alec Stone Sweet, “Why Europe rejected American Judicial Review – and Why it may not Matter,” 
Michigan Law Review 151 (2003): 2744–2780, at 2771. Constitutional courts now decide the outcome of a 
legal disputes – as it would be the case in the Appellate jurisdiction of the United States Supreme Court, as 
stated at 2772. The reference procedure (in which the Italian constitutional court does not have the task to 
decide the case at bar, but merely the question posed to the them by the referring court) is not immune from 
considerations by the constitutional court about the concrete case, i.e., the original dispute: Ferejohn and 
Pasquino, Constitutional Adjudication: Lessons from Europe, at 1674. 
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possibility of arguable concrete review that is generally exercised in abstract is through 
direct individual complains to the constitutional court.553  
In the United States, abstract review554 is mainly authorized in four situations.555 
First, when federal courts review acts enacted by federal agencies (administrative rules 
and regulations that were authorized by Congress as merely supplementing powers and 
that often admit pre-enforcement review by courts, albeit standing being limited to 
private parties).556          
 The second authorized abstract review refers to the cases where state statutes 
clearly authorize advisory opinions by the state supreme court.557 Third, when plaintiffs 
pursue declaratory or injunctive relief that, once granted, suspends the application of the 
law despite requiring further assessment of the court regarding its constitutionality.558 
Fourth, in the context of First Amendment freedoms, plaintiffs are authorized to 
                                                        
553 Shapiro and Stone Sweet, On Law, Politics & Judicialization, at 345, where it is emphasized that 
constitutional complaints are the least abstract forms of review in the continental system, because plaintiffs 
have to exhaust the totality of the applicable remedies in order to pledge to the constitutional court. 
 
554 It is difficult to actually enumerate and determine precisely all the hypotheses, to the extent that we have 
to research in a case-by-case basis. This is so, because the American constitutionalist academics do not use 
the term abstract control. Accordingly, this work is not exhaustive and concerns the most cited hypotheses. 
Shapiro and Stone Sweet, On Law, Politics & Judicialization, at 352, note that: “ no treatise in American 
constitutional law uses the term ‘abstract review’.” 
 
555 Due to its uncommon incidence, we are not including the so-called writ of certification – see discussion 
supra with regard to the most common avenues to the USSC. Fisher and Harriger, American Constitutional 
Law: Constitutional Structures, at 143, notes that the writ of certification, although rarely used, is an 
inquiry submitted by an appellate court to the USSC about a question of law. The authors cite, among the 
reasons for being uncommon, the fact that it potentially forces the Court to provide guidance considering a 
legal question, only – without the factual background and the related arguments presented by the litigants.  
 
556 Shapiro and Stone Sweet, On Law, Politics & Judicialization, at 373–374. 
 
557 This hypothesis is disputable, to the extent that the value of the decision is undermined, because state 
judges often stresses that advisory opinions are issued under no judicial capacity. Hence, such opinions do 
not have the stare decisis effect: Tribe, American Constitutional Law, at 329. 
 
558 Shapiro and Stone Sweet, On Law, Politics & Judicialization, at 348. Specific situations are further 
detailed at 348–362, with analysis of two paramount cases: one about free speech and the other about 
abortion. The authors inform, at 352, that the American professionals have two reactions when confronted 
with the existence of abstract review in the United States. The first reaction is the denial of its existence, 
stating that claims arising out of freedom of speech or privacy rights create the case or controversy 
requirement by the litigation of such rights. The other reaction is to understand abortion cases and First 
Amendment rights as exceptions to the general rule, which rejects abstract review. 
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challenge the law on its face, being also allowed to claim the rights of third parties.559 
The third and fourth categories often overlap.560 
With regard to abstract review exercised in the context of advisory opinions, a 
note must be made. The advisory opinion issued by the highest court of a state has been 
perceived as reducing questions of constitutionality about the enacted measure. This is so 
assuming that the legislative (or executive) that posed the constitutional doubt abides to 
the answer in an advisory opinion of the court.561 Nevertheless, for the court to answer in 
such an abstract context, it shall consider all the potential applications of the statute and 
further decide that none will be constitutional.562 
In addition, at the federal level, even the most concrete forms of judicial review 
are also based in abstract considerations when considering the stare decisis effect of a 
particular decision. Hence, any consideration of future applications of a specific holding 
is, in practice, abstract.563 
The European conception of concrete review remains abstract because the 
constitutional court has to answer the constitutional question that was referred to it by the 
lower court, without having to preside in a concrete case or controversy in the U.S. 
sense.564 Thus, the task of the referring judge consists of a limited assessment of the facts 
presented and if they would support review, a correct question that will be posed to the 
                                                        
559 Shapiro and Stone Sweet, On Law, Politics & Judicialization, at 373, the authors explain that Congress 
delegates to administrative agencies the implementation of particular federal statutes, with such delegations 
having force of law. The Congressional statute authorizes pre-enforcement and thus judicial review in 
abstract, since private parties who have standing can sue even before the act can be enforced. In this sense, 
the American administrative law is said, for the Professors, to reject the general assumption that concrete 
review is the best and only authoritative form of review. 
 
560 Shapiro and Stone Sweet, On Law, Politics & Judicialization, at 348. 
 
561 Note, Advisory Opinions, at 1304. In this sense, the goal of advisory opinion is to avoid the enactment 
of unconstitutional legislation, so potential claims of lack of biding precedent force would not be strong. 
 
562 Idem, at 1312. This might be not preferable by the Court. The note further counter-argues, at 1313, that 
judges should provide as much detail as possible about the matrix of cases that they have considered before 
issuing such advise. 
 
563 Shapiro and Stone Sweet, On Law, Politics & Judicialization, at 371–372. 
 
564 Stone Sweet, W hy Europe rejected American Judicial Review – and W hy it may not matter, at 2771. 
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constitutional court and the adjudication of the dispute based on the answer given by such 
specialized court.565 
Finally, the analysis of the U.S. resistance in acknowledging the existence of 
abstract review is not unique. Recall that the continental systems where constitutional 
review is mainly exercised in abstract are also reluctant in admitting concrete review. 
Therefore, the U.S. and continental models of constitutional review are products of 
different conceptions of separation of powers, with both models claiming that only their 
own model can correctly protect the distinction between the political and judicial 
functions, avoiding the “usurpation of the legislative (or more broadly, of the ‘political’) 
function.”566  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                        
565 Idem. 
 
566 Shapiro and Stone Sweet, On Law, Politics & Judicialization, at 345, concluding that ultimately such 
distinctions are made according to how each jurisdiction understands the principle of separation of powers, 
being locally interpreted. 
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CHAPTER FIVE 
ON THE EXCLUSION OR INCLUSION OF LOCAL GOVERNMENTS IN THE CONSTITUTION: U.S. 
AND BRAZILIAN SUPREME COURTS’ REASONING REGARDING ANNEXATION 
This research compares the decisions of the U.S. Supreme Court and its Brazilian 
counterpart, the STF, with regard to annexation laws and local governments. It utilizes 
the reasoning of both Supreme Courts in annexation cases as proxy for local powers. This 
research discusses the Brazilian unprecedented experience of leveling local governments 
alongside the states and the federal union in the Constitution of 1988.567 In this context, 
implications concerning comparative constitutional design are also considered.  
The comparison between both Supreme Courts’ reasoning is relevant due to 
several factors. Local governments in the United States levied, in taxes, $1,153 billion in 
2014,568 whereas Brazilian municipalities’ total revenue (taxes and all the mandatory 
constitutional transfers)569 reached $149,092 million in 2011.570  Brazil currently has 
5,564 local governments.571 In the United States, there were 89,004 local government 
entities in 2012.572 We compared thirty-one decisions from the U.S. Supreme Court  
                                                        
567 Stating that Brazil is the only federation to have included local governments in the federal constitutional 
arrangement: Cláudio Pereira de Souza Neto and Daniel Sarmento, Direito Constitucional: Teoria, História 
e Métodos de Trabalho (Rio de Janeiro: Forum, 2013), at 302. 
 
568 The number is equivalent to 6.6% of the GDP of the United States in that year. The information referred 
above was accessed for the last time in January, 2015, and is available at: 
www.usgovernmentrevenue.com/numbers 
 
569 Mandatory constitutional transfers from the Brazilian federal union and states to local governments are 
detailed in Part II, A, of this chapter. 
 
570 Based on a currency correction factor of 2.4 from the Brazilian Real to the USD. The data collected by 
the National Organization of Mayors is based on the Brazilian Institute Geography and Statistics (IBGE). 
The data does not include the federal district (Brasília). The revenues of local governments in Brazil are 
equivalent to 8.6% of the Brazilian GDP – as stated at the Panorama 2011 bulletin published by the 
National Organization of Mayors, at 7, last electronically accessed in June 2014, as all the data hereinafter. 
The information is available at: www.fnp.org.br/Documentos/DocumentoTipo107.pdf 
 
571 When referring to Brazilian municipalities, we use the term as synonym to local government. The data is 
available at: http://www12.senado.gov.br/noticias/entenda-o-assunto/municipios-brasileiros 
 
572 The current number was reduced – it used to be 89,476 in the last census of governments conducted in 
2007. Local governments included counties, municipalities, townships and special districts, as stated in the 
official census website: https://www.census.gov/newsroom/releases/archives/governments/cb12-161.html 
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(from 1870 to 2013) to sixteen decisions of the Brazilian Supreme Court – hereinafter 
STF – from 1988 to 2013.573 Both courts are independent and have similar jurisdiction 
when judging local entities.574 
The study of comparative constitutional law has been founded on the U.S. 
Constitution.575 Americans are concerned with their local governments, with this sphere 
of power having been traditionally viewed as a manifestation of their own democracy. 
Brazil is different. On the one hand, Brazil has been an exploit colony of Portugal, 
survived dictators and decades of military rulings, which are examples of a centralization 
of powers in the federal sphere. On the other hand, the democratic Constitution of 1988 
innovated in having local governments explicitly named as federal actors. Setting one’s 
own boundaries is of key importance when it comes to local governments, from 
economic to democratic arguments. Hence, annexation (so controversial in the United 
States due to exclusion of particular individuals) is an interesting object of research to 
compare with Brazil, where laws concerning the procedure of annexation were also 
object of judicial battles. 
Nowadays, in Brazil, there is still a sense that local governments should be 
concerned with embellishing the city. Mayors are expected to invest their time in 
coordinating efforts with the Governor and the President to receive additional revenue. 
Luckily, mayors have such revenue increased by bringing international sports events, 
such as the Olympics and World Cup, to their cities. Questions about the definition of 
boundaries of local governments remain open. Since local governments became federal 
actors in Brazil, there is an increased need to understand what are the issues that the STF 
decides about them. We contrast the current Brazilian scheme with the United States, 
                                                        
573 The year of 1988 is when the current Brazilian Constitution was approved and for the first time in 
Brazilian history municipalities were mentioned along with states and the federal union in the federal 
system.  
 
574 We explain the jurisdiction of both Supreme Courts and the definition of local governments in Part III of 
this work. 
 
575 In this direction: Mark Tushnet, “Comparative Law and National Identity,” in The Oxford Handbook of 
Comparative Law, ed. Mathias Reimann and Reinhard Zimmermann (New York: Oxford University Press, 
2008), at 1226.  
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which did not even acknowledge the existence of local governments in the constitutional 
text, but understood the local sphere as inherent to democratic government itself. 
The comparison illustrates the predominant conflicts among groups who are 
litigating in each country, offering evidence of what are the main issues being disputed in 
local spheres with regard to annexation. It shows how each Supreme Court balances 
freedom of local governments and national interests. It is worth noting that this research 
considers local government law in light of national (federal laws) and subnational (state 
laws) determinations, but it does not encompass the understanding of cities as 
international actors.576 Local governments in Brazil are not dominated by one single 
metropolis, as it is the case in Argentina or Mexico, with Brazilian urban centers being 
geographically spread out, as they are in the United States.577  
The rationale of the decisions and the main concerns cited by both Supreme 
Courts may contribute to improve our understanding of conflicts of powers between the 
different spheres of government. It may also improve the understanding of the Brazilian 
federal system as compared to the U.S. one. The comparison may indicate if the 
particular inclusion of municipalities in the Constitution, from a perspective grounded in 
constitutional design, may have benefited Brazil, but would be ineffective elsewhere.578 
Our research fosters the debate of U.S. federalism, while bringing a perspective grounded 
in local government.579 
                                                        
576 For the concept of cities as international actors and related consequences: Gerald E. Frug and David J. 
Barron, “International Local Government Law,” The Urban Lawyer 38 (2006): 1–62. 
 
577 David Samuels, “Reinventing Local Government? Municipalities and Intergovernmental Relations in 
Democratic Brazil,” in Democratic Brazil, ed. Peter R. Kingstone and Timothy J. Power (Pittsburg: 
University of Pittsburg Press, 2000), at 77. 
 
578 Noting that the literature about constitutional design and engineering is vast and has as foundation the 
understanding of constitutionalization “as a pragmatic ‘second order’ measure,” in contrast with 
constitutionalization as a first order, i.e., as a direct consequence of the will of the people. In the more 
pragmatic conception, constitutions may contribute to “institutionalize attempts to mitigate tensions in 
ethnically divided polities through the adoption of federalism, secured representation, and other trust-
building and power sharing mechanisms,” as argued by Ran Hirschl, “The Theocratic Challenge to 
Constitution Drafting in Post-Conflict States,” W illiam and Mary Law Review 49 (2008): 1179–1211, at 
1181–1182. 
 
579 Highlighting the incidental position of local governments in classical federalism and contending that 
comparative studies are limited: Sujit Choudhry and Nathan Hume, “Federalism, Devolution and 
Secession: from classical to post-conflict federalism,” in Comparative Constitutional Law, ed. Tom 
Ginsburg and Rosalind Dixon (Northampton: Edward Elgar, 2011), at 377. 
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It has been contended that constitutional design matters for several reasons.580 
Insights based on design sciences concluded that the scope and the size are relevant.581 In 
this sense, the comparison between Brazil and the United States is one of relevance. Both 
countries display continental dimensions, with complex federal systems, including 
several potential problems related to the implementation of policies on different levels.582  
The absence of constitutional provisions pertaining to local governments, as it is 
the case of the U.S. Constitution, has been pointed out as a failure of constitutional design 
relating to future matters.583 The Brazilian Constitution represents the apex in a system 
that not only opted for including local governments’ provisions in the Constitution, but 
also went further by securing a place for local governments as federal actors side-by-side 
with states and federal union.584  
This research uses annexation as a proxy for the powers of local governments. 
Based on such understanding, this research investigates if the inclusion of local 
                                                        
580 We use the expression here being mindful about its intrinsic limitations, as contended by Professor 
Ginsburg in: Tom Ginsburg, Comparative Constitutional Design (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
2012), at 1–2.   
 
581 Ran Hirschl, The “Design Sciences” and Constitutional “Success,” Texas Law Review 87 (2009): 1339–
1374, at 1343. 
 
582 Discussing problems of implementation of federal level policies: Hirschl, The “Design Sciences” and 
Constitutional “Success,” at 1344–1345. The Professor argues, at 1364, that constitutional design might be 
of increased impact in matters concerning: “ (…) national challenges: limiting governments to a degree, 
establishing electoral process, enhancing awareness of rights and liberties, and possibly providing for some 
institutional predictability, which in turn may promote economic growth.” 
 
583  Idem, at 1348. The Professor explains: “One among many manifestations of this problem in 
constitutional design is the silence of most pre-twentieth-century constitutions with respect to urbanization 
and the emergency of the megacity. Whereas principles of federalism in a two-layer system were usually 
set out, local government was often overlooked by constitutional framers. The metropolis phenomenon was 
not known to framers of the U.S. Constitution nor to the loyalists who adopted the British North America 
Act in 1867 (Canada’s confederating document). This means that megacities, such as Los Angeles, New 
York, or Toronto, are required to provide a vast array of services to their residents while their independent 
taxation and legislative authority is very limited. And the problem extends beyond taxation. Because the 
city is not recognized as an autonomous constitutional entity, it is often not represented at pertinent public-
policy bargaining forums (e.g. forums dealing with welfare, child support, housing, health care and labor). 
At the same time, because the megalopolis is home to so many people, it inevitably carries the brunt of 
governmental (in) action with respect to crime, poverty, homelessness, etc. Even more acute is the state of 
megacities in the developing world, where migration to the city and urban sprawl have long exceeded 
reasonable capacity.” 
 
584  Article 18 of the Brazilian Constitution of 1988 determines the following: The political and 
administrative organization of the Federative Republic of Brazil comprises the Union, the states, the 
Federal District and the municipalities, all of them autonomous, as this Constitution provides. 
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governments would actually be an improved design. Being a product of institutional 
choices and continuing experiences, the better a constitutional design is, the more it 
should promote democracy by avoiding permanent political conflict, while refraining 
dockets of courts of being clogged.585 Based on the decisions analyzed and by restricting 
our conclusions to annexation, we contend that the U.S. experience has been quite 
successful. 
By contrast, this research argues that the Brazilian experience cannot yet be 
deemed successful, to the extent that the annexation powers of local governments have 
been the object of two constitutional amendments as well as continuous litigation 
involving the STF. The constitutional modifications occurred in order to curb the abuses 
of local governments, which were not economically feasible and were created or annexed 
for the benefit of local political forces.  
This research also describes how the U.S. Supreme Court changed its 
interpretation of local powers and the involvement of the Court in securing particular 
rights, concluding that there has not been strong involvement of the Court in annexation 
procedures, but in protecting rights. This is in sharp contrast with the Brazilian 
experience. In addition, the more litigation occurs, the less institutional predictability can 
exist, and economic growth is, therefore, jeopardized.586 
This chapter is divided in five Parts. Parts I and II refer to the U.S. and Brazilian 
scenarios, respectively, with sub-items in each Part discussing the most controversial 
topics about annexation and the pertinent decisions of U.S. Supreme Court as well as 
those of the STF regarding federal matters involved in state laws of annexation. Part III 
delimitates the definitions relevant to enable our comparison. Part IV discusses the 
research findings and is organized as follows: Section A addresses the comparison of the 
decisions of both supreme courts focusing on constitutional design. Section B provides a 
general analysis of the decisions (especially concerned with fundamental rights), and 
their related impact. Part V concludes. 
 
                                                        
585 Ginsburg, Comparative Constitutional Design, at 10.   
 
586 Along those lines, see, among others: Hirschl, The “Design Sciences” and Constitutional “Success,” at 
1364. 
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I. THE U.S. SCENARIO 
A.  Annexation 
Annexation is the most frequent form of boundary change in the United States, 
where it is defined as “the territorial expansion of a municipal corporation.”587 There are 
five main forms of annexation: (1) by state legislative act, which was very common in the 
nineteenth century, but is currently rare;588 (2) by municipal action, which can occur by 
ordinance or resolution; (3) through petition of residents or landowners of the locality to 
be annexed; (4) by judicial determination; and, finally: (5) through the determination of a 
regional or statewide review commission specialized in boundaries.589 Forty-four states 
have general law authorizing annexation, in the absence of specific legislative 
measure.590         
 Notwithstanding the form of annexation procedures, states frequently require the 
fulfillment of one among the following additional requirements591: public hearings, 
commencement of annexation procedures by petitions of residents or landowners in the 
city and/or in the area to be annexed, approval of the county authority, city ordinance or 
resolution.592 In some states, the additional requirement of previous notice (actual or not) 
                                                        
587 Richard Briffault and Laurie Reynolds, Cases and Materials on State and Local Government Law (New 
York: Thomson/Reuters, 2009), at 210–211. 
 
588 Developing that argument and remarking that currently only six states allow annexation through petition 
to the state legislature: Michelle Wilde Anderson, “Mapped out of local Democracy,” Stanford Law 
Review 62 (2010): 931–1004, at 950. 
 
589 For the ideas mentioned in the totality of this paragraph, reference is made to: Briffault and Reynolds, 
Cases and Materials on State and Local Government Law, at 211. 
 
590 Specific information about the states, according to data measured until 1990, and published on page 25 
of the report of the Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations, see: State laws governing local 
government structure and administration. Washington, D.C. UNT Digital Library, published in 1993, and 
available at: http://digital.library.unt.edu/ark:/67531/metadc1206/ 
 
591 In this direction: Anderson, Mapped out of local Democracy, at 951. 
 
592 State laws governing local government structure and administration, at 25, supra. Noting that in 
annexations started by municipal ordinances, many states authorize the termination of that process in the 
cases that the majority of residents or landowners are against it: Laurie Reynolds, “Rethinking Municipal 
Annexation Powers,” The Urban Lawyer 24. N. 2 (1992): 247–303, at 278–279. 
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shall be sent to the owners.593 Therefore, there are a myriad of procedures that must be 
obeyed in order to start an annexation procedure.      
 It is worth emphasizing that annexation by state legislative act in the United 
States – which is the constitutional rule in Brazil – is perceived as having several 
problems. The most common criticism against it is the strong interference of the state in 
what is perceived as solely local matters, potentially jeopardizing the capacity of local 
governments to commit to long-term planning.594       
 Annexation commonly becomes a judicial dispute in two scenarios. The first one 
unfolds when municipalities that are neighbors dispute the same area, or when a 
municipality aims to annex land from its own unincorporated surrounding area.595 Both 
municipalities involved argue that each one has the most suitable proper land-use 
classification; often both municipalities would argue that the disputed area lies in their 
so-called natural path of development; and state statues frequently assume that the first 
municipality to trigger the annexation process should be the one to succeed.596 The 
second scenario refers to a municipality tentative annexation from an area that wants to 
remain unincorporated.597    
                                                        
593 For a survey about the procedural requirements involved in annexation: Reynolds, Rethinking Municipal 
Annexation Powers, at 287–288.  Professor Reynolds stresses that previous notice and hearings should be 
required, regardless of the procedure of annexation – if by municipal ordinance, by the initiative of the 
Board, etc. 
 
594 Idem, at 260. 
 
595 Idem, at 249. 
 
596 Idem. Professor Reynolds points North Carolina as an example of the adoption of the prior jurisdiction 
rule, at 290. Nevertheless, she emphasizes that quick action not necessarily relates to reasoned action, at 
250.  Praising the Tennessee’s annexation statute, which determines that when municipalities incorporated 
at the same county start annexation procedures regarding the same area, the larger municipality will have 
precedence, and the proceeding of the smaller one will be suspended until the decision of the larger 
municipality is reached: Christopher J. Tyson, “Annexation and the Mid-Size Metropolis: New Insights in 
the Age of Mobile Capital,” University of Pittsburg Law Review 73 (2012): 506–561, at 549. According to 
Professor Tyson, larger cities are more suitable for continued growth and expansion – because of their own 
scale, if nothing else. 
 
597 Reynolds, Rethinking Municipal Annexation Powers, at 249, where the Professor remarks that the 
second scenario referred above occurs frequently in areas of “residential subdivisions whose owners prefer 
to remain in the county with its lower tax rates, even though, to the uninformed observer, the subdivision 
already forms a part of the municipality whose annexation it is resisting.” 
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The main arguments for annexation generally rely on the ability of the 
municipality to provide improved public services, allocate resources more efficiently, 
development control of areas situated on the fringe, 598  police and health safety 
regulations, more equally distributed taxes (when people who live on the borders actually 
spend time, work, shop in the main municipality, thus free riding at the expense of those 
who reside and pay taxes in the municipality), and the recognition that those situated in 
the fringe – once annexed – would actually become part of the city that they already 
belong in practical terms.599 In this scenario, annexation can be conceptualized as a way 
to accommodate municipal growth – referring to population increase and the demands it 
encompasses, including the necessity of a larger tax base.600    
 Generally, state laws require impact assessments of boundary modifications, 
aimed at the benefits in overcoming potential losses that might occur in annexation of 
poor neighborhoods.601 Areas that intend to be annexed ought to be able to finance the 
development of their own infrastructure, while also levying property taxes – both being 
key factors in annexation decision making that may ultimately exclude unincorporated 
urban areas due to their inadequate services or absence of collection of potential 
revenue.602 Accordingly, most political power is vested in the municipalities, with 
unincorporated zones being left without bargaining power.603    
                                                        
598 See David Rusk, Cities without Suburbs (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1995), for a 
thoroughly empirical study about Albuquerque, in New Mexico, considering metropolitan areas across the 
country (counties and central city), and based on data from the 1950 census until the 1990 census. The 
Professor argues that the more integrated an urban area is, despite being located in a overall poor area-wide, 
the higher are the chances of cities to succeed, with poverty and violence tending to decline. The main 
claim is that as cities grow and expand their boundaries, public policy should be targeted at making those 
cities more elastic, to use the author’s concept. This “elasticity” is vital to diminish (and ultimate abolish) 
the inequalities between suburbs and cities. 
 
599 For a detailed review of those arguments: Reynolds, Rethinking Municipal Annexation Powers, at 252–
254. 
600 Judith Welch Wegner, “North Carolina’s Annexation Wars: Whys, Wherefores, and What Next,” North 
Carolina Law Review 91 (2012): 165–279, at 252–253. 
601 In this direction and emphasizing that, in practice, investments and the increased tax revenue in 
unincorporated urban areas are requirements to be met before the annexation procedure starts: Anderson, 
Mapped out of local Democracy, at 950. 
 
602 Idem, at 957. 
 
603 Idem, at 959. 
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 There are several interests involved in annexation process. The state where the 
areas are located is furthered with an efficient policy for annexation.604 It is noteworthy 
that the county where the area whose annexation is intended may be disfavored by such 
annexation, because it may lose tax revenues.605 In other situations, however, the county 
may be better off with the annexation, because of the reduction of overall area where it 
has to provide services, without loss in its tax base.606 Regarding the interests of residents 
and individual landowners, those interests are usually protected before the annexation, 
through the principle of self-determination,607 with some states currently protecting those 
interests shortly after the annexation.608      
 North Carolina adopted systems of extraterritorial jurisdiction that allows cities to 
exercise regulatory authority immediately outside the boundaries of the city, with 
residents of such area being involved in land use planning decisions.609 Extraterritorial 
jurisdiction, voluntary, and involuntary annexation decisions are intimately connected, 
because these annexations concern land that is contiguous or in the natural development 
of growth of a city and both – in North Carolina – must occur with a defined and official 
                                                        
604 In this sense and citing the annexation statute of North Carolina as one reciting state government reasons 
favoring involuntary annexation: Reynolds, Rethinking Municipal Annexation Powers, at 254. It is 
noteworthy that the current statute still provides for statements of policies: see, generally: North Carolina 
General Statute Section 160A-58.50, of 2011.   
 
605 Reynolds, Rethinking Municipal Annexation Powers, at 255. 
 
606 Explaining that the two different outcomes above mentioned may occur depending on two scenarios, 
respectively: in the first one, “ (…) city annexation means a loss of land base for the government units that 
formerly had jurisdiction over the land to be annexed. (…) In the second situation, the annexing 
municipalities do not acquire exclusive jurisdiction over annexed land; that is, the annexed land continues 
to remain within the jurisdiction of its former government and merely becomes subject to another layer of 
governmental control,” in Reynolds, Rethinking Municipal Annexation Powers, at 255.  
 
607 Idem, at 256–257, where the Professor further argues that all state statues – regardless if annexation was 
voluntary or not – should protect such interests by having a statutory mandate providing for equal 
municipal services in the recently annexed area. 
 
608 Noting that state statutes from Georgia, Michigan, Ohio, Oklahoma, Arkansas, for instance, require 
implementation of municipal services in the area newly annexed within a period raging from one year to 
three years from annexation, depending upon the nature of the service to be provided: Anderson, Mapped 
out of local Democracy, at 954. 
 
609 Wegner, North Carolina Annexation W ars: W hys, W herefores, and W hat Next, at 248, informing that 
extraterritorial areas are likely to be annexed and work as transition occurs: at 248–250. 
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development plan.610 Annexation within that state varies, and it is much more intensified 
in areas with substantial population and economic growth.611 In this scenario, it has been 
questioned if the same policy of annexation within a given state would be the best criteria 
considering the diversities that exist across the state of North Carolina.612 The ability of 
municipalities located in areas with small growth to expand their boundaries and tax 
bases has probably been jeopardized by the unified policy adopted by the new statutory 
scheme in North Carolina.613         
 The general criticisms of involuntary annexation614 encompass the potential abuse 
of municipalities by not providing adequate service, attempts to circumvent the intent of 
the state statute – particularly the contiguity requirement –, and selective annexation of 
the most affluent areas where the not so affluent tend to be kept outside.615 Moreover, 
voluntary annexation is perceived as more in consonance with the self-determination of 
the people directly involved. If the annexation is involuntary,616 i.e., initiated by the 
                                                        
610 Wegner, North Carolina Annexation W ars: W hys, W herefores, and W hat Next, at 250. 
 
611 Idem, at 254. 
 
612 This exact question is discussed by Wegner, North Carolina Annexation W ars: W hys, W herefores, and 
W hat Next, at 259, and more specifically: at 205–207, with the requirement of  “sound urban development 
after annexation,” as the author quotes the principled phrase from the Supreme Court of North Carolina 
decision in Nollan v. V illage of Marvin 360 N. C. 256, 624, S.E.2Ed 305 (2006). 
 
613 In this sense: Wegner, North Carolina Annexation W ars: W hys, W herefores, and W hat Next, at 259. 
 
614 For a deep analysis and dismissal of the main arguments against involuntary annexations: Reynolds, 
Rethinking Municipal Annexation Powers, at 268–271. 
 
615 We will analyze this last problem in the context of the U.S. Supreme Court decisions. For the moment, 
suffices to say that the mere dismissal of involuntary annexation does not avoid potential abuses from the 
municipalities. See: Reynolds, Rethinking Municipal Annexation Powers, at 268. 
 
616 Among the states that adopted involuntary annexation by 2012: Indiana, Kansas, Kentucky, Nebraska, 
Tennessee and Texas, as noted by Tyson, Annexation and the Mid-Size Metropolis: New Insights in the 
Age of Mobile Capital, at 514. For the author, the statute of North Carolina – since its reform in 2012  – no 
longer allows involuntary annexation, as mentioned at 557–559. For an in depth discussion about the new 
statute of North Carolina, including historical perspective: Wegner, North Carolina Annexation W ars: 
W hys, W herefores, and W hat Next, at 193–227. Professor Wegner clarifies that involuntary annexation is 
still technically available in North Carolina, although solely the largest cities will be able to afford it, given 
the new costly requirements – such as extension and implementation of sewer and water services within 
three years and half of the effective date of the annexation: Idem, at 212–213; and at 226, concluding that 
North Carolina now joints those states that make involuntary annexation extremely difficult. 
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municipality, there is no supremacy of self-determination. 617  The latter type of 
annexation is based on the assumption that municipalities are the best units of 
government in order to stimulate the development and the distribution of public services 
to urban areas.618 Commenting on the default choice by state statues, Professor Reynolds 
argues that: 
Consent of those to be annexed is frequently an absolute 
prerequisite for annexation. As a result, in nearly all states, 
objections by owners or residents immunize many tracks of 
contiguous urbanize territory from annexation. Self-determination 
remains the preferred, and frequently exclusive, means by which a 
municipality can expand its borders. Even in those states that do 
grant unilateral annexation powers to municipal governments, 
stringent statutory provisions usually limit involuntary annexations 
to very narrow circumstances.619 
Accordingly, the absolute protection of the so-called self-determination principle 
allows that few residents actually avoid the obligations of municipality while having its 
benefits.620 The majority of states do not have annexation by petition considering 
urbanization standards nor related legal requirements. Even where the self-determination 
reigns absolute, there are many ways that the majority of residents may use annexation to 
their own interests at the expense of one or a group of particular owners.621  
                                                        
617 For the use of the term supremacy of self-determination: Reynolds, Rethinking Municipal Annexation 
Powers, at 292. 
 
618 As contended by Reynolds, Rethinking Municipal Annexation Powers, at 296–297. For Professor 
Reynolds, residents who were annexed through involuntary proceedings should not be allowed to exercise 
vote rights that would be equivalent to a veto power. The current state legislation of North Carolina (North 
Carolina General Statute, Section: 160 A-58.50, of 2011) provides, in the recently added paragraph six: 
“That it is essential for citizens to have an effective voice in annexations initiated by municipalities.” 
 
619 Reynolds, Rethinking Municipal Annexation Powers, at 261–262. 
 
620 Idem, at 266, where the Professor discusses the unfairness and inefficiencies of the principle of self-
determination in the context of annexation. 
 
621 Reynolds, Rethinking Municipal Annexation Powers, at 267. 
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As municipalities become more empowered,622 there ought to be measures about 
the impact of annexation on the remaining governmental units in the state.623 The 
legislative ought to create a formula to equally allocate the contractual obligations in the 
new scheme, while the state ought to consider the gradual transference of revenue from 
the city to the county, allowing the latter to adapt to the reduction of its tax base.624  
 Considering that city boundaries should include urban land – regardless of its 
relative wealth – cities should not be the only governmental body with a say in 
annexation procedures.625  Those should not be completely detached from the political 
process.626 Counties cannot initiate annexations by themselves,627 although prominent 
research argues differently.628 There are important arguments considering a stronger role 
played by counties in annexation procedures: 
Indeed, certain existing features of county government make it an 
attractive negotiating partner over annexation, even from the 
perspective of city interests. Residents of incorporated areas enjoy 
the same voting rights in county government as those held by 
unincorporated area residents. Political accountability to city 
interests is thus built in to county governance. When it comes to 
interlocal negotiations and regional decision making (…) stronger 
counties do not necessarily mean weaker cities.629 
                                                        
622 Remarking that back to 1992, several aspects of the statutes of North Carolina were considered to be 
models by other states, specially the provisions about involuntary annexation: Wegner, North Carolina 
Annexation W ars: W hys, W herefores, and W hat Next, at 176. 
 
623 Reynolds, Rethinking Municipal Annexation Powers, at 301. 
 
624 Idem. 
 
625 Anderson, Mapped out of local Democracy, at 984. 
 
626 Reynolds, Rethinking Municipal Annexation Powers, at 265. 
 
627 Anderson, Mapped out of local Democracy, at 952. The Professor remarks that the exception to this 
general rule is Arizona, where counties are authorized to initiate annexation procedures as long as falling in 
very small parcels of land completely surrounded by a city. 
 
628 Anderson, Mapped out of local Democracy, at 985, where the Professor argues that counties should be 
allowed to start annexation procedures. She also contends that counties (or unincorporated communities) 
should actually be authorized to start involuntary annexation, as long as the state law authorizes involuntary 
annexation by the city. For a detailed discussion about when those involuntary annexations should occur: 
Idem, at 985–986. 
 
629 Anderson, Mapped out of local Democracy, at 984.  
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A related topic is the scope of judicial review in annexation procedures, which 
varies across states. Some of them have determined that courts should play a minor and 
specific role, whereas others require courts to engage in the analysis of reasonableness of 
the intended annexation.630 As an example of the latter, Wisconsin courts have been using 
the so-called Rule of Reason,631 which enables them to “examine the propriety and 
reasonableness of annexations despite compliance with the statutory requirements.”632 It 
has already been argued that courts should not engage in policy discussions, which 
should be considered essentially by the legislative; therefore, violation of the 
determinations of the state statute addressing annexation should be the sole basis for the 
judiciary to invalidate annexations.633        
 In addition to incorporation and annexation, other far less frequent forms of 
boundary changes exist in the United States, such as: consolidation (also known as 
merger), when to or more municipalities merge; deannexation (also referred as 
detachment) of an existing territory from an existing municipality; and disincorporation 
of a municipality.634 The latter occurs through annexation by another municipality; or 
                                                        
630 Reynolds, Rethinking Municipal Annexation Powers, at 294–295. 
 
631 The current Rule of Reason in Wisconsin has a three prong test establishing the following: first, 
exclusions and irregularities in boundary lines must not be the result of arbitrariness; secondly, there must 
be some present or demonstrable future necessity for the annexation; finally, thirdly: prohibition of other 
factors configuring abuse of discretion by the municipality, as explained by: Robert D. Zeinemann, 
“Overlooked Linkages Between Municipal Incorporation and Annexation Laws: An In-depth Look at 
Wisconsin’s Experience,” The Urban Lawyer 39 (2007): 257–317, at 286.  Under this Rule of Reason, if 
the municipality is not the petitioner (nor if it did not exercise control over the petitioner), the municipality 
is understood as being incapable of violating the first part of the test. Accordingly, Wisconsin 
municipalities avoid initiating annexations, preferring to wait for property owners and citizens to start 
annexation procedures: Zeinemann, Overlooked Linkages Between Municipal Incorporation and 
Annexation Laws: An In-depth Look at W isconsin’s Experience, at 287. For an analysis of the 
requirements of this rule: Idem, at 287–292; and also at 303–305. 
 
632 Idem, at 285, also noting that there is a controversy about the nature of this Rule of Reason, i.e., whether 
it is constitutionally based or merely a judicial doctrine that could be modified by the legislative branch. 
 
633 Reynolds, Rethinking Municipal Annexation Powers, at 295. 
 
634 Briffault and Reynolds, Cases and Materials on State and Local Government Law, at 240. 
 
  129 
with the surrounding municipality having its obligations superseded by the county or 
township.635 
B.   Specific Decisions of the U.S. Supreme Court 
This Section focuses on the federalism issues that the U.S. Supreme Court 
(USSC) has addressed when deciding matters related to annexation of local 
governments.636 It investigates the limits of annexation in state law enunciated by the 
Court, pertinent arguments relating to state powers, and how the highest court developed 
its interpretation over time. This part is a necessary step to be later supplemented by a 
comparison and contrast approach considering the decisions of the Supremo Tribunal 
Federal under the Brazilian Constitution of 1988. 
We used Lexis Advance in a detailed online research executed during the first 
weeks of January of 2014. We ran three searches, all of them combining annexation with 
municipality, county, and local government, respectively.637 On the one hand, there were 
cases that did not appeared in our search because they do not address annexation, but we 
                                                        
635 Idem, at 241. It is worth emphasizing once again that the focus of this article is annexation and we 
briefly mention other forms of boundary changes in the United States merely for the potential impact they 
may have as to annexation matters. 
 
636 We are interested in the progression of the United States Supreme Courts dockets, as well. Our research 
encompasses all the cases that met the search criteria further detailed, being systematic and coherent with 
the parameters used for the Brazilian STF. In this direction, our research is a departure from the use of the 
“most difficult cases,” because a relevant part of our study is to compare the dockets of both Supreme 
Courts. For a survey about studies using the approach of the “most difficult cases,” see: Ran Hirschl, “The 
Question of Case Selection in Comparative Constitutional Law,” American Journal of Comparative Law 53 
(2005): 125–155, at 144–146. 
 
637 Specifically, in the first search we used as key words: “annexation and municipality,” obtaining forty-
two cases. In the second, our key words were “annexation and county,” reaching a total number of one 
hundred and five results. In our last search, our criteria were: “annexation and local and government,” and 
we reached ninety-one cases. Those are the three most common denominations referring to local 
governments as translated to the Brazilian “municípios.” Tables 5.3, 5.4, and 5.5 display the raw results for 
each search, with the cases listed in chronological order. The tables show all the cases of the search, even 
when the words were not used in the context we were investigating. For instance, several cases referred to 
annexation of states to the federal union (Texas, Hawaii and Louisiana), which is not the annexation that is 
the object of this research. Hence, those cases were excluded. We also did not include school districts in 
our final table (Table 5.1), because they do not carry similar functions in Brazil.  After the pertinent 
exclusions, we found thirty-one decisions solely based on the Lexis Research. Notwithstanding this 
number, we will further address cases that are relevant (and that were cited by scholars in the field that 
might be directed related to the discussion), but that do not appear in in our final list of cases of the 
electronic search as consolidated in Table 5.1. 
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commented on them for purposes of completeness.638 On the other hand, there were cases 
that appeared in our search, but were excluded because they did not directly address 
annexation (or state and local government powers) in light of this specific form of 
boundary change.639 
At this point, we turn to the analysis of the U.S. cases, which were classified 
according to the main issues involved in the litigation. The cases of each set are grouped 
in chronological order, and the issues touching annexation were considered by 
preponderance. This division intends to facilitate further discussion. The annexation cases 
were assembled in the following five groups: police power of states over municipalities, 
succession of liability of counties, judicial review of state statute, general decisions about 
due process of law, and racial discrimination in connection with the right to vote. 
The first set of cases addresses police powers of the state over municipalities. In 
the Slaughter-Houses cases, the USSC held that the state had the exclusive right under its 
police power to determine the localities where slaughtering was allowed to occur.640 The 
USSC also found that the laws of the federal Constitution (in particular, Thirteenth and 
Fourteenth Amendments) were not applicable.641 There were, however, vigorous dissents, 
and we quote the following passage: 
It is true that (the Supreme Court of Illinois) in this opinion was 
speaking of a municipal ordinance and not of an act of the 
legislature of a State. But (…) a legislative body is no more 
                                                        
638 The two cases that we also discuss, because they refer to the application of the equal protection clause to 
states (despite not dealing with annexation, directly), are the following:  Avery v. Midlan County, 390 U.S. 
474 88 S. Ct. 1114 20 L. Ed. 2d 45 (1968) and Allegheny Pittsburgh Coal Co. v. County Com., 488 U.S. 
336 109 S. Ct. 633 102 L. Ed. 2d 688 (1989). 
 
639 There were several instances where annexation was not used in accordance with the technical meaning 
object of this research, but as mere vernacular synonym of inclusion or addition.  It is worth reiterating that 
we excluded from our analysis all the cases dealing with Board of Education, special districts and similar 
entities to the extent that they are not encompassed by municipalities in Brazil. 
 
640 The Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. 36, 21 L. Ed. 394 (1872). Technically, the decision in the  
Slaughter-House Cases rejected the application of the Privileges and Immunity clause as well as the Equal 
Protection and Due Process contained in the Fourteenth Amendment. For a discussion of how the Court 
modified the interpretation regarding the latter: Erwin Chemerinsky, Constitutional Law: Principles and 
Policies (New York: Aspen, 2006), at 494–498. 
 
641 For a review of previous cases securing state power to regulate domestic affairs – including local 
governments – and contending that the Fourteenth Amendments was not applicable: Raul Berger, 
Federalism: The Founders’ Design (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1987), at 158–161. 
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entitled to destroy the equality of rights of citizens, nor to fetter the 
industry of a city, than a municipal government. These rights are 
protected from invasion by the fundamental law.642  
 
The Slaughter-Houses cases represent the pioneer effort to challenge the former 
understanding of the Court about federalism occurring for the first time in light of the 
amendments of the Reconstruction.643 Under the premises of the traditional (Founding) 
federalism, such monopoly remains within the purview of the state. After the 
Reconstruction era, there was a valid challenge, even though the majority’s decision 
denied the departure proposed by the plaintiffs.644 The majority decision has been 
criticized on the grounds that it ultimately made the Privileges or Immunities Clause 
meaningless.645  
Another case dealing with the police powers arising out of the protection of health 
and morals was Holden, where the Court determined that state police power might validly 
limit the right of contract. For the Court, the sheriff of Salt Lake County was merely 
executing the state law.646 
 Holt considered the exercise of police powers outside the limits of the city of 
Tuscaloosa, Alabama.647 The Court decided that the state police jurisdiction statute648 
                                                        
642 The Slaughter-House Cases (1872), dissent opinion by Justice Field, at 108. All the internal citations to 
cases hereinafter are omitted, unless it is stated differently. 
 
643 Bruce Ackerman, W e the People: Foundations (Cambridge: The Belknap Press of Harvard University 
Press, 1993), at 94. 
 
644 Idem, at 95. Professor Ackerman contends that the Court refused to apply the Reconstructions 
amendments beyond the limited scope of race: Idem, at 115. 
 
645 John Hart Ely, Democracy and Distrust (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1980), at 22–23: Noting 
that the final decision made the Privileges or Immunities Clause meaningless, and emphasizing that the 
Court changed its opinion of the Equal Protection Clause from The Slaughter-House Cases, but have not 
done so as to the Privileges or Immunities Clause. 
 
646 Holden v. Hardy 169 U.S. 366 18 S. Ct. 383 42 L. Ed. 780 (1898). 
 
647 Holt Civic Club v. City of Tuscaloosa, 439 U.S. 60 99 S. Ct. 383 58 L. Ed. 2d 292 (1978). 
648 In dicta, Justice Rehnquist, writing for the majority of the Court, affirmed, at 73–74: “Appellants 
suggest a number of ‘constitutionally preferable’ governmental alternatives to Alabama's system of 
municipal police jurisdictions. (…) From a political science standpoint, appellants' suggestions may be 
sound, but this Court does not sit to determine whether Alabama has chosen the soundest or most practical 
form of internal government possible. Authority to make those judgments resides in the state legislature, 
and A labama citizens are free to urge their proposals to that body. See, e.g., (…) Hunter. The Alabama 
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subjecting residents within three miles radius of a city’s corporate limits to the city’s 
police powers as well as to the criminal jurisdiction of city’s courts – despite not 
extending the right to vote in the city’s election – was not in violation of the 
understanding of “government without franchise being a fundamental violation of the 
Due Process Clause.”649 
 The cases comprised in that first set touch a core question of the U.S. federalism  
– namely, police powers. As a rule, protection of health and safety can be regulated by 
the state under its police powers. The Slaughter House cases show that it was not always 
the case, in a time when freedom of contract was perceived as unlimited. Holt authorizes 
the city to exercise police powers even outside its borders, further blurring the division 
lines. It also provides an example of the geographical, economic, political, and social 
functions of the U.S. boundaries, which justified the expansion of police powers based on 
the effect that the lack of regulation could have in the boundaries of a city.   
The second set of cases addresses the question of succession of liability of 
counties. In Commissioners of Laramie County, the USSC decided that absent a state 
constitution – or organic law, if it is a territory – the legislature has the power to reduce 
or enlarge the area of a county, whenever the public necessity or convenience requires 
so.650 The Court specifically stressed that if a part of the territory of a town and its 
inhabitants is separated by annexation to another town (or by creation of a new 
corporation), the former corporation retains all its property, powers, rights, and 
                                                                                                                                                                     
Legislature could have decided that municipal corporations should have some measure of control over 
activities carried on just beyond their ‘city limit’ signs, particularly since today's police jurisdiction may be 
tomorrow's annexation to the city proper. Nor need the city's interests have been the only concern of the 
legislature when it enacted the police jurisdiction statutes. Urbanization of any area brings with it a number 
of individuals who long both for the quiet of suburban or country living and for the career opportunities 
offered by the city's working environment. Unincorporated communities like Holt dot the rim of most 
major population centers in Alabama and elsewhere, and state legislatures have a legitimate interest in 
seeing that this substantial segment of the population does not go without basic municipal services such as 
police, fire, and health protection.” Emphasis added. 
649 Holt Civic Club v. City of Tuscaloosa (1978), at 75. 
 
650 Commissioners of Laramie County v. Commissioners of Albany County, 92 U.S. 307 23 L. Ed. 552 
(1875). This case was cited as precedent for City of Worcester v. Worcester Consolidated Street Railway 
Company 96 U.S. 539 25 S. Ct. 327 (1905), at 548–549: “The city is a creature of the State. (…) a 
municipal corporation is not only a part of the State, but is a portion of its governmental power.”  
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privileges, remaining subject to all its obligations and duties, unless some new provision 
was made by the act authorizing the separation.651  
Along that same line of reasoning, the USSC affirmed that new towns formed by 
annexation of parts of an old town remained severally liable for the bonds of the 
dissolved town.652 Therefore, when a municipal corporation is dissolved and a new 
corporation is created and predominantly composed of the same community, it becomes 
the successor of the old corporation, liable for its debts. The status of being the same 
community was defined as relating to the taxable property being substantially the same, 
and having the same purposes of the former municipal corporation. Furthermore, the 
Court determined that any legislative enactment that withdraws or limits the remedies for 
the enforcement of obligations assumed by a municipal corporation, where no substantial 
equivalent is provided, is forbidden by the U.S. Constitution.653  
In another decision, the USSC held that, upon annexation, authorities of town or 
villages entitled to receive contractual benefits ceased to be authorized to do so. For the 
Court, the grant was nonexistent, because the underlying obligation no longer exists, with 
the ordinances of the city being extended over the territory immediately at the moment of 
the annexation.654 In addition, the famous principle of interpretation concerning public 
grants was emphatically mentioned:  
The rules of construction which have been adopted by courts in 
cases of public grants of this nature by the authorities of cities are 
of long standing. It has been held that such grants should be in 
plain language, that they should be certain and definite in their 
nature, and should contain no ambiguity in their terms. The 
legislative mind must be distinctly impressed with the unequivocal 
form of expression contained in the grant, in order that the 
privileges may be intelligently granted or purposely withheld. It is 
matter of common knowledge that grants of this character are 
usually prepared by those interested in them, and submitted to the 
legislatures with a view to obtain from such bodies the most liberal 
                                                        
651 Commissioners of Laramie County v. Commissioners of Albany County (1875), at 310–311. 
 
652 Mount Pleasant v. Beckwith 25 L. Ed. 699 (1879). 
 
653 Mobile v. Watson, 116 U.S. 289 6 S. Ct. 398 29 L. Ed. 620 (1886). 
 
654 Blair v. City of Chicago, 201 U.S. 400 26 S. Ct. 427 (1906), at 488–489. 
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grant of privileges which they are willing to give. This is one 
among many reasons why they are to be strictly construed. 655 
 
With regard to annexation of a township to a city and the contractual expiration of 
reduced fairs, the USSC cited Blair v. Chicago, reiterating that grants must be interpreted 
strictly, with no contractual rights being enlarged by implication and no violation of 
contractual obligations by the city, or take of property without due process of law.656 The 
USSC later distinguished and reduced the scope of this interpretation by considering the 
facts underlying such contract, ultimately determining that an extension of the diminished 
price would violate Article 1, § 10 of the Constitution, and the general prohibition of 
states impairing the obligation of contracts.657 
 The second ensemble of decisions illustrates the interpretation of the Court 
regarding contractual claims modified due to annexation. The Court distinguished the 
annexation effects when considering bonds (which, as a rule, had to be honored by the 
new entity) from the general contractual benefits. Those benefits should be interpreted as 
nonexistent after the annexation, if legal doubt existed. From the rationale of the 
decisions, the Court considered values of morality and transparency, which should inform 
public actions, even when they occurred in the closest sphere to the public (local 
government). 
 In a third set of cases, our classification was primarily based on the possibility of 
review by the judiciary of state statues about annexation. The first case addressed 
procedures pertinent to annexation.658 It considered the annexation of counties to the state 
of West Virginia after the Civil War, determining that such annexation was valid, 
provided that the counties’ population voted for it in an election. The USSC held that it 
had jurisdiction over the lawsuit between the new state of West Virginia and the state of 
                                                        
655 Idem, at 471. 
 
656 Detroit United Railway v. Detroit, 229 U.S. 39 33 S. Ct. 697 (1913), at 44. 
 
657 Detroit United Railway v. Michigan, 242 U.S. 238 37 S. Ct. 87 61 L. Ed. 268 (1916), at 252–253. 
 
658 Va v. W. Va., 78 U.S. 39 20 L. Ed. 67 (1870). 
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Virginia, with allegations of fraud in the election not being relevant, to the extent that the 
governor had certified the annexation in good faith.659   
In a different case, the decision affirmed that the validity of proceedings under a 
statute for the annexation of a territory to a city was a determination of judicial nature, 
not a matter solely of legislative cognizance.660 The Court explained: 
It may be true that the general rule is that the determination of the 
territorial boundaries of municipal corporations is purely a 
legislative function, but there is nothing in the Federal Constitution 
to prevent the people of a State from giving, if they see fit, full 
jurisdiction over such matters to the courts and taking it entirely 
away from the legislature. The preservation of legislative control in 
such matters is not one of the essential elements of a republican 
form of government which, under section 4 of Article 4 of the 
Constitution, the United States are bound to guarantee to every 
State in this Union. And whenever the Supreme Court of a State 
holds that under the true construction of its constitution and 
statutes the courts of that State have jurisdiction over such matters, 
the Federal courts can neither deny the correctness of this 
construction nor repudiate its binding force as presenting anything 
in conflict with the Federal Constitution.661 
 
 In addition, the USSC decided that despite the legislature having acted validly in 
annexing new territory to a city, the jurisdiction of the Court was not dependent upon the 
form that legislative action is expressed, “but rather upon its practical effect and 
operation as construed and applied by state court of last resort, and this irrespective of the 
process of reasoning by which the decision is reached, or the precise extent to which 
reliance is placed upon the subsequent legislation.”662 
 Considering matters related to annexation of federal territory by a city, the 
Supreme Court has previously stated that it has jurisdiction to decide the case with the 
                                                        
659 Idem, at 62–63. 
 
660 Forsyth v. Hammon, 166 U.S. 506 17 S. Ct. 665 41 L. Ed. 1095 (1897), at 515. 
 
661  Idem, at 519.  
 
662 Detroit United Railway v. Michigan, 242 U.S. 238 37 S. Ct. 87 61 L. Ed. 268 (1916), at 247. 
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majority of the justices authorizing the tax income levied on employees of the federal 
plant.663  
In another decision addressing the relationship between federal law and state 
powers with the potential effect in annexation,664 a unanimous Court held that the 
purchase of a hospital by the local government entity to which the state granted power to 
purchase hospitals (and which already owned the only other hospital in town) was not 
subject to state action immunity, thus unacceptable under antitrust law.665 In a different 
context removed from annexation, but also referring to limits of state power, the Court 
had determined that the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment should 
apply to state action that selects the party for discriminatory treatment by subjecting the 
party to taxes not imposed on others in the same class.666 
The cases above are relevant because they reiterate the judicial review of state law 
regarding annexation.  The first case stated that the political question doctrine does not 
preclude the Court from deciding claims arising out of boundary disputes between states, 
even when such lines have been determined in an agreement by both states and 
Congress.667 It advanced the power of the governor over the counties that were present in 
the governor’s state. The remaining cases emphasized that judicial review did not 
                                                        
663 Howard v. Commissioners of Sinking Fund, 344 U.S. 624 73 S. Ct. 465 97 L. Ed. 617 (1953). 
 
664 FTC v. Phoebe Putney Health System, 133 S. Ct. 1003 185 L. Ed. 2d 43 (2013). The case is not directly 
about annexation, but effects of this boundary change were considered in the rationale developed by the 
Court. 
 
665 FTC v. Phoebe Putney Health System, (2013), at 1013, the Court held, in dicta: “For example (…) 
Wisconsin statutory law regulating the municipal provision of sewage services expressly permitted cities to 
limit their service to surrounding unincorporated areas. While unincorporated towns alleged that the city's 
exercise of that power constituted an unlawful tying arrangement, an unlawful refusal to deal, and an abuse 
of monopoly power, we had no trouble concluding that these alleged anticompetitive effects were 
affirmatively contemplated by the State because it was ‘clear’ that they ‘logically would result’ from the 
grant of authority. As described by the Wisconsin Supreme Court, the state legislature  'viewed annexation 
by the city of a surrounding unincorporated area as a reasonable quid pro quo that a city could require 
before extending sewer services to the area.’ (…) Without immunity, federal antitrust law could have 
undermined that arrangement and taken completely off the table the policy option that the State clearly 
intended for cities to have.”   
 
666 Allegheny Pittsburgh Coal Co. v. County Com., 488 U.S. 336 109 S. Ct. 633 102 L. Ed. 2d 688 (1989), 
at 345–346. 
 
667 Va v. W. Va., 78 U.S. 39 20 L. Ed. 67 (1870), at 60–61. 
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jeopardize separation of powers – a claim that has been recurrent since Marbury v. 
Madison668 –, concluding that it is a prerogative of the judiciary, regardless of the form or 
content of the act (including taxes, for instance).  
Considering, specifically, FTC v. Phoebe Putney Health System, the 
interpretation of the Court was consistent with the state action doctrine, which fosters 
federalism by reserving an area of state sovereignty.669 State action doctrine considers 
that the government has to obey the Constitution, regardless if it resorted to a corporate 
form.670 The doctrine of state action, however, has many exceptions, with the most 
pertinent being the public function one.671 Such function refers to services that have been 
traditionally within the exclusive prerogative of the government.672 Ultimately, the 
decision did not encompass the hospital in that exception. 
The fourth set of cases comprises alleged violations to the due process of law 
protected by the Fourteenth Amendment. In the first case, the USSC decided that there 
was no violation of federal law or the Constitution in a lawsuit arising out of an 
annexation case that plaintiffs argued had occurred in violation of their due process of 
law.673 The Court dismissed the case, noting that it had no jurisdiction because the claim 
did not show a real and substantial dispute with regard to the effect or construction of the 
Constitution, or under color of federal law. In another case, the Court ruled that the 
discrimination between individuals and corporations regarding the annexation to a city of 
lands held for agricultural purposes cannot be attacked as unconstitutional in order to 
defeat the annexation of lands of a corporation that are not held for agricultural 
                                                        
668 Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, (1803). 
 
669 Chemerinsky, Constitutional Law: Principles and Policies, at 513. State action is addressed in chapter 
four of this thesis, in the context of the Eleventh Amendment. 
 
670 Chemerinsky, Constitutional Law: Principles and Policies, at 515.  
 
671 For a complete review of the exceptions: Idem, at 517–538. 
 
672 Idem, at 519, where the author cites that utility companies are not a public function, so the Constitution 
does not have always to apply. 
 
673  McCain v. Des Moines, 174 U.S. 168 (1899), emphasizing the existence of state constitution 
determining the issue, and the absence of violation to the United States Constitution. The Court later cited 
the case, albeit outside the annexation concept, in Swafford v. Templeton, 185 U.S. 487 (1902), at 493, 
where it stresses that a federal question exists whenever the subject matter of the litigation is federal. 
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purposes.674 Hence, discrimination between agricultural lands and other lands considering 
the right of a city to annex them is not in violation of constitutional guaranties of due 
process of law and equal protection of the laws because it is within the power of the state 
to classify objects of their legislation.675 
Still considering annexation and potential violation of the due process of law 
clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, the USSC held in Hunter: 
Municipal corporations are political subdivisions of the state, 
created as convenient agencies for exercising such of the 
governmental powers of the state as may be entrusted to them. For 
the purposes of executing these powers properly and efficiently 
they usually are given the power to acquire, hold, and manage 
personal and real property. The number, nature and duration of the 
powers conferred upon these corporations and the territory over 
which they shall be exercised rests in the absolute discretion of the 
State. (…) In all these respects the state is supreme, and its 
legislative body, conforming its action to the State Constitution, 
may do as it will, unrestrained by any provision of the Constitution 
of the United States.676 
 
Both cases in the fourth set deal with claims arising out of the Fourteenth 
Amendment, showing how restrictively the Court has interpreted them. Accordingly, 
municipalities ended up being empowered through the interpretation developed by the 
Court, who understood them as extension of the states. 
                                                        
674 Clark v. Kansas City, 176 U.S. 114 20 S. Ct. 284 44 L. Ed. 392 (1900).  
 
675 The Court peremptorily affirmed in Clark v. Kansas City (1900), at 120–121: “We think that the 
distinction is justified by the principle of the cases we have cited. That principle leaves to the State the 
adaptation of its laws to its conditions. The growth of cities is inevitable and in providing for their 
expansion it may be the judgment of an agricultural State that they should find a limit in the lands actually 
used for agriculture. Such use it could be taken for granted would be only temporary. Other uses, certainly 
those to which the plaintiff puts its lands, can receive all the benefits of the growth of a city and not be 
moved to submit to the burdens. (…) We think, therefore, that within the latitude which local government 
must be allowed the distinction is not arbitrary, and infringes no provision of the Constitution of the United 
States.” 
 
676 Hunter v. City of Pittsburg: 207 U.S. 161 28 S. Ct. 40 52 L. Ed. 151 (1907), at 178–179. It is noteworthy 
that state law provided for the annexation of cities, with the smaller being annexed to the larger. The 
majority of both cities approved the annexation, but the majority of voters in Allegheny (the smaller city) 
opposed to the annexation. The lower courts and the USSC affirmed the consolidation decree, also based 
on the nonexistence of a contract between the citizens and the city of Allegheny for a given taxation – 
which would be against the nature of municipal corporations. Moreover, the Court decided that there was 
no deprivation of property without the due process in light of the increased taxation applicable after the 
incorporation. 
 
  139 
The final set of cases focuses on the decisions of the USSC with regard to racial 
discrimination and the right to vote. Those decisions have been examined previously, but 
this research aims to address the federalism perspective involved in those annexation 
cases.677 Chronologically, our study starts with Gomillion,678 when the Court, for the first 
time in the context of annexation cases, limited the absolute power of states conceived in 
Hunter.679 The Court affirmed:  
Thus, a correct reading of the seemingly unconfined dicta of 
Hunter and kindred cases is not that the State has plenary power to 
manipulate in every conceivable way, for every conceivable 
purpose, the affairs of its municipal corporations, but rather that 
the State’s authority is unrestrained by the particular prohibitions 
of the Constitution considered in those cases. The Hunter opinion 
itself intimates that a state legislature may not be omnipotent even 
as to the disposition of some types of property owned by municipal 
corporations (…). Further, other cases in this Court have refused to 
allow a State to abolish a municipality, or alter its boundaries, or 
merge it with another city, without preserving to the creditors the 
old city some effective recourse for the collection of debts owned 
to them.680 
 
                                                        
677 For examples solely grounded on the decisions about the right to vote in local elections: Richard 
Briffault, “Who Rules at Home? One Person/One Vote and Local Governments,” University of Chicago 
Law Review 60 (1993): 339–424; Michelle Wilde Anderson, “Cities Inside Out: Race, Poverty, and 
Exclusion at the Urban Fringe,” University of California Los Angeles Law Review 55 (2008): 1095–1160, 
at 942–978, in particular. 
 
678 Gomillion v. Lightfoot, 364 U.S. 339 81 S. Ct. 125 5L. Ed. 2d 10 (1960), at 342, where the USSC stated 
the following: “The complaint amply alleges a claim of racial discrimination. Against this claim the 
respondents have never suggested (…) any countervailing municipal function which Act 140 is designed to 
serve. The respondents invoke generalities expressing the State’s unrestricted power – unlimited, that is, by 
the United States Constitution – to establish, destroy, or reorganize by contraction or expansion its political 
subdivisions, to wit, cities, counties, and other local units. We freely recognize the breath and importance 
of this aspect of the State’s political power. To exalt this power into an absolute is to misconceive the reach 
and rue of this Court’s decisions in the leading case of Hunter v. Pittsburgh, and related cases relied upon 
by respondents.” The Court further stressed that Lamarie was only authoritative as for the general 
nonexistence of a constitutionally protected obligation arising between a state and its subordinate 
governmental entities exclusively as the result of their relationship: Gomillion v. Lightfoot, at 343.  
 
679 For reference and discussion about Hunter: see supra, where the USSC held that municipal corporations 
were merely political subdivisions of the state and created upon states discretion. 
 
680 Gomillion v. Lightfoot (1960), at 344, where the conclusion of this quote ended with reference being 
expressly made to Mobile v. W atson – that is previously cited in this research in footnote 653, supra. 
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 The USSC further remarked that legislative control of municipalities, as any state 
power, is limited by the U.S. Constitution.681 The fact that in the excerpt above the Court 
had made an analogy with contractual rights in order to secure the right to vote bears 
emphasis. The Court considered that the new boundaries were a violation to the Fifteenth 
Amendment, depriving the citizens of the right to vote due to their race.682 It was 
reaffirmed that state power is immune of judicial review if such power was exercised 
completely within the domain of state interest – thus differently than the case at bar, 
where the state power was used to circumvent a federally protected right.683 In addition, 
in Avery v. Midland County, the Court stated that the Equal Protection Clause applies to 
the exercise of state power, regardless if it was directly exercised by the state or by a 
political subdivision.684 
 In another decision, the USSC upheld the modifications of Virginia’s 
reapportionment statute for elections of members of the House and Senate, which 
determined that legislative districts should not change, despite the resulting boundaries of 
the political subdivisions might have been modified after annexation.685 According to the 
majority opinion, the reapportion plan did not violate the Equal Protection Clause of the 
                                                        
681 Gomillion v. Lightfoot (1960), at 344–345. 
 
682 Gomillion v. Lightfoot (1960), at 345–346. The Court observed, at 347, that: “A statute which is alleged 
to have worked unconstitutional deprivations of petitioners’ right is not immune to attack simply because 
the mechanism employed by the legislature is a redefinition of municipal boundaries. According to the 
allegations here made, the Alabama legislature has not merely redrawn the Tuskegee city limits with 
incidental inconvenience of the petitioners; it is more accurate to say that it has deprived the petitioners of 
the municipal franchise and consequent rights and to that end it has incidentally changed the city’s 
boundaries. While in form this is merely an act redefining metes and bounds, if the allegations are 
established, the inescapable human effect of this essay in geometry and geography is to despoil colored 
citizens, and only colored citizens, of their therefore enjoyed voting rights.” 
 
683 Gomillion v. Lightfoot (1960), at 347–348. It is worth noting that the concurring opinion by Justice 
Whittaker located the federal protection right within the Equal protection Clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment to the Constitution, at 349.  
 
684 Avery v. Midland County, 390 U.S. 474 88 S. Ct. 1114 20 L. Ed. 2d 45 (1968), at 479. Importantly, this 
litigation was about an election for County Commissioners in Texas – not a direct annexation procedure, 
but it was included because it addressed annexation in dicta. It further stated that the Fourteenth 
Amendment guaranteed that citizens have equal representation in political subdivisions that exercised 
policy-making functions: Idem, at 481. 
 
685 Mahan v. Howell, 410 U.S. 315 93 S. Ct.979 35 L. Ed. 2d 320 (1973).  
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Fourteenth Amendment. 686  In another similar decision,687  the Court also found no 
violation of such clause, justifying its holding in Hunter.688 
 In Perkins v. Matthews689 the USSC considered violations to § 5 of the Voting 
Rights Act of 1965 (42 U.S.C.S. § 1973c) in the context of annexations and related 
changes of boundaries of adjacent areas that aimed to expand the number of eligible 
voters.690 The Court noted that the modifications of boundaries through those annexations 
was:  
                                                        
686 The Court held that there was no violation of the principle of one person, one vote, because it 
understood the state’s objective of preserving the integrity of political subdivision as rational, to the extent 
that it corroborated the legislative goal of facilitating enactments of statutes referring solely to local 
matters: Mahan v. Howell (1973), at 326–328. Nevertheless, Justice Brennan partially dissented – joined by 
Justices Douglas and Marshall – citing that the deviation of sixteen point four percent between the most 
overrepresented and the most underrepresented legislative districts in a state’s lower legislative house is 
constitutionally impermissible and cannot be justified on the ground that the state adhered to political 
subdivisions lines when designing the districts: at 345–349. 
 
687 In a case for a new county charter that required approval, under New York law, by a referendum of 
separate majorities of the voters who lived in the city within the county, and of those who lived outside city 
boundaries: City of Lockport v. Citizens for Community Action at Local Level, Inc., 430 U.S. 259 97 S. 
CT. 1047 51 L. Ed. 2d 313 (1977). 
688 The Court held in City of Lockport (1977), at 271: “The ultimate question then is whether, given the 
differing interests of city and non-city voters in the adoption of a new county charter in New York, those 
differences are sufficient under the Equal Protection Clause to justify the classifications made by New York 
law (…). If that question were posed in the context of annexation proceedings, the fact that the residents of 
the annexing city and the residents of the area to be annexed formed sufficiently different constituencies 
with sufficiently different interests could be readily perceived. The fact of impending union alone would 
not so merge them into one community of interest as constitutionally to require that their votes be 
aggregated in any referendum to approve annexation. Cf. Hunter. (…) Yet in terms of recognizing 
constituencies with separate and potentially opposing interests, the structural decision to annex or 
consolidate is similar in impact to the decision to restructure county government in New York. In each 
case, separate voter approval requirements are based on the perception that the real and long-term impact of 
a restructuring of local government is felt quite differently by the different county constituent units that in a 
sense compete to provide similar governmental services. Voters in these constituent units are directly and 
differentially affected by the restructuring of county government, which may make the provider of public 
services more remote and less subject to the voters' individual influence. The provisions of New York law 
here in question no more than recognize the realities of these substantially differing electoral interests. 
Granting to these provisions the presumption of constitutionality to which every duly enacted state and 
federal law is entitled, we are unable to conclude that they violate the Equal Protection Clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment.” 
689 Perkins v. Matthews, 400 U. S. 379 91 S. Ct. 431 27 L. Ed. 2d 476 (1971). The case arose out of a 
Mississippi’s city statute changing the location of polls, modification of boundaries changes – among 
others – in an election for mayor and aldermen, and it emphasized that the city was covered by the Voting 
Rights Act of 1965. 
 
690 Justice Harlan dissented in part from the opinion of the Court, arguing that section five of the Voting 
Rights Act should not apply to annexations, because, in his view, “it affected voting incidentally or 
peripherally”, as written at Perkins v. Matthews (1971), at 399. 
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  … A change of standard, practice, or procedure with respect to 
voting that impacted voting rights in two forms: by inclusion of 
some while leaving others outside and thus determining who may 
exercise the right to vote; and by dilution of the weight of the voter 
of electors to whom the vote was limited before the annexation.691 
 
 The USSC further explained the meaning of § 5 of the Voting Rights Act of 
1965692 in City of Richmond v. United States,693 a lawsuit that arose out of a post-
                                                        
691 Perkins v. Matthews (1971), at 388. The USSC further stressed that section five was conceived to 
address changes that have a potential for racial discrimination in voting – with the Court also citing 
Gomillion. 
692 In the most relevant part for this research, the text of the Voting rights Act of 1965, as amended of 42 
USCS § 1973c determined the following: (a) Whenever a State or political subdivision with respect to 
which the prohibitions set forth in section 4(a) [42 USCS § 1973b(a)] based upon determinations made 
under the first sentence of section 4(b) [42 USCS § 1973b(b)] are in effect shall enact or seek to administer 
any voting qualification or prerequisite to voting, or standard, practice, or procedure with respect to voting 
different from that in force or effect on November 1, 1964, or whenever a State or political subdivision 
with respect to which the prohibitions set forth in section 4(a) [42 USCS § 1973b(a)] based upon 
determinations made under the second sentence of section 4(b) [42 USCS § 1973b(b)] are in effect shall 
enact or seek to administer any voting qualification or prerequisite to voting, or standard, practice, or 
procedure with respect to voting different from that in force or effect on November 1, 1968, or whenever a 
State or political subdivision with respect to which the prohibitions set forth in section 4(a) [42 USCS § 
1973b(a)] based upon determinations made under the third sentence of section 4(b) [42 USCS § 1973b(b)] 
are in effect shall enact or seek to administer any voting qualification or prerequisite to voting, or standard, 
practice, or procedure with respect to voting different from that in force or effect on November 1, 1972, 
such State or subdivision may institute an action in the United States District Court for the District of 
Columbia for a declaratory judgment that such qualification prerequisite, standard, practice, or procedure 
neither has the purpose nor will have the effect of denying or abridging the right to vote on account of race 
or color, or in contravention of the guarantees set forth in section 4(f)(2) [42 USCS § 1973b(f)(2)], and 
unless and until the court enters such judgment no person shall be denied the right to vote for failure to 
comply with such qualification, prerequisite, standard, practice, or procedure (…) (b)  Any voting 
qualification or prerequisite to voting, or standard, practice, or procedure with respect to voting that has the 
purpose of or will have the effect of diminishing the ability of any citizens of the United States on account 
of race or color, or in contravention of the guarantees set forth in section 4(f)(2) [42 USCS § 1973b(f)(2)], 
to elect their preferred candidates of choice denies or abridges the right to vote within the meaning of 
subsection (a) of this section. (c) The term "purpose" in subsections (a) and (b) of this section shall include 
any discriminatory purpose. 
693 City of Richmond v. United States, 422 U.S. 358 95 S. Ct. 2296 45 L. Ed. 2d 245 (1975). The Court 
referred to its prior decision, at 368, affirming: “Perkins v. Matthews held that changes in city boundaries 
by annexation have sufficient potential for denying or abridging the right to vote on account of race or 
color that prior to becoming effective they must have the administrative or judicial approval required by 
section five. But it would be difficult to conceive of any annexation that would not change a city’s racial 
composition at least to some extent; and we did not hold in Perkins that every annexation effecting a 
reduction in the percentage of Negroes (sic) in the city’s population is prohibited by section five. We did 
not hold, as the District Court asserted, that ‘if the proportion of blacks in the new citizenry from the 
annexed area is appreciably less than the proportion of blacks living within the city’s old boundaries, and 
particularly if there is a history of racial bloc voting in the city, the voting power of black citizens as a class 
is diluted and thus abridged’ and that the annexation thus violates section five and cannot be approved.” 
The Court further cited Gomillion and affirmed, at 378, that any official action, whether an annexation or 
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annexation statute that reduced the African American population by 10% in comparison 
with the pre-annexation electoral base.694 City of Richmond was later used as precedent 
to validate other actions with similar impacts, despite not being related to annexation.695 
In addition, the USSC determined that political units of a state that is covered 
within the jurisdiction of the Voting Rights Act of 1965 had to comply with the 
mandatory preclearance procedures of § 5 of the Act,696 holding that the city failed to 
prove that there was no discrimination.697 Along those lines, the Court determined that 
                                                                                                                                                                     
not, taken purposely to discriminate against African Americans on account of their race was not acceptable 
under the Constitution nor under the statute. 
 
694 By contrast, the dissenting opinion in City of Richmond v. United States (1975) written by Justice 
Brennan, with whom Justice Douglas and Justice Marshall joined dissenting, cited the District Court 
reversed opinion, at 386: “Perkins left implicit the obvious: if the proportion of blacks in the new citizenry 
from annexed area is appreciably less than the proportion of blacks living within the city’s old boundaries, 
and particularly if there is a history of racial bloc voting in the city, the voting power of black citizens as a 
class is diluted and thus abridged.” The dissent also addressed the strategic behavior involved is such 
litigation, at 389–390: “More than five years have elapsed since the last municipal elections were held in 
Richmond. Hopes which were lifted by the District Court decision over a year ago are today again dashed, 
as the case is remanded for what may prove to be several additional years of litigation; Richmond will 
continue to be governed, as it has been for the last five years, by a slate of councilmen elected in clear 
violation of section five. The black population of Richmond may be justifiably suspicious of the 
‘protection’ its voting rights are receiving when these rights can be suspended in limbo, and the people 
deprived of the right to select their local officials in an election meeting constitutional and statutory 
standards, for so many years. I would affirm the judgment below, and let the United States District Court 
for the Eastern District of Virginia set about the of fashioning an appropriate remedy as expeditiously as 
possible.” 
 
695 Citing specifically City of Richmond in such context: United Jewish Organizations, Inc. v. Carey, 430 
U.S. 144 97 S. Ct. 996 51 L. Ed. 2d 229 (1977), at 160. 
 
696 City of Rome v. United States, 446 U.S. 156 100 S. Ct. 1548 64 L. Ed. 2d 119 (1980). Technically, the 
annexations are in reference to elections for City Commission and Board of Education. It is worth noting 
that the decision in City of Rome asserts: “ Congress plainly intended that a voting practice not be pre-
cleared unless both discriminatory purpose and effect are absent.” Emphasis in the original, at 172. 
697 The Court concluded: “The District Court properly concluded that these annexations must be scrutinized 
under the Voting Rights Act. See Perkins v. Matthews. By substantially enlarging the city's number of 
white eligible voters without creating a corresponding increase in the number of Negroes (sic), the 
annexations reduced the importance of the votes of Negro (sic) citizens who resided within the pre-
annexation boundaries of the city. In these circumstances, the city bore the burden of proving that its 
electoral system ‘fairly reflects the strength of the Negro (sic) community as it exists after the annexations.’ 
City of Richmond. The District Court's determination that the city failed to meet this burden of proof for 
City Commission elections was based on the presence of three vote-dilutive factors: the at-large electoral 
system, the residency requirement for officeholders, and the high degree of racial bloc voting. Particularly 
in light of the inadequate evidence introduced by the city, this determination cannot be considered to be 
clearly erroneous.” 
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the new boundaries resulting from two consolidations and one annexation in Texas698 
were in violation of § 5, due to insufficiently neutralizing the adverse impact upon 
minority voting.699  
In another landmark decision, the USSC concluded that annexation of inhabited 
land by a municipality was also subject to the preclearance requirement of § 5, because it 
constituted a change in the voting practices.700 The Court also draw attention to the 
nonexistence of African Americans in the previous annexation configuration as not being 
relevant, because the impermissible purpose under § 5 referred to contemporary as well 
as future circumstances.701 In another case of reapportionment in light of the Voting 
Rights Act, the Court ruled that the scheme was so irrational on its face that it could be 
solely understood as an effort to segregate districts on the basis of racial classifications.702 
Notwithstanding the previous case law concerning the Voting Rights Act, the 
Court decided that the Act was not applicable to the changes made in the allocation of 
powers of the county commissions.703 According to the majority of the USSC, § 5 was 
solely applicable to changes that affected voting, candidacy requirements and 
qualifications, or the composition of the electorate.704 The Court proclaimed:  
Neither the appellants nor the United States has pointed to 
anything we said there or in the statutes reenacting the Voting 
Rights Act to suggest that Congress meant other than what it said 
when it made section five applicable to changes “with respect to 
                                                        
698 City of Port Arthur v. United States, 459 U.S. 159 103 S. Ct. 530 74 L. Ed. 2d 334 (1982). 
 
699 City of Port Arthur v. United States (1982), at 162. The Court considered two previous plans and related 
findings of their discriminatory effect in order to determine that the third plan at bar was also tainted: at 
168. 
 
700 Pleasant Grove v. United States 479 U.S. 462 107 S. Ct. 794 93 L. Ed. 2d 866 (1987), specifically citing 
City of Rome, where the majority of the annexations were of vacant land, at 467. 
 
701 Pleasant Grove v. United States (1987), at 471. 
 
702 Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630 113 S. CT. 2816 125 L. Ed. 2d 511, at 640–652, in particular. This case 
does not encompass any annexation procedure directly, but it is included because the majority decided that 
appellants were able to state a cause of action (citing annexation in dicta), and the case appeared in our 
online search. 
 
703 Presley v. Etowah County Commission et al., 502 U.S. 491 112 S. Ct. 820 117 L. Ed. 2d 51 (1992). 
 
704 Presley v. Etowah County Commission (1992), at 501–509. 
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voting” rather than, say, changes “with respect to governance.” If 
federalism is to operate as a practical system of governance and 
not a mere poetic ideal, the States must be allowed both 
predictability and efficiency in structuring their governments. 
Constant minor adjustments in the allocation of power among state 
and local officials serve this elemental purpose. Covered changes 
must bear a direct relation to voting itself. That direct relation is 
absent in both cases now before us. The changes in (the counties of 
litigation) affected only the allocation of power among 
governmental officials. They had no impact on the substantive 
question whether a particular office would be elective or the 
procedural question how an election would be conducted. Neither 
change involves a new “voting qualification or prerequisite to 
voting, or standard, practice, or procedure with respect to voting.” 
42 U. S. C. § 1973c.705 
 In a case involving dilution of votes of governing authorities of counties in 
Georgia,706 the Court distinguished the application of § 2 of the Voting Rights Act from § 
5.707 In another case, the Court decided that there was no dilution of minority votes in a 
reapportionment plan from the Florida legislative.708 
 This research considered the decision of Shelby v. Holder, to the extent that the 
Court discussed the federalism pact in order to rule § 4(b) of the Voting Rights Act 
                                                        
705 Presley v. Etowah County Commission (1992), at 510. 
 
706 Holder v. Hall, 512 U.S. 874 U.S. 874 114 S. Ct. 2581 129 L. Ed. 2d 687 (1994). 
707 The Court held in Holder v. Hall (1994), at 884–885: “Retrogression is not the inquiry in section 2 
dilution cases. 42 U.S.C. § 1973(a) (whether voting practice ‘results in a denial or abridgement of the right 
of any citizen of the United States to vote on account of race or color’; … Plaintiffs could not establish a 
section 2 violation merely by showing that a challenged reapportionment or annexation, for example, 
involved a retrogressive effect on the political strength of a minority group’). Unlike in section 5 cases, 
therefore, a benchmark does not exist by definition in section 2 dilution cases. And as explained above, 
with some voting practices, there in fact may be no appropriate benchmark to determine if an existing 
voting practice is dilutive under section 2. For that reason, a voting practice that is subject to the 
preclearance requirements of section 5 is not necessarily subject to a dilution challenge under section 2. 
This conclusion is quite unremarkable. For example, in Perkins v. Matthews (1971), we held that a town's 
annexation of land was covered under section 5. Notwithstanding that holding, we think it quite improbable 
to suggest that a section 2 dilution challenge could be brought to a town's existing political boundaries (in 
an attempt to force it to annex surrounding land) by arguing that the current boundaries dilute a racial 
group's voting strength in comparison to the proposed new boundaries.” 
708 Johnson v. De Grandy, 512 U.S. 997 114 S. Ct. 2647 129 L. Ed. 2d 775 (1994), at 1019, where the 
majority of the Court emphasized that Richmond v. United States (1975) referred to territorial annexation 
designed to dilute African American votes was forbidden by section five of the VRA, regardless of its 
actual effect. 
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unconstitutional.709 According to the majority, the formula used in the Act was forty 
years old and no longer reflected the realities in the states covered by it.710 The USSC 
asserted: 
The Voting Rights Act of 1965 employed extraordinary measures 
to address an extraordinary problem. Section five of the Act 
required States to obtain federal permission before enacting any 
law related to voting—a drastic departure from basic principles of 
federalism. And section four of the Act applied that requirement 
only to some States—an equally dramatic departure from the 
principle that all States enjoy equal sovereignty. This was strong 
medicine, but Congress determined it was needed to address 
entrenched racial discrimination in voting (…). As we explained in 
upholding the law, “exceptional conditions can justify legislative 
measures not otherwise appropriate.”711 
 
 In light of the U.S. federalism, the Court explained that the federal government is 
not generally authorized to review and veto state enactments before they go into effect – 
despite such power being considered at the time of the Convention, it was denied in favor 
of the Supremacy Clause and related potential challenges occurring after the effect of 
state law. The Court also reaffirmed that the Tenth Amendment grants to the states all the 
powers not specifically granted to the federal government, and that “ (…) not only do 
States retain sovereignty under the Constitution, there is also a ‘fundamental principle of 
equal sovereignty’ among the States.”712 The dissenting opinion justified the exceptions 
                                                        
709 Shelby County v. Holder, 133 S. Ct. 2612 186 L. Ed. 2d 651 (2013). 
 
710 The decision emphasizes that African American voter turn out actually increased in five of the six states 
originally covered by the VRA, of 1965: Shelby County v. Holder (2013), at 2619. Shelby County is 
located in Alabama. The following states were originally covered by section five: Alabama, Georgia, 
Louisiana, Mississippi, South Carolina and Virginia. Arizona and Texas were included in 1972, also in 
their totality. The majority of the Court noted in Shelby, at 2628, that by 1965 the Act divided the states 
among those which have literacy tests (coupled with low voter registration and turn out) and those which 
did not; nowadays, for the Court: “ (…) the Nation is no longer divided along those lines, yet the Voting 
Rights Act continue to treat it as if it were.” At the time of the Shelby decision, Florida, New York, North 
Carolina, South Dakota and Michigan were partially included, according to data from the Department of 
Justice of the United States. There is no information available with regard to the current jurisdictions 
covered after Shelby (and its potential bail out effect) in the official website of the Department of Justice, 
last accessed March, 2014, available at: http://www.justice.gov/crt/about/vot/sec_5/covered.php 
 
711 Shelby County v. Holder (2013), at 2618. 
 
712 For all the references and quote in this paragraph: Shelby County v. Holder (2013), at 2623. 
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based on the remaining necessity of differentiated treatments for the states mentioned in 
the Act.713 
 The majority holding in Shelby can be understood as aligned with the current 
trend of using tradition to limit judicial review of democratic process at state and local 
levels.714 Nevertheless, tradition itself has been subject to criticisms, because the U.S. 
experience is founded in multiple traditions.715 In addition, the assurance of legislative 
representation of minorities has been the core of the Act, and it is unclear, as of today, 
how the decision of the Court affects those to whom the protection was designed.716 
Still considering the Shelby decision, a related topic of particular interest for our 
comparison with Brazil is the fact that the USSC determined that Congress did not act –
or did not consider doing so – despite the warning given by the USSC in a decision717 
dating back to 2009, determining that the formula of § 2 must be updated.718 
                                                        
713 The dissent opinion written by Justice Ginsburg  – joined by Justices Breyer, Sotomayor and Kagan – 
specifically addresses annexation as a form of discrimination in different passages: at 2535, and also at 
2646, where it was emphasized that Pleasant Grove, a city in a neighbor county of Shelby, acted with 
purposeful discrimination when annexing all white areas and denying the annexation request of an adjacent 
black neighborhood, citing Pleasant Grove v. United States (1987). 
 
714 Cass R. Sunstein, Designing Democracy: W hat Constitutions Do? (New York: Oxford University Press, 
2001), at 80–81. The author argues as potential explanations for such approach: the fact that the United 
States Constitution is better understood for the Court if being preservative, and that the due process clause 
is better interpreted in a very restrictive form.  According to the Professor, both understandings would 
reduce the Court’s discretion. 
 
715 The American experience regarding race, for example, is controversial. Along those lines and criticizing 
the use of tradition itself: Sunstein, Designing Democracy: W hat Constitutions Do?, at 82–87. 
 
716 Donald Horowitz, Constitutional Design: Proposals versus process, in The Architecture of Democracy: 
Constitutional Design, Conflict Management and Democracy, ed. Andrew Reynolds (New York: Oxford 
University Press, 2002), at 19. 
717 The Shelby decision (Shelby County v. Holder, of 2013), at 2615, refers to the following case: 
Northwest Austin Municipal Utilities Number One v. Holder, 557 U.S. 193, 129 S. Ct. 2504 174, l. ed. 2d 
140, which was decided in 2009. The Shelby decision emphasized, also at 2615, that Congress could have 
updated such formula, when it extended the Voting Rights Act of 1965 through its reauthorization in 2006.  
718  The Court stated: “Our decision in no way affects the permanent, nationwide ban on racial 
discrimination in voting found in section two. We issue no holding on section five itself, only on the 
coverage formula. Congress may draft another formula based on current conditions. Such a formula is an 
initial prerequisite to a determination that exceptional conditions still exist justifying such an ‘extraordinary 
departure from the traditional course of relations between the States and the Federal Government.’ (Presley, 
502 U.S., at 500–501, 112 S. Ct. 820, 117 L. Ed. 2d 51).  Our country has changed, and while any racial 
discrimination in voting is too much, Congress must ensure that the legislation it passes to remedy that 
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II. THE BRAZILIAN SCENARIO 
A. Brazilian Constitutional Order after 1988 
Brazilian re-democratization process started in 1979, with the appointment of the 
moderate Joao Figueiredo as President, with the gradual ending of the overcentralized 
military rule. In 1982, the first direct election for governors since the 1964 coup d’état 
was held.719 After a long deliberation,720 the Constitution of the Brazilian Republic was 
approved on October 5, 1988 by a Constitutional Convention that included deputies and 
senators.721  
Mayors and governors were among the most powerful actors in lobbying for 
decentralization722 and thus encouraging a constitutional order that developed a “center-
constraining federation unprecedented in Brazilian history.”723 In addition, municipalities 
                                                                                                                                                                     
problem speaks to current conditions.” Shelby County v. Holder (2013), at 2631. The dissent opinion 
vehemently criticized such understanding: at 2632–2633. 
719 For information concerning Brazilian elections for state governors, federal deputies, and senators from 
1945 until 1990, see: http://www.tse.jus.br/eleicoes/eleitos-1945-1990/cronologia-das-eleicoes. David 
Samuels, Ambition, Federalism, and Legislative Politics in Brazil (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 2003), at 169, emphasizes that direct elections brought a “dramatic change in the executive-
legislative relations (even though a military president remained in office until 1985).” The author details 
how the democratic elections pressured the president and conquered more decentralization of revenues, 
concluding that 1982 was the year that the military ruling actually ended. 
 
720 The constitutional convention met between February 1987 until September of 1988. Explaining that the 
Brazilian convention was not elected nor formed by delegates directly elected to write the Constitution, and 
that this fact was a compromise during the transition period from the military ruling to democracy: Souza 
Neto and Sarmento, Direito Constitucional: Teoria, História e Métodos de Trabalho, at 156–170. 
 
721 The less populated states of North and Center West were favored in the unbalanced representation of 
their states’ senators in the convention, because all states are equal in the Brazilian Senate. The non-
updated number of federal deputies per state (disregarding population growth in the Southeast) also 
disfavored the southeast states. See, for example, Souza Neto and Sarmento, Direito Constitucional: Teoria, 
História e Métodos de Trabalho, at 160.  
 
722 The Brazilian recent democracy had the federal revenues from the union reduced in more than eight 
percent and that change of revenues towards states and municipalities was not accompanied by 
administrative responsibilities, which contributed to fiscal crisis. In this sense: Kurt Weyland, “The 
Brazilian State in the New Democracy,” in Democratic Brazil, ed. Peter R. Kingstone and Timothy J. 
Power (Pittsburg: University of Pittsburg Press, 2000), at 42. 
 
723 Celina Souza, “Brazil: The Prospects of a Center-Constraining Federation in a Fragmented Polity,” 
Publius: The Journal of Federalism 32 (2002): 23–48, at 31–32. This observation is particular relevant, 
because Brazil has had lasting periods with state governors being very empowered, such as during the Old 
Republic. For a historical analysis of that period, during which federalism was marked for the 
preponderance of state interests: Joseph L. Love, Federalismo y Regionalismo en Brasil, 1889-1937, in 
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were also secured financial autonomy and levy of revenues in an unprecedented 
fashion.724  
 The decentralization implemented by the constitutional text with the municipal 
revenue sharing brought significance to the “elevation of municipalities to separate 
federal status” under the Constitution of 1988.725 In addition, such decentralization had 
disproportionately increased powers of mayoral officers, thus replicating, at the local 
                                                                                                                                                                     
Marcello Carmagnani Coordinator, Federalismos Latinoamericanos: México, Brasil, Argentina, Mexico, 
Fondo de Cultura Económica – El Colegio de México (1993), pp. 180-223. File last accessed November, 
2013, and electronically available at: http://www.google.com/url?sa=t&rct=j&q=&esrc=s 
&source=web&cd=8&ved=0CE0QFjAH&url=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.textosdigitales.com.ar%2FCP%2FC
ICLO_BASICO%2F2.008__Historia_II%2FLove__Federalismo_y_Regionalismo_en_Brasil.pdf&ei=SFIz
U9ydBsrErQGQpYDICA&usg=AFQjCNH2_C_wHGievrHL1jWhTCdc1ickvA&sig2=Q8jA06KSuZNBtz
2LExDgQg&bvm=bv.63738703,d.aWc 
 
724 The Brazilian Constitution established a complex system of revenues for municipalities. Exclusive 
municipal taxes are in article 156 of the Constitution: “The municipalities shall have the competence to 
institute taxes on: I - urban buildings and urban land property (“IPTU”); II - inter vivos transfer, on any 
account, by onerous acts, of real property, by nature or physical accession, and of real rights to property, 
except for real security, as well as the assignment of rights to the purchase thereof (“ITBI”); III - services 
of any nature not included in article 155, II, (state “ICMS” tax) as defined in a complementary law 
(“ISS”).” Article 158 further determines the municipal revenue sharing: “ The following shall be assigned 
to the municipalities:  I - the proceeds from the collection of the federal tax on income and earnings of any 
nature, levied at source on income paid on any account by them, by their autonomous government entities 
and by the foundations they institute and maintain (“IR”); II - fifty percent of the proceeds from the 
collection of the federal tax on rural property, concerning real property located in the municipalities, or the 
totality of the proceeds, in case the municipality exercises the option mentioned by article 153, paragraph 4, 
III (“ITR”); III - fifty percent of the proceeds from the collection of the state tax on the ownership of 
automotive vehicles licensed in the municipalities (“IPVA”); IV - twenty-five percent of the proceeds from 
the collection of the state tax on transactions regarding the circulation of goods and on rendering of 
interstate and intermunicipal transportation services and services of communication (“ICMS”). Article 159 
supplements the mandatory transfers from the union: “The Union shall remit: I - of the proceeds from the 
collection of taxes on income and earnings of any nature and on industrialized products, forty-seven 
percent as follows: (…) b) twenty-two and a half of one percent to the Revenue Sharing Fund of the 
Municipalities.” Municipalities can also levy: article 145, II: “fees, by virtue of the exercise of police power 
or for the effective or potential use of specific and divisible public services, rendered to the taxpayer or 
made available to him; III - benefit charges, resulting from public works. Article 149-A authorizes specific 
charges, as the following: “charges for compensation of the use of public light utility service, which is can 
be charged in the electric bill.”  Other constitutional provisions secure more revenues for municipalities, 
such as article 153, paragraph five: “Gold, when defined in law as a financial asset or an exchange 
instrument, is subject exclusively to the tax established in item V of the caption of the present article, due 
on the original transaction; the minimum rate shall be one per cent, and the transference of the amount 
collected is ensured under the following terms: (…) II -seventy per cent to the municipality of origin.” 
Other revenues are authorized as compensation for the use of the natural resources of the municipality and 
include: electrical energy generated; mineral exploitation; oil produced in the territory or in the continental 
platform – the so-called oil royalties, among others. 
 
725 Kent Eaton, “Decentralization and Federalism,” in Routledge Handbook of Latin American Politics, ed. 
Peter Kingstone and Deborah J. Yashar (New York: Routledge, 2012), at 42. 
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level, the concentration of powers in the executive, as it happened at the federal level, at 
the expense of legislative bodies.726 This phenomenon was named “decentralization of 
hyper-presidentialism.” On the one hand, it has been criticized for the general lack of 
transparency and the significant increase in “patronage and public sector payrolls at the 
expense of public good.” 727  On the other hand, depending on specific personal 
characteristics of mayors, there has been increasing popular participation, such as the 
famous Participatory Budgeting (PB) in Porto Alegre, in the southern region of Brazil.728 
Urbanization and the politics of the military ruling made the position of mayor 
much more attractive, contributing to weaker state governors while fostering the strong 
position of municipalities in the Constitution of 1988.729 In this sense, it would explain 
the reasons for the Brazilian departure of the comparative constitutional experience, with 
Brazilians writing their own peculiar federalism pact.730 Brazilian increased number of 
                                                        
726 Idem, at 38. 
 
727 Idem, at 39–41. 
728  See, e.g.: Brian Wampler, Participatory Budgeting in Brazil: Contestation, Cooperation, and 
Accountability (Pennsylvania: Pennsylvania State University Press, 2007), at 2–6. For an empirical study 
encompassing Porto Alegre, Blumenau, Ipatinga, Belo Horizonte, Rio Claro, São Paulo, Santo André, and 
Recife. The first two municipalities are located in the South; the remaining five in the South East – both 
regions being the most developed in Brazil. Only Recife belongs to the less developed Northeast. The study 
concluded that the experience in Porto Alegre’s participatory budgeting as a democratic one and capable of 
better distributing scarce resources to the poorest regions in the local government was not the rule. 
Accordingly, it is not necessarily due to participatory budgeting that poor regions in the cities will be 
included or have an improved democratic experience. In addition, it has been argued that Porto Alegre’s 
experience has been so successful because of PT’s (Brazilian labor party) self-interest and willingness in 
delegating some power to citizens was calculated, contributing later to the strength of the party nationally: 
Eaton, Decentralization and Federalism, at 40. 
729 Samuels, Reinventing Local Government? Municipalities and Intergovernmental Relations in 
Democratic Brazil, at 78–88, where the author notes that the self-interested mayors and their career 
motivations contribute to the increase of municipal power. At 91, he argues that the most import 
modification after democratization with regard to political careers was “ a revitalization not of national 
political parties but of politicians’ increasing efforts to secure office at the municipal level.” Developing the 
argument of how self-interested politicians in the Congress agreed to decentralize fiscal resources aiming at 
favoring their local supporters while increasing their own ambitions: Samuels, Ambition, Federalism, and 
Legislative Politics in Brazil, at 157–176. 
 
730 Brazil borrowed several constitutional provisions from the U.S. experience, such as: the nomination of 
STF justices, the residual powers of state if the constitutional is silent, mechanisms authorizing concrete 
judicial review on the state level, among others. Hence, the fact that Brazil decided not to borrow the 
absence of local governments provisions shows how much power local actors had at the time. For a 
comparative constitutional borrowing analysis as a subset of the institutional design literature, explaining 
why borrowing may not occur due to political factors: Lee Epstein, “Constitutional Borrowing and non-
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municipalities supports the understanding that in federal systems where units are 
heterogeneous, politicians have higher incentives to cooperate with each other at the local 
spheres, before working on the central level.731 This is particularly relevant in the 
Brazilian context, where municipalities have weak ties with their own state.732  
The Brazilian Constitution of 1988 inaugurated provisions contemplating the 
municipalities, which are the only form of local government,733 side by side with the 
states and the federal union.734 In addition, states in Brazil became authorized to create, 
through state complementary law,735 metropolitan regions, urban agglomerations, and 
micro regions of neighboring municipalities, provided those group modalities of 
municipalities organize, plan, and execute public functions that are common to all the 
municipalities involved.736  
                                                                                                                                                                     
borrowing,” International Journal of Constitutional Law (2003): 196–223, at 200. For an interesting 
analysis of the terms referring to “borrowing,” “transplants,”  “migration,” and “transfers,” arguing that the 
latter is preferable due to the reduced number of connotations: Günter Frankenberg, “Constitutional 
Transfer: the IKEA Theory Revisited,” International Journal of Constitutional Law 8 (2010): 563–579, at 
569–70.  
 
731 Arguing such advantage for federal systems which are heterogeneous, generally, see: Horowitz, 
Constitutional Design: Proposals versus Process, at 25. The idea remains influential, despite Brazil not 
being a divided society in terms of religion, ethnicity or race (see discussion in Part IV, infra). 
 
732 Luiz Cesar de Queiroz Ribeiro and Sol Garson Braule Pinto, Local Government and Metropolitan 
Regions in Federal Systems: A Global Design on Federalism, Vol. 6, ed. Nico Steytler (Montreal: McGill-
Queen’s University Press, 2006), at 75. 
 
733 In Brazil, there is no distinction between corporate and unincorporated land. Every land must belong to 
a municipality, which is the only designation for local government. Therefore, it is noteworthy that there 
are no townships, counties, nor boroughs in the sense of the U.S. denominations for local governments of 
general purpose. We shall develop this further, when we establish the general assumptions for our 
comparison, at Part III of this chapter. 
 
734 Article 18 of the Republican Constitution: The political and administrative organization of the 
Federative Republic of Brazil comprises the Union, the states, the Federal District and the municipalities, 
all of them autonomous, as this Constitution provides. 
 
735 The creation of those regions used to be authorized by federal law instead of state law, before the 
Constitution of 1988, as notes: Souza, Brazil: The Prospects of a Center-Constraining Federation in a 
Fragmented Polity, at 34.  
 
736 Article 23, paragraph three, of the Constitution of 1988: “The states may, by means of a state 
complementary law, establish metropolitan regions, urban agglomerations and micro regions, formed by 
the grouping of adjacent municipalities, in order to integrate the organization, the planning and the 
operation of public functions of common interest.” This provision has not been modified by constitutional 
amendments. 
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 In Brazil, all the electors of the involved municipalities must approve every 
boundary change affecting their municipalities through a previous plebiscite. Hence, 
involuntary annexation is not authorized by the Constitution. The process of boundary 
change can only be initiated if previous approval in a plebiscite consulting the population 
involved exists, and as long as there is a study of municipal assessment of the boundary 
modifications.737          
 The constitutional text also determines the fulfillment of those same procedural 
requirements for all forms of boundary changes – i.e., regardless if those changes occur 
in the context of establishment, merger, fusion, or dismemberment (annexation) of 
municipalities. For plebiscites concerning the changes of municipal boundaries, the state 
legislative chamber should organize it, and voting must take place in accordance with 
federal and state laws.738 Importantly, annexation of municipalities in Brazil was not 
marked by the exclusion of particular citizens, as it occurred in the U.S. experience.739 
The Constitutional Amendment 15, of 1996, modified the provisions concerning 
the changes pertaining to municipal boundaries. The main reasons mentioned in the 
proposal for the Constitutional Amendment 15 in the House of Representatives was the 
vast number of small municipalities 740  that were created or annexed without any 
                                                        
737 Article 18, paragraph four of the Constitution of 1988: The establishment, merger, fusion and 
dismemberment (annexation) of municipalities shall be effected through state law, within the period set 
forth by complementary federal law, and shall depend on prior consultation, by means of a plebiscite of the 
population of the municipalities concerned, after the publication of Municipal feasibility studies, presented 
and published as set forth by law.  
 
738 That is the specific content of article five of the federal law 9,709, of November 18 of 1998.  
 
739 In this direction: Samuels, Reinventing Local Government? Municipalities and Intergovernmental 
Relations in Democratic Brazil, at 98. 
 
740 Small municipality is defined as having less than ten thousand inhabitants. Noting that between the 1988 
and 2000, seventy four percent of municipalities created in Brazil were small municipalities:  Fabricio 
Ricardo de Limas Tomio, “The Creation of Municipalities After the 1988 Constitution,” Revista Brasileira 
de Ciências Sociais 17 (2002): 61–89, at 63–65, specifically. Commenting that during the democratic 
period after the Constitution of 1946 there has also been a significant increase in the number of 
municipalities due to politicians’ interests in increasing their influence in public contracts and government 
jobs: Samuels, Reinventing Local Government? Municipalities and Intergovernmental Relations in 
Democratic Brazil, at 93. 
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necessity,741 merely to earn federal assistance funds while also creating new political 
jobs.742 
Among the principal changes implemented by the Amendment 15 was the 
inclusion of previous municipal studies (assessments) considering the feasibility of 
boundary alterations. Another main modification referred to the nature of the 
complementary law whose compliance is mandatory by the modifying municipality. 
Originally, state complementary law was the only legislative act setting the requirements 
for those municipal changes. After the amendment, however, a federal complementary 
law defines those matters.743 At the end of 1996, President Fernando Henrique Cardoso 
successfully passed his fiscal policy law744 as part of an effort to transfer health care, 
housing, and social policies to subnational unities.745 The decentralization process has 
been perceived with mixed outcomes, with electoral competition at the local level being 
linked to a significant increase “in patronage and public sector payrolls at the expense of 
public goods.”746 
By 2007, Congress had not yet approved the federal complementary law that was 
demanded by the amended constitutional text. This complementary law must set the 
general determinations concerning the establishment, merger, fusion, and 
                                                        
741 The creation of municipalities was rampant. For example: Tocantins, a small state located in the North 
region of Brazil and created with the Constitution of 1988, has currently 139 municipalities. Data available 
at: http://www12.senado.gov.br/noticias/entenda-o-assunto/municipios-brasileiros 
 
742 The official motivation for the modification justified in the proposal for Amendment of the Constitution 
numbered 41, of 1991, that became later the Constitutional Amendment 15 of 1996, addressed the so-called 
abuse in creation and annexation of small municipalities: http://www.camara.gov.br/proposicoesWeb/ 
fichadetramitacao?idProposicao=24965 
 
743 The original text of article 18, paragraph four, stated the following: The establishment, merger, fusion 
and dismemberment (annexation) of municipalities shall preserve the continuity and the historical and 
cultural unity of the urban environment and shall occur through state law, in accordance with the 
requirements set forth by complementary state law, and upon previous manifestation of the population 
directly interested by plebiscite. For the current constitutional text: see footnote 737, supra. 
 
744 The so-called Kandir Law, the Complementary Law 87/96, removed ICMS (state tax levied based on 
exports, aiming to foster Brazilian trade, by reducing deficit). The fiscal reform would be further developed 
with the Complementary Law 101/2000, which imposed limits to debts of states and local governments. 
 
745 Alfred P. Montero, “Devolving Democracy? Political Decentralization and the New Federalism in 
Brazil,” in Democratic Brazil, ed. Peter R. Kingstone and Timothy J. Power (Pittsburg: University of 
Pittsburg Press, 2000), at 70. 
 
746 Eaton, Decentralization and Federalism, at 41. 
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dismemberment (annexation) of municipalities. During the congressional inertia after 
1996, several municipalities were created, annexed, merged – all during the absence of 
the necessary law that was supposed to define the rules for those procedures of boundary 
changes. In light of the extended inaction of the legislative branch, the STF determined 
that the non-edition of the federal complementary law in a reasonable time was a 
violation of the constitutional order.747  
The vast majority of decisions of the STF analyzed in our research refers to the 
evolution and further modification of the understanding of the STF. The Court has 
traditionally ruled that once the legislative process is started – i.e., once a bill of law is 
proposed in one of the houses –, there was no inertia to be attributed to the legislative 
branch.748 More than ten years have lapsed without the promulgation of the federal 
complementary law.749 There were decisions in which the STF determined that Congress 
had eighteen months, although other decisions established twenty-four months, to 
approve the federal complementary law mentioned in article 18, paragraph 4, of the 
Constitution.750 It is noteworthy that, according to our research in the official database of 
the federal executive office, the federal complementary law has not been approved yet.751 
                                                        
747 The leading case is the Direct Action of Unconstitutionality Number 3682, of May 05, 2007, when the 
STF considered that after eleven years after the Constitutional Amendment 15, of 1996, it was 
unreasonable for Congress to not have promulgated the federal complementary law, despite several 
legislative proposals. Neither the House nor the Senate actually discussed (let alone voted) the federal 
complementary law, as emphasized by: Gilmar Ferreira Mendes and Paulo Gustavo Gonet Branco, Curso 
de Direito Constitucional (São Paulo: Saraiva, 2013), at 1160. 
 
748 Idem, at 1159. 
 
749 In this sense, Justice Gilmar Mendes clarified that the inertia deliberandi, the absence of discussion and 
voting, was an omission capable of unconstitutionality attributable to the inaction of the legislative branch: 
Mendes and Branco, Curso de Direito Constitucional, at 1160. 
 
750 Noting that the STF declared the unconstitutionality without nullity of the municipalities created during 
the lapse between the Constitutional Amendment 15 of 1996 and the inaction of Congress for the first time 
in May, 2007: Alexandre de Moraes, Direito Constitucional (São Paulo: Atlas, 2012), at 312, where the 
Professor points to the discrepancies of the time granted to Congress to promulgate the federal 
complementary law. Justice Gilmar Mendes also notes those time discrepancies: Mendes and Branco, 
Curso de Direito Constitucional, at 1164–1165.  
 
751 As of January 10, 2015, there was no federal complementary law edited in compliance with article 18, 
paragraph four, of the Constitution of 1988, according to the official database of the Presidency, containing 
the totality of Brazilian legislation: http://www4.planalto.gov.br/legislacao/legislacao-1/leis-
complementares-1#content 
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Paradoxically, Congress opted for not approving the federal complementary 
law752 determined in the new wording of article 18, paragraph four, of the Constitution, 
but passed a Constitutional Amendment to the Transitory Dispositions of the 
Constitution, in 2008, determining that all the municipalities whose boundaries were 
changed by state laws published until December 31, 2006, and provided that those 
changes occurred in accordance with the then valid state complementary law at the time 
are deemed as being legal.753 
Recently the House and Senate approved a project of complementary law about 
boundary changes. Among the advantages of the modification procedures of local 
boundaries of municipalities whose rules were approved by the Senate in August 2014, 
after extensive negotiations with the federal government, the Senate mentions: reducing 
regional inequalities, greater presence of government, and growth in employment 
generation.754 The substitute to Senate Bill (PLS) 104/2014 establishes criteria for 
financial viability, minimum population (6,000 inhabitants in the North and Midwest,  
12,000 in the Northeast, and 20,000 in the South and Southeast regions), rules for 
submitting the proposal to the state assemblies, and for consulting the people through 
referendum. Furthermore, it requires territory with minimum area of 200 square 
kilometers in the North and Midwest, and 100 square kilometers in the other regions 
(South, South East, and Midwest). The bill prohibits the creation, merger, annexation, or 
split, if this jeopardizes existing municipalities. Despite criticism from some quarters that 
new cities (and new boundaries generally) mean more public spending, the bill passed 
with fifty-two votes in favor and only four against it. 
                                                        
752 The Constitution determines that the quorum for approval of complementary laws is of absolute 
majority, in its article 69. Absolute majority is considered as the first non fraction number above half of the 
total of deputies and, in practice, it means that two hundred and fifty seven deputies must approve the 
project of federal complementary law. The quorum for Constitutional Amendments requires three fifth 
approvals in both Houses, as determined in article 60, paragraph second. 
 
753  Article 96 of the Act of Transitory Constitutional Dispositions, included by the Constitutional 
Amendment 57, of 2008, determines: “Hereby are validated the acts of establishment, merger, fusion and 
dismemberment of municipalities whose law has been published until December 31, 2006, in accordance 
with the requirements under the state legislation at the time of its establishment.” 
 
754 For the official view of the Senate and access to the text of the proposal, we used the text available at: 
http://legis.senado.leg.br/sicon/#/pesquisa/lista/documentos 
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The project (bill) of complementary law regarding municipal boundaries that has 
been approved by the Congress was vetoed in its entirety by the current President Dilma 
Rousseff. She argued that the project was against public interest because it authorized 
change in boundaries and the expenses that accompanied it without parallel increase in 
revenues.755 The President has already vetoed a previous project of complementary law in 
2013 in its entirety.756 It is worth mentioning that the most recent project had more 
demanding requirements for boundary changes. Authoritative press has contended that 
the actual political reason for the presidential veto was the 2014 elections (and the 
support that the President anticipates in a run off).757 The mayor lobby ultimately made 
the President veto a bill that her own government has helped draft.758 
We turn next to investigate the decisions of the STF concerning the 
constitutionality of annexation cases. 
 
B.  The Analysis of the STF Decisions  
This research was conducted using the STF website.759 It is limited to the 
decisions that occurred during the Constitution of 1988 – thus after October of 1988 until 
February of 2014.760 The reasons for choosing this time period are threefold. First, the 
                                                        
755 The presidential reasons for the veto cited the technical opinion of the Finance Minister, which stated 
that the fiscal deficit problem concerning boundary changes remained detrimental to the country. See: 
http://www.planalto.gov.br/CCIVIL_03/_Ato2011-2014/2014/Msg/Vet/VET-250.htm 
 
756 In addition, a similar project containing less demanding requirements for boundary changes, according 
to the Finance Minister’s technical opinion, had already been subject to a total veto based on public 
interest, in November 2013: http://www.planalto.gov.br/CCIVIL_03/_Ato2011-2014/2013/Msg/Vet/VET-
505.htm 
 
757 For authoritative press, see, for example: Folha de São Paulo, version online of August, the twenty 
seventh of 2014, available at: http://www1.folha.uol.com.br/poder/2014/08/1506722-dilma-veta-criacao-
de-novos-municipios-e-abre-crise-com-congresso.shtml 
 
758 Idem. 
 
759 We used the search mechanism of case law (“jurisprudência,” in Portuguese), which is available at: 
http://www.stf.jus.br/portal/jurisprudencia/pesquisarJurisprudencia.asp 
 
760 Table 5.2 contains the final decisions of the STF. We ran four searches. The first one considered as 
criteria the following words: “município,” “incorporação,” and “inconstitucionalidade;” the second search 
altered the last word to “constitucionalidade.” The third search used as key words: “município,” 
“anexação,” and “inconstitucionalidade;” whereas our final search implemented the same modification of 
the second one by altering the last word for “constitucionalidade.” It is worth reiterating that we did so as a 
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Constitution of 1988 modernized the Brazilian tradition, as previously mentioned, by 
elevating municipalities to the status of federal actors (with states and the federal union). 
Second, the Constitution of 1988 technically ended the transition phase from the end of 
the military rule (1985) to democracy. Third, new constitutions are most susceptible to 
risk of replacement within their first nineteen years, so our study covers longer than such 
critical period.761 
It is worth noting that the U.S. concept of annexation is equivalent, in effect, to 
the concept of “dismemberment through annexation” in the Brazilian constitutional text. 
According to such Brazilian modality, both municipalities remain in existence. 762 
Establishment, merger, fusion, and dismemberment of municipalities appeared together 
in the search mechanisms of the STF, due to the writing of the constitutional provisions 
and the less technical terminology used by litigants.763 
With regard to the composition of lawsuits in our dataset,764 only direct actions of 
unconstitutionality (Adins) are included because annexation is a matter of state law, and 
it is only litigated in the STF if the claim arises out of arguable offenses to the federal 
Constitution. The STF, in Adins, has to pronounce the unconstitutionality of the norm in 
abstract as opposed to the concrete cases of U.S. review765 – and their related requirement 
                                                                                                                                                                     
cautionary design, because annexation appears coupled with incorporation in the search tools of the website 
of the STF. We solely researched the decisions of the plenary, namely, the Court en banc. No singular or 
panel decisions were considered, because only the Court en banc has jurisdiction to decide a unique and 
novel constitutional question or to departure from previous orientation.  
 
761  Zachary Elkins, Tom Ginsburg and James Melton, The Endurance of National Constitutions 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009), at 129–130, noting that even after the first nineteen years, 
constitutions remain threaten, albeit in a reduced rate. 
 
762 For a detailed analysis of the definitions of fusions and dismemberment in the context of state law: 
Moraes, Direito Constitucional, at 308–310. 
 
763  Annexation (“anexação”, in Portuguese) exists in the Constitution, among the hypothesis of 
dismemberment. The cases of our search cites all the terms referring to boundary changes, i.e., 
establishment, merger, fusion, and dismemberment of municipalities because the STF uses the 
constitutional provision of article 18, paragraph four, for purposes of indexation of search tools in its 
website. As emphasized earlier, we also researched for the word annexation (“anexação”) itself. After the 
appropriate exclusions (mainly referring to annexation and incorporation in the context of commercial law), 
this research analyzed sixteen decisions, which are detailed in Table 5.2. 
 
764 See Chart 5.2, which illustrates the lawsuits over time. 
 
765 For the precise discussion about the concept of abstract review and concrete review in Brazil: see 
chapter three of this thesis.  
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of existing case or controversy for standing. The fact that the STF decided the cases in 
Adin does not impact the jurisdiction of the Court, which is similar to the USSC in 
matters of annexation. Our dataset shows that the STF was not called to decide cases 
involving fundamental rights. The issues at bar relate to the application (including 
clarification) about the objective constitutional requirements to the Brazilian annexation. 
The regions that presented the highest number of lawsuits were the Northeast (mainly 
because of Bahía) and the Center West (Mato Grosso).766 
Concerning the dynamics of the federative pact, we note that the vast majority of 
the Adins were started either by the Attorney General of the Republic767 or by national 
parties.768 Only one Adin was filed by direct board of a legislative assembly of a state.769 
Hence, the litigation became a national one, no longer being possible to remain restricted 
to the local level. 
At this point, our focus is the discussion of the STF decisions. The Court has 
denied to rule on the constitutionality of a resolution of state assembly of the state of Rio 
de Janeiro770 specifying that for the annexation of municipality the previous plebiscite 
must occur in accordance with the federal Constitution, while declaring that the 
municipality was also a creature of the member state. 
After the Constitutional Amendment 15, of 1996, the STF determined, in an 
action of abstract control started against the state Assembly of Rio Grande do Sul,771 that 
                                                        
766 Bahía is the third state in number of municipalities. Mato Grosso is within the national average. For data 
about each state, and the federal district: http://www12.senado.gov.br/noticias/entenda-o-
assunto/municipios-brasileiros 
 
767 The Attorney General of the Republic filed the following ten Adins: ADI 1372 MC/RJ; ADI 1373 
MC/PR; ADI 2702/PA; ADI 2632/BA; ADI2994/BA; ADI 3149/SC; ADI 3489/SC; ADI 3316/MT; ADI 
3682/MT; and ADI 4992 MC/RO. 
 
768 Political parties started five Adins: ADI 2381MC/RS; ADI 2632MC/BA; ADI 3615/PB; ADI 2240/BA; 
ADI 3689/PA. 
 
769 ADI 2395 /DF. 
 
770 ADI 1372 MC/RJ, of 1995. Also determining that the plebiscite must occur before the changes in the 
municipal boundaries: ADI 1373 MC/PR, of 1995.  Attention should be paid to the fact that those decisions 
have occurred before the Constitutional Amendment 15, of 1996, although the necessity of previous 
plebiscite has been maintained by the amended text.  
 
771 ADI 2381 MC/RS, of 2001. 
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all the procedures referring to the establishment, merger, fusion, and dismemberment 
(thus, annexation) must be suspended until the federal complementary law was approved.  
The Court also distinguished the role of municipality as autonomous under article 
18 of the Constitution of 1988. In this decision, the STF stressed that municipalities could 
no longer be matters of the private interest of the state, as in previous constitutions of the 
first Republic. The STF also dismissed allegations attacking the constitutionality of the 
Constitutional Amendment 15. Those allegations were based in an arguable violation of 
the federative pact – in which protection is granted among the immutable clauses of the 
Constitution (article 60, paragraph 4, I).772  The STF decided that the amendment 15/96 
did not violate the essential nucleus of the autonomy of the member states when the 
amendment modified from state complementary law to federal law. 
 Several later decisions conditioned the modifications of municipal boundaries to 
the promulgation of the federal complementary law and the previous approval by 
plebiscite of the involved population.773 There have been decisions explicitly mentioning 
that the popular vote without the occurrence of plebiscite was a direct violation of the 
constitutional text.774 
 The change of paradigm in the understanding by the STF occurred in 2007, when 
the Court judged several direct actions of unconstitutionality on the same date, despite 
                                                        
772 In this direction: ADI 2381 MC/RS, of 2001; ADI 2395/DF, of 2007. 
 
773 In this sense: ADI 2632 MC/BA, of 2002 (in limine, i.e., by preliminary injunction); ADI 2702/PR, of 
2003; ADI 2632/BA, of 2004 (final decision); ADI 2994/BA, of 2004. Along those lines, but in the specific 
context of annexation of small municipalities: ADI 3149/SC, of 2004. 
 
774 ADI 3615/PB, of 2006. 
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those actions presented different justices as rapporteurs (reporters).775  Importantly, 
further decisions reiterated the new position of the Court.776  
 The most recent decisions of the STF still deny annexation of municipalities when 
based on state laws, if those boundary changes were enacted after the Constitutional 
Amendment 57, of 2008. The Court stressed that the Constitutional Amendment 57, 
which modified the Act of Transitory Dispositions of the Constitution, validated solely 
the boundary changes enacted by municipalities between the Constitutional Amendment  
15, of 1996, and December of 2006.777 Accordingly, the Court has interpreted the 
modification of the Transitory Acts quite literally, and as restrictively as possible in order 
to protect the constitutional order as a whole.  
 
III. LIMITING THE DEFINITION OF LOCAL GOVERNMENTS IN THE U.S. EXPERIENCE IN 
ORDER TO ENABLE OUR COMPARISON 
The U.S. federalism has two actors: states and the federal Union, with the U.S. 
Constitution being silent about local governments. 778  Local government entities – 
regardless of their denomination, which varies across the country from boroughs, 
counties, townships, and municipalities – are created by their states.779 Those entities 
                                                        
775 ADI 2240/BA, of May, 5th, 2007, whose rapporteur was Justice Eros Grau, granted twenty-four months 
for the Congress to legislate. ADI 3489/SC was also judged on the same day and with the same rapporteur, 
but determined eighteen months for Congress to act. All the decisions were unanimous as far as the 
unconstitutionality goes, although decided by majority as to the unconstitutionality of the boundaries 
change. This was so, because there was no federal complementary law due to the unconstitutional inaction 
of the legislative. Another case decided in the same date and with Justice Eros Grau as rapporteur, but 
establishing eighteen months: ADI 3316/MT. In the direct action of unconstitutionality by omission, ADI 
3682/ MT, from the same date, but having as rapporteur Justice Gilmar Mendes, it was emphasized that the 
inaction of Congress was unconstitutional and that the twenty four months deadline did not refer to 
Congress to act, but solely to the state laws altering the boundaries of the municipalities to remain valid. 
776 ADI 3689/PA, of 2007. 
 
777 ADI 4992 MC/RO, of 2013.  
 
778 In this sense: Briffault and Reynolds, Cases and Materials on State and Local Government Law, at 8. 
 
779 Tocqueville noted, in 1835, the distinguished denominations of local governments, although he 
emphasized the following: “ (…) the organization of towns and counties in the United States is everywhere 
based on the same idea, namely, that each is the best judge of what pertains only to itself and best equipped 
to provide for its own particular needs. Town and counties are therefore responsible for looking after their 
own special interests.” in Alexis de Tocqueville, Democracy in America, translated by Arthur Goldhammer 
(New York: The Library of America, 2004), at 91–92. 
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exist to execute state functions on the local level, being subject to control from the local 
population as well as to the state control – hence the so-called top-down and bottom-up 
aspects.780 Nevertheless, U.S. local governments engage in public services that in Brazil 
would be exclusive of a member of the federation – as judicial functions exercised by 
county courts, for instance. There is no municipal county or local judiciary in Brazil. It is 
worth reiterating that in Brazil local governments only have one form: municipalities. 
 Another relevant distinction between the two countries is the existence of special 
purpose local governments in the United States. Counties, municipalities, and towns are 
considered to be of general purpose because those local government unities provide 
services and regulations in a broad scope, including: safety, health, land use, transit and 
transportation, among others.781 Special purpose local governments,782 by contrast, are 
responsible for one or a few very limited functions – the most current example of special 
purpose being the school district.783 Special districts may be of multiple functions, as it is 
the case with special districts involved in sewerage, water supply, and natural 
resources.784 It has been argued that special districts lack accountability, if general-
purpose entities, such as counties and municipalities, are used as a parameter, because 
special districts are often governed by boards that may not be completely impartial.785 
Notwithstanding the criticisms, special districts remain public in their nature, as 
opposed to homeowners’ associations in gated communities that deliver services from a 
private perspective.786 Due to the increasing number of residents opting for subdivisions 
                                                        
780 Briffault and Reynolds, Cases and Materials on State and Local Government Law, at 9. 
 
781 Idem, at 11. 
 
782 This study shall not discuss decisions arising out of litigation concerning special districts, since they do 
not exist in similar fashion in Brazil. 
 
783 Briffault and Reynolds, Cases and Materials on State and Local Government Law, at 13, where the 
Professors stated that special districts became the most common species of local government currently in 
the United States.  
 
784 Idem. 
 
785 Wegner, North Carolina Annexation W ars: W hys, W herefores, and W hat Next, at 186. The Professor 
states that special district board members are either appointed by governmental or other constituent entities, 
or elected from stakeholders with associated interests – as, for example, property owners or benefited 
parties. 
 
786 Idem, at 187. 
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located outside the boundaries of municipalities, those communities have to rely on 
contracts with private providers for essential services, such as water, sewer, solid waste 
removal, and security – but the nature of those contracts remains private.787 Along the 
exclusions of special districts and homeowners’ associations, this research also disregards 
agreements between municipalities and private parties in the context of the annexation 
agreements because they are not present in all the states in the United States.788 A related 
reason for this exclusion is the fact that such annexation agreements are not authorized in 
Brazil.789 
Every land in the United States belongs to some multipurpose local government, 
which usually is the county,790 although some states use boroughs or townships.791 
County governments include incorporated and unincorporated lands. 792  Counties 
commonly have two main functions: running of countywide services to all residents (e.g., 
judicial and penal systems) and delivery of general services related to government 
                                                        
787 Idem, at 188. 
 
788 For a review of annexation agreements – including states where they are treated as development 
agreements, allowing zoning – see, e.g.: Wegner, North Carolina Annexation W ars: W hys, W herefores, 
and W hat Next, at 245–247.  
 
789 It is noteworthy that the Brazilian Constitution of 1988 admits agreements between municipalities, 
provided they have common public functions, as stated in article 25, paragraph third, supra. For reference 
about North Carolina’s municipalities agreements: Wegner, North Carolina Annexation W ars: W hys, 
W herefores, and W hat Next, at 245. 
 
790 Anderson, Cities Inside Out: Race, Poverty, and Exclusion at the Urban Fringe, at 1103–1104. In 
addition, the Professor distinguishes the existence of the following: consolidated city county governments 
(as, for instance, San Francisco, Denver, and Honolulu); “independent” cities, which are the exception, i.e., 
cities which are not included within a county’s territory (as occur, for example, in Baltimore City, St. Louis 
City, and thirty-nine cities in Virginia); areas where one or more county government has been subsumed 
within a city government and all land is incorporated in that city (as it is the case in New York City, 
Jacksonville, and Indianapolis); and states with county nomenclature, although all territory lies within a 
municipality, without actual unit of county government (Rhode Island, Connecticut, and the majority of 
Massachusetts). 
 
791 For the concepts of county, townships and boroughs, reference is made to: Briffault and Reynolds, 
Cases and Materials on State and Local Government Law, at 9–12. 
 
792 Tyson, Annexation and the Mid-Size Metropolis: New Insights in the Age of Mobile Capital, at 513, 
where the Professor notes that: “… Throughout New England, New York, New Jersey and Pennsylvania, 
all territory is divided among a myriad of cities, villages, boroughs, towns or townships, and there is no 
unincorporated land.”  
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function (e.g., police, road maintenance).793 Hence, counties exist as creatures of the 
state, to serve state administrative purposes and are not the result of local decisions, as it 
is the case with decisions concerning the creation of a new municipality.794 Counties are 
legally responsible for the initial land-use approvals as well as for services of 
unincorporated areas.795 In this sense, municipal underbounding – annexation policies 
and practices designed by growing municipalities aiming to exclude low-income minority 
communities of city voting rights and municipal services – and general formulations of 
municipal exclusion are explanations that disregard the role played by counties in 
contributing to such exclusions.796 
Attention should be paid to the fact that the United States has unincorporated 
land, i.e., land that is not located within the boundaries of a municipality. 797 Brazil, on 
the contrary, does not feature similar distinction between the levels of autonomy and 
range of powers as the one that exists in the United States among counties, boroughs, or 
townships. Remarkably, in Brazil, every parcel of land must be located in a municipality. 
Another pertinent distinction refers to the creation of municipalities. The question 
of necessity in creating a municipality is distinguished from the requirements of Brazilian 
Constitution because, in Brazil, all municipalities have to be created in accordance with 
the general requisites stated in the Constitution.798 In the United States, however, thirty-
                                                        
793 Reynolds, Rethinking Municipal Annexation Powers, at 255. The Professor notices, at 258, the tendency 
of counties across the nation to provide general municipal services to unincorporated despite urbanized 
area, and, as a consequence, county governments became engaged in activities that traditionally belonged 
to the cities. 
 
794 Wegner, North Carolina Annexation W ars: W hys, W herefores, and W hat Next, at 178. The author, at 
179, observes that responsibilities and powers of counties vary across the United States. 
 
795 Anderson, Cities Inside Out: Race, Poverty, and Exclusion at the Urban Fringe, at 1114, where the 
author stresses that the legal responsibility involved – including but not limited to the eligibility and 
desirability for annexation – belongs to counties not to municipalities. 
 
796 For the concept of municipal underbounding: Anderson, Cities Inside Out: Race, Poverty, and Exclusion 
at the Urban Fringe, at 1113; and Anderson, Mapped out of local Democracy, at 938. For the role played by 
counties in the exclusion of low-income citizens: Anderson, Cities Inside Out: Race, Poverty, and 
Exclusion at the Urban Fringe, at 1113–1114. 
 
797 For criticisms about the unincorporated areas and how historically the federal and state governments 
legitimized racially, national origin, and class related discrimination: Anderson, Cities Inside Out: Race, 
Poverty, and Exclusion at the Urban Fringe, at 1125–1133, in particular. 
 
798 Article 18 of the Brazilian Constitution, cited supra, regulates those maters. 
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six state statutes required a minimum population threshold in order to justify a new local 
government.799 Importantly, the creation of a local government in the United States 
occurs where none existed before, and thus usually implicates the increase in taxation and 
regulation – both of which are far reduced in comparison with counties.800 Frequently, 
governments of unincorporated areas do not provide public services of the same level of 
quality as those available in a municipality.801 In addition, it is not evident whether the 
existence of a second tier of local government in the United States – namely, the 
existence of municipalities – is an actual advantage in upper-class areas.802 On the other 
hand, in low-income communities, potential advantages of nonincorporation would not 
attach.803 
In the United States, annexation varies across the states,804 with these changes of 
boundaries being rare in some, while very common in others.805 It has also been argued 
that race and class biases are present in annexation, reflecting seminal conflicts relating to 
property rights and redistribution.806 In this sense, the boundaries of a municipality have a 
remarkable exclusionary function, which determines who is entitled to participate in the 
redistribution of the resources of a given community and, by doing so, political discourse 
                                                        
799 According to the data measured until 1990 and published on pages 22–23 of the report of the Advisory 
Commission on Intergovernmental Relations: State laws governing local government structure and 
administration, supra. 
 
800 Briffault and Reynolds, Cases and Materials on State and Local Government Law, at 197, where the 
Professors note that decisions about taxes and regulations tend to be made by majority rule, and that those 
decisions may ultimately burden minorities. 
 
801 Reynolds, Rethinking Municipal Annexation Powers, at 251. 
 
802 Anderson, Cities Inside Out: Race, Poverty, and Exclusion at the Urban Fringe, at 1143–1144. 
According to this line of reasoning: municipalities would charge higher property taxes and impose less 
regulations – both being among the advantages for affluent citizens to prefer unincorporated areas, where 
they can purchase the services they prefer and not pay for services that they will not use. 
 
803 Idem, at 1145, arguing that this would be the case in unincorporated areas that are not assisted by basic 
public services as well as in those areas suffering because of damaged land or non-authorized land used. 
 
804 As stated by Zeinemann, Overlooked Linkages Between Municipal Incorporation and Annexation Laws, 
at 311, where the author emphasizes that annexation has been used strategically: “ … as tools to strive for 
or protect territory and tax base.”   
 
805 Idem, at 258–259. 
 
806 Tyson, Annexation and the Mid-Size Metropolis: New Insights in the Age of Mobile Capital, at 519. 
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mistakenly starts to address notions of private property rights through modifications of 
city boundaries.807 The core of the USSC decisions referring to annexation address 
questions related to such exclusion. 
In Brazil, the main topics litigated in the STF are of a formalistic and procedural 
nature. Brazil has experienced fierce litigation regarding annexation, due to lack of the 
federal complementary law that was supposed to regulate such matters (annexation and 
creation of municipalities). 
Finally, we clarify some relevant features concerning the jurisdiction of both 
courts. The mechanism of appointments for the STF was transplanted from the U.S. 
Constitution in 1891. While the STF has eleven justices who are subject to mandatory 
retirement at the age of seventy years old, the remaining provisions are similar to the U.S. 
Constitution. In particular, justices are nominated by the President and subject to 
confirmation by the Senate. 808  Both Courts are independent and have the same 
jurisdiction with regard to annexation because in Brazil809 and in the United States such 
subject matter is generally dealt with at the state level, and the Courts have jurisdiction 
only if specific violations to the federal Constitution occur.810 
 
IV. DISCUSSION ABOUT OUR RESEARCH FINDINGS 
This Part is divided in two sections. Section A addresses the comparison of the 
decisions of both supreme courts based on constitutional design. Section B focuses on the 
general analysis of the comparison, including fundamental rights, and related 
consequences. 
 
                                                        
807 Idem. 
 
808 For a comparison about the mechanisms of access to both Courts: Maria Angela Jardim de Santa Cruz 
Oliveira and Nuno Garoupa, “Choosing Judges in Brazil: Reassessing Legal Transplants from the United 
States,” American Journal of Comparative Law 59 (2011): 529–561. 
 
809 Even in light of the constitutional amendments that occurred in Brazil in 1996 and 2008 (see supra, Part 
II, A), the annexation of municipality occurs in the field of state law – albeit obedient to general guidance 
that will be determined in a federal complementary law, one which does not exist yet. 
 
810 We refer to independence in the sense that there is no external and direct interference with each 
Supreme Court’s final decision in a given case, generally. 
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A.  Insights Based on Constitutional Design 
Since its inception in the U.S. constitutional scheme, federalism has been a 
complex concept.811 Federalism and judicial review are often named along the structural 
provisions of the U.S. Constitution that have been very influential abroad.812 This 
research considers the different federal experiences of the United States and Brazil, being 
mindful of the traditional resistance of the USSC to comparative law insights.813 
Federalism itself has been associated to the success of the U.S. Constitutionalism.814 
Federalism is traditionally defined as an arrangement in which a written 
constitution expressly determines powers of the central as well as regional spheres of 
                                                        
811 The following has been remarked about the U.S. federalism: “Law and legal institutions, as conceived 
by the Revolutionary generation, were aids in the process of balancing the virtues and excesses of the 
sovereign people against the virtues and excesses of their government. A first premise of the Founding 
Fathers, including Marshall, was that the sovereign people were not above the laws, although they have the 
power to change them. Marshall and his contemporaries to operationalizing this principle in the form of a 
national government devoted considerable time and thought. Their solution was the creation of a series of 
balanced but often ambiguous power relations between the branches of the government and between those 
branches and their sovereign constituency. The term federalism has been characteristically used to describe 
this solution, but the term has difficulties.” Reference is made to: G. Edward White, The American Judicial 
Tradition (New York: Oxford University Press, 2006), at 19. Accordingly, federalism itself is not separated 
from the system of checks and balances among coordinate branches and the dual spheres of power, with 
judicial review being inherent to the constitutional system. 
 
812 David S. Law and Mila Versteeg, “The Declining Influence of the United States Constitution,” New 
Y ork University Law Review 87 (2012): 762–858, at 785, where the authors note that the influence of the 
United States structural Constitution (provisions encompassing federalism, presidentialism and judicial 
review in its concrete form) are in decline. Noting the preponderance of the centralized system of review 
(continental) – as opposed to the U.S. decentralized model: Tom Ginsburg, “Economic Analysis and the 
Design of Constitutional Courts,” Theoretical Inquiries at Law 3 (2002): 49–85, at 57. 
 
813 For an overview of the different instances when the USSC has considered Comparative Constitutional 
Law: Mark Tushnet, “The Possibilities of Comparative Constitutional Law,” Y ale Law Journal 108 (1999): 
1225–1309, at 1230–1238, specifically. At 1231, the Professor notes how comparative law arguments 
grounded on the denial of the capital punishment in the developed world have been dismissed by the Court, 
based on the understanding that the U.S. conceptions shall be dispositive when judging a case. 
Emphasizing this interpretation as among the factors that have been reducing the influence of the U.S. 
Constitutionalism internationally: Law and Versteeg, The Declining Influence of the United States 
Constitution, at 852. 
 
814 Keith S. Rosenn, “The Success of Constitutionalism in the United States and its failure in Latin 
America: An explanation,” University of Miami Inter-American Law Review 22, N.1 (1990): 1–50, at 9–
20. The author stresses that federalism, among other constitutional features (such as separation of powers 
and a system of check and balances that does not allow the preponderance of any branch), was key to the 
success of the American experience. He contends that one of the failures of Latin America 
Constitutionalism is the transplant of constitutional provisions without considering the particular realities of 
the country that is importing them. 
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governments, with direct elections for national and regional governments, with the 
distinguished spheres of government being able to act independently from each other, and 
a high court being independent to decide conflicts among them.815   
 Federalism is, therefore, a response to concrete political tensions. It is often 
addressed among the constitutional design choices that impact power sharing – namely, 
the participation of representatives of the totality of the relevant groups of society in 
political decision making.816 With regard to the choice of a federal constitutional scheme, 
it has been remarked that: 
Generally, it is advisable that the federation be relatively 
decentralized and that its component units (states or provinces) be 
relatively small – both to increase the prospects that each unit will 
be relatively homogenous and to avoid dominance by large states 
on the federal level. Beyond this, a great many decisions need to be 
made regarding details that will vary from country to country (such 
as exactly where the state boundaries should be drawn). Experts 
have no clear advice to offer on how much decentralization is 
desirable within the federation and there is no consensus among 
them as to whether the American, Canadian, Indian, Australian, 
German, Swiss, or Austrian model is most worthy of being 
emulated.817 
 
Part of the literature on constitutional design targets divided societies. Despite the 
political tensions that exist in Brazil and the United States, both countries are not 
considered divided societies.818 The precise concept of divided societies itself is disputed. 
Based on political and constitutional analysis, a divided society is one where ethnic, 
                                                        
815 For the specific definition of classical federalism: Choudhry and Hume, Federalism, Devolution and 
Secession: from classical to post-conflict federalism, at 357. The authors emphasize the small numbers of 
studies involving local governments: at 377 – see supra, in the Introduction of this chapter. 
 
816 The concept of power sharing is articulated by Arend Lijphart, “Constitutional Design for Divided 
Societies,” Journal of Democracy 15 (2004): 96–109, at 97. The Professor contends that the federal system 
is a recommended alternative for countries with cleavages: at 104. In the Brazilian case, due to the strong 
economical inequalities among states, federalism arguably would provide autonomy for different groups 
located across several regions. 
 
817 Lijphart, Constitutional Design for Divided Societies, at 105. 
 
818 Conceptualizing divided societies as those in which there are deep ethnic, religious or national 
cleavages: Katharine Belmont, Scott Mainwaring, and Andrew Reynolds, “Institutional Design, Conflict 
Management and Democracy,” in The Architecture of Democracy: Constitutional Design, Conflict 
Management and Democracy, ed. Andrew Reynolds (New York: Oxford University Press, 2002), at 3. 
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religious, or cultural cleavages have political impact.819 Because political conflicts in 
Brazil (nor in the United States) are not generally coincident with ethnocultural conflicts, 
this research does not consider those countries as divided societies. 
There have been limited attempts in the literature to “evaluate the success of the 
design choices made by different federations.” 820  This study aims to mitigate the 
parochialism in the current U.S. scholarship.821 Classical studies of federalism draw 
comparisons between countries of the developed world, such as Australia, Canada, 
Switzerland, and the United States.822 In this context, the comparison with Brazil brings a 
new perspective, because the Brazilian federalism has been classified as extreme, due to 
the many differences across the different states.823 
The role of the U.S Supreme Court being a safeguard of federalism has been 
recently questioned.824 Our research provides evidence of the U.S. Supreme Court 
                                                        
819 Choudhry, Bridging Comparative Politics and Comparative Constitutional Law, at 4. The Professor 
states, at 4–5: “As a category of political and constitutional analysis, a divided society is not merely a 
society which is ethnically, linguistically, religiously, or culturally diverse. Indeed, whether through 
conquest, colonization, slavery or immigration, it is hard to imagine a state today that is not diverse in one 
or more of these dimensions. The age of ethnoculturally homogenous state, if there ever was one, is long 
over. Rather, what marks a divided society is that these differences are politically salient – that is, they are 
persistent markers of political identity and bases for political mobilization. Ethnocultural diversity 
translates into political fragmentation. In a divided society, political claims are refracted through the lens of 
ethnic identity, and political conflict is synonymous with conflict among ethnocultural groups.” 
 
820 Choudhry and Hume, Federalism, Devolution and Secession: from classical to post-conflict federalism, 
at 359. 
 
821 For an empirical study finding evidence of U.S. parochialism with regard to federalism scholarship: 
Carol S. Weissert, “Beyond Marble Cakes and Picket Fences: What U.S. Federalism Scholars can Learn 
from Comparative Work,” The Journal of Politics 73 (2011): 965–979, at 967–968. Emphasizing, long ago, 
the necessity of further research about comparative constitutional law: Bruce Ackerman, “The Rise of the 
World Constitutionalism,” Virginia Law Review 83 (1997): 771–797, at 794. 
 
822 Choudhry and Hume, Federalism, Devolution and Secession: from classical to post-conflict federalism, 
at 356. 
 
823 Scott W. Desposato, “The Impact of Federalism on National Party Cohesion in Brazil,” Legislative 
Studies Quarterly 29 (2004): 259–285, at 262. 
 
824 Acknowledging the existence of the debate in the U.S. constitutional scheme, see, for instance: Weissert, 
Beyond Marble Cakes and Picket Fences: W hat U.S. Federalism Scholars can Learn from Comparative 
W ork, at 968.  
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playing the safeguard role in the context of annexation.825 The Brazilian Constitution 
explicitly determines that the STF has the duty to safeguard the Constitution,826 with 
federalism being listed among the constitutional immutable clauses.827 It is worth noting 
that the jurisdiction of the STF encompasses conflicts among the states and/or among 
states and the union, but not among municipalities.828 As addressed earlier, the USSC 
controls its own dockets, i.e., it choses what it hears and when. The STF, by contrast, has 
to judge all the cases that reach the Court. Nevertheless, because only the STF sitting as a 
Court en banc (not in panels and not in chambers of single justices) can change the case 
law or decide a new constitutional issue in a given claim, the lack of certiorari does not 
impact the STF’s jurisdiction in order to make it significantly different from the USSC 
with regard to the constitutionality of annexation cases.829 
The U.S. Constitution does not mention local governments, but they are perceived 
as the core of the U.S. citizenship.830 Such understanding has not been immune from 
controversy.831 The absence of constitutional provisions pertaining to local governments 
                                                        
825 It is noteworthy that the United States and Brazil are secular countries, so federalism is not expected to 
be used to override local religious manifestations, as it has happened in Malaysia and Nigeria, as mentioned 
by: Hirschl, The Theocratic Challenge to Constitution Drafting in Post-Conflict States, at 1209.   
 
826 Article 102 of the Brazilian Constitution of 1988 states that: The Supremo Tribunal Federal is 
responsible, essentially, for safeguarding the Constitution. 
 
827 Article 60, paragraph four of the Brazilian Constitution of 1988 declares that: no proposal of amendment 
shall be considered which is aimed at abolishing: I – the federative form of State. 
 
828 Article 102, f, of the Brazilian Constitution of 1988 determines that: f) disputes and conflicts between 
the Union and the states, the Union and the federal district, or between one another, including the 
respective indirect administration bodies. 
 
829 Reference here is made to Part III of this chapter, where we addressed the similar jurisdiction of both 
supreme courts in annexation matters. 
 
830 Tocqueville remarked, in 1835, how local government was key for the principle of popular sovereignty 
in America: Alexis de Tocqueville, Democracy in America, at 62–63, where the author notes: “ (…) From 
the beginning, the principle of sovereignty of the people was the fundamental principle of most of the 
English colonies in America. It was nevertheless far from dominating the government of society then as it 
does now. (…) It could not manifest itself openly in law, because the colonies were still constrained to 
obey the metropolis. It was therefore reduced to taking refuge in provincial assemblies and above all in 
town governments. There it spread in secret.” Further, at 69, Tocqueville contends: “ In the town as 
elsewhere the people are the source of all social power, but nowhere do they exercise their power more 
directly.”  
 
831 Although this vision is far from being unanimous, as, for instance, argued by: Frug, The City as a Legal 
Concept, at 1067, where he states: “… There is a widespread belief that although cities are supposed to 
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has been pointed out as a failure of constitutional design relating to future matters.832 It is 
relevant that in the U.S. experience, cities only have the powers that were delegated to 
them by states and that were not limited by judicial interpretation.833 The power to tax 
granted to municipalities is significantly constrained834 by state rules as well as by the 
Commerce Clause.835 In this sense, the choice of locating cities as subordinated to states 
was adopted in light of the federal system,836 based on an assumption that had it been 
different, the unified political system under the Constitution would have been 
jeopardized.837  
In Brazil, by contrast, municipalities have vast powers because they were 
conceived as federal actors. Consequently, much autonomy was granted to them. Taxing 
                                                                                                                                                                     
protect the public interest, they cannot be trusted to do so. This distrust engenders support for state and 
federal control of cities to prevent local abuse of power, curb local selfishness, or correct the inefficiencies 
resulting from ‘balkanized’ local decision making. City discretion of any kind evokes images of corruption, 
patronage, and even foolishness. This sense of necessity and desirability has made local powerlessness part 
of our definition of modern society, so that decentralization of power appears to be a nostalgic memory of 
an era gone forever or a dream of romantics who fail to understand the world as it really is.” Based on 
Professor Frug’s claim, we could understand involuntary annexation as a mechanism to turn cities less 
powerlessness, offering a potential counter-balance to this biased conception of local government as 
inherently poisoned by local forces.  
 
832 Hirschl, The “Design Sciences” and Constitutional “Success,” at 1348, and as mentioned in our 
introduction to this chapter. In addition, article V of the U.S. Constitution, with its rigidity towards 
amendments, has been perceived as much condescending to state powers while being too hostile to local 
interests: Aziz Z. Huq, “The Function of Article V,” University of Pennsylvania Law Review 162 (2014): 
1165–1236, at 1187–1188. 
 
833 Frug, The City as a Legal Concept, at 1062. 
 
834 For general constraints imposed by state powers and by the Commerce Clause, see, generally: Frug, The 
City as a Legal Concept, at 1064, where the author emphasizes that the abilities of cities to borrow money 
suffered even stronger limitations. The Professor remarks, at 1063, that even in “home rule” states (i.e., 
where powers of purely local matter would be granted to cities), state law considers cities as “creatures of 
the state,” as quoted in Hunter. 
 
835 Definitions regarding the application of the Commerce Clause have varied throughout the history of the 
United States: Chemerinsky, Constitutional Law: Principles and Policies, at 242–243. 
 
836 For criticisms about the consequences of locating municipalities as forbidden of exercising general 
governmental power, while not being capable of the freedom granted to private corporations: Frug, The 
City as a Legal Concept, at 1065–1067. 
 
837 Idem, at 1106. Noting that the states would encompass the federation (and that the unitary government 
was out of the picture, due to historical experiences present at the time of the Framers), and contending that 
the only question at the Convention with that regard was how much autonomy to confer to the central 
government: Robert A. Dahl, How Democratic is the American Constitution? (New Haven: Yale 
University Press, 2001), at 12. 
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powers are guaranteed in several provisions of the constitutional text, along with direct 
transfers of revenues from the union and the state where the municipality is located.838 
Therefore, there is an interest in creating and annexing municipalities in order to receive 
such revenues – but not necessarily in excluding particular citizens, as it has occurred in 
annexations in the U.S. 
Annexation in the United States is defined in state laws. According to principles 
of constitutional law, Congress may act when (implied or express) authorization exists in 
the Constitution.839 In light of such constitutional principles, powers not granted to the 
national government are reserved for the states. The states did not grant the federal 
government authority to modify municipal boundaries, and state legislatures may directly 
alter municipal boundaries or establish procedures that local governments have to obey 
when altering them.840 Therefore, there is no uniform national law regulating annexation. 
The Brazilian Constitution of 1988 is the only one to expressly 841  locate 
municipalities accompanying the federal union and states as members of the 
federation.842 Hence, the residual powers of the Brazilian states are defined not only 
considering the powers not granted to the federal union, but also the powers that were not 
conferred to municipalities.843 Modifications of municipal boundaries are determined in 
                                                        
838 For the detailed scope of local governments powers and revenues: see footnote 725, supra.  
 
839 Chemerinsky, Constitutional Law: Principles and Policies, at 234. Article I of the U.S. Constitution 
states: “All legislative powers herein granted shall be vested in a Congress of the United States which shall 
consist of a Senate and a House of Representatives.” The Tenth Amendment determines that: “The powers 
not delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the 
States respectively, or to the people.” 
 
840  Grey Lindsey, “Annexation Activity and Policy in the US,” in Redrawing Local Government 
Boundaries: and International Study of Politics, Procedures and Decisions, ed. John Meligrana (Vancouver: 
UBC Press, 2004), at 56. 
 
841 See footnote 567, supra. Noting, specifically, that Brazilian municipalities are among the most 
empowered in the world: Moraes, Direito Constitucional, at 296. 
 
842 The Brazilian Constitution and its modern allocation of powers to local governments have already been 
observed by Hirschl, The “Design Sciences” and Constitutional “Success,” at 1348, where the Professor 
also cites Germany and India as countries where local governments have extended powers. 
 
843 Article 25 of the Brazilian Constitution of 1988 determines that: “The states are organized and governed 
by the Constitutions and laws they may adopt, in accordance with the principles of this Constitution. 
Paragraph 1. All powers that this Constitution does not prohibit the states from exercising shall be 
conferred upon them.” 
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the Constitution and have been subject to recent constitutional amendments and ongoing 
controversies. The first controversy concerned lack of action by the legislative branch 
that failed to promulgate federal complementary law determined in the Constitution.844 
Another controversy referred to whether the alteration from state complementary law, as 
it was the original constitutional text, to federal complementary law was unconstitutional. 
The STF dismissed such allegation, stating the necessity of uniformity across the union 
and the admissible power to amend the Constitution when exercised in accordance with 
the due legislative process established in the constitutional text.845 
As presented in Part II, Section A, the design choice in 1988 was to delegate to 
state complementary law the general requirements for annexation (and for any boundary 
change). After the Constitutional Amendment 15, of 1996, the modified constitutional 
requirement became one of federal complementary law. States benefitted from such 
deferral in the time of the writing of the original text.846 At the time of the convention, 
such requirements were not viewed as crucial. However, with local governments being 
entitled to the new federal status and revenue transfers from state and the federal union, it 
became clear that the “state complementary law” mandate could not endure. In this sense, 
the deferral was conditioned upon the general efficiency of the federal scheme.  
Once the original scheme has been proved inadequate, it led to centralization of 
the general rules in the federal sphere, through a national complementary law – albeit 
creation and annexation shall occur through state laws in accordance with the general 
provisions to be determined by such federal complementary law. Nevertheless, 
considering the textual analysis of the Constitution after the Constitutional Amendment 
15, of 1996, states lost power to the union.  It is noteworthy that annexation and boundary 
                                                        
844 The previous Part II, B, located and quoted all the constitutional provisions and decisions mentioned in 
this paragraph. 
 
845 For specific decisions of the STF exposing this rationale:  ADI 2381 MC/RS, of 2001; ADI 2395/DF, of 
2007. See discussion supra, in Part II, B, of this chapter. 
 
846 Rosalind Dixon and Tom Ginsburg, “Deciding not to Decide: Deferral in Constitutional Design,” 
International Journal of Constitutional Law 9 (2011): 636–672. The dataset developed by the Professors 
shows, at 660, that systems for local elections are among the most common provisions of deferrals to 
legislative law. Municipal boundaries did not appear in the list. It is worth noting that, in Brazil, issues 
delegated to national complementary law are quite common. This delegation occurs when the Constitution 
does not detail what has been perceived, at the time of the convention, as minutia. 
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changes are still addressed in state law, but those laws must be subordinated to a general 
federal complementary law that does not exist – even after more than eighteen years of 
the edition of the Constitutional Amendment 15.  
The deferral to a “by law” clause in the Brazilian experience has been marked by 
political disputes involving different actors. Validating our understanding are the 
necessity of further constitutional amendments and the current uncertain situation 
concerning annexation procedures, due to the nonexistence of the national (federal) 
complementary law. Along those lines, despite STF’s decisions demanding the approval 
of such law by Congress, nothing has happened. So, the lacuna still exists. The political 
pressure arising out of the new constitutional text and the decisions of the STF were not 
sufficient to overcome the legislative inertia.847  
With regard to inter-branch relations, the USSC and the STF have declared that 
U.S. and Brazilian congresses, respectively, have to update or enact a particular 
legislative act.848 The STF was considerably patient and deferent to Congress, waiting 
more than eleven years to declare the inertia deliberandi of Congress.849 This fact also 
proves how strong are local politicians who benefitted personally from the absence of a 
national scheme in Brazil. As previously stated, the current President of Brazil vetoed a 
law that her own cabinet has drafted.850 Hence, local political forces are powerful in 
Brazil. Local governments are not that powerful, because hostages of an uncertain legal 
situation that denies the minimum standards for their own existence. In Brazil, local 
spheres are not embedded in the democratic experience traditionally associated with the 
American localism experience.  
                                                        
847 Discussing the problems of legislative inertia in what the authors designated “by law” constitutional 
deferral clauses, and specifically pointing out the Brazilian legislative inertia: Dixon and Ginsburg, 
Deciding not to Decide: Deferral in Constitutional Design, at 665–666. 
 
848 For the discussion about the USSC: see Part I, B, supra, footnotes 717 and 718, when the Shelby Court 
emphasized that the USSC has determined that Congress did not act – or did not consider so – despite 
previous warnings by the USSC in a decision dating back to 2009. Such decision stated the necessity of an 
updated formula of section two. It took forty years for the USSC to require an update formula and four 
years to judge Congress in mora.  
 
849 See discussion supra, Part II, A, specifically. 
 
850 See footnote 755, supra. 
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 Notwithstanding specific distinctions of jurisdiction, the decisions of the STF are 
not necessarily lower numbered, but they present limited subject matters in comparison 
with the decisions of the USSC. The first explanation refers to the period of time, since 
the analyzed U.S. decisions date back to the inception of the Constitution. Hence, having 
thirty-one annexation cases in our dataset (and considering the US Constitution was 
signed in 1787 and ratified in 1789) does not corroborate the understating that the 
absence of local governments in such founding document is necessarily negative.851 
There is no evidence that such absence nowadays contributes to the increase of litigation, 
according to our annexation cases. Remarkably, the bulk of litigation analyzed in the 
context of annexation has been after the Voting Rights Act of 1965.852 If we disregard 
such cases, the number of litigation in both courts is almost the same (twenty in the 
United States versus sixteen cases in Brazil).853 This occurs, despite the U.S. Constitution 
being largely the same document since 1787.854  
Accordingly, we argue, based on annexation cases, that the absence of provisions 
about local governments in the U.S Constitution van generally be considered as a 
successful experience. Our findings corroborate the idea that constitutional silence about 
issues that might be controversial at the time of the writing has a positive impact in the 
future.855 The proper relationship between state and cities was, in fact, a disputed political 
                                                        
851 As claimed, for instance by Hirschl, The “Design Sciences” and Constitutional “Success,” at 1348, and 
the quote in our Introduction to this chapter, at footnote 583, supra. 
 
852 For a complete list of the cases, year and main issues discussed by the USSC and the STF, see Tables 
5.1 and 5.2, respectively.  
 
853 Chart 5.1 illustrates the comparison between the decisions of the United States Supreme Court (from 
1870 until 2013) and the Brazilian Supremo Tribunal Federal (from 1988, when the Constitution 
inaugurated the inclusion of municipalities in the federal pact, until 2013). Chart 5.2 details the Brazilian 
constitutional actions across time. 
 
854 For arguments claiming that the interpretation of the USSC amounted to a complete new Constitution 
despite the text remaining the same during the New Deal: Bruce Ackerman, W e the People: Foundations, at 
58–80. For the opposite view: Elkins, Ginsburg and Melton, The Endurance of National Constitutions, at 
165, considering that the amendments did not amount to a complete new Constitution. 
 
855 Discussing incomplete theorization: Sunstein, Designing Democracy: W hat Constitutions Do, at 58, 
affirms: “Most of their virtues involve the constructive uses of silence (…) Especially in a diverse society, 
silence – on something that may prove false, obtuse, or excessively contentious – can help minimize 
conflict, allow the present to learn from the future and save a great deal of time and expense. What is said 
and resolved is no more important than what is left out.”  
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issue.856 In this sense, the lack of provisions with regard to local matters was the 
preferred solution, to the extent that it would increase the chances of success in the 
future.857 It would be naïve to argue that local governments should have been in the 
Constitution since its inception, because it would jeopardize the strength of federal union 
vis-à-vis the state and local forces.858 
Another explanation supporting the absence of local governments and municipal 
powers in the U.S. constitutional text – including their boundaries – arises of the 
relatively small number of cases heard by the USSC. One would expect the litigation to 
be much higher, considering the extended time period and the absence of constitutional 
provisions regulating local governments. This would be the case, because parties would 
be tempted to litigate potential changes in the traditional view of local powers.859  
Meanwhile, the decisions of the STF show the dynamics of detailed and flexible 
requisites for endurance of constitutions.860 Our findings support the understanding that 
                                                        
856 Frug, The City as a Legal Concept, at 1105–1107, where the author points out the different conceptions 
of local government, namely the Jeffersonian view of local government as “elementary republic,” as 
opposed to the skeptic Madisonian view. For the latter, see the discussions by Madison on Federalists 10 
and 51 regarding the advantages of the union over states to control factions, and how the federal system 
encapsulates a dual protection for the people: Alexander Hamilton, James Madison and John Jay, The 
Federalist Papers, ed. Clinton Rossiter (New York: Penguin Books, 1999), at 78 and at 320–322, 
respectively. 
 
857 In this sense: Walter F. Murphy, “Theories of Constitutional Design: Designing a Constitution: of 
Architects and Builders,” Texas Law Review 87 (2009): 1303–1337, at 1334, where the author affirms: 
“Writing, if strong disagreements exist, will have a better chance of success if avoiding the contentious 
topic for the future.” 
 
858 See footnotes 831–837, supra, and references therein. 
 
859 Which is not to say that there have been no cases in such direction. See footnotes 640–644, supra, for 
our discussion about the Slaughter-House Cases, and the attempt to push the Court towards a new 
interpretation of federalism after the Reconstruction Amendments.  
 
860 Elkins, Ginsburg and Melton, The Endurance of National Constitutions, have classified the Brazilian 
Constitution of 1988 as fulfilling the main requirements for longevity: it is inclusive, at 79, because the 
convention was marked by public discussions, even having projects based on citizens’ initiatives; flexible, 
at 82–83, because constitutional amendments and judicial review are authorized and used; and specific, 
because it is a long and detailed text, at 84. The United States Constitution can be understood as having 
“low levels of inclusion”, at 163, with the Professors classifying it as rigid and general, at 87. Nevertheless, 
there was participation in the approval, as emphasized by Justin Blount, Zachary Elkins and Tom Ginsburg, 
“Does the Process of Constitution-Making Matter?,” in Comparative Constitutional Design, ed. Tom 
Ginsburg (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012), at 53.  
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specificity demands continuous “investments in the text,” increasing amendments.861 Our 
findings are aligned with the literature,862 because the Brazilian Constitution is very 
detailed, while being quite flexible with regard to amendments.863  
In addition, it has been contended that constitutions with built-in alteration 
mechanisms are preferable to rigid ones,864 particularly if we consider that the design 
science might be more effective solving past or present problems instead of future 
challenges.865 Here, the rigid rules866 and procedures of the U.S. Constitution,867 which 
                                                        
861 Elkins, Ginsburg and Melton, The Endurance of National Constitutions, at 87–88. 
 
862 Elkins, Ginsburg and Melton, The Endurance of National Constitutions, at 87, stating that specificity 
and flexibility contribute to endurance of constitutions by providing incentives for the parties to monitor 
and update the constitutional text. The Professors also stress, at 65, that the U.S. Constitution does not 
feature the totality of elements that would grant longevity – namely: flexibility, inclusion and specificity, 
generally. 
 
863 Idem, at 74, developing such arguments: “ If, on the one hand, formal constitutional amendment is 
relatively simple, as in contemporary Brazil where the legislature does not have to pass its amendments to 
the subnational units for approval, there may be less need for judicial or other institutional reinterpretations 
of the constitution.” 
 
864 Idem, at 139–140, commenting on amendment as a significant predictor of longevity of constitutions, 
based on their empirical multi-countries study of comparative constitutionalism. 
 
865 Hirschl, The “Design Sciences” and Constitutional “Success,” at 1347. Arguing that the easiness of 
amendments alleviates pressure from the courts and new institutional reinterpretations: Elkins, Ginsburg 
and Melton, The Endurance of National Constitutions, at 74. Specifically addressing the existence of 
constitutional amendments as self-adjusting mechanisms contained in constitutions: Hirschl, The “Design 
Sciences” and Constitutional “Success,” at 1349. 
 
866 Locating the U.S. Constitution among those most difficult to amend in the world, and contending its 
ineffectiveness as far as self-adjustments mechanisms are considered: Hirschl, The “Design Sciences” and 
Constitutional “Success,” at 1349. Also agreeing with the proposition regarding the difficulty to amend the 
U.S. Constitution: Sanford Levinson, Our Undemocratic Constitution (New York: Oxford University Press, 
2006), at 21. Furthermore, Huq, The Function of Article V , at 1174, notices the tension inherent to 
Federalists and Whigs, arguing that Article V was a “compromise mechanism that allowed either the 
federal government or state institutions to be bypassed entirely.” In this sense, general undemocratic 
aspects of the constitutional text were the outcome of the pragmatic conception of the Framers, who had 
chosen to compromise: Dahl, How Democratic is the American Constitution?, at 38. The U.S. Constitution 
has formal inflexibility, but features informal flexibility granted by judicial review, for instance, as argued 
by: Elkins, Ginsburg and Melton, The Endurance of National Constitutions, at 162–167. 
 
867 Article V of the U.S. Constitution determines that: “The Congress, whenever two thirds of both houses 
shall deem it necessary, shall propose amendments to this Constitution, or, on the application of the 
legislatures of two thirds of the several states, shall call a convention for proposing amendments, which, in 
either case, shall be valid to all intents and purposes, as part of this Constitution, when ratified by the 
legislatures of three fourths of the several states, or by conventions in three fourths thereof, as the one or 
the other mode of ratification may be proposed by the Congress; provided that no amendment which may 
be made prior to the year one thousand eight hundred and eight shall in any manner affect the first and 
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lead to the notion of its enormous difficult in amend the U. S. Constitution, are 
considerably different from the Brazilian experience.868 
Our findings are consistent with the understanding that constitutional amendments 
are not aimed at modifications of the constitutional text, but at authorizing legislative and 
popular actors an increased mechanism to pressure the interpretation of the highest court 
regarding that design. 869  Amendment procedures are tied to questions of judicial 
interpretation and the more difficult to amend a constitution is, the higher the pressure on 
constitutional courts to decide issues addressing challenges posed by new conditions.870  
Our analysis of the U.S. Constitution validates such reasoning, because on several 
occasions the USSC did not even consider different interpretations of the Fourteen 
Amendment – as, for instance, to include rights to vote in annexation procedure within 
the realm of its application. With regard to the Brazilian Constitution, which is quite 
flexible, the STF felt empowered to declare the annexations that occurred after the 
constitutional amendments as in violation of the requirement of federal complementary 
law – even though such law does not yet exist. Clearly, the STF determined Congress to 
enact such law, because that congressional inertia was unconstitutional. 
                                                                                                                                                                     
fourth clauses in the ninth section of the first article; and that no state, without its consent, shall be deprived 
of its equal suffrage in the Senate.” 
 
868 The specific provisions pertinent to the amendment process of the Brazilian Constitution of 1988 are 
stated in its article 60: “The Constitution may be amended on the proposal of: I - at least one-third of the 
members of the Chamber of Deputies or of the Federal Senate; II - the President of the Republic; III - more 
than one half of the Legislative Assemblies of the units of the Federation, each of them expressing itself by 
the relative majority of its members. Paragraph l - The Constitution shall not be amended while federal 
intervention, a state of defense or a state of siege is in force. Paragraph 2 - The proposal shall be discussed 
and voted upon in each House of the National Congress, in two readings, and it shall be considered 
approved if it obtains in both readings, three-fifths of the votes of the respective members. (…) Paragraph 5 
- The matter dealt with in a proposal of amendment that is rejected or considered impaired shall not be the 
subject of another proposal in the same legislative session.” Despite the requirement of three-fifth approval 
in both Houses, in the Brazilian political reality it is not that difficult to obtain such quorum. The current 
Constitution was approved in 1988 and has, so far, seventy-seven amendments until October of 2014. 
 
869 Rosalind Dixon, “Constitutional Amendment Rules: a Comparative Perspective,” in Comparative 
Constitutional Law, ed. Tom Ginsburg and Rosalind Dixon (Northampton: Edward Elgar, 2011), at 96, and 
at 98–99. 
 
870 Mark Tushnet, Comparative Law and National Identity, at 1239.  Arguing that the judiciary as well as 
other institutional players reinterpret the Constitution: Elkins, Ginsburg and Melton, The Endurance of 
National Constitutions, at 74. 
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This research corroborates that transparency is important in terms of reducing the 
self-interest of distinct actors,871 although the Brazilian case was far from curbing 
personal self-interest of mayors, in particular.872  In this context, the constitutional 
amendments and the related litigation that have followed did not spare the STF from 
judging constitutional claims of local governments. Hence design choice matters, but is 
not the only variable involved if one considers the need of legal conflicts being resolved 
by supreme courts. 
The constitutional design adopted in Brazil authorized constitutional adaptation to 
the extent that the amendments aimed at eliminating the existence of several 
municipalities created or annexed for political interests only, without any concern with 
the public needs. Thus, Brazil has a unique design if one considers the allocation of 
powers to the municipalities in the constitutional text. In practice, however, it did not lead 
to more power to local governments or to better services. Citizens are still excluded on 
economic bases from such access. Importantly, the rate of annexation cases involving 
Brazilian municipalities jeopardizes economic growth due to the lack of certainty of their 
formation or modification. Accordingly, the design of the Brazilian Constitution cannot 
yet be deemed as completely successful, when considered in light of the litigation 
involving annexation of local governments.  
 
B.  General Analysis of the Comparison and Related Consequences 
The decisions of the Supremo concerning the validity of annexations laws of the 
states and the Constitutional Amendments 15 and 56 contribute to the understanding that 
the movements of centralization and decentralization in Brazil should not be understood 
as a permanent dichotomy,873 but as a continuous accommodation of different interests. 
                                                        
871 In this direction, see, for example: Blount, Elkins and Ginsburg, Does the Process of Constitution-
Making Matter?, at 58. 
 
872 Here is relevant to distinguish self-interest on the personal level, which are negative, from group interest 
that may – or not – be inappropriate. Along those lines and explaining that transparency reduces the latter – 
as contended by: Jon Elster, “Channels of Constitution Making,” in Comparative Constitutional Design, ed. 
Tom Ginsburg (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012), at 22. 
 
873 Noting that the centralization-decentralization is not that relevant and is more useful as a continuum: 
Souza, Brazil: The Prospects of a Center-Constraining Federation in a Fragmented Polity, at 35. 
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This understanding about Brazil also supports our claim that the decisions of the USSC 
do not necessarily refer to alternate visions of local governments, but as adaptive 
mechanisms to their own present circumstances.874  
Considering such reasoning, previous scholarship identifies different conceptions 
by the USSC when applying the principle of “one person, one vote” to elections 
concerning local governments.875 The first one is based on the understanding of local 
governments as merely the extension of the state, as affirmed in Hunter. The second 
treats local governments as forums for local democracy, and the third conception defines 
local governments as proprietary enterprises.876 Those models support the understanding 
of the federalization of local election law as being partial, with states still being entitled 
to significant control of local governments – including their organization and structure.877 
In our view, the different conceptualizations contended by each model are not an 
evolution but rather particular waves that still can be further elaborated by the Court.878 
In Hunter, the Court asserted that local governments are not autonomous but merely arms 
of the state. This conception was further mitigated by Avery, which considered local 
governments as being representatives elected by the people.879 It has been argued that 
                                                        
874 This is the case, notwithstanding different theoretical conceptions about local governments, as pointed 
out in footnotes 812 and 813, supra. 
 
875 Detailing those three models: Briffault, W ho Rules at Home? One Person/One Vote and Local 
Governments, at 344.  
 
876 The view of local governments as local democracy is further explained at 347, when the Professor cites 
the Avery decision and the pertinent USSC’s view of local governments as being of  “representatives 
elected by the people.” The third model refers only to special districts, and is mentioned for completeness, 
due to the fact that special districts are not encompassed in our research. Reference is made to: Briffault, 
W ho Rules at Home? One Person/One Vote and Local Governments, at 359–381, specifically. 
 
877 Briffault, W ho Rules at Home? One Person/One Vote and Local Governments, at 339.  
 
878 Arguing that the USSC developed the first two models as an evolution of its approach to local 
government itself: Anderson, Mapped out of local Democracy, at 964. Our argument is based on the fact 
that evolution presupposes that the newer concept is necessarily better than the oldest one. Based on our 
research about the USSC case law (and considering their recent decision in Shelby, for instance), we do not 
agree with the proposition that newer decisions are necessarily superior. 
 
879 Professor Briffault understands both conceptions as alternatives – therefore not as mitigation, but as if 
recent decisions superseded previous case law: Briffault, W ho Rules at Home? One Person/One Vote and 
Local Governments, at 347. In our understanding, the majority of the Court is trying to reconcile both 
views, to the extent that the Court also acknowledged state powers and prerogatives in Avery, at 480: 
“Although the forms and functions of local government and the relationships among the various units are 
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even the Federalists would concede the historical and legal precedence of states880 as well 
as the many efforts by the framers in secure from federal interference with state’s local 
affairs.881 
This research concerns the limits imposed by the U.S. Supreme Court in 
annexation cases.882 It demonstrates how the issues judged by the USSC evolved across 
time. In the beginning, the Court was mainly focused on patrimonial disputes. After the 
enactment of the Voting Registration Act, of 1965, its docket changed, being particularly 
concerned with asserting the effectiveness of federal rights. The docket also shows 
different actors then in previous years. This occurred because the states that were 
mentioned in the Act started to be object of intense litigation. Interestingly, participation 
in the U.S. Constitution was associated with claims for a Bill of Rights that the Anti-
Federalists intended to have contemplated in the Constitution, with participation being 
linked to limitations on federal power.883 
If annexation in the United States was used to exclude specific demographics of 
the population from particular municipalities, in Brazil, the exclusion occurs by the lack 
of resources that this same population should have access – whether provided by the state 
                                                                                                                                                                     
matters of state concern, it is now beyond question that a State’s political subdivisions must comply with 
the Fourteenth Amendment. The actions of local government are the actions of the State. A city, a town, or 
county may no more deny the equal protection of the laws than it may abridge freedom of speech, establish 
an official religion, arrest without a probable cause, or deny due process of law.” Further, at 485, it 
concluded:  “The Court is aware of the immense pressures facing units of local government, and of the 
greatly varying problems with which they must deal. The Constitution does not require that a uniform 
straitjacket binds citizens in devising mechanisms of local government suitable for local needs and efficient 
in solving local problems.” 
 
880 Berger, Federalism: The Founders’ Design, at 29. 
 
881  Idem, at 168–169. 
 
882 This research is not focused on the economic federalism and the related literature about competitive 
federalism – which dates back to the Fifties, with the seminal work of Charles M. Tiebout, “A Pure Theory 
of Local Expenditures,” The Journal of Political Economy 64 (1956): 416–424. It is worth emphasizing that 
we agree with the claim that political inequalities among Brazilian states and regions are substantial 
obstacles to the study of competitive federalism in Brazil. In this direction: Souza, Brazil: The Prospects of 
a Center-Constraining Federation in a Fragmented Polity, at 45. As addressed earlier, our focus is the 
impact of the USSC decisions concerning local governments in the context of annexation in comparison 
with the decisions of the Brazilian Supreme Court (STF) in those issues and the consequences of the 
particular constitutional design adopted. 
 
883 Blount, Elkins and Ginsburg, Does the Process of Constitution-Making Matter?, at 53. 
 
  181 
or by municipalities. In light of the concentration of powers at the federal level in Brazil 
and the existence of an increasing number of municipalities that are not financially 
feasible, the debate pertinent to local interests tend to be far from the citizen, in a 
different experience from the traditional U.S. portrayal. This research corroborates 
previous claims for the general creation of a national level policy in Brazil. The current 
chaos of decentralization enhances inequalities among Brazilian regions, neglecting the 
poorest segments of society.884 
Based on evidence provided by our analysis of the decisions about annexation, we 
contend that general-purpose local governments in the United States are more powerful 
than municipalities in Brazil. In this sense, we used annexation as a proxy for local 
powers, which in the United States derives also from the self-determination of the states. 
This claim is supported by the existence of involuntary annexation in the United States, 
as well as by the fact that the U.S. states are capable of defining their own boundary 
limits in general, without interference from the federal union. The mitigated self-
determination principle of Brazilian states contributes to reduce access to federal 
resources. This is a cause of concern. This situation has held back innovation due to the 
lack of resources that states endure in Brazil, with small municipalities not being 
financially self-sustainable.885 The absence of innovation is in sharp contrast with the 
idea of states being used as laboratories in the United States.886 
 The STF has emphasized several times, independently from the constitutional 
amendments, that the plebiscite involving all the interested electors must occur before the 
annexation of a municipality. This is a democratic rule, and its implementation lacks 
application.  
An interesting question is if the mandatory prerequisite of plebiscite of all the 
citizens affected by the annexation would improve the exclusionary problems existing in 
                                                        
884 Samuels, Reinventing Local Government? Municipalities and Intergovernmental Relations in 
Democratic Brazil, at 96. 
 
885 David Samuels and Fernando Luiz Abrucio, “Federalism and Democratic Transitions: The “New” 
Politics of the Governors in Brazil,” Publius: The Journal of Federalism 30 (2000): 43–61, at 60. 
 
886 For the famous quote of the dissent opinion by Justice Brandeis considering the states as laboratories for 
innovation in the United States: New State Ice Co. v. Liebman, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932). 
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the United States. In our view, this plebiscite would not be an effective rule in the United 
States, where self-determination has been used to exclude areas that are not of economic 
interest of the majority of residents in a city or town. The use of mandatory assessment 
studies, including environmental and cultural factors (which are mandatory in Brazil), 
should be incentivized as a practice across the U.S. states. We note that the majority of 
the states already consider some previous studies of feasibility or assessments concerning 
annexation.887 This notwithstanding, our general recommendation is for such studies to 
encompass broader factors, including environmental impact. 
After distinct constitutional amendments and changes in the case law of the STF 
itself, Brazil remains in a grey area  – in practice as well as of legal matters –, due to the 
absence of general federal complementary law. Therefore, municipalities were not 
necessarily more empowered simply by virtue of their inclusion in the Brazilian 
Constitution. In this sense, the federal pact chosen was not capable of continuing as 
originally planned. Despite warnings by the STF,888 local actors are, de facto, annexing 
cities without the existence of federal complementary law.  
Comparative constitutional law is concerned with the existence and scope of bill 
of rights provisions. 889  In this sense, the constitutional architecture regarding 
competences, powers, and structure of the government are perceived with less enthusiasm 
than provisions of rights.890 However, as the decisions of the U.S. Supreme Court 
demonstrate, they are necessary for the protection of rights and the rule of law. With 
regard to the protection of rights, our findings corroborate that such protection increased 
                                                        
887 Mentioning previous studies of the assessment for boundary changes and how they are focused on fiscal 
policies: Anderson, Mapped out of local Democracy, at 950. 
 
888 Our findings are consistent with the balanced role played by the STF in the transition to democracy. The 
Court has been protective of the rule of law, as it has been observed based on studies limited to the 
economical arena: Diana Kapiszewski, High Courts and Economic Governance in Argentina and Brazil, 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012), at 207, in particular. 
 
889 Sujit Choudhry, Bridging Comparative Politics and Comparative Constitutional Law, University of 
Toronto Legal Studies Research Series, No. 09-01 (2008): 1–40, available at: ssrn.com, abstract number 
1287619, at 9–13. 
 
890 Günter Frankenberg, “Comparing Constitutions,” International Journal of Constitutional Law 4 (2006): 
439–459, at 455–456, emphasizing the reduced appeal of constitutional provisions about political 
organization as object of comparative constitutional law. 
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after World War II,891 as the importance of constitutional adjudication increased even in 
the United States in order to grant protection to minorities.892 The decisions of the 
Supremo, by contrast, protect the rule of law but do not prove supportive of any 
protection of fundamental rights. This is different from what we expected, because the 
STF has a long tradition of protection of fundamental rights.893  
Our results also corroborate Shapiro and Stone Sweet’s hypothesis with regard to 
the expansionary role of courts in order to protect rights.894 The Supreme Court of the 
United States as well as the STF has expanded their role from the traditional and very 
restrictive separation of powers doctrine. Hence, both courts have moved the lines from 
what might have been considered previously as a clear separation. The U.S. Supreme 
Court did so by reviewing its original interpretation of the Fourteenth Amendment, 
                                                        
891 Charles R. Epp, The Rights Revolution: Lawyers, Activists and Supreme Courts in Comparative 
Perspective (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1998), at 38–39. The Professor notes that the 
increased presence of cases involving the due process clause and equality has actually started during the 
1918 (after the World War I), but the USSC rejected such claims until the sixties. Arguing, generally, that 
the increased litigation took place after the World War II in the United States, for instance: Mary Ann 
Glendon, Rights Talk: The Impoverishment of Political Discourse (New York: The Free Press, 1991), at 
163. 
 
892Mauro Cappelletti, “Repudiating Montesquieu? The Expansion and Legitimacy of ‘Constitutional 
Justice,’” Catholic University Law Review 35 (1986): 1–32, at 6.  
 
893 The Supremo Tribunal Federal has historically been very protective of fundamental rights and has done 
so even during the military ruling, when the writ of habeas corpus was further suspended by the militaries. 
Along those lines: Igor Savitsky, “O STF e o AI-5,” in Jurisprudência Constitucional: Como decide o 
STF?, ed. Diogo R. Coutinho and Adriana M. Vojvodic (São Paulo: Malheiros, 2009), at 238–240; and at 
271. For general observations of the judiciary as being protective of rights and minorities in Latin America, 
in particular: Cappelletti, Repudiating Montesquieu? The Expansion and Legitimacy of “Constitutional 
Justice,” at 25. 
 
894 Martin Shapiro and Alec Stone Sweet, On Law, Politics & Judicialization (New York: Oxford 
University Press, 2011), at 364, where they contend: “ (…) the more judges are asked to protect rights in an 
effective manner – the pan-European situation – or the more judges consider effective rights protection to 
be their constitutional duty – the American situation – the less likely judicial review will conform to, or be 
contained by, separation of powers doctrines that preclude abstract review. Put very differently, in systems 
in which the supremacy of the constitutional law within the general hierarchy of norms is defended by a 
authority, all separation of powers notions are contingent because they are secondary to, rather than 
constitutive of, judicial function.” Despite the reference to abstract review in the quote, the claim is 
generally applicable to our findings, regardless of the species of review used by both supreme courts. In 
Brazil, it was clearly abstract, because all the decisions were made through direct actions of 
unconstitutionality. In the United States, however, the decisions were concrete, because they were not made 
in the context of pre-enforcement of legislation, for instance. Nevertheless, those decisions have considered 
elements of abstract review, such as: potential effect on non-litigants parties, general observations about 
previous experiences which did not relate to the parties arguing the case at bar, future effectiveness of the 
prohibition of race discrimination, among others.  
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extending the prohibition of discriminate to states, and by upholding the constitutionality 
of the Voting Rights Act – at least for several years until 2013. The STF, in its turn and in 
a bold movement, has declared the unconstitutionality of the Legislative branch in not 
approving the federal complementary law determining general requirements for 
annexation of municipalities.  
It has been argued that the impact of constitutional law in Latin America is 
different than in the United States due to the ease by which constitutional provisions can 
be ignored or changed. 895  The existence of two constitutional amendments about 
annexation and the current undefined legal situation of change of boundaries, most 
unfortunately, prove that this is still the case. The decisions of the STF regarding 
annexations, however, indicate that there are reasons to be optimistic. The STF has been 
protecting the Constitution, striking a balance regarding the principle of separation of 
powers. As for the amendments, they ultimately contributed to the endurance of the 
constitutional democratic pact. The changes implemented by the amendments aimed at 
curbing the abuses that have occurred when the constitutional requirement was merely 
one of state complementary law – instead of a national complementary law. 
Finally, historical reasons and the related differences of their democratic 
experiences explain the two countries’ distinct choices of constitutional design and the 
role played by each Supreme Court. It is clear that Brazil can no longer contend that its 
own local governments are among the most empowered, if the rules for their own 
boundaries are not even completely defined. In this direction, our analysis sheds light on 
potential reasons why there was not a full transplant of the U.S. federalism to the 
constitutional pact established in 1988. Local elites in Brazil were powerful enough to 
reject the general rule of the global constitutional market regarding the existence of two 
level spheres in federal systems – not three, as the Brazilian Constitution of 1988 
created.896 Brazilians currently pay a high price for such innovation, despite the efforts of 
the STF in mitigating abuse. 
                                                        
895 Miguel Schor, “Constitutionalism Through the Looking Glass of Latin America,” Texas International 
Law Journal 41 (2006): 1–38, at 3–6. 
 
896 For the concept of global constitutional market and the importance of understanding the reasons why 
particular provisions are transferred different to other jurisdictions for the field of Comparative Law: 
Frankenberg, Constitutional Transfer: the IKEA Theory Revisited, at 570–576. 
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V. CONCLUSION 
Constitutional design is a controversial topic even in its denomination. Some will 
emphasize the process and the continuing idea of construction embedded in it.897 
Nonetheless, all agree as to the importance of the debate, in particular due to the fact that 
“non-ideational obstacles are strong, (…) the interests affected are non uniform, and 
retrogression is possible after adoption.”898 
This research uses the decisions about annexation made by the U.S. Supreme 
Court and its Brazilian counterpart, the STF, to investigate if the inclusion of 
municipalities in the Brazilian Constitution was actually an improved constitutional 
design. After two constitutional amendments and recent decisions of the STF rendering 
as unconstitutional the current inaction of Congress in approving the required federal 
complementary law, no evidence was found to support the proposition that the current 
design was necessarily completely superior to the current comparative trend that uses the 
dual spheres system of the United States federalism as paradigm. Our claim is that the 
federalism option made by the constitutional assembly in 1987 was a balanced one, given 
the transition from a centralized military ruling to a democratic and more decentralized 
pact. After almost thirty years, some Brazilians citizens still struggle to know where 
exactly their municipality ends. This uncertainty has important consequences. From the 
political sphere, you cannot know exactly who is your mayor, nor who are you voting for. 
From a more pragmatic perspective, who should you sue to provide you health or 
medicines? Those are constitutional rights that must be secured by all the three spheres of 
power, jointly liable.899 From public governance, it is difficult to administer, to determine 
spending – even approve a budget – if boundaries are not certain.  
We approached the decisions of both Supreme Courts with no preconceptions. 
This research does not argue that one constitutional design is necessarily superior to the 
                                                        
897 Horowitz, Constitutional Design: Proposals versus Process, at 16, for instance. 
 
898 Idem, at 18. 
 
899 Note that, technically, plaintiffs must sue the municipality first and then the state and by last the federal 
union, based on the interpretation of the following constitutional provisions: article 194, VII, article 196, 
and article 198, I-III. 
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other on itself, and in abstract. We considered the silence of the U.S. Constitution and the 
recent inclusion of municipalities as federal actors in Brazil as choices that reached the 
best feasible option at the time of constitutional writing. In that sense, as any 
controversial constitutional choice, it was a product of compromise. In the U.S., such 
compromise was between Federalists and Republicans. In Brazil, settlement was 
achieved by concessions of the national Union to local as well as regional forces. 
The decisions of both Supreme Courts demonstrate sharp differences between 
their case law in subject matters of annexation. On the one hand, the USSC initial 
decisions were about police powers and contractual claims, with significant deference to 
state powers. As the docket of the Court evolved over time, protection of fundamental 
rights, especially equality in light of the Voting Rights Act, became the bulk of litigation. 
Thus, the original unlimited conception of state power was reviewed in light of the 
national protection granted to fundamental rights.  
Therefore, this research shows that the absence of provisions about local 
governments in the U.S. Constitution can be generally viewed as successful, in light of 
the current constitutional design literature about the lack of provisions relating to 
controversial matters at the time of the convention. It also shows that only recently has 
the USSC been more involved in litigation of federal rights in the context of annexation. 
The Court has been acting in a careful self-constrained fashion, being vigilant of its broad 
interpretation of the constitutional pact that grants states significant powers. Because 
local governments are still perceived as a qualified extension of states, they are 
remarkably powerful, albeit the absence of reserved constitutional provisions about the 
local sphere. 
The results of the comparison with the STF are counterintuitive, because we 
would expect the Brazilian Supreme Court to be more involved in litigation regarding the 
protection of fundamental rights. This would be the case, if nothing else, due to the lack 
of certiorari and the detailed provisions of the Brazilian Constitution. The former would 
ultimately grant access to the Court through extraordinary appeal, while the latter would 
increase the chances of litigation, because annexation procedures are treated in the 
constitutional text. 
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This research does not maintain that the U.S. system, i.e., the absence of 
provisions of local governments, should be transplanted to the Brazilian Constitution. It 
does argue, however, that local actors in Brazil must be restrained and act in accordance 
with the constitutional commands. Such recommended course of action consists in 
obeying the STF, and refraining from annexing municipalities in the absence of the 
pertinent federal complementary law. It also consists of obeying the specific 
constitutional administrative principles of legality, morality, efficiency and 
impersonality, which are mandatory to all public administration.900 Those principles will 
support an informed conduct, including detailed assessment of the financial feasibility of 
annexation. 
This work argues that general-purpose local governments in the United States are 
more powerful than municipalities in Brazil, based on our evidence of the USSC’s 
decisions in annexation cases. Our study uses annexation as a proxy for local powers, 
which include self-determination of the states in the United States. This claim is 
supported not only by the fact that U.S. states have powers which were not attributed to 
the union, whereas the Brazilian states have residual powers defined as those which were 
not conferred to the union neither to local governments. The existence of involuntary 
annexation in the United States coupled with the states being capable of defining their 
own boundary limits in general, without interference of the union, demonstrates how 
strong state and local governments are in the United States. In Brazil, it is worth 
reiterating, the Constitutional Amendment 15 stipulates that state laws providing for 
annexation shall comply with general requisites to be determined on a national 
complementary law that has not yet been approved by Congress. 
After distinct constitutional amendments and changes in the case law of the STF 
itself, Brazil remains in a grey area  – in practice as well as in legal matters – due to the 
absence of the general federal complementary law commanded by the constitutional test. 
In addition, we do not argue that the constitutional design after 1988 is a failure either. 
This is so because legislative, executive and judicial branches have tried to curb abuses in 
different historical moments referring to annexation. Furthermore, the current 
                                                        
900 Article 37, caput, of the Brazilian Constitution: “The direct and indirect public administration of any of 
the powers of the Union, the States, the Federal District and Municipalities shall obey the principles of 
strict legality, impersonality, morality, publicity and efficiency.” 
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Constitutional has less than thirty years of life – which is considerably short if compared 
with the more than two hundred and twenty years of the U.S. Constitution. 
Therefore, it is not necessarily because municipalities were included in the 
Brazilian Constitution that they became more empowered. In this sense, the federal pact 
chosen was not capable to continue as originally designed. Despite the decisions of the 
STF, local governments are, de facto, annexing each other without the existence of the 
federal complementary law. This is a clear violation of the rule of law, and generates 
great uncertainty as for the legal regime applicable to those municipalities which are 
changing their boundaries. It also produces unnecessary litigation, a considerable burden 
on the allocation of resources and budget matters. This occurs because no administrator 
knows exactly where its municipality starts or ends in cases of annexation that have 
occurred after the Constitutional Amendment 15. 
Accordingly, local actors were significantly empowered by the current 
constitutional design in Brazil, but this is not to say that local governments became more 
powerful. Importantly, local governments in Brazil did not turn to higher democratic 
spheres nationally; they are not more inclusive of the less wealthy population. The 
current economical deficit of municipalities proves that, in Brazil, the exclusion of certain 
demographics of essential services happens by the lack of resources that this same 
population should have access to.  
The empowerment of local actors is among the consequences of the dismantling 
of the over-centralized system enacted during the military ruling. The decisions of the 
STF tried to bring balance, national uniformity, and efficiency to the current system 
established by the Constitution of 1988. Nevertheless, the Court has its own limitations in 
light of the other branches of power and influential local forces. With regard to the latter, 
the President has recently vetoed the project of complementary law approved by 
Congress and which her own team has diligently worked in the draft. Therefore, local 
forces cannot remain unchecked, with the municipal boundaries being altered in a clear 
violation of the constitutional order that all administrations swore to obey. 
In conclusion, more research needs to be done concerning the constitutional 
design choices affecting local governments in Brazil and the United States, including 
empirical studies. Investigations regarding Brazil’s and the United States’ similar tax 
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powers in the local sphere, for instance, are of interest. In addition, we also hope to have 
contributed to the literature of Latin America in general, proving that the democratization 
process and the related topic of Brazilian constitutional design are relevant beyond 
Brazilian borders. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  190 
Table 5.1: Final List of Annexation Cases based on our Lexis Search 
Final List of Cases about annexation based on Lexis Year Issue 
Va. v. W. Va., 78 U.S. 39 1870 Annexation of counties in Virginia 
Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. 36 1872 Police powers of the state 
Comm’rs of Laramie v. Comm’rs of Albany, 92 U.S. 307 1875 County reduction and debt payment 
Mt. Pleasant v. Beckwith, 100 U.S. 514 1879 Bonds and extinction municipality 
Mobile v. Watson, 116 U.S. 289 1886 City’s legal successor 
Forsyth v. Hammond, 166 U.S. 06 1897 Tax and county comm. Board ann. 
Holden v. Hardy, 169 U.S. 366 1898 Utah police powers  
McCain v. Des Moines, 174 U.S. 168 1899 Annexation under color of law 
Clark v. Kansas City, 176 U.S. 114 1900 Individuals and corp. annexation land 
Worcester v. Worcester C. S. R. Co., 196 U.S. 539 1905 State interfering with municipality 
Blair v. Chi., 201 U.S. 400 1906 Right of the city to grant license 
Hunter v. Pittsburgh, 207 U.S. 161 1907 Consolidation of two cities and taxes 
Detroit U. Railway v. Detroit, 229 U.S. 39 1913 Contractual rights 
Detroit United Railway v. Michigan, 242 U.S. 238 1916 City fares and Contract Clause 
Howard v. Commissioners of Sinking Fund, 344 U.S. 624 1953 Annexation of federal area by munic. 
Gomillion v. Lightfoot, 364 U.S. 339 1960 State limited powers: disenfranchise 
Perkins v. Matthews, 400 U.S. 379 1971 Voting Rights Act 
Mahan v. Howell, 410 U.S. 315 1973 Virginia’s reapportionment statute 
Richmond v. United States, 422 U.S. 358 1975 Voting Rights Act 
United Jewish Organizations, Inc. v. Carey, 430 U.S. 144 1977 Voting Rights Act 
Lockport v. Ctz. for Cm. Ac. at Ll. Lv., Inc. 430 U.S. 259 1977 Equal Protection of Fourteenth Am. 
Holt Civic Club v. Tuscaloosa, 439 U.S. 60  1978 State police powers 
City of Rome v. United States, 446 U.S. 156 1980 Voting Rights Act 
Port Arthur v. United States, 459 U.S. 159 1982 Voting Rights Act 
Pleasant Grove v. United States, 479 U.S. 462 1987 Voting Rights Act 
Presley v. Etowah County Comm’n, 502 U.S. 491 1992 Voting Rights Act 
Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630 1993 Voting Rights Act 
Holder v. Hall, 512 U.S. 874 1994 Voting Rights Act 
Johnson v. De Grandy, 512 U.S. 997 1994 Voting Rights Act 
FTC v. Phoebe Putney Health Sys., 133 S. Ct. 1003 2013 State legislative power and the city 
Shelby County v. Holder, 133 S. Ct. 2612 2013 Voting Rights Act as unconstitutional 
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Table 5.2: Final decisions of the STF  
Final list of cases of STF decisions  Year Issue 
ADI 1372 MC/ RJ 1995 Plebiscite 
ADI 1373 MC/ PR 1995 Plebiscite 
ADI 2381 MC/ RS 2001 Suspension/perennial clause 
ADI 2632 MC/BA  2002 Condition fed. complementary law 
ADI 2702/PA 2003 Condition fed. complementary law 
ADI 2632/BA  2004 Condition fed. complementary law 
ADI 2994/BA  2004 Condition fed. complementary law 
ADI 3149/SC 2004 Condition fed. complementary law 
ADI 3615/ PB 2006 Condition fed. complementary law 
ADI 2240/BA 2007 Change of STF’s case law 
ADI 3489/SC 2007 Change STF’s case law 
ADI 3316/MT 2007 Change STF’s case law 
ADI 3682/MT 2007 Change STF’s case law 
ADI 3689/PA 2007 Reiterate change in STF’s case law 
ADI 2395/DF 2007 Denial of federalism perennial clause 
ADI 4992MC/RO 2013 Denial of annexation based on CA 57 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  192 
Chart 5.1: Comparison of the decisions of the USSC and the STF: Number of lawsuits from 1870 until 
2013 involving annexation of local governments 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Chart 5.2: Decisions of the STF: Number of lawsuits from 1988 until 2013 
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Table 5.3: Search based on “annexation” and municipality (without exclusions) 
Cases with regard to annexation and municipality Year Issue 
Jones v. McMasters, 61 U.S. 8 1858 Citizenship of Mexican Republic 
Girard v. Phila., 74 U.S. 1 1869 Trust in favor of a municipality 
Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. 36 1872 Police powers of the state 
Comm’rs of Laramie v. Comm’rs of Albany, 92 U.S. 307 1875 County reduction and debt payment 
New Orleans v. Clark, 95 U.S. 644 1877 Bonds liability of the city 
Mt. Pleasant v. Beckwith, 100 U.S. 514 1879 Bonds and extinction municipality 
La. v. Pilsbury, 105 U.S. 278 1881 Rates of taxation  
Clark v. Barnard, 108 U.S. 436 1883 State immunity waived 
Mobile v. Watson, 116 U.S. 289 1886 City’s legal successor 
Long Island Water Supply Co. v. Brooklyn, 166 U.S. 685 1897 Eminent domain and judicial review 
McCain v. Des Moines, 174 U.S. 168 1899 Annexation under color of law 
Morris v. United States, 174 U.S. 196 1899 Claim of heirs of a river 
De Lima v. Bidwell, 182 U.S. 1 1901 Taxation territory and Puerto Rico 
Rogers Park Water Co. v. Fergus, 180 U.S. 624 1901 Rates charged by water company  
Downes v. Bidwell, 182 U.S. 244 1901 Puerto Rico’s annexation to the U.S. 
Worcester v. Worcester C. S. R. Co., 196 U.S. 539 1905 State interfering with municipality 
Blair v. Chi., 201 U.S. 400 1906 Right of the city to grant license 
Hunter v. Pittsburgh, 207 U.S. 161 1907 Consolidation two cities and taxes 
Ponce v. Roman Catholic Apostolic Church, 210 U.S. 296 1908 Porto Rico and gift to Church 
Detroit U. Railway v. Detroit, 229 U.S. 39 1913 Ordinance to remove railways 
Denver v. New York Trust Co., 229 U.S. 123 1913 Water rights 
Elzaburu v. Chaves, 239 U.S. 283 1915 Claim about disputed ownership 
Detroit United Railway v. Michigan, 242 U.S. 238 1916 City fares and Contract Clause 
Howard v. Commissioners of Sinking Fund, 344 U.S. 624 1953 Annexation of federal area by munic. 
Gomillion v. Lightfoot, 364 U.S. 339 1960 State limited powers disenfranchise 
Perkins v. Matthews, 400 U.S. 379 1971 Discrimination Voting Rights Act 
Milliken v. Bradley, 418 U.S. 717 1974 School desegregation 
Richmond v. United States, 422 U.S. 358 1975 Discrimination Voting Rights Act 
Beer v. United States, 425 U.S. 130 1976 Voting Rights Act 
Dougherty County, Ga. Bd. of Ed. v. White, 439 US. 32 1978 Voting Rights Act 
Holt Civic Club v. Tuscaloosa, 439 U.S. 60  1978 Non-resident right to vote: XIV Am. 
United States v. Board of Comm’rs, 435 U.S. 110 1978 Voting Rights Act 
City of Rome v. United States, 446 U.S. 156 1980 Voting discrimination XV Amend. 
Port Arthur v. United States, 459 U.S. 159 1982 Voting Rights Act 
Hallie v. Eau Claire, 471 U.S. 34 1985 State action and antitrust law 
Macdonald v. County of Yolo, 477 U.S. 340 1986 Zoning regulations and just comp. 
Pleasant Grove v. United States, 479 U.S. 462 1987 Voting Rights Act 
Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469 1989 Racial discrimination 
Presley v. Etowah County Comm’n, 502 U.S. 491 1992 Voting Rights Act 
Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630 1993 Race and Equal Protection Clause 
Reno v. Bossier Parish Sch. Bd., 528 U.S. 320 2000 Voting Rights Act 
FTC v. Phoebe Putney Health Sys., 133 S. Ct. 1003 2013 State legislation power and the city 
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Table 5.4: Search based on “annexation” and “county” (without exclusions): Part I 
Cases with regard to annexation and county (Part I) Year Issue 
Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. 1 1831 County of Washington ann. indians 
Winn v. Patterson, 34 U.S. 663  1835 Witnesses and deed validity 
Lessee of Pollard’s Heirs v. Kibbe, 39 U.S. 353 1840 Acceptance of annexation by State 
Brashear v. Mason, 47 U.S. 92 1848 Annexation of Texas 
Goodtitle ex dem. Pollard v. Kibbe 1850 Patent and annexation of Alabama 
Oakey v. Bennett, 52 U.S. 33 1851 Annexation of Texas to the Union 
Butler v. Pa, 51 U.S. 402 1851 County officers challenging salaries 
League v. De Young, 52 U.S. 185 1851 Annexation of Texas 
Calkin v. Cocke, 55 U.S. 227 1853 Annexation of Texas 
O’ Reilly v. Morse, 56 U.S. 62 1854 Patent infringement 
United States v. Dawson, 56 U.S. 467 1854 Arkansas and indian territory 
Stevens v. Gladding, 58 U.S. 447 1855 Copyright infringement 
Jones v. League, 59 U.S. 76 1855 Annexation of Texas 
Jones v. McMasters, 61 U.S. 8 1858 Citizenship Mexican Republic 
Middleton v. McGrew, 64 US. 45 1859 Annexation of Texas 
Christy v. Pridgeon, 71 U.S. 196 1866 Annexation of Texas 
Girard v. Phila., 74 U.S. 1 1869 Trust in favor of a municipality 
Va. v. W. Va., 78 U.S. 39 1870 Annexation of counties in Virginia 
Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. 36 1872 Police powers of the state 
Comm’rs of Laramie v. Comm’rs of Albany, 92 U.S. 307 1875 County reduction and debt payment 
New Orleans v. Clark, 95 U.S. 644 1877 Bonds liability of the city 
Hill v. Nat’l Bank, 97 U.S. 450 1878 Land parcels of trust annexed 
Mt. Pleasant v. Beckwith, 100 U.S. 514 1879 Bonds and extinction municipality 
La. v. Pilsbury, 105 U.S. 278 1881 Rates of taxation  
Clark v. Barnard, 108 U.S. 436 1883 State immunity waived 
In re Devoe Mfg. Co., 108 U.S. 401 1883 District of New York annexation 
Walsh v. Preston, 109 U.S. 297 1883 Texas annexation 
Freeman v. Dawson, 110 U.S. 264 1884 Lien for a Tennessee county 
Mobile v. Watson, 116 U.S. 289 1886 City’s legal successor 
Late Corp. of Church of J. Christ v. U. S., 136 U.S. 1 1890 Texas annexation 
Cook v. United Stats, 138 U.S. 157 1891 Texas annexation 
Bird v. Benlisa, 142 U.S. 664 1892 Annexation of a county in Florida 
Boyd v. Nebraska, 143 U.S. 135 1892 Citizenship 
United States v. Texas, 143 U.S. 621 1892 Boundary dispute with Texas 
San Pedro & Canon del Agua Co. v. U. S., 146 U.S. 120 1892 Annexation of New Mexico 
United States v. Texas, 162 U.S. 1 1896 Annexation of Texas 
Long Island Water Supply Co. v. Brooklyn, 166 U.S. 685 1897 Eminent domain and judicial review 
Forsyth v. Hammond, 166 U.S. 06 1897 Tax and county comm. Board ann. 
Holden v. Hardy, 169 U.S. 366 1898 Utah police powers  
United States v. Wong Kim Ark, 169 U.S. 649 1898 Annexation of foreign territory 
McCain v. Des Moines, 174 U.S. 168 1899 Annexation under color of law 
Morris v. United States, 174 U.S. 196 1899 Claim of heirs of a river 
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Table 5.4: cont. Search based on “annexation” and “county” (without exclusions): Part II 
Cases with regard to annexation and county (Part II) Year Issue 
Clark v. Kansas City, 176 U.S. 114 1900 Individuals and corp. annexation land 
De Lima v. Bidwell, 182 U.S. 1 1901 Taxation territory and Puerto Rico 
Rogers Park Water Co. v. Fergus, 180 U.S. 624 1901 Rates charged by water company  
Downes v. Bidwell, 182 U.S. 244 1901 Puerto Rico’s annexation to the U.S. 
Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. McGrew, 188 U.S. 291 1903 Ownership of insurance policy 
Missouri v. Nebraska, 196 U.S. 23 1904 Nebraska annexation to the Union 
Worcester v. Worcester C. S. R. Co., 196 U.S. 539 1905 State interfering with municipality 
Carter v. Gear, 197 U.S. 348 1905 Annexation of Hawaii 
Blair v. Chi., 201 U.S. 400 1906 Right of the city to grant license 
Burton v. United States, 202 U.S. 344 1906 Conflict among counties jurisdictions 
Hunter v. Pittsburgh, 207 U.S. 161 1907 Consolidation two cities and taxes 
Vandalia R. Co. v. Indiana, 207 U.S. 359 1907 Taking and just compensation 
Wynne v. United States, 217 U.S. 234 1910 Hawaii annexation 
Virginia v. West Virginia, 220 U.S. 1 1911 Jurisd. of USSC 
Lewers & Crooke, Ltd. v. Atcherly, 222 U.S. 285 1911 Hawaii annexation 
Denver v. New York Trust Co., 229 U.S. 123 1913 Water rights 
Detroit U. Railway v. Detroit, 229 U.S. 39 1913 Ordinance to remove railways 
Dakota Cent. Tel. Co. v. S.D., 250 U.S. 163 1919 Annexation telephone lines WW I 
Ozawa v. United States, 260 U.S. 178 1922 Hawaii annexation 
Exchange Trust Co.  v. Drainage Dist., 278 U.S. 421 1929 County court ann. Arkansas 
Ohio ex rel. Bryant v. Akron Metrp. Park D., 281 U.S. 74 1930 Ohio statute and county court 
Missouri ex rel Missouri Ins. Co. v. Gehner, 281 U.S. 313 1930 Freedom of US bonds from state tax 
United States v. O’Donnel, 303 U.S. 501 1938 California ad Mexican Claim Acts 
Johnson v. Yelllow Cab Transit Co., 321 U.S. 383 1944 Liquor taxation in OK territory 
Hooven & Allison Co. v. Evatt, 324 U.S. 652 1945 State tax after annexation 
Duncan v. Kahanamoku, 327 U.S. 304 1946 Hawaii annexation 
United States v. Fullard-Leo, 331 U.S. 256 1947 Hawaii annexation 
Howard v. Commissioners of Sinking Fund, 344 U.S. 624 1953 Annexation of federal area by munic. 
Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1 1957 Criminal jurisdiction after ann. 
Harrison v. NAACP, 360 U.S. 167 1959 Jurisdiction conflict annexation 
United States v. Louisiana, 363 U.S. 1 1960 Texas annexation 
Gomillion v. Lightfoot, 364 U.S. 339 1960 State limited powers disenfranchise 
Perkins v. Matthews, 400 U.S. 379 1971 Discrimination Voting Rights Act 
James v. Valtierra, 402 U.S. 137 1971 Race and vote  
Mahan v. Howell, 410 U.S. 315 1973 Virginia’s reapportionment statute 
San Antonio Ind. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 1973 Texas school district and equal prot. 
Ga. v. United States  1973 Voting Rights Act 
Milliken v. Bradley, 418 U.S. 717 1974 School desegregation 
Richmond v. United States, 422 U.S. 358 1975 Discrimination Voting Rights Act 
United Jewish Organizations, Inc. v. Carey, 430 U.S. 144 1977 Annexation and Voting Rights Act 
Lockport v. Ctz. for Cm. Ac. at Ll. Lv., Inc. 430 U.S. 259 1977 NY law equal prot. City and non city  
Hazelwood School Dist. v. United States, 433 U.S. 299 1977 Ann. and Civil Rights Act 
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Table 5.4: cont. Search based on “annexation” and “county” (without exclusions): Part III 
Cases with regard to annexation and county (Part III) Year Issue 
United States v. Board of Comm’rs, 435 U.S. 110 1978 Voting Rights Act 
Dougherty County, Ga. Bd. of Ed. v. White, 439 US. 32 1978 Voting Rights Act 
Holt Civic Club v. Tuscaloosa, 439 U.S. 60  1978 Non-resident right to vote: XIV Am. 
Columbus Bd. of Educ. v. Penick, 443 U.S. 449 1979 Racial discrimination in school distr. 
City of Rome v. United States, 446 U.S. 156 1980 Voting discrimination XV Amend. 
Bryant v. Yellen, 447 U.S. 352 1980 State tax exception anti-trust law 
Hallie v. Eau Claire, 471 U.S. 34 1985 State action and antitrust law 
Macdonald v. County of Yolo, 477 U.S. 340 1986 Zoning regulations and just comp. 
Pleasant Grove v. United States, 479 U.S. 462 1987 Voting Rights Act 
Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469 1989 Racial discrimination 
Presley v. Etowah County Comm’n, 502 U.S. 491 1992 Voting Rights Act 
Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630 1993 Race and Equal Protection Clause 
Holder v. Hall, 512 U.S. 874 1994 Dilution and Voting Rights Act 
Johnson v. De Grandy, 512 U.S. 997 1994 Dilution and Voting Rights Act 
Reno v. Bossier Parish Sch. Bd., 520 U.S. 471 1997 Texas annexation 
Abrams v. Johnson, 521 U.S. 74 1997 Race as factor for county lines 
Reno v. Bossier Parish Sch. Bd., 528 U.S. 320 2000 Voting Rights Act 
United States v. Lara, 541 U.S. 193 2004 Annexation of Hawaii 
Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723 2008 Detention in Guantanamo Bay 
FTC v. Phoebe Putney Health Sys., 133 S. Ct. 1003 2013 State legislation power and the city 
Shelby County v. Holder, 133 S. Ct. 2612 2013 Voting Rights Act as unconst. 
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Table 5.5: Search based on “annexation” and “local government” (without exclusions): Part I 
Cases concerning annexation and local gov. (Part I) Year Issue 
The Amiable Isabella, 19 U.S. 1 1821 Treaty immunity to Spanish ship 
Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. 1 1831 County of Washington ann. indians 
Livingston’s Ex’x v. Story, 36 U.S. 351  1837 Annexation of Louisiana to the U.S. 
Lessee of Pollard’s Heirs v. Kibbe, 39 U.S. 833 1849 Treaty between U.S. and Spain 
United States v. King, 48 U.S. 92 1848 Annexation of Louisiana 
Oakey v. Bennett, 52 U.S. 33 1851 Annexation of Texas  
Butler v. Pa, 51 U.S. 402 1851 County officers challenging salaries 
League v. De Young, 52 U.S. 185 1851 Annexation of Texas 
O’ Reilly v.Morse, 56 U.S. 62 1854 Patent infringement 
United States v. Dawson, 56 U.S. 467 1854 Arkansas and indian territory 
Christy v. Pridgen, 71 U.S. 196 1866 Annexation of Texas  
Miss v. Johnson, 71 U.S. 475 1867 Annexation of Texas  
De Haro v. United States, 72 U.S. 599 1867 Annexation of California 
Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. 36 1872 Police powers of the state 
Comm’rs of Laramie v. Comm’rs of Albany, 92 U.S. 307 1875 County reduction and debt payment 
La. v. Pilsbury, 105 U.S. 278 1881 Rates of taxation  
In re Devoe Mfg. Co., 108 U.S. 401 1883 District of New York annexation 
Mobile v. Watson, 116 U.S. 289 1886 City’s legal successor 
Late Corp. of Church of J. Christ v. U. S., 136 U.S. 1 1890 Texas annexation 
Cook v. United Stats, 138 U.S. 157 1891 Texas annexation 
Boyd v. Nebraska, 143 U.S. 135 1892 Citizenship 
Long Island Water Supply Co. v. Brooklyn, 166 U.S. 685 1897 Eminent domain and judicial review 
Forsyth v. Hammond, 166 U.S. 06 1897 Tax and county comm. Board ann. 
United States v. Wong Kim Ark, 169 U.S. 649 1898 Annexation of foreign territory 
McCain v. Des Moines, 174 U.S. 168 1899 Annexation under color of law 
Morris v. United States, 174 U.S. 196 1899 Claim of heirs of a river 
Clark v. Kansas City, 176 U.S. 114 1900 Individuals and corp. annexation land 
De Lima v. Bidwell, 182 U.S. 1 1901 Taxation territory and Puerto Rico 
Downes v. Bidwell, 182 U.S. 244 1901 Puerto Rico’s annexation to the U.S. 
Ex parte Wilder’s S.S. Co., 183 U.S. 545 1902 Hawaii annexation 
Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. McGrew, 188 U.S. 291 1903 Ownership of insurance policy 
Hawaii v. Mankichi, 190 U.S. 197 1903 Crim. proc. and Hawaii annexation 
Gonzales v. Williams, 192 U.S. 1 1904 Porto Rico’s annexation to the U.S. 
Dorr v. United States, 195 U.S. 138 1904 Self-gov. in territory: jury trial 
Worcester v. Worcester C. S. R. Co., 196 U.S. 539 1905 State interfering with municipality 
Carter v. Gear, 197 U.S. 348 1905 Annexation of Hawaii 
Blair v. Chi., 201 U.S. 400 1906 Right of the city to grant license 
Hunter v. Pittsburgh, 207 U.S. 161 1907 Consolidation two cities and taxes 
Kealoha v. Castle, 210 U.S. 149 1908 Annexation of Hawaii 
Ponce v. Roman Catholic Apostolic Church, 210 U.S. 296 1908 Porto Rico and gift to Church 
Honolulu Rapid Trst & Land Co. v. Wilder, 211 U.S. 137 1908 Hawaii annexation 
Wynne v. United States, 217 U.S. 234 1910 Hawaii annexation 
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Table 5.5: cont. Search based on “annexation” and “local government” (without exclusions): Part II 
Cases concerning annexation and local gov. (Part II) Year Issue 
Virginia v. West Virginia, 220 U.S. 1 1911 Jurisd. of USSC: disputes btw states 
Elzaburu v. Chaves, 239 U.S. 283 1915 Claim about disputed ownership 
Dakota Cent. Tel. Co. v. S.D., 250 U.S. 163 1919 Annexation telephone lines WW I 
Porto Rico R., Light and Power Co. v. Mor, 253 U.S. 345 1920 Porto Rico annexation 
Exchange Trust Co.  v. Drainage Dist., 278 U.S. 421 1929 County court ann. Arkansas 
Missouri ex rel Missouri Ins. Co. v. Gehner, 281 U.S. 313 1930 Freedom of US bonds from state tax 
Hooven & Allison Co. v. Evatt, 324 U.S. 652 1945 State tax after annexation 
Duncan v. Kahanamoku, 327 U.S. 304 1946 Hawaii annexation 
United States v. Fullard-Leo, 331 U.S. 256 1947 Hawaii annexation 
Vermilya-Brown Co. v. Connell, 335 U.S. 377 1948 Fair labor relations Act 
United States v. Texas, 339 U.S. 707 1950 Texas annexation 
Madsen v. Kinsella, 343 U.S. 341 1952 Armed forces jurisdiction 
Howard v. Commissioners of Sinking Fund, 344 U.S. 624 1953 Annexation of federal area by munic. 
Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1 1957 Criminal jurisdiction after ann. 
Perez v. Brownell, 356 U.S. 44 1958 Denationalization of Am. to German 
Harrison v. NAACP, 360 U.S. 167 1959 Jurisdiction conflict annexation 
United States v. Louisiana, 363 U.S. 1 1960 Texas annexation 
Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145 1968 Hawaii annexation 
Perkins v. Matthews, 400 U.S. 379 1971 Discrimination Voting Rights Act 
James v. Valtierra, 402 U.S. 137 1971 Race and vote 
Mahan v. Howell, 410 U.S. 315 1973 Virginia’s reapportionment statute 
San Antonio Ind. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 1973 Texas school district and equal prot. 
Ga. v. United States  1973 Voting Rights Act 
Milliken v. Bradley, 418 U.S. 717 1974 School desegregation 
Richmond v. United States, 422 U.S. 358 1975 Discrimination Voting Rights Act 
Lockport v. Ctz. for Cm. Ac. at Ll. Lv., Inc. 430 U.S. 259 1977 NY law equal prot. City and non city  
Hazelwood School Dist. v. United States, 433 U.S. 299 1977 Ann. and Civil Rights Act 
United States v. Board of Comm’rs, 435 U.S. 110 1978 Voting Rights Act 
Dougherty County, Ga. Bd. of Ed. v. White, 439 US. 32 1978 Voting Rights Act 
Holt Civic Club v. Tuscaloosa, 439 U.S. 60  1978 Non-resident right to vote: XIV Am. 
Columbus Bd. of Educ. v. Penick, 443 U.S. 449 1979 Racial discrimination in school distr. 
Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S. 164 1979 Hawaii annexation 
City of Rome v. United States, 446 U.S. 156 1980 Voting discrimination XV Amend. 
Port Arthur v. United States, 459 U.S. 159 1982 Voting Rights Act 
Summa Corp v. California, 466 U.S. 198 1984 California annexation 
Hallie v. Eau Claire, 471 U.S. 34 1985 State action and antitrust law 
Macdonald v. County of Yolo, 477 U.S. 340 1986 Zoning regulations and just comp. 
Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469 1989 Racial discrimination 
Presley v. Etowah County Comm’n, 502 U.S. 491 1992 Voting Rights Act 
Holder v. Hall, 512 U.S. 874 1994 Dilution and Voting Rights Act 
Johnson v. De Grandy, 512 U.S. 997 1994 Voting Rights Act 
Reno v. Bossier Parish Sch. Bd., 520 U.S. 471 1997 Texas annexation 
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Table 5.5: cont. Search based on “annexation” and “local government” (without exclusions): Part III 
Cases concerning annexation and local gov. (Part III) Year Issue 
Abrams v. Johnson, 521 U.S. 74 1997 Race as factor for county lines 
Miller v. Albright, 523 U.S. 420 1998 Nationality/ citizenship 
Reno v. Bossier Parish Sch. Bd., 528 U.S. 320 2000 Voting Rights Act 
Rice v. Cayetano, 528 U.S. 495 2000 Voting Rights Act 
Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723 2008 Detention in Guantanamo Bay 
FTC v. Phoebe Putney Health Sys., 133 S. Ct. 1003 2013 State legislation power and the city 
Shelby County v. Holder, 133 S. Ct. 2612 2013 Voting Rights Act is unconst. 
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CHAPTER SIX 
DO SPECIALIZED COURTS MAKE A DIFFERENCE? EVIDENCE FROM BRAZILIAN STATE 
SUPREME COURTS
901 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Court specialization has been promoted as a significant component of legal 
reform worldwide. This chapter focuses on possible differences between constitutional 
decisions made by a nonspecialized court sitting en banc or by a specialized court panel 
(órgão especial) across the Brazilian state supreme courts.                    
 There is a vast literature on the costs902 and benefits903 of court specialization, and 
how it impacts legal consistency. 904   In this context, this chapter discusses the 
                                                        
901 A much concise version of this chapter will be published in the European Business Law Review 
(Forthcoming, 2016). 
 
902 The main criticism against specialized courts is the possibility of capture by interest groups. This is a 
relevant issue in the context of constitutional review. The literature points out two major moments for 
capture: at appointment and at adjudication. As for the appointment procedure, interest groups might 
exercise influence in supporting a particular candidate.  At the adjudication phase, as the argument goes, 
the smaller and the more specialized the court, the easier monitoring becomes. Likewise, the easier it is to 
influence those deciding the cases. Nevertheless, the fact that specialized judges organized as a cohesive 
group are less likely to be accountable may be an advantage in and of itself. Importantly, in subject matters 
of public law (such as administrative and constitutional law), government structural bias might occur, with 
the government aligning its bureaucratic structure with that of the specialized court. See, generally: 
Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss, “Specialized Adjudication,” Brigham Y oung University Law Review 64 
(1990): 377–441, at 380, emphasizing that even members of the bar would exercise capture. 
 
903 Recurrent arguments favoring constitutional specialization include the superior quality of the decisions, 
legal coherence, uniformity, and diminished workload of ordinary courts. Regarding the quality, it is 
argued that the contents of decisions tend to be better in specialized courts, because judges are more 
familiar with the main claims and pertinent theories of the particular field (in our case, constitutional law). 
Therefore, less time is spent in debating or discovering the applicable law, with a final decision being 
rendered in a speedy fashion. By contrast, a common point against specialization refers to the quality of 
those in the specialized bench. Arguably, the repetitive nature of the work does not help to attract the most 
brilliant individuals of the legal profession. See, e.g., Giuseppe Dari-Mattiacci, Nuno Garoupa and 
Fernando Gomez-Pomar, “State Liability,” European Review of Private Law 18  (2010): 773–811, at 800–
801, and references therein.   
 
904 Legal coherence and uniformity are often mentioned, because the aggregation of cases in a single, but 
smaller, constitutional court will facilitate consensus. As the argument goes, it will promote better guidance 
to litigants of future cases, by increasing predictability in the area of constitutional review. The workload of 
generalist judges will also be smaller, because the specialized panel will dislocate their initial jurisdiction 
on the subject matter. In this direction: Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss, “The Federal Circuit: A Case Study in 
Specialized Courts,” New Y ork University Law Review 64 (1989): 1–78, at 8; Dreyfuss, Specialized 
Adjudication, at 378; Richard L. Revesz, “Specialized Courts and the Administrative Lawmaking System,” 
University of Pennsylvania Law Review 138 (1990): 1111–1175; Nuno Garoupa and Carlos Gomez-
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constitutional review exercised by Brazilian state supreme courts or specialized panels of 
those courts.         
 Constitutional review is important due to its positive relation with economic and 
political stability. It may ultimately contribute to the assurance of political and economic 
liberties and, by doing so, such review enhances economic growth.905 Constitutional 
review is also relevant to the extent that the judiciary tends to be more isolated from 
immediate political calculation, thus enabling the courts to protect rights more 
effectively.906          
 When Brazilian state supreme courts exercise constitutional review of state or 
municipal norms based in an alleged violation of the constitution of the state, they do so 
resembling preponderantly the constitutional court originally conceived by Kelsen.907 
This understanding of state supreme courts as constitutional courts is based mainly on the 
fact that their adjudication occurs in a centralized fashion and in abstract. It is 
centralized,908 because the state supreme court (or the specialized tribunal, where exists 
                                                                                                                                                                     
Liguerre, “The Syndrome of the Efficiency of the Common Law,” Boston University International Law 
Journal 29 (2011): 287–335, at 322. 
 
905 See Garoupa and Gomez-Liguerre, The Syndrome of the Efficiency of the Common Law, at 330–331; 
see also Rafael La Porta, Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes, Cristian Pop-Eleches and Andrei Shleifer, “Judicial 
Checks and Balances,” Journal of Political Economy 112 (2004): 445–470, presenting empirical findings 
validating the importance of constitutional review and independent courts. 
 
906 See, e.g., Alec Stone Sweet, Governing with Judges: Constitutional Politics in Europe (New York: 
Oxford University Press, 2010), at 225. 
 
907 Hans Kelsen, Jurisdição Constitucional (São Paulo: VMF Martins Fontes, 2003), at VIII, providing 
details about the collaboration of Kelsen, since 1918, in the writing of the Austrian Constitution of 1920. 
State supreme courts and specialized panels are both within the Brazilian judiciary – so they are not 
integrated by political actors as Kelsen initially advocated as the main composition for constitutional 
courts. See, e.g., Víctor Ferreres Comella, “The Rise of Specialized Constitutional Courts,” in Comparative 
Constitutional Law, ed. Rosalind Dixon and Tom Ginsburg (Northampton: Elgar Publishing, 2011), at 268–
271, discussing the rise of specialized constitutional courts as conceived by Kelsen and citing legal 
certainty, expertise, and democracy as recurrent arguments in justifying specialization of constitutional 
review. Specifically emphasizing the Kelsenian court as having jurisdiction over Austrian federalism 
disputes: Tom Ginsburg and Mila Versteeg, “Why Do Countries Adopt Constitutional Review?,” Journal of 
Law, Economics and Organization 30 (2013): 587–637, at 592. 
 
908 The centralized system of judicial review is based on the absence of stare decisis in Continental Europe, 
generally. The effect of stare decisis is that a decision of the highest court in any jurisdiction is biding on all 
lower courts of that jurisdiction. Accordingly, where there is stare decisis, the decision of the highest court 
is bidding erga omnes (towards all), in practice. See, e.g., Mauro Cappelletti, Judicial Review in the 
Contemporary World (Indianapolis: The Bobbs-Merrill Company, 1971), at 56. The current chapter of this 
thesis will further detail the jurisdiction of state courts in Brazil. 
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one) is the only court that has jurisdiction. By contrast, in the decentralized system (e.g., 
in the United States), every judge has such prerogative. The concrete system of judicial 
review present in the United States was perceived by Kelsen as subjecting distinct courts 
to interpret constitutional provisions in a different manner and, therefore, 
nonuniformly.909 In addition, it has been argued that constitutional courts are more prone 
to activism.910          
 State supreme courts may also be considered constitutional courts because they 
rule on cases in an abstract context (i.e., without the U.S. requirement of an actual case or 
controversy). Hence, the unconstitutionality of a norm is the main question being 
decided, with predetermined persons, bodies, or institutions exclusively authorized to 
initiate the action and entitled to legitimate standing. Among the latter, frequently 
political actors or other branches of government are authorized to proceed as so.911 
 Brazil provides an interesting context to test the relationship between specialized 
constitutional review and output measures, because there are variations across Brazilian 
state supreme courts within the same cultural and legal backgrounds.  
Cross-country empirical analysis does not provide for full control of differences 
in cultural and legal contexts. The twenty-seven states of the Brazilian federation are 
organized in five regions. Those regions grouped states with similar geographical, 
                                                        
909 Hans Kelsen, Judicial Review of Legislation: A Comparative Study of the Austrian and the U.S. 
Constitution, The Journal of Politics 4, No. 2 (1942): 183–200, at 185. 
 
910 Victor Ferreres Comella, “Comparative Avenues in Constitutional Law: Constitutional Structures and 
Institutional Designs: The Consequences of Centralizing Constitutional Review in a Special Court: Some 
Thoughts on Judicial Activism,” Texas Law Review 82 (2004): 1705–1736, at 1712–1720, contending that 
constitutional courts are more prone to activism for several reasons, including justifying their own 
existence. Other factors that would apply to state courts in Brazil refer to the absence of discretionary 
jurisdiction of the constitutional court. Because they have to decide the cases, they are not authorized to 
exercise the “passive virtues” or prudence when the issues at bar are the most controversial ones. Another 
factor applicable to Brazilian state courts refers to the difficulty in the use of partial avoidance when it 
comes to abstract challenges. Abstract control implies a complete decision. Due to its own broad nature, 
hardly a compromise is found. 
 
911 See: Nuno Garoupa and Tom Ginsburg, “Building Reputation in Constitutional Courts: Political and 
Judicial Audiences,” Arizona Journal of International and Comparative Law 23, N. 3 (2011): 539–568, at 
540, providing an analysis in the context of comparative law; Martin Shapiro and Alec Stone Sweet, On 
Law, Politics, & Judicialization (New York: Oxford University Press, 2003), at 348–350, and at 365–375, 
reaching similar conclusions despite the criticism of the generalist classification that ultimately understands 
that there is no abstract review in the U.S. Recall our discussion about the potential existence of abstract 
review in the U.S. in chapter four of this thesis. 
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historical, economic, social, and cultural experiences (Table 6.8 summarizes the Brazilian 
states and regions).   
With the purpose of investigating how specialized constitutional review may 
affect output measures, an original dataset was constructed by the authors to empirically 
explore this question. This dataset considered the cases of abstract review judged 
between January 1, 2006, and December 31, 2010. It was originally designed to 
encompass cases of ação direta de inconstitucionalidade (or representação de 
inconstitucionalidade),912 ação declaratória de constitucionalidade,913 and ação direta de 
inconstitucionalidade por omissão914 across twenty-five state supreme courts of the 
Brazilian federation, 915  having as a parameter of constitutional review the state 
constitution.916 Six hundred and thirty cases were included in the dataset. The aim of this 
                                                        
912 The direct action of unconstitutionality (ação direta de inconstitucionalidade - Adin) is a form of direct 
action in which the declaration of unconstitutionality occurs in the principal form of review – i.e., the main 
goal of the claim is the invalidation of a state or federal norm in abstract. It is exercised under the 
concentrate control of constitutional review by the Brazilian Supreme Court (Supremo Tribunal Federal), 
when the allegedly unconstitutionality refers to violation of the Republican Constitution; or by state 
supreme courts, if the state or local norm is arguably violating the state constitution. Representação de 
inconstitucionalidade is how the Republican Constitution refers to the federal ação direta de 
inconstitucionalidade, i.e., direct action of unconstitutionality at the state level in article 125, paragraph 
second of the of the Constitution of 1988. This research focuses on the state level and uses both terms (ação 
direta de inconstitucionalidade and representação de inconstitucionalidade) interchangeably. 
 
913 The declaratory action of constitutionality (ação declaratória de constitucionalidade - ADC) is also a 
form of direct action, with the declaration of constitutionality occurring in the so-called principal form of 
review. It has as object a particular federal norm in abstract – and federal norm only, according to article 
102, I, a, of the Constitution of 1988. The declaratory action of constitutionality is solely exercised under 
the concentrate control by the state supreme courts if the state norm is arguably conflicting with the state 
constitution. The existence of the declaratory action of constitutionality on the state level is not unanimous 
across the Brazilian federation and the state supreme courts search tools did not distinguish the ADC from 
Adin on the state level, as detailed infra. 
 
914 This research originally included ação direta de inconstitucionalidade por omissão – namely, direct 
actions by omission or lack of a particular measure. None was found in our sample, as discussed in Section 
III. The existence of the Adin by omission on the state level is itself controversial. Providing arguments 
supporting such existence: Clèmerson Merlin Clève, A Fiscalização Abstrata da Constitucionalidade no 
Direito Brasileiro (São Paulo: Editora Revista dos Tribunais, 2000), at 392–394. 
 
915 Although we have researched all twenty-seven Brazilian states (including the federal district, which has 
its own tribunal as if it were a state), data for two states could not be gathered, because it was not available 
online by the time we finished this dataset (December, 2013). For further information about the states 
included and their data: see section referring to the Hypothesis and Dataset, and Table 6.1, infra.  
 
916 In Brazil, “parameter” is the most common denomination referring to the distinction between the 
abstract control of constitutionality exercised considering the text of the state constitution or the federal 
one. Notwithstanding the complexity of Brazilian judicial review and potential thorns that often exist in 
technical legal translations, it is worth contextualizing the use of such denomination. The U.S. 
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research is to study the impact of the federalism choice concerning the creation of 
specialized panels in Brazil. This chapter also aims to identify possible sources of 
variance in order to explain asymmetric patterns of delay, decision-making and litigation. 
 The first question to consider is whether there are significant variations regarding 
the outcomes of the cases of abstract review. Our study of abstract review in the state 
level across Brazilian state supreme courts is unique. Direct actions of unconstitutionality 
arising out of arguable violations to the Republican Constitution, which can only be filed 
at the STF, have been object of study of several scholars.917 The second question is if 
there are variations, can they be correlated with the use of a specialized panel (órgão 
especial), the latter being frequent in the larger states (a variable to be taken into account 
in the empirical exercise)?         
 At the same time, we make a contribution to the understanding of the Brazilian 
judicial system, focusing on the decisions of state courts regarding the constitutionality of 
                                                                                                                                                                     
constitutional experience does not have an exact term to replace the Brazilian concept of “parameter of 
constitutionality,” due to the fact that the U.S. judicial review is traditionally exercised in concrete cases, 
i.e., the arguable unconstitutionality of a norm is discussed in an actual case or controversy with the 
plaintiff having to prove an injury in fact, generally (see chapter four of this thesis for a discussion about 
the existence of abstract review in the U.S.). In any event, the concrete review is strikingly different from 
the abstract review, where the constitutionality is the focus of the lawsuit and judged in abstract – i.e., with 
no injury in fact being required. In the abstract review, as said earlier, only pre-selected persons, bodies or 
institutions have standing to argue the constitutionality in such theoretical framework. Furthermore, the 
U.S. constitutional tradition refers ordinarily to “limitations” when considering the potential conflict 
between state and federal constitutional norms. Kenneth L. Karst, revised by James E. Pfander, ed. Kermit 
Hall, The Oxford Companion to the Supreme Court of the United States (New York: Oxford University 
Press, 2005), at 532, stating that this view is based on the general understanding that state and national 
spheres of sovereignty are a natural consequence of the U.S. dual federalism. See, among others: Erwin 
Chemerinsky, Constitutional Law: Principles and Policies (New York: Aspen Publishers, 2006), at 312–
327, and at 389–473, detailing federal and state powers, the Tenth Amendment, as well as the limits on 
state regulatory and taxing power in light of doctrines of preemption, the Dormant Commerce Clause, and 
the Privileges and Immunities Clause of article IV, Section 2, of the United States Constitution. It is 
noteworthy that, in Brazil, depending on the exact interpretation chosen for the long and analytic 
Republican Constitution of 1988, the already limited scope of state competences and powers might be 
reduced even further, as stressed in: Gilmar Ferreira Mendes and Paulo Gustavo Gonet Branco, Curso de 
Direito Constitucional (São Paulo, Saraiva, 2013), at 1322. 
 
917 For research focusing on Adins in the federal level, see, for instance: Luiz Werneck Vianna, Maria Alice 
R. Carvalho, Manoel P. C. Melo and Marcelo B. Burgos, A Judicialização da Política e das Relações 
Sociais no Brasil (São Paulo: Revan, 1999); Marcus Faro de Castro, “The Courts Law and Democracy in 
Brazil,” International Social Science Journal 152 (1997): at 241–252; Luiz Werneck Vianna, Marcelo 
Baumann, and Paula Martins Salles, “Dezessete Anos de Judicialização da Política,” Tempo Social Revista 
de Sociologia da USP 19 (2007): 39–85; Matthew M. Taylor, “Citizen Against the State: the Riddle of 
High Impact, Low Functionality Courts in Brazil,” Brazilian Journal of Political Economy 25 (2005): 418–
438; Matthew M. Taylor and Luciano Da Ros, “Os Partidos Dentro e Fora do poder: A Judicialização como 
Resultado Contingente da Estratégia Política,” DADOS – Revista de Ciências Sociais 51 (2008): 825–864. 
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laws in abstract control in light of the state constitution. This empirical approach with the 
use of regression analysis is not common in Brazil, especially in relation to courts other 
than the Supreme Court.918         
 The performance measures we analyze are the ones most obviously related to the 
arguments favorable and unfavorable to specialized constitutional review. If a specialized 
court is better than a nonspecialized court, then we should expect cases to be decided 
faster; therefore, we study duration. Along those lines, cases should reflect better quality 
of lawmaking (hence we look at length and citations of superior courts). Furthermore, 
because a specialized bench is expected to know better legal doctrines and their nuances, 
we could expect deeper legal discussions and potentially different reasoning (thus we 
consider dissent rates).         
 In light of the above, the main contributions of this research to the literature are 
straightforward: an original dataset designed by the authors in order to compare decisions 
by state specialized panels versus states without those specialized panels, across Brazilian 
state supreme courts. In addition, this research investigates whether the existence of 
specialized panels can be correlated to potential differences across states within the 
context of constitutional review. Hence, we address the general question of the impact of 
the federalism choices, namely, the discretion in the creation of specialized panels in 
Brazil.           
 This chapter proceeds as follows. An overview of the Brazilian system of judicial 
review and the related topic of the jurisdiction of state supreme courts are presented in 
Part II. The hypothesis is addressed in Part III. A regression analysis is presented in Part 
IV and discussed in Part V. Part VI concludes the current chapter, considering our 
preliminary findings.    
 
 
 
                                                        
918 For empirical research using regressions in the STF, see, e.g., Maria Fernanda Jaloretto and Bernardo 
Pinheiro Machado Müeller, “O Procedimento de Escolha dos Ministros do Supremo Tribunal Federal – 
uma Análise Empírica,” Economic Analysis of Law Review 2 (2011): 170–187; Mariana Llanos and Leany 
Barreiro Lemos, “Presidential Preferences? The Supreme Federal Tribunal Nominations in Democratic 
Brazil,” Latin American Politics and Society 55, N. 2 (2013): 1–25; Ricardo Ribeiro, “Preferências, Custos 
da Decisão e Normas Jurídicas no Processo Decisório das Cortes: o Modelo de Múltiplos 
Comportamentos,” Economic Analysis of Law Review 2 (2011): 264–296.  
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II. THE BRAZILIAN SYSTEM OF JUDICIAL REVIEW 
This Part is divided into three Sections. Section A begins with an overview of the 
Brazilian system of judicial review. Section B discusses the mechanisms of appointment 
to the STF and state supreme courts, while Section C contextualizes and generally 
identifies the particular requirements for the constitutional actions included in our 
research.  
A. Overview of Judicial Review in Brazil 
 Judicial review in Brazil is understood based on two main criteria: subjective and 
procedural. The subjective criterion refers to the judicial bodies that exercise the control 
and is divided into diffuse or concentrate.919 The judicial review is diffuse when any 
judge or court – provided that they have jurisdictional power – can pronounce the 
unconstitutionality of a law. This is how it generally happens in the United States. By 
contrast, in the concentrate form, judicial review is restricted to a limited number of 
bodies with original jurisdictional power – that is, they do not hear the case on appeal, but 
as a first instance court.         
 The procedural criterion is based on the form under which control is exercised. It 
occurs in an incidental form – focusing on the concrete case, as it usually is in the United 
States, as opposed to occurring in a principal form. In the latter, there is no specific 
concrete case, and the court has to consider abstract arguments as well as the possible 
effects of the alleged unconstitutional law. In the incidental form, the court has to rule on 
the constitutionality as an incidental question related to the merits of the case. In the 
principal form, however, the judgment about the constitutionality is the core and the 
exclusive question related to the merit of the case.920    
 The judicial review model adopted by the Brazilian Constitution of 1988 is a 
hybrid, combining the incidental and diffuse model (the U.S. system) with the principal 
and concentrate model (the continental European form). The principal control  – namely, 
                                                        
919 Keith S. Rosenn, “Procedural Protection of Constitutional Rights in Brazil,” American Journal of 
Comparative Law 59 (2011): 1009–1050, at 1009–1013, analyzing the Brazilian system of judicial review 
and stating its notoriously complexity. 
 
920 Luís Roberto Barroso, O Controle de Constitucionalidade no Direito Brasileiro (Rio de Janeiro: Saraiva, 
2012), at 72–73. 
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the one usually exercised through direct actions and in abstract – occurs in two forms. In 
the first form, the direct action is initiated in the STF, where the unconstitutionality refers 
to federal or state laws arguably in conflict with the Republican Constitution.921 The other 
form is the focus of this chapter: direct actions initiated in state supreme courts and 
arising out of the unconstitutionality of state or municipal laws that are potentially 
violating the constitution of a given state. 
B. Context and Particular Requirements for Constitutional Actions 
 We turn our attention to the concentrate, principal, and abstract controls of 
constitutionality. This work focuses on the forms of direct action of unconstitutionality 
(Adin, as they are called), direct action of unconstitutionality arising out of omission,922 
and declaratory action of constitutionality (ADC). We do note, however, that both actions 
(Adin and ADC) have their procedural aspects determined by the federal law 9,868 of 
1999. The declaratory action of constitutionality has no rigorous counterpart in 
comparative experience.923 The Republican Constitution does not expressly mention the 
declaratory action of constitutionality at the state level, but there is specialized legal 
doctrine arguing its admissibility.924    
                                                        
921 Idem, at 87–88. 
 
922 This research distinguishes the Direct Action of Unconstitutionality based on action – also called 
generic Adin – from the Direct Action of Unconstitutionality based on omission (Adin by omission). The 
latter is determined under the federal law 12,063 of 2009, combined with the federal law 9868 of 1999. 
According to article 103, paragraph 2, of the Constitution of 1988: When the unconstitutionality is declared 
on account of lack of a measure (omission) to render a constitutional provision effective, the competent 
power shall be notified for the adoption of the necessary actions and, in the case of an administrative body, 
shall do so within thirty days. Hely Lopes Meirelles, Arnoldo Wald and Gilmar Ferreira Mendes, Mandado 
de Segurança e Ações Constitucionais (São Paulo: Malheiros, 2009), at 500, stating that the STF also has 
jurisdiction to rule on legislative omission of state courts. We reiterate that in our research across the 
Brazilian state supreme courts no direct action for unconstitutionality by omission was found. We further 
discuss those findings in Part III of this chapter. 
 
923 Barroso, O Controle de Constitucionalidade no Direito Brasileiro, at 258. 
 
924 Citing the theoretical approaches, and also advocating for the admissibility of the declaratory action of 
constitutionality at the state level: Barroso, O Controle de Constitucionalidade no Direito Brasileiro, at 261; 
Alexandre de Moraes, Direito Constitucional (São Paulo: Atlas, 2012), at 811; Uadi Lammêgo Bulos, 
Curso de Direito Constitucional (São Paulo: Saraiva, 2012), at 318. Contending that such declaratory action 
would not be very useful, to the extent that the arguable unconstitutional state norm would still be subject 
to federal constitutional review: Clève, A Fiscalização Abstrata da Constitucionalidade no Direito 
Brasileiro, at 395–396. 
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It is noteworthy that the generic Adin and ADC are very similar actions whose 
main difference is the need for a prior judicial controversy about the constitutionality of a 
law.925 The justification of such specific requirement in the case of the ADC is based on 
the general presumption of constitutionality of all legal norms. This requirement also 
impacts the effects of the decision. Hence, in Adin, the decision that recognizes the 
unconstitutionality has retroactive effects (ex tunc) unless the appropriate court decides 
differently. In ADC, however, the decision recognizing the constitutionality has 
immediate effects, without retroactive consequences. Both actions admit in limine 
decisions, and the final decision of the STF is binding toward all possible parties (erga 
omnes).926         
 Caution is recommended when analyzing those possibilities of concurrent 
jurisdiction of state supreme courts and the STF.927 The case law of the STF has created a 
special cause for suspension of the lawsuit in the state supreme court when two different 
lawsuits are initiated in the federal and state levels. It occurs when a lawsuit was started 
in the STF and another one in the state supreme court, with the challenged state norm 
arising out of a mandatory repetition clause of the Republican Constitution in the state 
constitution. In this particular hypothesis, the lawsuit filed at the state supreme court is 
suspended.          
 Notwithstanding the position of the STF with regard to the definition of the norms 
that should be considered of mandatory repetition,928 there is no doctrinal consensus 
                                                        
925 Technically, the other main distinction was mentioned in the Introduction, supra, when emphasized that 
Adins arising out of potential violation to the Republican Constitution of 1988 may have as object state and 
federal laws or normative acts; whereas ADCs arising out of potential violation to the Constitution can only 
have federal laws as object. 
 
926 This study addresses in limine decisions as a generic term for preliminary injunction and remedies. This 
chapter disregards the distinction between “liminar” and “cautelar,” noting, however, that the former is a 
type of in limine decisions.  
 
927 Meirelles, Wald and Mendes, Mandado de Segurança e Ações Constitucionais, at 429. 
 
928 The case law of the STF has considered as being norms of mandatory repetition, among others: all the 
norms pertinent to the legislative procedure, including rules about who is the competent authority to draft 
bills; all the norms of the Republican Constitution that were aimed at the public administration – at all 
levels; all constitutional provisions about the Judiciary and its auxiliary functions; number of state 
representatives in the state assembly, term limits for governors and mayors, and reelection provisions. 
These constitutional norms have been perceived as a manifestation of the necessary symmetrical 
arrangement between state and federal levels. In this direction, for instance: Mendes and Branco, Curso de 
Direito Constitucional, at 792–793, and Lammêgo Bulos, Curso de Direito Constitucional, at 915–918.  
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about the full extension of those norms. The question of a constitutional norm that is 
reproduced in the state constitution is not simple, because there are norms in the 
Republican Constitution that must be repeated, identically, in the state constitutions. 
Those norms are called norms of mandatory reproduction.  They coexist with norms that 
the state constitution may opt to repeat – in this case, norms of imitation.929 Only the first 
type – norms of mandatory reproduction – is subject to review by the STF in the context 
of extraordinary appeal. Norms of state imitation are not subject to such extraordinary 
review because, strictly speaking, they are state norms.930     
 We should note that in abstract control, as opposed to in concrete control, only 
certain parties are allowed to initiate the lawsuit. Thus, standing is restricted to 
preselected persons, bodies, institutions, or groups.931 The current text of the Republican 
Constitution of 1988 is understood to be quite progressive,932 allowing a broad number of 
actors to initiate an abstract lawsuit in the STF.933 This extended list suggests that the 
                                                        
929
 Clève, A Fiscalização Abstrata da Constitucionalidade no Direito Brasileiro, at 404. 
 
930 Idem. 
 
931  Article 103 of the Constitution of 1988 affirms that: The following may file an action of 
unconstitutionality and the declaratory actions of constitutionality: I - the President of the Republic; II - the 
Directing Board of the Federal Senate; III - the Directing Board of the House of Representatives; V - the 
Directing Board of a State Legislative Assembly or of the Legislative Chamber of the Federal District; V - 
a State Governor or the Governor of the Federal District; VI - the Attorney-General of the Republic; VII - 
the Federal Council of the Brazilian Bar Association; VIII - a political party represented in the National 
Congress; IX - a confederation of labor unions or professional association of nationwide nature. §1 - The 
Attorney-General of the Republic shall be previously heard in actions of unconstitutionality and in all suits 
under the power of the Supreme Federal Court. §2 - When unconstitutionality is declared on account of 
lack of a measure to render a constitutional provision effective, the competent Power shall be notified for 
the adoption of the necessary actions and, in the case of an administrative body to do so within thirty days. 
§3 - When the Supremo Tribunal Federal examines the unconstitutionality in abstract of a legal provision 
or normative act, it shall first summon the Advocate-General of the Union, who shall defend the impugned 
act or text. 
 
932 The original text was already quite broad, but became even more extensive after the Constitutional 
Amendment 45 of 2004. This amendment introduced the Governor of the Federal District, as well as its 
Legislative Assembly as parties entitled to standing. Presenting a detailed analysis on the extended list of 
parties as a particular feature of the centralization trend in the STF, see, for example: Diana Kapiszewski, 
High Courts and Economic Governance in Argentina and Brazil (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
2012), at 98–101. 
 
933 Criticizing the centralization in the STF promoted by the súmula vinculante, inaugurated by the 
Constitutional Amendment 45 of 2004, and the related modification in the balance of power between the 
highest court and the lower courts: Daniel M. Brinks, “Judicial Reform and Independence in Brazil and 
Argentina: The Beginning of a New Millennium?,” Texas Law Review 40 (2005): 595–622, at 618–621. 
The Republican Constitution of 1988 prohibits the standing of one single body, as stated in its article 125, 
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intent is to strengthen the abstract control as a peculiar mechanism of correction of the 
more general system of concrete judicial review. It is worth noting that the vast lists of 
rights that are protected in the Constitution have contributed to increase the STF 
power.934          
 At the state level, by symmetric considerations concerning the federal sphere, the 
following actors are authorized to exercise abstract and concentrate reviews based on 
alleged violations of the state constitution: the state governor, the directing board of the 
state assembly (panel composed of the president, two vice-presidents, and four vice-
secretaries elected by the state assembly), state general prosecutor (Procurador Geral de 
Justiça), political parties represented in the state assembly, confederation of labor unions 
or professional association of a statewide nature, and the state committee of the national 
bar association.935  
 Along those lines, the mayor, the directing board of the municipal chamber (panel 
composed of the president, two vice-president, and four vice-secretaries elected by the 
municipal assembly), and political parties represented in the municipal assembly should 
                                                                                                                                                                     
paragraph two: “The states have the competence to institute actions of unconstitutionality of state or 
municipal laws or normative acts in the light of the constitution of the state, it being forbidden to attribute 
legitimation to act (in American constitutional parlor: standing) to a sole body.” 
 
934 Oscar Vilhena Vieira, O Supremo Tribunal Federal: Jurisprudência Política (São Paulo: Malheiros, 
2002), at 20–22. 
 
935 The actual persons, groups, bodies, and institutions that are authorized to initiate the abstract control of 
constitutionality depend on the specific provisions of each state constitution. There is a doctrinal 
controversy about whether or not the parties authorized to have standing in the state level must be the same 
as those of the federal level. See: Meirelles, Wald and Mendes, Mandado de Segurança e Ações 
Constitucionais, at 831, defending the similar nature of ADC and Adin, including at the state level; 
Lammêgo Bulos, Curso de Direito Constitucional, at 280, arguing that the state constitution can actually 
reduce the parties listed in the federal level; Clève, A Fiscalização Abstrata da Constitucionalidade no 
Direito Brasileiro, at 398–399, defending the constitutionality of the freedom for the state constitution to 
determine who is authorized to file an Adin or ADC based on violations of the state constitutions, but 
noting that it will not be recommended to broadly increase such standing. In a practical note: the STF has 
already admitted, in limine, the extended list of the Constitution of the State of Rio de Janeiro, in its article 
162, in the STF case number: ADI 558-8 MC, available at: www.stf.jus.br. According to the decision of the 
STF, of August 16, 1991, the Constitution of the State of Rio de Janeiro is valid, when extending beyond 
the list of those authorized bodies to commence unconstitutionality actions under article 103 of the 
Constitution. For the STF, based on article 125, paragraph four, of the Constitution, the list contained at 
article 103 does not have to be mandatorily followed on the state level, when the unconstitutionality is 
based on the arguable violation of the state constitution. Hence, Public Defenders and General State 
Advocates – who do not have standing to sue in the federal level, because not expressly mentioned in 
article 103 of the Constitution of 1988 – are authorized to file those actions, thus having standing to sue. 
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be authorized to initiate the unconstitutionality action arising out of an arguable conflict 
with provision(s) of the state constitution. 
C. Mechanisms of Appointment for the Brazilian Supreme Court and State 
Supreme Courts  
The mechanism of appointments for justices of the STF was transplanted from the 
U.S. Constitution. Although the STF has eleven justices that are subject to mandatory 
retirement at the age of seventy years old, the remaining provisions are similar to the U.S. 
Constitution. In Brazil, justices (and state supreme court and state judges) are entitled to 
life tenure. The President nominates Justices to the STF subject to confirmation by the 
Senate.936 It has also been considered by some commentators in Brazil that the STF is 
“susceptible to pressures by the ruling political majority” because justices are chosen by 
the President, and duly confirmed by the Senate.937      
 In this scenario, the STF has important features of the archetypal recognition 
judiciary. By contrast, the archetypal career judiciary is preponderant with regard to state 
judges and state supreme courts judges in Brazil. This is so because state judges enter at a 
young age and early in their careers – most of the time immediately after fulfilling the 
requirement of three years of legal practice.938 About 80% of the state supreme court 
judges must have been admitted to the career path through a civil service entrance 
examination consisting of written or written and oral tests. After two years into their 
career path, ordinary judges are entitled to tenure, protection against reduction of their 
payments, and restrictions on their removability.        
 All state judges and state supreme court judges are subject to the same 
constitutional requirements across Brazilian states. Thus, there is uniformity regarding 
the necessity of written exams for entrance in the profession and how one progress in the 
                                                        
936 Article 101 of the Constitution of 1988. 
 
937 Rogério B. Arantes, “Constitutionalism, The Expansion of Justice and the Judicialization of Politics in 
Brazil,” in The Judicialization of Politics in Latin America, ed. Rachel Sieder, Line Schjolden and Alan 
Angell (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2006), at 252. 
 
938 Cappelletti, Judicial Review in the Contemporary W orld, at 63, stressing that European continental 
judges tend to be “career judges,” with professionals entering the judiciary at a very early age, having their 
promotion to higher courts conferred upon a seniority basis, and with the focus of their professional 
training being legal-technic – in contrast to the common law judge who is policy-oriented. 
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career. Each state supreme court administers these exams and makes promotion 
decisions, as a prerogative of their federalism powers. The Brazilian national bar 
association participates in all stages of the public examination.939 The promotion from 
ordinary judge to judge of the state supreme court (located in the capital of each state of 
the Union) is made under two criteria: seniority or merit, alternately.940   
 Regarding the composition of state supreme courts, as we have said before, 80% 
of the members of those courts are forged in their judicial career path. The remaining 
20% are spread among public prosecutors and public defenders (that also have their own 
particular career path), and members of the state bar.        
 Because state supreme court judges are not directly appointed by governors, 
decisions of the state supreme courts in the context of abstract review are expected to be 
less politicized than their counterpart in the STF (federal level).941 In this fashion, lower-
court judges in Brazil follow mechanisms of appointment that seek to remove political 
influences from that process. Such process focuses on securing a meritocratic, 
professionalized, and open exam, with state courts system being isolated politically.942 
Nevertheless, there may be conflicts arising out of different conceptions of the role of the 
judiciary across jurisdictions. Those conflicts occur between old traditional formalistic 
judges and the more modern and socially conscious judges. This tension is particularly 
perceptive within the judicial ranks of Brazil.943 
 
                                                        
939 According to the specific command of article 93, I, of the Constitution of 1988, which determines the 
participation of the national bar association in every phase of the public examination. 
 
940 Article 93, III, of the Constitution of 1988. 
 
941 In the context of continental constitutional courts compared with the U.S. Supreme Court, mechanisms 
of appointment have already been cited as a form to reduce diversity in the court: John Ferejohn and 
Pasquale Pasquino, “Constitutional Adjudication: Lessons from Europe,” Texas Law Review 82 (2004): 
1671–1704, at 1701–1702. This is relevant because the more diverse is the court, the smaller the likelihood 
of consensus with regard to a particular issue at bar.  
 
942 Daniel M. Brinks, “Faithful Servants of the Regime,” in Courts in Latin America, ed. Gretchen Helmke 
and Julio Rios-Figueroa (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012), at 131; Rodrigo M. Nunes, 
“Politics without Insurance: Democratic Competition and Judicial Reform in Brazil,” Comparative Politics 
42 (2010): 313–331, at 313–314. 
 
943 Daniel M. Brinks, “A Tale of Two Cities: The Judiciary and the Rule of Law in Latin America,” in 
Routledge Handbooks of Latin American Politics, ed. Peter Kingstone and Deborah J. Yashar (New York: 
Routledge, 2012), at 66. 
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III. THE HYPOTHESIS AND DATASET 
This research focuses on the cases of abstract review litigated before twenty-five 
Brazilian state supreme courts. Each party wants to maximize what can be regulated (or 
not), at some point enhancing its political powers. In this context, competences or 
attributions of one party necessarily reduces the influence of the other party. The 
legislation reviewed by the state supreme courts reflects a conflict that could not be 
solved politically within the sphere of the state. Conflicts emerge between political actors 
that could not be reconciled without the intervention of state supreme courts.   
 When judging such conflicts, the state supreme court (or specialized panel) is 
constrained by the Republican Constitution as well as by the clauses of mandatory 
repetition, which have been interpreted by the STF as safeguards of federalism. 
Interestingly, the judges who sit in the specialized section of state supreme courts are 
among the most experienced and most knowledgeable according to the election of their 
own peers.           
 The Republican Constitution of 1988, article 93, in the last part of § XI, 
determines that half of the positions of the specialized panel shall be occupied by the 
most senior members of the state supreme court, while the remaining half shall be filled 
by election by the state supreme court sitting en banc. This is different from state 
supreme courts that do not have specialized sections or panels where, theoretically, every 
judge of the state supreme court has a vote.       
 Specialized panels of state supreme courts are not a mandatory constitutional 
requirement. Instead, they are an option that article 93, § XI, of the Republican 
Constitution left to be decided for every state whose state supreme court has more than 
twenty-five state supreme court judges.944 The total number of judges in a state is 
tentatively proportional to the population of the state and the related judicial demand 
(article 93, § XIII, of the Constitution). The creation of the specialized panel is informed 
by complete discretion of the state supreme court, sitting en banc, in terms of its internal 
                                                        
944 For arguments supporting the discretionary nature of the creation of a specialized panel, and arguing that 
the Constitutional Amendment 45 of 2004 reinforced the existence of specialized panels: Alexandre de 
Moraes, “Órgão Especial e Delegação Constitucional de Competências Jurisdicionais, Disciplinares e 
Administrativas do Tribunal Pleno,” Revista de Direito Admnistrativo (2007): 292–305, at 294–297. 
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procedural law. Hence, it is based technically on a judgment of convenience and 
opportunity.
945
          
 This study argues that this constitutional option was made to benefit and respect 
the federalism powers that remained with the states and their related jurisdiction. In order 
to comply with the constitutional provisions, the minimum and maximum numbers of 
state supreme court judges in the composition of the specialized panel shall be eleven and 
twenty-five, respectively.946 The composition of specialized panels of state supreme 
courts must respect the alternation of classes for the 20% of the so-called Quinto 
Constitutional. This percentage, in its literal translation from article 94 of the 
Constitution, means that one fifth of the tribunal (or specialized court) must be formed by 
members of the state public prosecution, public defender, and the state bar association.  
 A note about the jurisdiction of specialized panels is required. Specialized panels 
absorb all competences that originally belonged to the en banc tribunal (plenary), having 
the complete jurisdiction of the subject matter.
947
 Therefore, there is no appeal from the 
decision of the specialized panel to the state supreme court. The specialized panel is a 
court itself. It concentrates on decisions that before its creation would have been made by 
the full state supreme court, i.e., by all of state supreme court judges – namely, by all 
those who have been promoted in the career and have the status of a court of appeals 
judge.            
 It is also noteworthy that where specialized panels have been created, solely the 
judges who are in such panel rule on subject matter of the abstract and concentrate 
control of constitutionality. By contrast, in the states lacking a specialized panel, every 
                                                        
945 Moraes, Direito Constitucional, at 561–562. 
 
946 There have been criticisms about the number of twenty-five as being too large ultimately jeopardizing 
deliberation, as argued by: Nagib Slaibi Filho, O Órgão Especial na Reforma da Justiça, (2011), last 
accessed November of 2013, and available at: ww.nagib.net/index.php/publicacoes/artigos/constitucional, 
at 2. The Professor and member of the state supreme court of Rio de Janeiro notes, at 2, that the number of 
twenty-five judges was the determination of the Constitutional Amendment 7 of 1977 (which modified the 
militarily-enacted Constitution of 1967). 
 
947  Article 93, XI, of the Constitution of 1988, and the Administrative Resolution no. 2, of the National 
Council of Justice, of the 14.03.2006 (Enunciado Administrativo do Conselho Nacional de Justiça-CNJ), 
last accessed February, 2014, and available at http://www.cnj.jus.br/atos-administrativos/atos-da-
presidencia/314-enunciados-administrativos/ 11158 enunciado-administrativo-no-2, establishing that where 
it is created, the specialized panel has the delegated competences of the state supreme court en banc, with 
the quorum for decision by the panel being one of absolute majority of its members. 
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state supreme court judge has a vote, while cumulating other judicial functions with such 
state constitutional review.        
 Furthermore, there is a particular requirement of reserve of judgment by the 
plenary that must be fulfilled when the state supreme court (or when a specialized panel) 
decides the unconstitutionality of a law – as opposed to a single judge. The requirement 
of plenary is essentially a constitutional command determining that only the absolute 
majority of all the judges of a given court – i.e., considering the full bench or the court en 
banc – can declare the unconstitutionality of a law, as determined at article 97 of the 
Brazilian Constitution.         
 The requirement of reserve of judgment by the plenary applies exclusively to the 
declaration of unconstitutionality, but not to declare the constitutionality of a law or 
normative act. The declaration of constitutionality dismisses the plenary requirement due 
to the general legal presumption of constitutionality of laws.
948
 According to this 
requirement, only the absolute majority of the members of the court sitting en banc – or 
the specialized panel, in the states where they exist – can declare a norm to be 
unconstitutional.
949
 In the current Brazilian constitutional text, the plenary requirement 
also applies to the principal and concentrate forms of judicial review as long as such 
unconstitutionality has not yet been recognized by the state supreme court (or its 
specialized panel) or the STF sitting en banc.
950
      
 The requirement of plenary (or full bench) trial applies regardless of whether 
previous acknowledgment occurred in principal or incidental forms. This requirement is 
particularly important to this research, because it focuses on the principal, concentrate, 
and abstract controls exercised by the state supreme courts across the Brazilian 
federation.           
                                                        
948 Barroso, O Controle de Constitucionalidade no Direito Brasileiro, at 120. 
 
949 The current writing of article 93, of the Constitution of 1988 is the following: “A complementary law, 
proposed by the Supremo Tribunal Federal, shall provide for the Statute of the Judiciary, observing the 
following principles: (…) XI - in courts with more than twenty-five judges, a special body may be 
constituted, with a minimum of eleven and a maximum of twenty-five members, to exercise the 
administrative and jurisdictional duties delegated by the full court, one half of the members being chosen 
by seniority, and the other half by voting of the full court.” 
 
950 Barroso, O Controle de Constitucionalidade no Direito Brasileiro, at 120, stating that the requirement 
initially was applicable only to the incidental and diffuse review.  Nowadays, the Professor argues, there is 
no distinction, and the requirement applies to all hypotheses of review. 
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 At this stage, we can hypothesize, primarily based on the constitutional 
arrangement, that specialized panels would affect the performance of the state supreme 
court judges, because only states with more than twenty-five appeal judges are allowed to 
have specialized panels. Considering those institutional arrangements, we elaborated the 
following null hypothesis: 
H0: The existence of a specialized panel has no effect on performance measures across 
state supreme courts.         
 Our dataset includes all the cases of abstract review decided between January 1, 
2006 and December 31, 2010 (mainly cases of ação direta de inconstitucionalidade or 
representação de inconstitucionalidade) across twenty-five state supreme courts – also 
named Court of Appeals in some Brazilian states. Our dataset is summarized by Table 6.1 
(detailed information can be found in Table 6.2).      
 We researched the twenty-seven states of the Brazilian federation. Most 
unfortunately, the websites of Goiás and Espírito Santo were not able to run the pertinent 
search for this research, i.e., the selection of cases decided by the state supreme courts 
between January 1, 2006 and December 31, 2010. We did not consider the claims of mere 
incidental declaration that are converted in abstract, as ruled by state tribunals.
951
 In states 
                                                        
951 Due to the fact that this research is focused on the abstract control, we limited our analysis to the 
following types of lawsuits: direct action of unconstitutionality (ação direta de inconstitucionalidade or 
representação de inconstitucionalidade, as some states call the ação direta de inconstitucionalidade at the 
state level); direct action of unconstitutionality based on the lack of particular measure (ação direta de 
inconstitucionalidade por omissão) and declaratory action of constitutionality (ação declaratória de 
constitucionalidade). All the information was gathered between March of 2012 and December of 2013, and 
was available in the website of each state supreme court. It is noteworthy that the search mechanisms of the 
websites are not uniform across Brazilian state supreme courts. Hence, in some states (such as in Bahía), 
there was no specification of the type of lawsuit involved. In this instance, we read the references of each 
lawsuit in order to determine if it was a lawsuit concerning: Adin, ADC or Adin by omission. In addition, 
in some states (as it occurred with Rio de Janeiro), the search tools of the website did not distinguish 
among the classes of action, listing all the cases of constitutional review which the specialized panel 
decided. In those hypotheses, we had to read the summary of the judgment to determine if it was not a case 
that the specialized panel has decided based on the concrete review. Recurrent examples of concrete review 
adjudicated by state courts are: incidental declaration of unconstitutionality (a procedural action that occurs 
in the course of another lawsuit, which is the main legal action), and writ of injunction (mandado de 
segurança). 
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where the absolute number of abstract actions was larger than forty, we used a random 
sampling.
952
  
 For each case, we obtained the following information divided in ten factors: (1). 
Decision favorable or unfavorable to the petitioner. (2). Identity of the petitioner 
(governor, state congress, other political actors, other). (3). Nature of the claim 
(administrative, tax, contractual, election law, environmental law, procedural 
constitutional law, or other). (4). Number of dissent votes. (5). Length of decision 
(measured by number of words). (6). Time lag (from the moment the petition was filed 
with the court until the decision in limine or the final one). (7). Distinction if the decision 
was final or in limine; and, if it was final, whether the lawsuit was extinguished with or 
without merits. In the former case, we also searched whether there was a modification of 
the decision made in limine or the court ordered an interim measure (namely, if the 
injunction was granted and the final decision ruled on the constitutionality of the law), 
and if the injunction was denied, whether the final decision has considered the norm 
constitutional. We also researched whether the effects of the final decision were 
modulated (i.e., whether the decision did not follow the general rule of retroactive effect 
applicable to Adins from the date when the decision was published). We should 
emphasize that the Republican Constitution and the federal law 9868, of 1999, are silent 
about the possibility of modulation of effects when the arguable violation of 
constitutionality arises out of the state constitution. Hence, we investigate if state 
supreme courts were using this alternative. (8). Whether the decision recognized the 
normative act of the state or municipality as a mandatory clause of repetition (as 
mirroring the federal constitution) or is the decision silent? This is relevant because such 
repetition of the federal constitution works as a pragmatic check on the state constitution. 
(9). Number of judges involved in the deciding panel. (10). If there were citations to other 
courts, we looked at which court they cited (STF; the Supremo Tribunal de Justiça – STJ, 
                                                        
952 Table 6.1 illustrates the information we gathered for twenty-five states of the Brazilian federation. 
Importantly, if a particular state had more than a total of forty actions of abstract review, we effectuated a 
random sampling. Aiming at maintaining a proportional number of actions in each state, we utilized a 
random sampling procedure in order to assure such final proportional representation in our dataset. The 
random selection operated as the following: Mato Grosso, Pará, Pernambuco and Rio Grande do Norte: one 
in every two decisions was analyzed and coded; Santa Catarina: one in every three decisions was analyzed 
and coded; Federal District and Minas Gerais: one in every five decisions; São Paulo: one in every six 
decisions; Rio de Janeiro: one in every eight decisions was analyzed and coded. 
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which is the supreme court of Brazil for infra-constitutional law, or other state supreme 
court). This is particularly relevant because the number of decisions by lower courts 
following the STF lacks systematic research.953 Moreover, the Constitutional Amendment 
45, of December 2004, which established the súmula vinculante – a mechanism akin to 
biding precedent – became effective before the period researched. In this direction, we 
test if the centralization that the STF tried to achieve with the Amendment is actually 
effective. 
From Table 6.1, some important variations across Brazilian states can be noticed. 
Some states have a small number of decisions in 2006-2010, and therefore play a less 
important role in our dataset. However, in reference to those states with a considerable 
number of decisions, we can see significant differences.    
 Starting with the existence of dissents, we can see that DF, Minas Gerais and São 
Paulo seem to be less prone to unanimous decisions than Rio de Janeiro, Mato Grosso, 
Santa Catarina and Pará. Concerning delays, we can see that they are less significant in 
DF, Minas Gerais, Mato Grosso and São Paulo, while being more significant in Pará and 
Pernambuco. Rio de Janeiro is quite close to the national average. Finally, length 
(number of words) indicates shorter decisions in Rio de Janeiro and Mato Grosso and 
longer in DF.           
 Out of the twenty-five state supreme courts for which we have information, ten 
currently have a specialized panel (Ceará changed in 2010), with the remaining fifteen 
deciding en banc (the two missing states also decide en banc). The question to be 
empirically researched is the extent to which these variations are explained by the option 
for a specialized panel.           
 As previously mentioned in this Part, article 93, § XI, of the Republican 
Constitution of 1988 does not determine which states should or should not have 
specialized panels. It merely grants the discretion to each state supreme court in order to 
create such panels, provided the state supreme court has twenty-five judges (or more). 
The size of the court involves a difficult balance between the time necessary to reach a 
decision and the quality of the accuracy of the award. Accordingly, the larger the number 
of judges in a constitutional court, the higher the costs of deliberation – although with 
                                                        
953 Vilhena Vieira, O Supremo Tribunal Federal: Jurisprudência Política, at 218. 
  219 
fewer possibilities of mistake than if the court only had a single judge.954 In light of the 
above, out of the twenty-five state supreme courts for which we have information, ten 
currently have specialized panels and fifteen decide en banc (i.e., do not have a 
specialized panel).          
 Among those fifteen state supreme courts deciding en banc, ten (approximately 
67%) do not meet the constitutional requirement of having more than twenty-five judges 
sitting in the state supreme court. Out of the fifteen states researched that do not have 
specialized panel, five states (33%) have more than twenty-five judges sitting in the state 
supreme court. This data is compiled in Table 6.1. Despite meeting the general 
requirement for creation of specialized panel, those five states decided not to create such 
panels.          
 According to our data, as compiled in Table 6.1, the states that have more than 
twenty-five judges sitting in the state supreme court but do not have a specialized panel 
are the following: Bahía, Ceará (which created a specialized panel in 2011), Maranhão, 
Goiás, and Mato Grosso. The first three are located at the northeast; and the last two are 
located in the center-west region. Article 93, XIII of the Constitution of 1988 requires 
that the population and the demand for the judicial service to be high in order to justify 
the creation of new positions for judges, but the provision does not specifically address 
state supreme court judges.         
 Our dataset shows that Ceará has an average lag of more than forty-seven months 
to decide a case of abstract review. Thus, it is not surprising that the state supreme court 
decided to, using their discretion, create the specialized panel recently (2011). Bahía, 
with more than thirty-six months as average lag, is also far above the national average of 
almost nineteen months. Bahía, however, opted for not creating such panel so far. It is 
still an open question as to how the state supreme court will deal with the issue. The 
remaining states (Goiás, Maranhão, and Mato Grosso) are far below the national average 
of lawsuits, and they do not meet the threshold regarding the volume of actions in the 
state judiciary.            
  
                                                        
954 Tom Ginsburg, Judicial Review in New Democracies: Constitutional Courts in Asian Cases (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2003), at 47.   
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Brazil provides a fascinating context to test the relationship between specialized 
constitutional review and output measures, due to variations across Brazilian state 
supreme courts within the same cultural and legal backgrounds. In this scenario, this 
research also considers that Brazilian federalism is embedded with substantial asymmetry 
among the states. Importantly, such asymmetry does not refer to local cultural 
differences, which are linked with significant economical gaps among the several states 
of the Brazilian federation. States located at the southeast and southern regions tend to 
contribute more significantly to the GDP, whereas states located at the remaining regions, 
particularly the North, contributed less.955       
 Accordingly, all the researched states located at the south and southeast regions 
have specialized panels. Their performance measures are all below the national average 
in terms of duration and extension of the decisions. Hence, the most developed states in 
Brazil perceive specialized panels as efficient and their performance measures generally 
corroborate such understanding when compared with the national average indicators, as 
illustrated in Table 6.1.        
 At this point, we turn our attention to the types of cases (legal actions) that are 
presented in the dataset. Although the research encompasses cases of Adin (also called 
representation of unconstitutionality on the state constitutions), Adin by omission and 
ADC, the vast majority of our dataset comprises Adins. This is the case for three main 
reasons. The first one is a technical explanation: most search mechanisms in each website 
of the state supreme courts list Adins as the sole action of unconstitutionality. Second, the 
STF jurisprudence, as discussed in Part II, considers Adins and ADCs as equal actions, 
albeit the negative side of unconstitutionality. This understanding results in a mitigation 
of the general presumption of constitutionality of norms, which is so precious to civil law 
jurisdictions.          
 Therefore, state supreme courts, following the lead of the STF, do not distinguish 
between Adins and ADCs on the state level. 956 Third, the STF website’s search only 
                                                        
955 According to the official statistics of Brazilian Institute Brazilian Institute for Geographic and Statistics: 
IBGE, based on the last census (2010), last accessed November, 2013, and available at:  
http://www.ibge.gov.br/estadosat 
 
956 The case law of the STF has approached the general direct action of unconstitutionality and the direct 
action of unconstitutionality based on omission – even before the law 12063, of 2009  – as similar lawsuits. 
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recently started to differentiate between the ordinary Adin and Adin by omission – the 
latter being quite rare in the federal level. Thus, it is not surprising that the state supreme 
courts’ websites did not contain differentiation within types of Adins, until 2010.  
 In spite of the doctrinal admission of Adin by omission and ADC, these actions 
barely appear at the state level. A central issue is that not all state constitutions actually 
consider those types of actions by specifically mentioning them in their texts. Our 
findings concerning the lack of Adin by omission and ADC corroborates the 
understanding that state constitutions are not particularly relevant in the current national 
context, due to the fact that limited subject matters are left to be determined in the state 
constitutions. 957  Our findings also validate the fact that the importance of state 
constitution has been mitigated.        
 At this stage, a note about how we define our approach to state constitution is 
necessary. This research was agnostic about the relevance of state constitutions, despite 
the reduced literature about the topic. As a matter of fact, the few authors who have 
briefly considered this issue had limited their claims to the reduce relevance of state 
constitutions in general, without detailing such understanding.958 It is noteworthy that we 
gathered data about each state constitution959 also in order to verify if extended standing 
norms regarding abstract review would significantly impact the parties who actually sue 
(they do not, as we will discuss further in this section).   
                                                                                                                                                                     
The website of the Court itself, in its search mechanisms, did not distinguish both actions, until October of 
2008, as noted by Justice Gilmar Mendes in Mendes and Branco, Curso de Direito Constitucional, at 1156. 
The authors point out the difficulties of knowing the exact number of direct actions of unconstitutionality 
arising out of omissions. 
 
957 Claudio Pereira de Souza Neto and Daniel Sarmento, Direito Constitucional: Teoria, História e Métodos 
de Trabalho (Rio de Janeiro: Forum, 2013), at 335. 
 
958 Reference is made to the most famous Brazilian constitutional treaties: Moraes, Direito Constitucional, 
at 605–607, criticizing decisions of the STF removing from state constitutions specific competences; citing 
the several instances that the STF declared state constitutional norms as violating the federal Constitution: 
Mendes and Branco, Curso de Direito Constitucional, at 791–797; arguing the application of the symmetry 
principle on the state level: Lammêgo Bulos, Curso de Direito Constitucional, at 917, Clève, A Fiscalização 
Abstrata da Constitucionalidade no Direito Brasileiro, at 394, and Barroso, O Controle de 
Constitucionalidade no Direito Brasileiro, at 205. In addition, there are no empirical studies encompassing 
the totality of Brazilian states and corroborating this understanding about state constitutions. For a 
discussion about symmetry and the mandatory federal constitutional norms that shall be repeated in state 
constitutions: see footnote 928, supra, and references therein.  
 
959 See Table 6.8 (with three pages) at the end of this chapter. 
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 Policymakers are generally not concerned with the contents of state constitutions. 
This reduced relevance of state constitutions is not necessarily constant in the Brazilian 
constitutional experience, to the extent that during the República Velha, from 1889 to 
1930, state constitutions played a remarkable role.960 Despite the jurisdiction of state 
supreme courts being perceived as an essential component of Brazilian federalism, the 
role played by state supreme courts has actually diminished in the absence of state 
constitutional writs and/or remedies to assure their jurisdiction.961 Hence, our findings 
corroborate the general understanding of the reducing importance of state constitutions 
on their own.         
 Considering the general composition of the cases in our dataset, we observe that 
the main types of actions litigated are related to public matters. The two most frequent 
types of actions are related to tax law (including competences for budget matters) and 
administrative law (from police powers to zone regulations and traffic). The fact that tax 
and administrative laws are the most litigated matters replicates the federal dockets of the 
STF regarding Adins, because those matters are commonly litigated at the federal level as 
well.            
 The number of legitimate persons or entities entitled to have standing does not 
seem to affect the overall number of actions, because the main actors who actually 
challenge a given legislative act in court are generally the same in all the states. 
Importantly, the fact that particular state constitutional provisions might be broader or 
stricter does not appear to influence those petitioners (parties with potential standing) 
who actually challenge the act.962 We observe that the parties who challenged state 
legislative measures are the same across the dataset, namely: the governor, public 
                                                        
960 In this direction: Souza Neto and Sarmento, Direito Constitucional: Teoria, História e Métodos de 
Trabalho, at 335–336, where the authors stress the importance of state constitutions in the U.S., and the fact 
that the USSC does not consistently block departures from the constitutional federal text – as often occurs 
in Brazil.  
 
961 Brazilian federalism pact is considered among the so-called immutable clauses of the Constitution, as 
determined by article 60, paragraph four, I, of the Brazilian Constitution of 1988. 
 
962  Rio de Janeiro, Rio Grande do Sul, and Mato Grosso would be the three states with the most flexible, 
i.e., most extended list for standing. This is so according to the information gathered (see Table 6.8) and 
considering the most flexible state constitutions as those authorizing two of the following three actors to 
have standing to sue in Adins: the general State Attorney, the General Public Defender, and local labor 
union (or local class entity), without further restrictions. 
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prosecutor, and legislative assembly. This probably indicates that the governors are 
working as a check on legislative assemblies and vice-versa, with the public prosecutor of 
the state being an effective agent in checking both.     
 Remarkably, political parties, class entities, or unions do not appear to be active in 
comparison with the percentage of actions on the national level. For a comparison with 
the national level, the percentages of Adins filed between 1988 and 2002 are the 
following: political parties (34%), professional unions (20%), and associations (15%). 
Therefore, those actors filed 69% of all the Adins.963 We argue that our preliminary 
results corroborate the view that understands the constitutions of the Brazilian states (and 
their related state legislation) as not being sufficiently relevant in practice.964 Otherwise, 
those active actors in the federal level would have been engaged in more aggressive 
litigation at the state level.         
 We further argue that another related explanation to the lower numbers reached 
when compared with the federal level refers to the role exercised by courts.  We suggest 
that those controversial disputes at the state level are simply not arriving at the state 
judiciary. In this sense, those specific political actors were able to reconcile their interests 
without the intervention of the state supreme court, solving their disagreements 
politically. This is consistent with the understanding that state political actors are 
powerful on their own, i.e., each having their own bargaining power. Therefore, fewer 
conflicts are heard by the judiciary.        
 With regard to the conflicts actually being heard, we note that the strongest cases 
end up in court. We conclude so, because plaintiffs win 70.47% of the cases.965 We 
attribute this percentage to the fact that litigation is exercised for highly competent public 
legal actors, such as the governor and the general state prosecutor. Accordingly, the 
selection of cases seems to operate before the parties actually decide to initiate a claim.  
                                                        
963 The numbers refer to the research conducted by: Matthew M. Taylor, Judging Policy: Courts and Policy 
Reform in Democratic Brazil (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2008), at 81. 
 
964 Stating the lack of importance of state constitutions: Barroso, O Controle de Constitucionalidade no 
Direito Brasileiro, at 261. 
 
965 Emphasis is made to the absence of similar research to which we could compare our dataset. This rate 
encompasses preliminary injunctions as well as final decisions. 
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 In addition, we argue that this significant rate of success (70.47%) may be viewed 
as a more efficiently conducted litigation, because only parties with vast legal resources 
file Adins.966 This is a sharp contrast with the federal level, where associations and 
political parties are important litigants.967 It may also be explained by the less politicized 
composition of state supreme courts and specialized panels, because there is no direct 
political appointment by the governor, as it happens with the president in the federal level 
for the STF.          
 Accordingly, our findings corroborate the assumption that by removing political 
influences from the appointment mechanisms for state supreme court judges (and 
specialized panels), the politicization in judging state Adins was considerably mitigated. 
Hence, federalism choices matter because they minimize politicization of the state 
judiciary, allowing it on the federal level.      
 Furthermore, we clarify that the Priest and Klein model for litigated disputes and 
disputes that were settled before or during litigation in the United States does not seem 
applicable to the decisions in abstract control of constitutionality. 968  The main 
justification for our understanding is that the adopted procedural rules bar desistence by 
the party who initiated the Adin, which precludes settlements.969 There are claims in the 
U.S. literature that defend any litigation rate favoring the plaintiff is possible, to the 
extent that the 50% winning prediction defended by Priest and Klein has very difficult 
requirements for validation.970 
 
                                                        
966 The governor and the general state prosecutors the general state attorney office and state prosecutors, 
respectively, working to support their interests. There is no economical cost for such actors to use their 
legal team – some times also known as their famous “legal army.” 
 
967 For instance: Taylor, Judging Policy: Courts and Policy Reform in Democratic Brazil, at 79, indicates 
that plaintiffs on federal Adins have around 25% chances of victory in the STF, if preliminary injunctions 
and final decisions are combined. 
 
968 George Priest and Benjamin Klein, “The Selection of Disputes for Litigation,” Journal of Legal Studies 
XIII (1984): 1–55.  
 
969 In that direction: article 5 of law 9,868, of November of 1999. Notice that the procedural rules of this 
law are also applicable at the state level. 
   
970 Steven Shavell, Any Frequency of Plaintiff Victory at Trial is Possible, The Journal of Legal Studies 25, 
N. 2 (1996): 493–501, at 495–498, for the specificities of the model referred above. 
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IV. REGRESSION ANALYSIS 
Our dependent variables to test our hypothesis are: length (extension of the 
decision measured by number of words), lag (time lag from the beginning of the action 
until the decision – either final or in limine), rate of dissents among the judges of the state 
supreme court, whether or not the decision favored the plaintiff, and whether or not the 
court that issued the final decision cited other courts (STF, STJ, or other state supreme 
court). If a state supreme court (also known as court of appeals) of a given state was 
cited, we recorded the data.          
 The performance measures above referred relate directly to the alleged benefits of 
specialization addressed in our Introduction. In this direction, quicker and better 
constitutional review should be observed in terms of shorter time lag, longer decisions 
(with deeper discussion of legal doctrines), and more citations (as part of more elaborated 
legal doctrines). It should also be observed an increase of dissents, since a smaller group 
of specialized judges has more time to develop and consider varying interpretations of the 
law.           
 Improved legal doctrine and speedy results are also mentioned as advantages of 
specialized courts, because judges are more familiar with the main arguments and 
pertinent theories of the particular field. Consequently, less time would be spent in 
debating or discovering the applicable law. As far this line of argument goes, a final 
decision would be rendered faster if a specialized panel were the issuing authority.
971 
 The remaining variable relates directly to whether or not the decision favored the 
plaintiff. This is so to identify any possible bias. According to this argument, if smaller 
specialized courts are easier to capture, as suggested by the literature, we could expect 
them to be against plaintiffs more often. Importantly, this research focuses on the abstract 
control of constitutionality. Among the implications of this control is the fact that only 
preselected political actors along with institutions are authorized to have standing to sue. 
                                                        
971 See, e.g., Dreyfuss, Specialized Adjudication, at 378, contending that the continuous involvement of the 
court with the specialized field would contribute to enhance quality; listing among the benefits of 
specialization: speed, economy of scale applications, and efficiency concretized by streamlining of 
repetitive tasks: Jeffrey W. Stempel, “Two Cheers for Specialization,” Brooklyn Law Review 61 (1995): 
67–128, at 88–89; arguing that specialized courts have a higher probability to correctly decide complex 
fields – as in cases involving tax law: Revesz, Specialized Courts and the Administrative Lawmaking 
System, at 1117. 
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Therefore, the nature of the specific constitutional review researched (i.e., abstract) 
would facilitate the detection of bias across our dataset.    
 Empirical research considering such constitutional adjudication is often 
questioned in light of potential selection bias. Our goal is not to simply examine which 
tribunals decide faster or produce better law, in general. After all, the state judiciary of the 
most organized states would be expected to have such panels. This research investigates 
the consequences of having a specialized panel. Had we merely focused on the existence 
of specialized panels, it would make no difference.       
 According to our preliminary findings, however, had the state of Bahía enacted 
specialized panels,
972
 the decisions would be faster, while presenting an increased 
likelihood of dissent and dissent rates.       
 This is so, because our preliminary findings show that the existence of a 
specialized panel is significant relevant for the duration of the procedure and dissent (rate 
and likelihood). Importantly, there are no dataset to which we are capable to compare 
ours.            
 In addition, as emphasized earlier, the specialized panel is created merely as a 
administrative measure,
973
 and upon the discretion of each state supreme court, provided 
that the number of lawsuits is high enough to justify such creation, and as long as there 
are twenty five members in the state supreme court.
974  
                                                        
972 For data about Bahía, please see our discussion on the previous section, pages 220 and 221, supra. 
 
973 The current article 93, XI, states that half of the specialized panel shall be formed by the most senior 
members of the state supreme court and the remaining half shall be determined through election by all 
members of such state supreme court. Noting that before the Constitutional Amendment 45 of 2004, the 
composition of the specialized panel was controversial, and that reasonability and efficiency ought to be 
considered in the creation of specialized panels: Moraes, Órgão Especial e Delegação Constitucional de 
Competências Jurisdicionais, Disciplinares e Administrativas do Tribunal Pleno, at 292–293. 
 
974 As stated in article 93, XI, of the Republican Constitution and our discussion in Part III, supra. 
Furthermore, the creation of specialized panels must occur in public sessions of the Court, in accordance 
with Article 93, X of the Constitution. Notice that our dataset starts in 1st January, 2006. By that time, the 
Constitutional Amendment 45 of 2004 had already clarified the composition of specialized panels. Hence, 
there has been no discussion or controversy when Ceará created its new specialized panel, in 2011. 
Efficiency is the reason cited for creating Ceará’s specialized panel, as stated in: 
http://www.google.com/url?sa=t&rct=j&q=&esrc=s&source=web&cd=10&ved=0CGYQFjAJ&url=http%3
A%2F%2Fwww.tjce.jus.br%2Finstitucional%2Fpdf%2FDISCURSO_ORGAO_ESPECIAL.pdf&ei=wOgj
VfS5I8KfsAXCjoAw&usg=AFQjCNEYbxCEajjU9dlFXrJZWXuDQbYwUA&sig2=mmg_H-KT7o-
uqTZHVk5Xng&bvm=bv.89947451,d.eXY (accessed April, 2015). 
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Table 6.2 presents simple correlations with the most important results being 
highlighted in yellow. They indicate that a specialized panel is positively correlated with 
the existence of dissent opinions (which we can intuitively assign to the Federal District, 
Minas Gerais, and São Paulo on Table 6.1). Likewise, they are negatively correlated with 
time lag, i.e., the duration of the lawsuit measured in months. Length (number of words) 
seems positively correlated with the existence of dissents, which appears plausible. 
Finally, citations are positively correlated with length and dissent – two results not very 
surprising. Those findings are consistent with the idea that the more citations a decision 
has, the longer (in terms of words) and more likely it would be to cite other courts.   
 We turn next to our regression analysis, for which we consider several 
independent variables. As controls, we include specialized panels (which is the variable 
we want to discuss), number of judges in the deciding court for each specific case (to 
control for variations since not all judges are present in all cases), decision in limine and 
decision on rejecting the petition due to the inexistence of merits (reflecting the work 
demanded from the court), type under constitutional review (namely administrative, tax, 
contract, election, and procedure), and existence of citations (in reference to STF, STJ, or 
other state supreme courts). We also include type of plaintiffs and defendants and the 
existence of retroactive effect in other specifications, but the results are largely 
consistent.
975
           
 Table 6.3 reports the correlations across control variables in order to identify 
potential problems with multicollinearity, with the main results highlighted in yellow. We 
observe that few controls are correlated. Type of law under constitutional review presents 
some negative correlations (when a case is about tax law, the same case is not about 
administrative law or procedure). A specialized panel seems to be correlated with 
decision in limine (positively) and constitutional procedural law (negatively). 
 All regressions include fixed effects in reference to states. Our additional 
findings, based on our main regressions presented in Table 6.4, show that the existence of 
specialized panels appears to be positively correlated with dissent (likelihood of dissent 
and dissent rates). Because there were 103 dissents in a universe of 630 decisions, we 
                                                        
975 These additional regressions are presented in Table 6.7.   
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note that specialized panels increase the likelihood of dissent as well as the rate of 
dissent. This increased likelihood remains valid, even when controlling for the states 
which are heavily represented in the sample (fixed effects for the states of Rio de Janeiro, 
São Paulo, Santa Catarina, DF, and Minas Gerais are included, but not reported in Table 
6.4 for all regressions).       
 Concerning the duration of the lawsuit (our dependent variable called “lag”) and 
the length of the decisions, the existence of specialized panels has a positive effect on 
length (but not statistically significant) and a negative effect on duration (which is 
statistically significant). In both regressions, the dependent variables seem to be quite 
random. Therefore, we should not put a lot of emphasis on the controls that seem 
statistically significant (number of judges, decision in limine, citation STF, citation STJ, 
non-merit decision, types of law).  The duration – our time lag variable –, by being 
negatively affected by the existence of specialized panels, corroborates the claim that 
specialized courts decide cases quicker.
976
 Accordingly, specialized panels reduce the 
duration of lawsuit.           
 In addition, citations of other courts and the outcome of the case (the decision 
being pro-plaintiff) do not appear to be affected by specialized panels. Although, in these 
two cases, the quality of the regressions seems consistent. Number of judges seems to 
increase, while non-merit decision seems to decrease the likelihood that the decision is 
pro-plaintiff; non-merit decision appears to decrease the likelihood of citations. For a 
specific illustration of the citations of state supreme courts, see Table 6.6.   
 The main explanation for specialized panels being related to an increase in the 
existence of dissent and its rates refers to the composition of the panel itself, in light of 
the career archetypal that we detailed in our previous Section. There is no political 
indication for state supreme court judges – if one considers the composition of at least 
80% of the court being of career state judges.      
 With regard to the remaining 20%, it is composed of public prosecutions and 
public defenders (both having their own career path, respectively), and members of the 
state bar. Hence, political appointments have been generally removed from the 
                                                        
976 Dreyfuss, Specialized Adjudication, at 378. 
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nomination process for state supreme court judges.
977
 It is also noteworthy that the 
particular composition of specialized panels as mainly a career judiciary supports the 
rebuttal of potential unattractiveness of the work. As we have discussed earlier, a 
common point against specialization is the quality of those in the specialized bench. The 
repetitive nature of the work would not help to attract and retain the most brilliant minds 
of the legal profession.
978
 This argument, however, does not apply to specialized 
constitutional panels in Brazil, because of its archetypal career composition.   
 Due to the fact that all judges who sit in the specialized panel are among the most 
senior and most reputable, it might be expected that they have less incentives to 
compromise (i.e., accept the other opinions of other well-known judges). By contrast, one 
could argue that life tenure and the stability of judicial financial compensation ultimately 
lead to judges being “(…) kept in line if at all mainly by informal norms of judicial 
propriety and restraint, and informal norms are likely to be more effective the smaller the 
group in which they are operative.”
979
       
 This understanding has been cautioned as valid for federal district courts that first 
hear cases in panels, but not necessarily for constitutional courts in general.
980
 Also, with 
regard to federal courts, it has been previously contended that consensus would be 
expected, because specialized panels should be small enough for the court to speak in 
“one single voice.”
981         
 A counterargument to such rationale is the fact that dissent opinions in specialized 
panels are not perceived as necessarily against the court itself. All the judges siting in the 
                                                        
977 Article 94 of the Constitution of 1988 determines that one fifth of the State Supreme Court (or 
specialized panels) must encompass public prosecutors with more than ten years in the career, and lawyers 
with reputable legal knowledge and unquestioned character, with more than ten years of legal practice. 
Each class (public prosecutor or the state subdivision of the national bar association) designates six names 
for the State Supreme Court. The latter will choose three names of such list, and forward the short list to the 
Governor. Hence, the tribunal (State Supreme Court or specialized panel) is directly involved in the 
appointment of their new member also with regard to those joining the court through the clause of the 
Quinto Constitucional. 
 
978 See supra references in footnote 903. 
 
979 Richard Posner, “Is the Ninth Circuit too Large? A Statistical Study of Judicial Quality,” Journal of 
Legal Studies 29 (2000): 711–720, at 712. 
 
980 Ginsburg, Judicial Review in New Democracies: Constitutional Courts in Asian Cases, at 48. 
 
981 Dreyfuss, Specialized Adjudication, at 378. 
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specialized panel are experts in the constitutional field. They also have more time and 
resources to study the law in depth, so dissents may appear higher.    
 A recurrent counterargument is that all judges in Brazil – whether they sit in the 
state supreme court or not – are entitled to the federal constitutional protections of tenure 
and stability. Moreover, one usual incentive for compromise is to reduce the number of 
appeals. This incentive is not present because, in practice, specialized panels operate as 
the court of last resort. Importantly, they operate in such fashion, while also being the 
court with original jurisdiction over abstract state constitutional control.    
 Another common incentive for agreement has its impact reduced in this context: 
the prospect of promotion. Appeal judges who sit on the specialized panel are not further 
promoted at the state level because, in terms of the state judicial structure, they have 
reached the apex of their careers (and there is very little tradition of state supreme court 
judges being appointed to the STF). Therefore, the main reasons that are usually 
presented as supporting consensus are overall not present in the specific cases of 
specialized panels.          
 As for as the outcome of the cases and the existence of specialized panels, our 
preliminary findings do not show a significant correlation. The results actually support 
the view that appellate judges on specialized panels are more independent than originally 
thought.           
 The conventional perception suggests that it would be easier for the government 
(or interested groups) to convince a small number of judges sitting in panel than it would 
be if there were the full numbers of state supreme court judges.    
 The traditional conception is not validated by our data. The possibility of capture 
by interest groups to the reduced number of specialized panel does not seem 
applicable.
982
 We contend that the archetypal of career judiciary and their meritocratic 
selection explain this result.        
 Also supporting the view that specialized panels are more independent than 
originally thought is the fact that it would be easier for the public administration to be 
aligned with the state supreme court judges in cases relating to public matters, such as 
                                                        
982 For the distinct moments when capture has been pointed out to occur: see footnote 902, supra. 
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administrative and constitutional procedural law. This would be the case, due to the 
potential for occurrence of government structural bias.
983
    
 Accordingly, it would be less difficult for the administration to convince fewer 
judges of the administration’s own interests – with the administration succeeding in such 
cases. Nevertheless, more research needs to be done to provide further insights. It is 
worth reiterating that even in the field of administrative law, there was no statistical 
significance regarding the success of the administration.    
 The fact that citations of other courts do not seem to be directly related to the 
existence of specialized courts is counterintuitive.
984
 One would expect that, in an effort 
to convince their equal peers, the simple mention of how other courts decided in similar 
cases might be perceived as a valid strategy. However, it may be that citing other courts 
that are hierarchically superior – STF and STJ – ultimately would work as an authority 
argument instead of mere persuasion. In addition, it is unclear how much access state 
supreme courts have to past decisions of other state courts. State courts decisions, if not 
polemical, are limited to publication in the state official repository, not being published 
nationally.          
 We address the specific citations of other courts next. According to Table 6.5, the 
influence of the STF in cases of constitutional review is quite remarkable because the 
STF is mentioned in 56% of the decisions by state supreme courts. The courts citing the 
STF are widespread in our dataset, not being concentrated in particular regions. 
Consequently, it may be understood as one possible effect of the current system akin to 
precedent in Brazil in constitutional matters.   
                                                        
983 E.g., Dari-Mattiacci, Garoupa, Gomez-Pomar, State Liability, at 801–802. 
 
984 Ferejohn and Pasquino, Constitutional Adjudication: Lessons from Europe, at 1692–1693, where the 
Professors argue that internal deliberation in constitutional courts in Europe – based on persuasion and 
reasoning to achieve a common course – are preponderant over external deliberation, which focuses on 
convincing actors outside the group, i.e., external to the court. Along these line of reasoning, despite the 
sessions of the specialized panels or tribunals being open to the public in Brazil, it is expected that due to 
the lower numbers of state supreme court judges in a specialized panel, face to face debates would be 
easier, with probably a higher chance of consensus to be achieved. This would be the case, because rarely 
anyone watches the specialized panel (or tribunals) sessions. 
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There have been discussions about the existence of precedent and the scope of it 
in Brazil.
985
 We shall emphasize that such discussion has occurred even before the 
Constitutional Amendment 45, of 2004,
986
 officially brought mechanisms that may be 
characterized as having the legal effect of stare decisis, which in Brazil is implemented 
under a procedural institute named súmula vinculante.
987
 The Court has sparsely utilized 
this institute.         
 Therefore, the doctrines of symmetry between state and federal constitutions and 
limitations of standing requirements by the STF have both operated to not only reduce the 
caseload of the STF, but also to centralized the guidance regarding the pertinent decisions 
of abstract control in the STF. As stressed earlier, such doctrines precede the 
Constitutional Amendment 45. Nevertheless, the implementation of the reform of the 
judiciary by that amendment may have increased the number of citations. Hence, state 
supreme courts cite the STF in abstract review, but do so as bound, in practice, by 
hierarchical precedent.          
 Only 3.7% of the decisions mention the STJ, which is consistent with the subject 
matter being researched – namely, abstract constitutional review of state and municipal 
laws in light of the state’s constitution. It was not expected to have state supreme courts 
citing the STJ, because constitutional law and related conflicts are within the realm of the 
jurisdiction of the STF.         
 As for citation of decisions of other courts of appeal, the percentage is quite low.  
A small percentage of 8% of the total decisions of state courts of appeal in our dataset – 
also named state supreme courts – actually mentions other state supreme courts. This may 
be indicative of isolation across the state supreme courts. Such understanding is also 
coherent with the lack of incentives for state supreme courts (or specialized panels) to 
                                                        
985 Contending the existence of precedent in Brazil: Maria Angela Jardim de Santa Cruz Oliveira and Nuno 
Garoupa, “Stare Decisis and Certiorari arrive to Brazil: A Comparative Law and Economics Approach,” 
Emory International Law Review 26 (2012): 555–598. 
 
986 Notice that the STF has established legal doctrines aiming to reduce the cases heard by the Court, by 
requiring litigants in extraordinary appeals to show the constitutional question (and specific constitutional 
textual provisions) that directly influenced the case, since the judgment at the trial instance (the so-called 
prequestionamento). 
 
987 With regard to the number of súmula vinculante, the Court has been very considerate to lower courts, 
enacting few súmulas. 
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research or cite previous decisions of other courts that are situated at the same 
hierarchical level in the legal order.     
 Notwithstanding the low number of citations to specific supreme courts (8%), the 
one of Rio Grande do Sul is the most cited across the dataset.
988
 The court of Rio Grande 
do Sul has a strong tradition of acknowledging the existence of abstract review of state 
and municipal norms that precedes any constitutional provisions.
989
 The court, located in 
the South region of Brazil, has a reputation of being modern and independent. This 
reputation dates back to the Direito Alternativo, a strong legal movement emphasizing the 
effectiveness of fairness in the case at bar – instead of concerns related to legal 
formalities.
990
 This trend is controversial. It has been argued that the Direito Alternativo 
was not the general rule and that the traditional view of the majority of judges may have 
had a chilling impact on the filling of rights claims.
991    
 Rio de Janeiro and Minas Gerais are cited, and, to a lesser degree, São Paulo. All 
of those courts are in the Southeast region of Brazil. The state supreme courts of 
Roraima, Pernambuco, and Rio Grande do Norte were all cited once. Because Brazil is 
not a common law jurisdiction, the fact that judges in a given state supreme court cited 
another state supreme court is definitely a greater sign of prestige and knowledge for 
those being cited. Those cross-state supreme courts citations are not mandatory by the 
Brazilian civil law system, thus increasing the value of those citations.  
 In conclusion, we do not find specialized panels having an important effect on 
several performance measures while impacting dissents (likelihood and rate) as well as 
duration. Therefore our empirical analysis provides mixed results in terms of confirming 
                                                        
988 Ferejohn, and Pasquino, Constitutional Adjudication: Lessons from Europe, at 1680–1681, note that 
there is a tendency for judges in different courts to mention the reasoning of past courts on related issues – 
which would increase legitimacy of the decisions. Nevertheless, if state supreme courts and specialized 
panels do not have access to other state courts decisions in general, it increases the difficulties for citing 
courts at the same hierarchical level albeit not close located geographically. 
 
989 Clève,  A Fiscalização Abstrata da Constitucionalidade no Direito Brasileiro, at 391. 
 
990 Amilton Bueno de Carvalho, Magistratura e Direito A lternativo (São Paulo: Acadêmica, 1992). 
 
991 Diana Kapiszewski, ‘Power Broker, Policy Make or Rights Protector? The Brazilian Supremo Federal in 
Transition,” in Courts in Latin America, ed. Gretchen Helmke and Julio Rios-Figueroa (Cambridge: 
Cambridge  University Press, 2011), at 173–174. 
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the theoretical literature on the benefits of specialized constitutional review to the extent 
that they do not seem to be better. Still, there are statistically significant differences. 
V. CONCLUSION 
This research tests for the effect of the existence of specialized tribunals when 
state supreme courts rule in the abstract form of judicial review – namely: Adins and 
ADCs. There are four main contributions of this research to the literature. First, we 
constructed an original dataset comparing the decisions by state specialized panels to 
those of states without specialized panels across the Brazilian federation.  Second, we 
further test whether the existence of specialized panels can be correlated to potential 
differences of court performance across Brazilian state supreme courts. Third, our 
preliminary findings corroborate legal treaties claiming the reduced importance of state 
constitutions. Finally, a natural development of our empirical analysis is that federalism 
choices such as the discretion granted to state tribunals in creating a specialized court are 
relevant, because they reduced politicization in the state judiciary.    
 Our empirical analysis focuses on the existence of specialized panels to rule in 
those abstract forms of judicial review. The results seem to point out that the existence of 
special panels in state supreme courts does impact performance by increasing the number 
and likelihood of dissents as well as by reducing the duration of the lawsuit. The outcome 
of the case (the decision being pro-plaintiff), the length of the decision (in number of 
words), and the number of citations of other courts do not appear to be related to the 
existence of specialized panels. The outcome of the case has been proved different from 
the federal level, where politicization is intense. Thus, based on our preliminary findings 
about plaintiff’s successful litigation rates in abstract review in Brazilian states, we argue 
that federalism choices are relevant, because they minimize politicization of the state 
judiciary.         
 Considering Brazilian constitutional law and limited to our preliminary findings, 
this research corroborates the understanding that state constitutions have reduced 
importance in contemporary Brazil. Even where state constitutions were more detailed in 
authorizing standing, the same parties remained suing across the dataset. Therefore, 
having a more flexible (and democratic) understanding of standing  does not prove to 
impact litigation, so far.       
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 Although our empirical analysis shows important impacts on performance, they 
do not seem substantially related to the cost-benefit analysis of court specialization. From 
that viewpoint, our results do not suggest that specialized panels necessarily produce 
better constitutional law than en banc decisions. However, by finding some statistical 
variations in court performance (number and likelihood of dissents as well as duration), 
we argue that a particular institutional design (specialized versus non-specialized) cannot 
simply be ignored.   
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Table 6.1: Dataset of the Brazilian State Court of Appeals for Abstract Judicial Review 
 
 Number of 
Observations 
Number     
of Cases 
with 
Dissent 
Number of 
Cases with 
Pro- 
Petitioner  
Decision 
Average         
Lag                  
(In 
months) 
Average   
Length               
(In words) 
Has the 
Court of 
Appeals 25          
or more 
Appellate 
Judges? 
Existence of 
Specialized 
Panel 
BRAZIL 
 
630 103 444 18.62 2316 - - 
Acre 
 
2 1 1 12 5257 NO NO 
Alagoas 
 
4 2 2 37.25 2788 NO NO 
Amapá 
 
3 0 2 7 3417 NO NO 
Amazonas 
 
1 0 1 5 994 NO NO 
Bahía 
 
11 0 9 36.73 1621 YES NO 
Ceará 16 0 13 47.19 1114 YES NO     
(until2010) 
DF 
 
59 34 42 13.46 3828 YES YES 
Espírito 
Santo 
0 0 0 0 0 Unavailable NO 
Goiás 
 
0 0 0 0 0 YES NO 
Maranhão 
 
1 0 1 1 88 YES NO 
Mt. Grosso 
 
31 2 22 6.1 1422 YES NO 
Mt. Gr. Sul 
 
2 6 17 17.46 3123 YES YES 
Mn. Gerais 
 
61 19 43 14.34 2313 YES YES 
Pará 
 
43 0 27 32.84 2109 YES NO 
Paraíba 
 
2 0 2 5 1349 NO NO 
Paraná 
 
12 2 8 9.92 1873 YES YES 
Pernambu-
co 
20 2 12 50.85 2856 YES YES 
Piauí 
 
14 0 12 19.86 2012 NO NO 
Rio de 
Janeiro 
120 8 93 16.8 1048 YES YES 
Rio Gr. 
Norte 
24 2 18 23.13 2959 NO NO 
Rio Gr. Sul 
 
5 2 4 6.4 1823 YES YES 
Rondônia 
 
9 1 5 9.1 2791 NO NO 
Roraima 
 
1 0 1 3 1351 NO NO 
St. Catarina 
 
47 4 30 19.38 3171 YES YES 
São Paulo 
 
92 16 62 13.52 2651 YES YES 
Sergipe 
 
15 0 11 14.13 2961 NO NO 
Tocantins 
 
13 2 6 17.08 553 NO NO 
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Table 6.2: Simple correlations (dependent variables) 
 Length Lag 
(duration) 
Dissent Decision 
Pro-
Plaintiff 
Citations Specialized 
Panel 
Length 1      
Lag 
(duration) 
0.09 1     
Dissent 0.42 -0.08 1    
Decision 
Pro-
Plaintiff 
0.00 -0.05 0.01 1   
Citations 0.31 0.02 0.13 0.03 1  
Specialized 
Panel 
0.05 -0.12 0.20 0.01 -0.01 1 
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Table 6.3: Simple correlations (control variables) 
 N
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n 
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aw
 
C
it
at
io
n 
S
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C
it
at
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n 
S
T
J 
C
it
at
io
n 
O
th
er
s 
N
on
 m
er
it
 
S
pe
ci
al
iz
ed
 
P
an
el
 
Number of 
Judges 
1            
Decision in 
limine 
0.06 1           
Administrative 
Law 
-0.06 0.06 1          
Tax Law 0.01 0.06 -0.41 1         
Contract Law 0.02 0.03 -0.06 -0.02 1        
Election Law 0.01 0.00 -0.10 -0.04 -0.06 1       
Constitutional 
Procedural Law 
0.05 -0.18 -0.53 -0.20 -0.03 -0.05 1      
Citation STF -0.05 0.04 0.03 0.04 -0.01 0.02 -0.11 1     
Citation STJ 0.11 0.07 -0.00 0.05 -0.01 -0.02 -0.06 0.05 1    
Citation Others 0.12 0.04 0.03 0.02 -0.02 0.03 -0.00 -0.09 -
0.06 
1   
Non merit 0.06 0.12 0.05 -0.01 -0.02 0.07 -0.08 -0.14 -
0.02 
0.02 1  
Specialized 
Panel 
-0.02 0.24 0.10 0.06 0.04 -0.01 -0.26 0.03 0.11 0.03 -
0.02 
1 
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Table 6.4: Regressions (with state fixed effects) 
 Regression One:                                                                                                                        
(TOBIT)                                                                                                                                                                          
Regression Two:                                                                                                           
(TOBIT)                                                                                                                     
Regression Three:                                                                       
(TOBIT)           
Regression Four:                                  
(LOGISTIC)                                          
Regression Five:                                
(LOGISTIC)                                                                                                     
Regression Six:                               
(TOBIT)
Dependent 
Variable: 
Length Lag (duration) Dissent Rates Existence of 
Dissent 
Decision Pro-
Plaintiff 
Citations 
Number of 
Observations: 
630 630 630 630 630 630 
       
Number of 
Judges 
10.51 
(12.29) 
      0.84*** 
(0.15) 
-0.05 
(0.09) 
-0.06 
(0.04) 
    0.05** 
(0.02) 
-0.002 
(0.006) 
Decision In 
limine 
    490.74*** 
(187.60) 
      15.19*** 
(2.29) 
         1.15 
(1.14) 
0.64 
(0.40) 
0.42 
(0.28) 
0.099 
(0.087) 
Administrative 
Law 
  -393.96* 
(209.85) 
1.98 
(2.56) 
-0.89 
(1.10) 
-0.01 
(0.40) 
0.22 
(0.33) 
-0.016 
(0.098) 
Tax Law 
 
 -454.72* 
(256.66) 
4.78 
(3.13) 
-1.90 
(1.48) 
       -0.39 
(0.54) 
-0.48 
(0.39) 
0.084 
(0.119) 
Contract Law 
 
-471.60 
(1168.85) 
-7.75 
(14.27) 
4.43 
(4.60) 
2.00 
(1.50) 
           -1.45 
(1.48) 
-0.450 
(0.557) 
Election Law 
 
 -1307.56* 
(695.66) 
              4.13 
(8.49) 
- - - 0.109 
(0.322) 
Constitutional 
Procedure Law 
-22.63 
(259.92) 
3.22 
(3.17) 
- 1.28 
(1.40) 
           - 0.16 
(0.50) 
0.38 
(0.41) 
  -0.208* 
(0.121) 
Citation STF       1073.74*** 
(136.16) 
          0.93 
(1.66) 
         2.62*** 
(0.80) 
     0.87*** 
(0.28) 
-0.27 
(0.23) 
- 
Citation STJ     1642.45*** 
(356.12) 
-4.46 
(4.35) 
         2.49 
(1.57) 
 0.92* 
(0.53) 
  -0.89* 
(0.49) 
- 
Citation Others 158.89 
(248.82) 
0.88 
(3.04) 
-1.45 
(1.57) 
-0.21 
 (0.54) 
        0.55 
(0.48) 
- 
Non Merit   -469.22** 
(208.20) 
-2.04 
(2.54) 
-1.97 
(1.37) 
    -0.89* 
 (0.52) 
     -4.29*** 
(0.50) 
     -0.518*** 
(0.101) 
Specialized 
Panel 
222.38 
(303.1)  
    -10.13*** 
(3.70) 
      5.31*** 
(1.62) 
      1.68*** 
 (0.56) 
0.21 
(0.46) 
0.124 
(0.139) 
Pseudo R²:  0.02 0.03 0.10 0.23 0.24 0.05 
                                           
The asterisk (*)/(**)/(***) indicates statistical significance at ten/five/one percent.    
Standard deviations in parentheses. 
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Table 6.5: Percentage of Decisions Pro-Petitioner and Percentage of Decisions with Dissent 
Total of Decisions 
 
Pro-Petitioner With Dissent 
In numbers: 630 
 
444 103 
In percentage: 100% 
 
70.47% 16.35% 
 
 
 
Table 6.6: Citation Chart 
Total of Decisions 
 
Citing STF Citing STJ Citing Other State Courts  
In numbers: 630 
 
353 23 51 
In percentage: 100% 
 
56.03% 3.65% 8.09% 
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Table 6.7: Regressions with Additional Controls (with state fixed effects) 
 Regression One:                                                                                                                        
(TOBIT)                                                                                                                                                                          
Regression Two:                                                  
(TOBIT)                                                                                                                     
Regression Three:                                                                                                                     
(TOBIT)           
Regression Four:                                 
(LOGISTIC)                                          
Regression Five:                                  
(LOGISTIC)                                                                    
Regression Six:                                                          
(TOBIT)
Dependent 
Variable: 
Length Lag (duration) Dissent Rates Existence of 
Dissent 
Decision Pro-
Plaintiff 
Citations 
Number of Obs: 630 630 630 630 630 630 
       
Number of 
Judges 
 
6.68 
(12.11) 
       0.82*** 
(0.15) 
-0.02 
(0.09) 
-0.05 
(0.04) 
      0.07*** 
(0.02) 
-0.003 
(0.006) 
Decision In 
limine 
      437.94** 
(189.28) 
      15.91*** 
(2.34) 
0.71 
(1.17) 
0.50 
(0.44)  
  -0.51 
(0.35) 
0.094 
(0.089) 
Administrative 
Law 
-317.52 
(208.51) 
2.43 
(2.58) 
-1.22 
(1.10) 
-0.08 
(0.42) 
-0.17 
(0.39) 
-0.002 
(0.098) 
Tax Law 
 
-407.05 
(255.09) 
4.98 
(3.15) 
-1.88 
(1.47) 
-0.38 
(0.57) 
-0.62 
(0.45) 
0.039 
(0.119) 
Contract Law 
 
-304.17 
(1153.59) 
-6.63 
(14.25) 
2.35 
(4.67) 
1.60 
(1.59) 
-1.41 
(1.55) 
-0.392 
(0.551) 
Election Law 
 
-1027.82 
(701.15) 
-0.50 
(8.66) 
- - - 0.069 
(0.327) 
Constitutional 
Procedure Law 
35.27 
(259.16) 
3.14 
(3.20) 
- 1.29 
(1.40) 
-0.08 
(0.53) 
-0.17 
(0.49) 
-0.142 
(0.122) 
Citation STF         981.06*** 
(134.90) 
0.85 
(1.67) 
        2.53*** 
(0.79) 
      0.79*** 
(0.29) 
 -0.25 
(0.27) 
- 
Citation STJ       1664.52*** 
(357.19) 
-4.32 
(4.41) 
   2.69* 
(1.60) 
   0.98* 
 (0.57) 
-0.80 
(0.66) 
- 
Citation Others 197.62 
(242.92) 
0.94 
(2.99) 
-1.48 
(1.57) 
-0.14 
(0.55) 
0.71 
(0.61) 
- 
Non 
Merit 
     -530.63** 
(212.41) 
-3.33 
(2.62) 
-2.32 
(1.45) 
   -0.97* 
(0.55) 
      -4.00*** 
(0.55) 
      -0.541*** 
(0.104) 
Specialized 
Panel 
315.38 
(300.46) 
     -9.48** 
(3.71) 
        5.59*** 
(1.63) 
     1.84*** 
(0.58) 
0.37 
(0.52) 
0.073 
(0.138) 
Pseudo R²:  0.02 0.03 0.12 0.27 0.43 0.06 
                                        
The asterisk (*)/(**)/(***) indicates statistical significance at ten/five/one percent.    
Standard deviations in parentheses. 
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Table 6.8: State Constitution information (First of three)992 
Adin Acre Alagoas Amapá Amazonas Bahía Ceará Federal 
District 
Espírito 
Santo 
Goiás 
Governor  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes; Art. 30, 
L.9868/99 
Yes Yes 
Gen.Attorne
y of State 
Yes  No No No No No Not 
applicable 
No No 
Gen. Public 
Defender  
No Yes No No No Yes Not 
applicable 
No No 
Mesa 
Legislative 
Assembly 
Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes (and 
representat.)  
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
PGJ Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Pol. Party 
State asselbl 
Yes  Yes  Yes – plus 
Local Ass.  
Yes  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
RgSec OAB Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Un. or Class 
entity State 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Un. or Class 
entity Local 
No No No No Yes Yes, if 
param is 
local act 
Not 
applicable 
Yes, if p. 
is local act 
No 
Mayor 
 
Yes, if par. 
is local act 
Yes Yes, if 
param. is 
local act 
Yes Yes Yes, if 
param is 
local act 
Not 
applicable 
Yes, if p. 
local act 
Yes, if p. 
local act 
Mesa da 
Camara 
Yes- par. is 
local act 
Yes Yes, if 
param. is 
local act 
Yes (and 
vereadores) 
Yes Yes, par. is 
local act 
Not 
applicable 
Yes, p. is 
local act 
Yes, p. is 
local act 
TCU  No No No No No No NA No Yes  
Is Adin by 
Omission? 
Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
ADC? No No Yes No No Yes, if 
local. 
Yes No Yes 
ADPF? No Yes No No No No NA No No 
Effects Unc. Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes NA Yes Yes 
Prov. Quinto 
Const.? 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes NA Yes Yes 
                                                        
992 Note that all the information regarding the Constitution of the States researched was gathered at the 
website of the Brazilian Senate, last accessed August of 2013, and available at: www2.senado.leg.br 
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Table 6.8 cont.: State Constitution information (Second of Three) 
Adin Maranhāo Mato 
Grosso 
Mato 
Grosso do 
Sul 
Minas  
Gerais 
Pará Paraíba Paraná Pernam-
buco 
Piauí 
Governor  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Gen.Attorne
y of State 
Yes  Yes  No No No Yes Yes No No 
Gen. Public 
Defender  
No Yes No Yes Yes No No No No 
Mesa 
Legislative 
Assembly 
Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes Yes Yes Yes, plus any  
reprstv. 
Yes Yes 
PGJ Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Pol. Party 
State 
asselml 
Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes local 
and 
nation. 
Yes, and 
locally 
Reg section 
OAB 
Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Un. or Class 
entity State 
Yes,  Cons 
Reg Prof 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes  Yes 
Un. or Class 
entity Local 
Yes,  Cons 
Reg Prof 
Yes if param  
is local 
No No No No No Yes if p.  
is local 
Yes 
Mayor Yes Yes,if param  
is local 
Yes,if param  
is local 
Yes Yes Yes,if p.  is 
local 
Yes,if p.  is 
local 
Yes,if p.  
is local 
Yes 
Mesa da 
Camara 
Yes Yes,if param  
is local 
Yes,if param  
is local 
Yes Yes Yes,if p.  is 
local 
Yes,if param  
is local 
Yes,if p.  
is local 
Yes 
TCU  No No No No No No No No No 
Is Adin by 
Omission? 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Is ADC 
mentioned? 
Yes No Yes Yes Yes No No No Yes 
Is ADPF 
mentioned? 
No No Yes No No No No No No 
Prov. effects 
of  Unconst 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes,. 
Prov. 
Quinto 
Const.? 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
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Table 6.8 cont.: State Constitution information (Third of Three) 
Adin Rio de 
Janeiro 
Rio Grande 
do Norte 
Rio Grande 
do Sul 
Roraima Rondônia Santa 
Catarina 
São Paulo Sergipe  Tocan-
tins 
Governor  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
General 
Attorney of 
State 
Yes No No No No No No No No 
Gen. Public 
Defender  
Yes No Yes No No No No No No 
Mesa 
Legislative 
Assembly 
Yes (in 
limine Adin 
by the STF). 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
PGJ Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Pol. Party 
State asseml 
Yes, and    
locally reprs 
Yes,if param  
is local 
Yes,if param  
is local 
Yes Yes, and    
locally reprs 
Yes, and    
locally reprs 
Yes,if 
param  is 
local 
Yes, and    
locally 
reprs 
Yes 
Reg section 
OAB 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Un. or Class 
entity State 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Un. or Class 
entity Local 
No No Yes No No No Yes No No 
Mayor Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes,if param 
is local 
Yes Yes No 
Mesa da 
Camara 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes,if param 
is local 
Yes,if param 
is local 
Yes Yes No 
TCU No No No No No No No No No 
Is Adin by 
Omission? 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No 
Is ADC 
mentioned? 
No No No No No No No No No 
Is ADPF 
mentioned? 
No Yes No No No No No No No 
Prov. effects 
of  Unconst 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes  
Prov. 
Quinto 
Const.? 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
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Table 6.9: Brazilian states (in alphabetical order), abbreviations and regions 
Member States Abbreviations Brazilian 
Regions  
Member States Abbreviations Brazilian 
Regions 
Acre AC North Paraíba PB Northeast 
Alagoas AL Northeast Paraná PR South 
Amapá AP North Pernambuco PE Northeast 
Amazonas AM North Piauí PI Northeast 
Bahía BA Northeast Rio de Janeiro RJ Southeast 
Ceará CE Northeast Rio Grande do 
Norte 
RN Northeast 
Federal District DF West Rio Grande do 
Sul 
RS South 
Espírito Santo ES Southeast Rondônia RO North 
Goiás GO West Roraima RR North 
Maranhão MA Northeast Santa Catarina SC South 
Mato Grosso MT West São Paulo SP Southeast 
Mato Grosso do Sul MS West  Sergipe SE Northeast 
Minas Gerais MG Southeast Tocantins TO North 
Pará PA North    
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CHAPTER SEVEN 
ADDRESSING FEDERAL CONFLICTS: AN EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS OF THE BRAZILIAN SUPREME 
COURT, 1988-2010 993 
I. INTRODUCTION 
 Federal conflicts are an important area of the law that every Supreme Court has to 
address. In fact, the general role of supreme courts in the context of federal states has 
been considered in detail by political scientists and legal economists. They suggest that 
the appropriate balance of power between the union (federal government) and the states, 
and between the states themselves, justifies an independent and strong judiciary.
994
 
Constitutional provisions concerning the division of competences are inevitably 
incomplete and, therefore, subject to potentially different interpretations and conflicts. All 
sides have an interest in empowering an independent court to referee these disputes.  The 
enforcement of federalism requires a neutral third party, thus decreasing the likelihood 
that justices will be openly and overwhelmingly captured by specific political interests.
995 
 Brazil has been politically organized as a federal state since 1891. Brazilian states 
have significant powers but the union is largely dominant.
996
 Brazil has been pointed out 
                                                        
993 An earlier (and shorter) version of this chapter has been previously published: Carolina Arlota and Nuno 
Garoupa, “Addressing Federal Conflicts: An Empirical Analysis of the Brazilian Supreme Court, 1988- 
2010,” Review of Law & Economics (2014): 137–168, ISSN (Online) 1555–5879, ISSN (Print) 2194–6000, 
DOI: 10.1515/rle-2013-0037. 
 
994 Theories of judicial independence include, among others: William Landes and Richard Posner, “The 
Independent Judiciary in an Interest-Group Perspective,” Journal of Law and Economics 18 (1975): 875–
901; Richard Epstein, “The Independence of Judges: The Uses and Limitations of Public Choice,” Brigham 
Y oung University Law Review (1990): 827–855; Mark Ramseyer, “The Puzzling (In)dependence of 
Courts,” Journal of Legal Studies 23 (1994): 721–747. 
 
995 See discussion by: Jenna Bednar and William Eskridge, “Steadying the Court’s ‘Unsteady Path’: A 
Theory of Enforcement of Federalism,” Southern California Law Review 68 (1995): 1447–1491; Jenna 
Bednar, “Judicial Predictability and Federal Stability: Strategic Consequences of Imperfection,” Journal of 
Theoretical Politics 16 (2004): 423–446. 
 
996 Contending that Brazilian federalism is one of enabled center, due to the union’s entitlement to initiate 
legislation coupled with the success in approving such bills:  Marta Arretche, “Demos-Constraining or 
Demos-Enabling Federalism? Political Institutions and Policy Change in Brazil,” Journal of Politics in 
Latin America 5 (2013): 133–150, at 137–141. 
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as an extreme case of federalism.
997
 The Constitution of 1988 has delegated important 
competences to state governments. Unsurprisingly, the Brazilian Supreme Court 
(Supremo Tribunal Federal: hereinafter “STF”) is frequently asked to entertain conflicts 
of jurisdiction. Constitutional principles and doctrines had to be developed by the STF to 
address these particular issues.        
 Our approach to federal conflicts is empirical in nature. The U.S. Supreme Court 
has been the focus of much empirical attention by legal scholars and political scientists. 
Empirical debate about other constitutional courts is an emerging literature.
998
 More 
importantly, the particular case of the Brazilian Supreme Court has been studied by 
relatively fewer scholars and empirical work based on regression analysis is not common 
yet.
999
           
 Federative conflicts, namely, a conflict between the union and a given state (or 
states) have not been researched. When adjudicating such conflicts, the STF justices are 
inevitably confronted with two opposing political interests: those of the union and those 
                                                        
997 Arguing that Brazilian is an extreme case of federalism due to several factors, including the highly 
different cultures, economical development and distinguished political histories among the states: Scott W. 
Desposato, “The Impact of Federalism on National Party Cohesion in Brazil,” Legislative Studies Quarterly 
29 (2004): 259–285, at 262. 
 
998 See, among others: Benjamin Alarie and Andrew J. Green, “Should They All Just Get Along? Judicial 
Ideology, Collegiality, and Appointments to the Supreme Court of Canada,” University of New Brunswick 
Law Journal 58 (2008): 73–91; Sofia Amaral Garcia, Nuno Garoupa and Veronica Grembi, “Judicial 
Independence and Party Politics in the Kelsenian Constitutional Courts: the Case of Portugal,” Journal of 
Empirical Legal Studies 6 (2009): 381–404; Raphael Franck, “Judicial Independence Under a Divided 
Polity: A Study of the Rulings of the French Constitutional Court, 1959-2006,” Journal of Law, Economics 
and Organization 25 (2009): 262–284; Raphael Franck,  “Judicial Independence and the Validity of 
Controverted Elections,” American Law and Economics Review 12 (2010): 394–422; Nuno Garoupa, 
Fernando Gómez and Veronica Grembi, “Judging Under Political Pressure: An Empirical Analysis of 
Constitutional Review Voting in the Spanish Constitutional Court,” Journal of Law, Economics and 
Organization 29 (2013): 513–534; Andrew J. Green and Benjamin Alarie, “Policy Preference Change and 
Appointments to the Supreme Court of Canada,” Osgoode Hall Law Journal 47 (2009): 1–46; Gemma Sala, 
“The Impact of Judicial Review on Federalism in Spain,” Paper presented at the 2009 Midwest Political 
Science Association, Chicago, April 2-5 (2009); C. Neal Tate and Panu Sittiwong, “Decision Making in the 
Canadian Supreme Court: Extending the Personal Attributes Model Across Nations,” Journal of Politics 51 
(1989): 900–916; Georg Vanberg, The Politics of Constitutional Review in Germany (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2005); Tom Ginsburg, Judicial Review in New Democracies: Constitutional 
Courts in Asian Cases (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003); Mary L. Volcansek, Constitutional 
Politics in Italy (New York: Palgrave Macmillan Press, 2000). 
 
999 Notable exceptions being: Maria Fernanda Jaloretto and Bernardo Pinheiro Machado Mueller, “O 
Procedimento de Escolha dos Ministros do Supremo Tribunal Federal – uma Análise Empírica,” Economic 
Analysis of Law Review 2 (2011): 170–187; and Mariana Llanos and Leany Barreiro Lemos, “Presidential 
Preferences? The Supreme Federal Tribunal Nominations in Democratic Brazil,” Latin American Politics 
and Society 55 (2013): 77–105. 
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of the states. We focus on the alignment between revealed judicial preferences when 
deciding those federative conflicts and presidential appointments in Brazil. Therefore, we 
test whether or not a justice appointed by a given President is more likely to favor the 
union when such President is in office than otherwise.    
 In the U.S., the overwhelming majority of justices nominated were originated 
from the party of the President.
1000
 Republican Presidents tend to appoint justices who are 
more conservative in the political spectrum, while Democratic Presidents nominees are 
much more liberal. According to this line of analysis, a Republican President tends to 
support a justice who is against abortion, well fare state measures, general intervention in 
the economy, and healthcare, for instance.
1001
      
 In the U.S., the appointer President considers candidates as close as possible to his 
ideologies
1002
 – this also being the case in Brazil,1003 albeit judges being prohibited of 
partisan-political activities.1004 Nevertheless, legal doctrines in Brazil cannot be generally 
used as a proxy to political affiliations. Brazilian legal doctrines are nonpartisan. The 
demarcation of ideology, thus, is not evident – in a significantly different arrangement 
than the existing scenario in the U.S. The legal issues debated in Brazil are framed 
differently than along party lines. Moreover, the fact that Brazil has a multiparty system 
with high fragmentation contributes to additional difficulties in interpreting regressions – 
in a sharp contrast with the strong U.S. bi-partisan system.     
                                                        
1000 In their dataset comprising 147 justices’ nominations, the Professors note that 87% came from the 
presidential party: Jeffrey A. Segal and Harold J. Spaeth, The Supreme Court and the A ttitudinal Model 
Revisited (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005), at 180. 
 
1001  Noting that Reagan, during his campaign in 1986, declared that he would favor judicial nominees who 
are “harsh on crime, opposed abortion, and favored school prayer,” Idem, at 181. 
 
1002 A model considering the ideology of the President, median Senator and Supreme Court is capable of 
explaining 80% of the variance referring to the ideology in presidential nominees, as argued by Segal and 
Spaeth, The Supreme Court and the A ttitudinal Model Revisited, at 185–186. 
 
1003 Stressing how Brazilian Presidents appoint nominees holding similar views: Daniel M. Brinks, 
“Faithful Servants of the Regime,” in Courts in Latin America, ed. Gretchen Helmke and Julio Rios-
Figueroa (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011), at 139–140. 
 
1004 The constitutional prohibition of judges (and justices) of exercising any partisan activities is located at 
article 95, sole paragraph, III, of the Constitution of 1988. This prohibition is also contained in article26, II, 
c, of the Complementary Law 35 of 1979 – the so-called Magistrate Statute. According to the STF, judges 
and justices are forbidden of the exercise of any partisan-political activity, included any affiliation to 
political parties due to independence concerns, as held in: Adin 1371, June 3, 1998, and having justice Neri 
da Silveira as rapporteur. 
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 In the Brazilian political reality, given the highly fragmented political party 
system
1005
 (more than ten political parties are regularly represented in the Congress), the 
President is usually supported by a broad coalition in the Senate.
1006
 The longevity of 
political parties (those that started during the dictatorship in the 1970s and continue to be 
important today) shows to a great extent that there was no abrupt substitution of the 
political elites during the period we consider, but rather cyclical rearrangements of the 
same elites.
1007
           
 The Constitution of 19988 opted for maintaining all the constitutional 
modifications that were previously introduced during the military ruling and that 
ultimately led to a great extension of the legislative powers of the President.
1008
 It is 
worth noting that in Brazil, despite the multiparty system, parties are disciplined, and the 
President has vast approval of the bills enacted by the legislature,
1009
 with the legislative 
                                                        
1005 Remarking that once Presidents are elected, they have to form such broad coalition governments, 
though offers of jobs and resources to distinct political parties:  Scott Mainwaring, “Multipartism, Robust 
Federalism, and Presidentialism in Brazil,” in Presidentialism and Democracy in Latin America, ed. Scott 
Mainwaring and Matthew Soberg Shugart (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997), at 69–74. 
 
1006 In such scenario, the STF would be very careful about the decisions, to the extent that this broad 
coalition may reduce dissent, thus decreasing the space of courts. For how dominant parties reduce the 
policy space of courts, see: Ginsburg, Judicial Review in New Democracies: Constitutional Courts in Asian 
Cases, at 81–82; and also at 248–261. Arguing that strong Presidents in Brazil had produced a democratic 
society due to the interference of the judiciary as a check: Marcus Andre Melo, “Strong Presidents, Robust 
Democracies? Separation of Powers and Rule of Law in Latin America,” Brazilian Political Science 
Review 3 (2009): 30–59. 
 
1007 Adriano Nervo Codato, “Uma História Política da Transição Brasileira: Da Ditadura Militar à 
Democracia,”  Revista de Sociologia e Política 25 (2005): 83–106. 
 
1008 Argelina Cheibub Figueiredo and Fernando Limongi, “Presidential Power, Legislative Organization 
and Party Behavior in Brazil,” Comparative Politics 32, N. 2 (2000): 151–170, at 163.  
 
1009 It is not that presidents conquered support for approval of their agenda by endless negotiations with 
deputes or senators on a case by case basis – as evidenced by the research of roll call votes, demonstrating 
that political parties are disciplined and that the approval for the president’s agenda is based on the support 
from the parties forming the government coalition: Figueiredo and Limongi, Presidential Power, 
Legislative Organization and Party Behavior in Brazil, at 154. The Professors argued, at 158, that 
presidents gather support as prime ministers do, namely “by building government coalitions through the 
distribution of ministries to political parties and thereby securing the votes they needed in congress.” 
Another recent study arguing that Presidents do not need to bargain on a case by case to approve legislation 
and discussing evidence that governors cannot undermine the executive influence in Congress: José 
Antônio Cheibub, Argelina Figueiredo and Fernando Limongi, “Political Parties and Governors as 
Determinants of Legislative Behavior in Brazil’s Chamber of Deputies, 1988–2006,” Latin America 
Politics and Society 51 (2009): 1–30, at 23–25. 
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organization being very centralized.
1010
 President and Congress are, in the vast majority 
of the cases on the same side, with the President bargaining with the parties – instead of 
separately negotiating with members of Congress.
1011
 Thus, Congress is aligned with the 
President, approving her or his agenda.
1012
 In addition, there has been a long history of 
executive dominance over legislative (and courts) coupled with the civil law tradition that 
emphasizes judges as mere applicators of the law, instead of actors involving in its 
interpretation.
1013        
 Political scientists have observed the judicialization of politics in Brazil and 
provide several explanations: the extension of social and economic rights guaranteed by 
the 1988 Constitution, the dynamics of different interest groups using the courts to 
arbitrate their conflicts, the lack of strong political parties and consistent majorities, the 
empowerment of the judiciary and prosecutors (Ministério Público) to develop social and 
economic rights,
1014
 and the decentralization of federally collected funds to finance state 
governments.
1015
 Importantly, it has been argued that the Brazilian judiciary has been a 
relevant player in defining policy choices. As a consequence, unlike other Latin American 
                                                        
1010 Figueiredo and Limongi, Presidential Power, Legislative Organization and Party Behavior in Brazil, at 
164–165. 
 
1011 Idem, at 162. 
 
1012 It has been argued that only 0.026% of the executive proposals voted on the full Chamber were 
rejected, after the Constitution of 1988: Matthew M. Taylor, Judging Policy: Courts and Policy Reform in 
Democratic Brazil (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2008), at 74, based on the empirical study 
conducted by Argelina Cheibub Figueiredo and Fernando Limongi, Executivo e Legislativo na Nova 
Ordem Constitucional, FGV (1999). 
 
1013 Emphasizing the concentration of powers in the executive and the related executive dominance as well 
as the legal education based on civil law as a legacy of European colonialism, see, for instance: Rebecca 
Bill Chavez, The Rule of Law in Nascent Democracies: Judicial Politics in Argentina (Stanford: Stanford 
University Press, 2004), at 12–14. 
 
1014  See, for example, Rogerio B. Arantes, “Constitutionalism, The Expansion of Justice and the 
Judicialization of Politics in Brazil,” in The Judicialization of Politics in Latin America, ed. Rachel Sieder, 
Line Schjolden and Alan Angell (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2006), at 231.  On mitigating the 
importance of the STF in deciding cases of federal conflicts, and emphasizing that political negotiations 
among the executive, state governors and representatives of the states in national Congress, see: Keith S. 
Rosenn, “Federalism in Brazil,” Duquesne Law Review 43 (2005): 577–598, at 584. For important 
implications about the political dimension of the legal doctrines accepted by the STF: see Oscar Vilhena 
Vieira, O Supremo Tribunal Federal: Jurisprudência Política (São Paulo: Revista dos Tribunais, 1994); 
Oscar Vilhena Vieira, “Supremocracia,” Revista de Direito GV , São Paulo 4 (2008): 441–464. 
 
1015 Marcus Faro de Castro and Maria Izabel Valladão de Carvalho, “Globalization and Recent Political 
Transitions in Brazil,” International Political Science Review 24 (2003): 465–490, at 472. 
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countries facing a transitional period from dictatorship to democracy, there is no general 
perception of the judiciary as deferent to the executive branch in Brazil.
1016 
 Empirical work to uncover patterns of judicial politics has consistently focused on 
direct actions of unconstitutionality (a form of abstract constitutional review): the so-
called Adins (Ação direta de inconstitucionalidade). These Adins are a form of 
constitutional litigation involving actors which can be more easily associated with 
political interests (mainly political and institutional bodies), and they relate to abstract 
challenges of federal legislation which are intrinsically politicized in nature (there are 
other forms of constitutional litigation which we will explain in detail later). Not 
surprisingly, they are perceived to be partisan due to the frequency they are used by 
groups affected by federal legislative action.
1017
     
 However, fewer empirical studies search for a straight correlation between 
judicial ideology and decisions by the STF.
1018
 Current empirical work, restricted to 
Adins in the period 2002 to 2009, concludes that there is no statistical significance 
between appointment and the behavior of STF justices.
1019
      
 At the same time, it has been argued that the Supremo Tribunal Federal is simply 
deferent to presidential policies (favoring the President in cases of disputes arising out of 
separation of powers). As far this argument goes, it would be easier to rule against the 
                                                        
1016 Taylor, Judging Policy: Courts and Policy Reform in Democratic Brazil, at 3. Emphasizing that 
Brazilian judiciary as “exceptionally strong by regional standards,” Diana Kapiszewski, High Courts and 
Economic Governance in Argentina and Brazil (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012), at 113. 
The Professor argues that interbranch interactions followed a pattern of accommodation on crucial 
economical cases decided after the authoritarian period, at 8 and 31, with her dataset comprising mainly 
Adins. Nevertheless, there have been voices stating some level of deference of justices of the STF to the 
executive branch with regard to separation of powers doctrines. In this direction: Brinks, Faithful Servants 
of the Regime, at 136–137. 
 
1017 Carlos Santiso, “Economic Reform and Judicial Governance in Brazil: Balancing Independence with 
Accountability,” in Democratization and the Judiciary: The Accountability Function of Courts in New 
Democracies, ed. Siri Gloppen, Roberto Gargarella and Elin Skaar (London: Frank Cass & Ltd., 2004), at 
173–174. 
 
1018 Ernani Rodrigues Carvalho, “Em busca da Judicialização da Política no Brasil: Apontamentos para uma 
Nova Abordagem,” Revista de Sociologia Política 23 (2004): 115–126. 
 
1019 Jaloretto and Mueller, O Procedimento de Escolha dos Ministros do Supremo Tribunal Federal – uma 
Análise Empírica, at 175–180, in particular. 
 
  252 
states than it is to rule against the union.
1020
 In this sense, state legislatures and state 
governments would not be significantly powerful vis-à-vis the union.   
 Our contribution is distinct in providing an empirical testing of judicial behavior 
in the STF in the context of conflicts of federal versus state jurisdiction (including, but 
not limited to, Adins). Furthermore, we observe empirical patterns that seem to point out 
a certain degree of politicization that is in contradiction to previous empirical 
literature.
1021
 At the same time, our results stress that judicial behavior in the STF follows 
patterns that are significantly different from the U.S. Supreme Court.  
 Our study fills a gap in the literature because it considers lawsuits of different 
types (not solely Adins). In addition, it also tests for centralization and possible alignment 
between STF justices and the appointing presidents, in the specific context of federal 
conflicts. Furthermore, our dataset includes all the decisions by the Court en banc or by 
panels that appeared concerning federalism (as so considered by the website of the STF) 
between 1988 (when the current Constitution was approved) and 2010 (the end of 
President Lula’s term in office).        
 This research also contributes to the debacle of long-established legal views based 
on the continental tradition and which contend that the judiciary is completely immune 
from political pressures (neutrality based argument), with judges being disinterested 
actors in the final award by merely applying the law to a concrete case.
1022   
 This chapter goes as follows. An overview of the Brazilian Supreme Court is 
presented in Part II. The hypothesis is discussed in Part III. The dataset and preliminary 
                                                        
1020 Generally, see: Daniel M. Brinks, “Judicial Reform and Independence in Brazil and Argentina: The 
Beginning of a New Millennium?,” Texas Law Review 40 (2005): 595–622; Daniel M. Brinks, Faithful 
Servants of the Regime, at 136–137, and at 141. 
 
1021 Jaloretto and Mueller, O Procedimento de Escolha dos Ministros do Supremo Tribunal Federal – uma 
Análise Empírica, at 178–185. 
 
1022 Locating the continental tradition and the dogma of the negative legislator conceived by Kelsen in the 
context of the review exercised by constitutional courts: Alec Stone Sweet, Governing with Judges: 
Constitutional Politics in Europe (New York: Oxford University Press, 2000), at 133–139. See also 
chapters three and four of this thesis, when we analyzed the concept of negative legislator, the principle of 
separation of powers in light of their influence for the Brazilian abstract review, and the presence of such 
modality of review in the United States, respectively. Therefore, the continental tradition clearly denies the 
invalidation of a legislative act by the judiciary – and by constitutional courts, in particular – as having a 
political dimension, with judges being perceived as neutral in the Austro-Germanic influential doctrine. In 
this direction: Stone Sweet, Governing with Judges: Constitutional Politics in Europe, at 141–145. 
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empirical evidence is presented in Part IV. A regression analysis is considered in Part V 
and discussed in Part VI. 
II. THE BRAZILIAN SUPREME COURT 
 The Brazilian Constitution of 1988 recognizes the autonomy to the federal union, 
the states, and the municipalities. However, sovereignty belongs to the Brazilian 
Republic, while most of the powers are centralized in the federal union. The states are 
entitled to self-organization, being governed by their own state constitution. They also 
have self-government, since they can set the appropriate rules for division of powers 
within the government in their own territories. At the same time, states are also entitled to 
political representation in the Senate. This federalist arrangement is formally protected by 
the Constitution. In fact, the federal structure cannot be abolished or reduced by a 
constitutional amendment. The Brazilian Constitution of 1988 determines the STF to be 
the guardian of the federal system. Moreover, according to constitutional law and 
established doctrines of the STF, whenever a conflict among members of the union and 
the state(s) takes place, the STF is the only competent court to decide it.1023  
 In the STF, judicial review is exercised in two main forms: concrete or abstract 
review. In abstract review (constitutional litigation refers to a norm in general and not in 
a particular context or situation), the STF considers the so-called direct actions of 
unconstitutionality and constitutionality, mainly. At the same time, in abstract review 
(unlike in concrete review), there is a limited set of actors with possible standing.1024 In 
addition, abstract review is determined solely by considerations concerning the 
constitutionality or unconstitutionality of the challenged norm, and not the particulars of 
litigation. In concrete review,1025 in contrast, the STF has to consider the specific case or 
controversy being brought by the parties (therefore, any citizen, group or company can 
                                                        
1023 Article 102 of the Brazilian Constitution of 1988:  “The Supremo Tribunal Federal is responsible, 
essentially, for safeguarding the Constitution, and it is within its original jurisdiction: (…) f) disputes and 
conflicts between the Union and the states, the Union and the Federal District, or between one another, 
including the respective indirect administrative bodies.” 
 
1024 See article 103 of the 1988 Constitution.  
 
1025 Concrete review is exercised by the STF mainly in the context of the Court’s original competence as 
well as under extraordinary appeals – the latter being responsible for the huge caseload faced by the STF: 
Luís Roberto Barroso, O Controle de Constitucionalidade no Direito Brasileiro (Rio de Janeiro: Saraiva, 
2012), at 127. 
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have standing). In concrete review, the question of constitutionality matters, but it is not 
the fundamental issue litigated by the parties.1026     
 The mechanism of appointment to the STF was transplanted from the U.S. 
Constitution in 1891. Although the STF has eleven justices who are subject to mandatory 
retirement at the age of seventy years old, the remaining provisions are similar to the U.S. 
Constitution. In particular, the justices are appointed by the President and subject to 
confirmation by the Senate.1027 The mechanism of appointment of justices to the STF 
(with its recognition archetypal) is an exception to the general rule used for most court 
appointments in Brazil for which public examination and some career path prevail. 
Importantly, there is a general impression in Brazil that the decisive factor to sit on the 
STF is merely the will of the President in choosing a given candidate,1028 because the 
Senate is by and large deferent to the presidential choice.1029   
 Table 7.1 summarizes presidential terms and judicial appointments to the STF 
during the relevant period for our study (1988-2010). We can see that the most relevant 
presidents in shaping the STF were Figueiredo (under the military dictatorship), Collor 
(1990-1992), Sarney (1985-1990), and Lula (2003-2011). The remaining presidents 
(Castello Branco and Geisel under the military dictatorship, and Itamar and FHC under 
the Constitution of 1988) made significantly fewer appointments.   
 The Brazilian Supreme Court has attracted the attention of social scientists and 
interesting empirical research has been developed. A major research work focuses on the 
number of Adins decided between 1988 and 1998 (presidential terms of Sarney, Collor de 
Mello, Itamar, and FHC) and finds that a significant majority (more than 70%) was 
                                                        
1026 Along those lines, cases of original competence of the STF include, among others: civil actions, writs 
of mandado de segurança, extraordinary appeals, and actions of reclamation: Gilmar Ferreira Mendes and 
Paulo Gustavo Gonet Branco, Curso de Direito Constitucional (São Paulo: Saraiva, 2013), at 1063–1101. 
 
1027 Maria Angela Jardim de Santa Cruz Oliveira and Nuno Garoupa, “Choosing Judges in Brazil: 
Reassessing Legal Transplants from the United States,” American Journal of Comparative Law 59, N. 2 
(2011): 529–561. 
 
1028 Barroso, O Controle de Constitucionalidade no Direito Brasileiro, at 396. 
 
1029 The Brazilian Constitution, article 101, sole paragraph, requires absolute majority in the Senate, namely 
more than half of the totality of the senators. Personal information about the justices for the period of 1988 
until 2010 is available at Table 7.7. 
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initiated by opposition political parties.1030  When expanding the dataset to 2005, the 
authors observe an increasing average number of Adins during the first three years of 
President Lula’s term in office (2002 to 2005) despite the most usual petitioner being in 
power during this period (PT was the traditional opposition in the previous period and a 
major petitioner for Adins).         
 At the same time, they identify important effects of challenging Adins in 
administrative law, possibly correcting a balance of power between the union and the 
states, favoring the latter.1031 They also argue that while opposition between the union 
and the states was an inevitable result of the centralization of government during the 
military regime, it was smoothed down by the Constitution of 1988. According to the 
authors, a new trend for centralization started around 2002, which resulted in more 
conflicts between the union and the states. The research points out that the distribution of 
Adins across the states is very unequal, illustrating diversity within Brazilian federalism. 
Furthermore, the findings show that the STF prefers to adjudicate Adins in limine rather 
than en banc.1032 This preference is also corroborated in a quantitative research focusing 
on Adins between 1988 and 2006.1033         
 Recent empirical work shows that more Adins were initiated under the 
government of President Fernando Henrique Cardoso (1995-2002) than under the 
government of President Lula (for the period 2002-2008).1034 Similarly, focusing on 
                                                        
1030 See: Luiz Werneck Vianna, Maria Alice R. Carvalho, Manoel P.C. Melo and Marcelo B. Burgos, A 
Judicialização da Política e das Relações Sociais no Brasil (São Paulo: Revan, 1999). For another empirical 
work focused on direct actions of unconstitutionality (but limited to the period from 1988 to 1993) and 
initiated by political parties: Marcus Faro de Castro, “The Courts Law and Democracy in Brazil, 
International Social Science Journal 152 (2007): 241–252, at 246–247. 
 
1031 Luiz Werneck Vianna, Marcelo Baumann and Paula Martins Salles, “Dezessete Anos de Judicialização 
da Política,” Tempo Social, Revista de Sociologia da USP 19 (2007): 39–85. 
 
1032 Decisions in limine are similar to injunctions. Such remedies may be granted by the rapporteur (the 
reporter justice) or by a panel of the STF in particular cases – as occurs, for instance, when the subject 
matter in question is not novel, i.e., it has been previously discussed and voted by the Court sitting en banc. 
 
1033 Paulo Cesar Amorim Alves, “Diga ‘Trinta e Três’: uma Tentativa de Diagnóstico da Agenda Política 
do STF e dos Órgãos de sua Burocracia Processual,” in Jurisprudência Constitucional: Como decide o 
STF?, ed. Diogo R. Coutinho and Adriana M. Vojvodic (São Paulo: Malheiros, 2009). 
 
1034 Matthew M. Taylor and Luciano Da Ros, “Os Partidos Dentro e Fora do poder: A Judicialização como 
Resultado Contingente da Estratégia Política,” DADOS – Revista de Ciências Sociais 51 (2008): 825–864.  
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Adins between 1988 and 2003, federalism and separation of powers emerge as the main 
issues addressed by the STF.1035 The role of professional associations and private interest 
in empirically explaining the outcome of Adins has also been considered.1036  
 The STF does not have control of their own dockets, technically lacking general 
mechanisms similar to the U.S. certiorari.1037 The STF has to rule on all the cases that 
reach their dockets.1038 The absence of certiorari enables a sense of collegiality in the 
Court, because many decisions (if a question is not posed to the STF for the first time) are 
judged by one justice or specific panels.1039  The lack of certiorari does not mean that the 
STF is not empowered to select some cases. The general absence of mechanisms of 
                                                        
1035 Fabiana Luci Oliveira, “Justice, Professionalism, and Politics in the Exercise of Judicial Review by 
Brazil's Supreme Court,” Brazilian Political Science Review 3 (2008): 93–116. 
 
1036 See: Matthew M. Taylor, “Citizen Against the State: the Riddle of High Impact, Low Functionality 
Courts in Brazil,” Brazilian Journal of Political Economy 25 (2005): 418–438; Taylor, Judging Policy: 
Courts and Policy Reform in Democratic Brazil. For a study establishing, generally, the deliberative and 
argumentative profiles of justices considering Adins between 2006 and 2010, see: Carlos Ari Sundfeld and 
Rodrigo Pagani Souza, “Accountability e Jurisprudência do STF: Estudo empírico de variáveis 
institucionais e estrutura das decisões”, in Jurisdição Constitucional no Brasil, ed. Adriana M. Vojvodic, 
Henrique Motta Pinto, Paula Gorzoni and Rodrigo Pagani de Souza (São Paulo: Malheiros, 2012). 
 
1037 The Constitutional Amendment 45 of 2004 introduced two important mechanisms. The first one is the 
so-called general repercussion for extraordinary appeals. It already existed, in practice, as a non-written 
requirement demanded by the case law of the STF. The general repercussion requires that for filing an 
extraordinary appeal in the STF, parties must demonstrate that the constitutional question has a substantial 
impact, under the terms of article 102, paragraph 3, of the Constitution. Hence, the Court does not have 
certiorari, technically speaking, because it cannot freely choose which cases to judge. The second 
mechanism inaugurated by the Constitutional Amendment 45 is the “súmula vinculante.” This “súmula” 
works as a binding precedent for all other members of the judiciary as well as the public administration. 
However, solely the STF – and by a qualified majority of two thirds – can authorize the edition of the 
“súmulas.” Such “súmulas” are limited to constitutional matters, and have as prerequisite the existence of 
several reiterative decisions on the specific subject matter, as stated in Article 103-A, of the Constitution. 
From 2004 to 2012, the Court edited thirty-two “súmulas,” only, according to the official website of the 
STF. Therefore, Brazil presents a mitigated system of stare decisis, after the Constitutional Amendment 45. 
 
1038 According to the Internal Rules of Procedure of the Supremo Tribunal Federal (“Regimento Interno”), 
from October 27, 1980, the President and Vice-President are elected by the Tribunal  (article second, sole 
paragraph, combined with article 7,I), with the President having significant discretion. For a study about the 
different roles and understandings among the justices in selected cases: Giovani A. Fernandes, Juliano E. 
Lima, Maitê A. Guedes, Tassia L. R. da Silva, “Em Busca da Autonomia Político-Institucional do Supremo 
Tribunal Federal: a Relevância do Perfil Biobibliográfico dos seus Ministros nomeados após 2003,” ed.  
José Ribas Vieira, Revista de Direito do UniFOA  (2009): 65–91, last accessed April, 2012, and available 
at: http://www.unifoa.edu.br/revistadodireito/203.pdf. 
 
1039 Kapiszewski, High Courts Economic Governance in Argentina and Brazil, at 104–106, for procedural 
analysis of the distribution and selection of the cases that will be judged by the President of the STF, who 
decides when it will be the most opportune moment to deliver the decisions. 
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certiorari removes a significant aspect of the U.S. political science literature with regard 
to the strategic behavior of justices in the U.S. Supreme Court.1040  In Brazil, the public 
sessions of the Court are transmitted on live television.1041 Those two factors are 
important because, at least in theory, they may eliminate some of the recurrent instances 
pointed out by the U.S. literature for strategic behavior of justices.1042      
 At this point, it is appropriate to clarify that the current literature (as previously 
reviewed in this chapter) has been mainly developed by political scientists with a 
primordial focus on Adins. This line of research is understandable since it emphasizes the 
role played by political parties within the STF. In fact, Adins can only be started by 
political actors, mainly political parties (regardless of whether or not they control the 
Congress) and governors of the states, among others. Naturally, Adins are perceived to 
work as a proxy for the amount of general opposition against the executive branch. To 
some extent, it is a simplified methodology for empirical research (including coding) and 
it enables the construction of reasonable datasets considering a reasonable number of 
decisions by the STF.         
 In addition, Adins are lawsuits that directly start in the STF, and the decision of 
the STF is fully binding erga omnes (since Adins are developed as abstract actions of 
constitutional review). Adins are conceived to address, by definition, potential violations 
of the constitutional text, i.e., matters that conceptually define and allocate powers across 
                                                        
1040 For a study about the decisions of the United States Supreme Court granting certiorari or denying it as 
an example of strategic behavior, with empirical findings supporting this argument:  Gregory Caldeira, 
John R. Wright, Christopher J.W. Zorn, “Sophisticated Voting and Gate-Keeping in the Supreme Court,” 
The Journal of Law, Economics & Organization 15 (1999): 549–572. 
 
1041 It has been remarked that the STF is a reality show, whereas the USSC is a black box, as declared by 
Professor Celso Roma, from the State University of São Paulo – USP, in an interview to Gabriel Manzano, 
at the Brazilian daily journal: O Estado de São Paulo, August 19, of 2013, last accessed September of 2013, 
and available on line at: http://politica.estadao.com.br/ noticias/geral-suprema-corte-americana-e-um-
mundo-secreto-e-a-brasileira-e-um-reality-show,1065703. 
 
1042 Caldeira, Wright, and Zorn, Sophisticated Voting and Gate-Keeping in the Supreme Court, at 551, the 
authors discuss that the United States Supreme Court offers several opportunities for strategic behavior, 
such as: opinion assignments, dissents, concurrences, and choice of who will write the majority opinion. In 
the STF, by contrast, the original rapporteur is determined by an electronic random selection system. For an 
article emphasizing the similar features of this selection to a “lottery,” see the opinion page of Carta Maior, 
from September 27, 2012, and available on line at: http://cartamaior.com.br/?/Editoria/Politica/BBB-no-
STF-Qual-a-importancia-do-relator-%0D%0A/4/25841.  
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the branches of government or protect the most important rights.1043 Significantly, 
previous studies that investigated judicial ideology and the outcome of STF decisions in 
detail are solely limited to Adins.        
 It is noteworthy that Adins tend to be more partisans, since they are directly 
related to alleged violations of the constitutional text. As explained, they can only be 
petitioned by authorized actors or bodies mentioned in the Constitution (mostly political 
actors). To the extent that our dataset also includes concrete cases (as, for instance, 
extraordinary appeals, which do not have particular standing restrictions), one would 
expect to have less partisan decisions the more diverse the dataset is.  
 Accordingly, our dataset is a radical departure from previous research, because it 
accounts for more diverse types of lawsuits (and related different types of judicial review, 
namely, abstract and concrete), while focusing on federal conflicts and the period it 
encompasses (since the early days of the Constitution of 1988 until 2010). 
 
III. THE HYPOTHESIS 
This chapter focuses on the cases litigated before the STF where one side is the 
union (federal government) and the other side is a state. Each party wants to maximize 
jurisdiction, and at some point enhancing the political competence or attribution of one 
party necessarily reduces the influence of the other party. The legislation reviewed by the 
STF reflects a conflict of competence that could not be solved politically. It is usually the 
case that one side has a political interest in enacting some form of legislation that will be 
challenged by the other side. Naturally, conflicts emerge between political actors that 
frequently cannot be reconciled without the intervention of the STF.  
 The U.S. literature encompasses three main models for judicial decision making 
for the Supreme Court. We enunciate those models briefly. The first one is the legal 
model, whose corollary holds that the plain meaning of the statutes and the Constitution, 
precedents, and/or intent of the Framers are the major factors that influence the decision 
                                                        
1043 We emphasize conceptually, because the Brazilian Constitution is significantly long, with several 
articles that do not necessarily protect constitutional rights as traditionally or conventionally considered. As 
an example, article 242, paragraph second, states that the Public School Pedro II – located in the city of Rio 
de Janeiro – shall always be federal. 
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of the Court.1044 In contrast, the attitudinal model states that ideological attitudes and 
values of the justices are considered along with the facts of the case.1045 Stating 
differently, preferences of justices matter for the decision of cases.1046 According to the 
strategic model, “justices are strategic actors who realize that their ability to achieve their 
goals depends on a consideration of the preferences of others, of the choices they expect 
others to make, and of the institutional context in which they act.”1047 Thus, this third 
model considers the interaction of the Court with the legislative and executive branches. 
 The perception of the judiciary as being subject to particular challenges for the 
enforcement of its decisions has been incorporated to the United States since its 
inception.1048 In the United States, judicial behavior has been the principal interest in 
political science and legal empirical studies after World War II.1049 Because judges do not 
have effective mechanisms to oblige compliance with the decision of the court, they have 
to consider other political factors as well as the public opinion in order to avoid damaging 
the legitimacy of the court as an institution.1050  
                                                        
1044 Segal and Spaeth, The Supreme Court and the A ttitudinal Model Revisited, at 48. 
 
1045 Idem, at 87. 
 
1046 Discussing preferences of judges when comparing them to theater goers, judge Posner writes: 
“Spectators make choices about the meaning of a play or movie by bringing to bear their personal 
experiences and any specialized cultural competence that they may have by virtue of study of or immersion 
in the type of drama that they are watching, and often by discussing their reactions with friends who may 
have a similar competence. The judge brings to bear on his spectatorial function not only a range of 
personal and political preferences, but also a specialized cultural competence – his knowledge of and 
experience in 'the law'.” Richard A. Posner, “What do Judges Maximize? (The Same Thing as Everybody 
Else Does),” Chicago John M. Olin Law and Economics W orking Paper N. 15, 2D series (March 1993): 1–
29, at 19. 
 
1047 Lee Epstein and Jack Knight, The Choices Justices Make, (Washington, DC: Congressional Quarterly 
Inc. Press, 1998), at xiii. 
 
1048 See chapter four of this thesis, for a discussion about the separation of powers principle in the U.S. 
reality, including the famous Federalist 78. 
 
1049 See, for example: Daniel R. Pinello, “Linking Party to Judicial Ideology in American Courts: A Meta-
analysis,” The Justice System Journal 20, N. 3 (1999): 219–254, at 220. 
 
1050 Tracey E. George and Lee Epstein, “On the Nature of Supreme Court Decision Making,” American 
Political Science Review 86, No. 2 (June 1992): 323–337, at 325–326. 
 
  260 
 Therefore, independence of the courts does not derive from the constitutional 
text,1051 it includes elections. In this perspective, political organization affects the cost of 
legislation,1052 with the fragmentation of political parties being associated with the 
increasing discretionary power of courts.1053   
The study of independence of the courts in Brazil was mainly developed by 
political scientists. This is still a remarkable influence of the general civil law perception 
of judges as neutral and impartial. This is a tradition based on the mores, instead of 
specific rules in the codes or any objective norm.1054     
 Commenting on civil law judges, they have been compared to an operator of a 
machine that was conceived and built by legislators.1055 In this direction, the iudex of 
Roman times, a tradition in which judges did not exercise a creative function, was 
exacerbated by the anti-judicial ideology of the continental European revolutions1056 and 
their strict separation of powers principle. 1057  Among the current approaches to 
interpretation, the German Constitutional Court is fond of the so-called constitutional 
                                                        
1051 Although constitutional texts are relevant, as argues: Tom Ginsburg, “Economic Analysis and the 
Design of Constitutional Courts,” Theoretical Inquiries at Law 3 (2002): 49–85, at 55–70, where the 
Professor discusses design issues such as: centralization or decentralization, access and standing, court size, 
term length, mechanisms of appointments, and the form that review is exercised.  
 
1052 Ramseyer, The Puzzling (In)dependence of Courts: a Comparative Approach, at 745–747. 
 
1053 In this direction, for instance: Robert D. Cooter, The Strategic Constitution (New Jersey: Princeton 
University Press, 2002), at 229. 
 
1054 Barroso, O Direito Constitucional e a Efetividade de suas Normas: Limites e Possibilidades da 
Constituição Brasileira (Rio de Janeiro, Renovar: 2004), at 127, stating that judges rely heavily on the 
principle of the initiative of the parties, instead of being more proactive. 
 
1055 Kenneth L. Karst and Keith Rosenn, Law and Development in Latin America, (Oakland: University of 
California Press, 1975), at 91, where the Professors contend: “The great names of the civil law are not those 
of judges (…) but those of legislators and scholars (…). The civil law judge is not a culture hero or a father 
figure, as he often is with us. His image is that of a civil servant who performs important but essentially 
uncreative functions. 
 
1056 Karst and Rosenn, Law and Development in Latin America, at 90, emphasizing that civil law judges 
shall only use “the law” when deciding a case. Accordingly, civil law judges are generally prohibited of 
using judicial case law – not even their own prior decisions.  
 
1057 In this sense: Karst and Rosenn, Law and Development in Latin America, at 91, where it is noted that 
the process of selection and tenure for civil law judges is coherent with the different status of the judicial 
profession in civil law jurisdictions. 
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textualism.1058 This interpretation is based on the civil law tradition of legal positivism 
and has deeply influenced constitutional adjudication in Brazil, as well.  
 In the context of adjudicating federal conflicts, we can start by considering 
different theories of judicial behavior. Legalists expect that judicial preferences (in 
particular, political and ideological preferences) play no significant role. 1059 
Attitudinalists suggest that judicial preferences explain adjudication of federal conflicts in 
much the same way as they explain judicial decisions more generally.1060 Agency 
theorists consider strategic aspects in federal conflicts (for example, the reaction by the 
Congress or by the President as well as by the states).1061 At the same time, important 
political and institutional constraints can incentivize consensus in the court where justices 
are willing to abdicate their ideologically-preferred outcomes to forge significant 
majorities that enhance the judicial reputation of the court.1062    
 We focus fundamentally on the alignment between revealed judicial preferences 
when adjudicating cases and presidential appointments in Brazil (as we have explained 
before, the Brazilian Senate plays a limited role in confirming these appointments). 
                                                        
1058  Danielle E. Finck, “Judicial Review: The United States Supreme Court Versus the German 
Constitutional Court,” Boston College International & Comparative Law Review 20 (1997): 123–157, at 
154. 
 
1059 For a general discussion, see: Richard Posner, W hat Do Judges and Justices Maximize? (The Same 
Thing Everybody Else); Richard Posner, “Judicial Behavior and Performance: An Economic Approach,” 
Florida State University Law Review 32 (2005): 1259–1279. 
 
1060 And as long as diverse federal arrangements are associated with different ideologies. In this sense:  see, 
among others: Saul Brenner and Harold J. Spaeth, “Ideological Position as a Variable in the Authoring of 
Dissenting Opinions on the Warren and Burger Courts,” American Politics Quarterly 16 (1988): 317–328; 
Jeffrey A. Segal and A. D. Cover, “Ideological Values and the Votes of U.S. Supreme Court Justices,” 
American Political Science Review 83 (1989): 557–565; George and Epstein, On the Nature of Supreme 
Court Decision Making; Epstein and Knight, The Choices of the Justices Make;  Segal and Spaeth, The 
Supreme Court and the A ttitudinal Model Revisited; Thomas G. Hansford and James F. Springgs II, The 
Politics of Precedent on the US Supreme Court (New Haven: Princeton University Press, 2006). 
 
1061 In such direction, see: Pablo T. Spiller and Rafael Gelly, Strategic Judicial Decision Making (2007), 
NBER Working Paper 13321. 
 
1062 See, among others: Charles M. Cameron and Lewis A. Kornhauser, Modeling Collegial Courts III: 
Adjudication Equilibria (2010), SSRN Working-paper, http://ssrn.com/abstract=1400838; Nuno Garoupa 
and Tom Ginsburg, “Reputation, Information, and the Organization of the Judiciary,” Journal of 
Comparative Law 4 (2010): 226–254; Nuno Garoupa and Tom Ginsburg, “Building Reputation in 
Constitutional Courts: Party and Judicial Politics,” Arizona Journal of International and Comparative Law 
28 (2012): 539–568. 
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Under the legalist model, there should be none. For attitudinalists, given the political 
nature of the selection and appointment of STF justices, it is almost natural to expect 
justices to exhibit the same political preferences as the party that appointed them.  
 For agency theorists, the expectation concerning alignment is more complex. On 
one hand, it could be weak for two reasons. First, Shapiro conjectures that the union 
usually wins in cases against the states because courts are excessively dependent on the 
central government in civil law systems.1063  He argues that constitutional courts tend to 
serve as an agent of the union, “policing” the states while rarely limiting the union’s 
competences and powers. In other words, political alignment cannot be systematic 
because the particular influence of the union vis-à-vis the states dominates adjudication in 
the federal context (independent of any particular party interest). Second, the rational 
theory of judicial independence sees judicial review as an instrument to achieve an 
effective balance between federal and state powers.      
 In order to maximize influence and perform the refereeing role, justices cannot be 
systematically aligned with particular political interests given the need to pursue a 
perception of neutrality in relation to the litigation before the Court.1064 On the other 
hand, given the existence of limited tenure and the possibility of further political 
appointments, justices could be tempted to satisfy the presidential appointer. When 
reviewing conflicts of jurisdiction, the STF justices are inevitably confronted with two 
opposing political interests: those of the union and those of the states. In this context, the 
political nature and the political implications of judicial review are understandable. 
 At this stage we can hypothesize two different explanations. One version is that 
there is no alignment between revealed judicial preferences and presidential 
appointments. This hypothesis is supported by legalists as well as Shapiro’s conjecture 
and the literature on independent courts.1065 An additional reason can be borrowed from 
                                                        
1063 Martin Shapiro, “Judicial Review in Developed Democracies,” Democratization 10 (2003): 7–26, at 8–
9. 
 
1064 Landes and Posner, The Independent Judiciary in an Interest-Group Perspective. 
 
1065 There are several possible explanations consistent with Shapiro’s conjecture. It could be the case that 
justices always favor the union because of a pro-federal ideology across the judiciary independently of the 
President in office. Another possibility is that all Presidents have similar preferences when it comes to 
favoring the union and all justices, as consequence, have equally identical preferences. Certain aspects of 
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the comparative judicial politics literature. Due to institutional arrangements, justices in 
civil law jurisdictions are simply insulated from political interests.1066 For instance, the 
mechanism of appointment in Brazil has been perceived as consensual and depoliticized 
by some scholars.1067 Other legal scholars argue that the role of the legal professions and 
a strong sense of judicial independence have eliminated any causal relationship between 
presidential interests and judicial behavior. 1068  These understandings result in the 
following hypothesis: 
H0: A justice appointed by a given President is not more likely to favor the union when 
such President is in office than otherwise. 
The alternative account suggests alignment is to be expected, as supported by the 
attitudinal model and some versions of the agency theory. Presidential appointers will 
select individuals that are ideologically close to their policy preferences (so preferences 
are expected to be aligned between appointer and appointee; therefore, in a model of 
sincere voting such as the attitudinal model, we should expect the appointee to reflect the 
preferences of the appointer).        
 At the same time, in the context of limited tenure (justices have life tenure with 
mandatory retirement at seventy years old) and with an eye on future advancements (such 
as positions in future administrations or other political sinecures), justices will seriously 
consider the political repercussions of Court decisions for the appointers (the appointee 
should reflect the preferences of the appointer due to strategic reasons). Therefore, as an 
alternative, we expect a consistent alignment of the way that justices vote and the 
interests of the appointers (due to both selection and incentives). 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                                     
institutional design (such as mandatory retirement at seventy and concerns for other career goals) could 
induce justices to support any given President rather than exhibiting any special loyalty for the appointer. 
 
1066 Pasquale Pasquino, “Constitutional Adjudication and Democracy. Comparative Perspectives: USA, 
France, Italy,” Ratio Juris 1, N. 11 (1998): 38–50; John Ferejohn, and Pasquale Pasquino, “Constitutional 
Adjudication: Lessons from Europe,” Texas Law Review 82 (2004): 1671–1704. 
 
1067 For instance: Llanos and Lemos, Presidential Preferences? The Supreme Federal Tribunal Nominations 
in Democratic Brazil. 
 
1068 Ricardo Ribeiro, “Preferências, Custos da Decisão e Normas Jurídicas no Processo Decisório das 
Cortes: o Modelo de Múltiplos Comportamentos,” Economic Analysis of Law Review 2 (2011): 264–296. 
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IV. THE DATASET AND PRELIMINARY EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE 
Our hypothesis is tested on a panel of data recording 119 decisions of the STF 
concerning disputes between the union and the states between 1988 and 2010, and 
collected by the authors. Our research encompasses all the relevant decisions (as 
explained below) made after the proclamation of the 1988 Constitution up to December 
31, 2010. For this research, we considered the date when the decision was made (i.e., 
when the Court adjudicated it), regardless of when it was published. We chose to close 
our dataset at December 31, 2010, because it coincides with the last day of President 
Lula’s term in office.          
 We have considered different possible search techniques regarding identification 
of cases addressing federalism on the website of the STF. A mere search for “federalism” 
as the single criterion would not be relevant for our purposes, since it would encompass 
only twenty-eight cases decided en banc by the plenary.1069 In light of these limitations, 
the best criterion for researching “federalism” was to use as keywords a combination of 
“conflict and powers and union and state and constitution and 1988.”1070   
 We decided to focus on federalism conflicts that have developed precedents and 
relevant decisions of the STF after the adoption of the current Brazilian Constitution. If 
our sample size might be deemed as restricted in comparison to the overall workload of 
the STF, the main reason is because we have focused on the leading cases appointed by 
the website search. We did this by commanding keywords in the search mechanisms of 
the STF database as well as concentrating our attention on the decisions from panels and 
the tribunal sitting en banc, rather than individual decisions.    
 For the purpose of this research, it is not relevant to consider individual votes of 
the justices when there is a single justice deciding the case – informally, even before the 
constitutional amendment 45, of 2004, there were, in practice, mechanisms to ensure that 
                                                        
1069 Plus eighteen decisions of the Presidency of STF, and sixty-four documents in reference to monocratic 
decisions (from October 5, 1988 to January 1, 2012). Despite the intrinsic importance of the decisions of 
the Presidency, the statistical analysis of a dataset built on single opinions (also including monocratic or 
individual decisions) is less compelling. 
 
1070 In Portuguese, we used the following key words: “conflito e competência e união e estado e 
constituição e 1988,” in the section of legal doctrine of the STF website, last accessed January 2014, and 
available at the following link: http://www.stf.jus.br/portal/jurisprudencia/pesquisarJurisprudencia.asp.  
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the plenary would be responsible for setting the guidelines (i.e., for deciding the leading 
cases). Consequently, individual decisions take place when the petition did not demand 
any innovation in terms of STF doctrines (for example, when the plenary has already 
decided a similar claim in some analogous context).1071 Hence, our research focuses 
solely on those decisions that were not disposed of by an individual judge. 1072 
Importantly, the use of keywords as search terms assured that the dataset includes the 
largest possible number of true conflicts between the federal union and a state, or 
between the union and more than one state. We emphasize that a mere search by the 
name of the states or by the union would not produce such results. Therefore, we decided 
to use the combined search with the aforementioned keywords.    
 However, not every decision that appeared in our preliminary search was 
coded.1073 At this stage, we obtained a provisional number of 141 decisions for 1988 to 
2010. Importantly, we were very flexible regarding the definition of conflict of powers 
and it does not merely refer to conflicts of legislative competence. It also encompasses 
conflicts of possible attributions, such as among federal public prosecutors and state 
public prosecutors.         
 It is worth noting that our dataset contains decisions of direct actions of 
unconstitutionality (the so-called Adins, a form of abstract review, as we explained 
before) as well as other forms of concrete and diffused control of constitutionality (such 
as extraordinary appeals). Our dataset also encompasses different types of actions, such 
                                                        
1071 This procedure is determined at article 101 of the Internal Rules of Procedure in the STF: RiSTF. The 
Constitution also requires in article 97 that the principle of reserve of plenary (that is, only a decision en 
banc of the full court is appropriate) must be observed when courts declare an act to be unconstitutional, 
with a minimum quorum of qualified majority regardless of the form of constitutional control involved: 
Barroso, O Controle de Constitucionalidade no Direito Brasileiro, at 143–144. Some legal scholars argue 
that this specific quorum should also apply to the incidental and concentrate forms of control when the STF 
is the court in question, as explained by Alexandre de Moraes, Direito Constitucional (São Paulo: Atlas, 
2012), at 747. 
 
1072 Note that the STF judged en banc in 2006 and 2007 0.5% of all the decisions of the STF in those two 
years, as argued by: Marcos Paulo Veríssimo, “A Constituição de 1988, Vinte anos depois: Suprema Corte 
e Ativismo Judicial ‘`a brasileira’,” Revista de Direito GV , São Paulo 4 (2008): 407–440, at 421. 
 
1073 We have excluded six lawsuits decided before the Constitution of 1988: CJ 6718; CJ 6641; CJ 6589; CJ 
6658; CJ 6672; CJ 6647. We also excluded eleven lawsuits decided after December 31, 2010: AI 753844 
AgR; ACO 1109; ADI 3847; ACO 1136; ACO 987; Rcl 11243; Rcl 2936; ADI 4167; ACO 1534 TA-Ref; 
Rcl 6235 AgR; AI 796310 AgR. All those lawsuits are based on the search updated by March 20, 2012. 
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as: conflicts of competence (“CC”), civil actions based on the primary competence of the 
STF (“ACO”), actions based on the disobedience of a fundamental constitutional 
principle (“ADPF”), federal interventions (“IF”), reclamations (“RCL”), writs of 
mandado de segurança (“MS”) and injunction mandamus (“MI”).1074 This is particularly 
important because most of the literature in political science has been mainly concerned 
with a single form of abstract control of constitutionality in Brazil (namely, Adins), and 
has largely ignored other types of actions.1075      
 In fact, Adins are only the third most frequent form of action in our dataset (only 
15% of the total number of cases considered). The most frequent action in our dataset is 
the ACO (26% of cases considered), which are lawsuits initiated at the STF rather than 
appealed. This is the case because, as mentioned previously, the STF is the solely 
competent court to rule on direct federal conflicts among members of the union (although 
technically there are different understandings when it concerns to municipalities).1076 The 
second most frequent action included in our dataset is the IF, also reflecting original 
jurisdiction of the STF (21% of cases considered). Finally, extraordinary appeals (“RE”) 
represent 9% of our dataset. Other actions (including MS, ADPF, RCL, MI) account for 
29% of the dataset in dispersed ways.1077      
 We shall emphasize that there were no exclusions by convenience or for similar 
reasoning in our dataset. The total actions that firstly appeared were 141 decisions. We 
excluded a total of twenty-two actions after the final readings of the cases involved, as 
                                                        
1074 The abbreviations in parenthesis refer to specific types of actions named in Portuguese and that 
appeared in our dataset, in accordance with the symbols used by the Court. For the complete list of the 
decisions analyzed, see Table 7.5. See also footnotes 1069 and 1070, supra.  
 
1075 Since the seminal work of Werneck Vianna et al., A Judicialização da Política e das Relações Sociais 
no Brasil. On the other hand, note that our dataset has a relatively small number of cases when the full 
workload is considered given that we focus on decisions by panels or by the Court en banc based on 
federalism only, as we have explained. 
 
1076 Despite the fact that article 18 of the Constitution asserts that the Federal Republic of Brazil 
encompasses the union, the states, the federal district, and the municipalities, whereas the text of article 
102, f, particularly excludes the municipalities: see footnote 1023, supra. 
 
1077 Those abbreviations are used by the STF. In English, they would be translated as: writ of mandamus; 
action for non-compliance with a mandatory constitutional precept; action of non-compliance with a 
decision of the STF (different from an action of content of court); injunction mandamus (a misleading 
name, because it can only apply in the case of disobedience to a constitutional norm that lacks a proper 
implementation measure by one of the elected branches). 
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further explained. All the pertinent exclusions were made either because there was no 
federal conflict or because it was impossible to precisely code the conflict in terms of 
union versus state or states.         
 An example of the absence of a true federal conflict refers to the cases where the 
search engine of the website of the STF classified a national nonpublic body as a union, 
such as the union of the commercial enterprises (instead of union as synonym of the 
federal government, which is the actual object of our research).1078 Accordingly, it is 
worth reiterating that we focused the composition of our dataset in the substance, i.e., the 
existence of a potential conflict between the union and a state or states.  
 Importantly, as detailed above, our dataset is not limited to a specific form of 
action; on the contrary, it includes different actions ranging from the original jurisdiction 
of the STF to the extraordinary appeals that are exclusive to the Court, although not 
within its original jurisdiction. We crafted the research to be as simple as possible and, by 
doing so, we faithfully preserved the number of actions as closer to the original results 
provided by the website of the STF, while also considering in a coherent and systematic 
fashion the concept of union and states through all the dataset composition (as well as for 
coding purposes).         
 Our next step was to select the cases that referred to a potential conflict of powers 
between the federal government (i.e., the federal union) and the states. We determined 
this through a mere reading of the summary of each decision.1079 Thus, we excluded the 
cases based on claims brought by the union against other members or bodies of the union 
that would not have a significant impact on the states. After making the pertinent 
exclusions, we had 119 decisions.1080 Our dataset is composed of decisions en banc as 
                                                        
1078 In Portuguese, the word union also refers to any group of persons or companies with common interests, 
similar to associations. Hence, the results produced by the STF search engine do not refer solely to “union” 
as a federal entity, considering its dual meaning in the Portuguese language. 
 
1079  In Portuguese, “ementa.” 
 
1080 The cases included in our dataset reflect the diversity of the powers of the federal union, with conflicts 
of the pertinent competences encompassing issues as distinct as: the postal service company (Correios); 
nuclear energy; sea and shores; education; traffic; gamble activity; social security; civil servant employees; 
indigenous people and land; and environmental protection. Regarding the type of claim, the vast majority 
(twenty-five decisions) refers to requests for the intervention of the federal government in a particular state. 
As for the nature of the claims analyzed, conflicts of legislative competence, scope of federal jurisdiction 
and taxation are the most represented. It is important to notice that federal jurisdiction peaked from the 
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well as some decisions by panel.1081 As we emphasized earlier, this composition of 
dataset is very rare in the literature.        
 A possible objection concerns the final dataset. Due to limitations with the STF 
website and their taxonomy with keywords, it is possible that our search has excluded 
some relevant decisions. In order to minimize this possibility, we started with a broad 
search which inevitably had the cost of including less relevant cases. By checking for 
robustness, we eliminated possible noise in the selection or classification of decisions to 
be included. Given our complicated procedure and careful rechecking of all relevant case 
law, as described above, we demonstrated that there is no systematic bias in our dataset in 
terms of excluding certain types of cases that involve federal conflicts.1082 Notice that 
there is no other dataset of federal conflicts in the STF against which we could compare 
ours.           
 After determining the cases that actually had a potential conflict of powers 
between the union and the states, we turned our attention to coding those decisions. At 
that point, we considered the full opinion of each justice available online.1083  
 We worked with a binary dummy variable, assigning “1” if the justice voted for 
the union and  “0” if the justice voted in favor of the state(s). Importantly, in some cases, 
our coding is based on the preponderance to determine whether or not a decision was pro-
                                                                                                                                                                     
adoption of the Constitution (1988) until 1997. After that, agreements between the union and particular 
states referring to fiscal responsibility are dominant. For a list of the decisions of our dataset, see Table 7.5. 
For a list of the decisions containing the nature of the claims involved in the federal conflict under review, 
see Table 7.6. 
 
1081 This research considered eleven decisions by panels: RE 148123, 11.30.1993; RMS 22021, 04.18.1995; 
RE 165865, 11.03.1997; RE 305996, 04.30.2002; RE 323642, 05.14.2002; RCL 723, 08.13.2002; RE 
274902, 09.10.2002; RE 306005A, 09.17.2002; RE 429171, 09.14.2004; RE 361829, 12.13.2005; RE 
512468, 05.13.2008. 
 
1082 The initial selection was made by the search engine of the STF itself. Our exclusions were limited to 
cases that did not contain federal conflicts – as, for instance, when the union is the plaintiff and the 
defendant is a federal public enterprise with a state, for instance. Furthermore, in regression five we control 
for a stricter concept of union, as explained infra. 
 
1083 Here, we used the search tool of the website known as “inteiro teor,” last accessed January, 2014, and 
available on line at: www.stf.jus.br/portal/inteiroTeor/pesquisarInteiroTeor.asp. 
 
  269 
union or pro-state. 1084  Dissenting opinions were only coded as dissent when the 
controversy addressed the federalism claim.       
 The research considers the broadest possible interpretation to determine who 
stands as “union” and who stands as “state.”1085 As a consequence, it is possible that the 
interests of the “union” might not overlap exactly with the interests of the President and, 
therefore, it could generate noise in the econometric analysis (because federal agencies 
might pursue an agenda that is not favorable to the President). The regression 
specifications will take into account these definitions. In particular, we will narrow the 
definitions for the sake of robustness testing by making sure that “union” does capture the 
direct interests of the federal executive branch (i.e., the President). The consequence is 
that the regression specifications for robustness will use fewer decisions (more precisely, 
107 decisions).         
 We control for a decision in limine as well as a decision on the merit.1086 Only 
lawsuits that were extinguished due to the lack of jurisdiction of the STF were considered 
as non-merit decisions.  
                                                        
1084 Because of the nature of the underlying legal issue, as it is originated from conflicts across 
constitutional competences, there is a tendency for the winner to get a substantial victory, with only minor 
issues being left to the opponent.  
 
1085 By “union” we consider every federal judiciary body (which is relevant, since in Brazil labor courts, 
military courts and electoral courts are specialized jurisdictions of federal justice), the President of the 
Republic as well as the National Congress, the Senate, the Chamber of Deputies, and the federal 
prosecution agency – whether designated as Ministério Público Federal (MPF) or as Procuradoria-Geral da 
República (PGR). The army, federal police, federal public foundations, federal public institutes, autarquias, 
public federal enterprises, federal public companies, federal regulatory and federal executive agencies were 
also considered as “union.” Exception was made for the so-called public and private jointly-owned stock 
companies, due to specific constitutional provisions. National associations and labor unions were not 
deemed as “union” or “states.” However, when they succeeded, their victory was counted as pro-union or 
pro-state, depending on the scope and nature of representation. With the same reasoning, by “states” we 
consider every body of state judiciary, state prosecutors, state legislative assemblies, state public 
companies, and state police. Here, we should point out that in Brazil, there is no equivalent to the U.S. 
Tenth Amendment immunity. Therefore, states and state governors can be directly sued in Brazil. For this 
research, municipalities were included within the state where they are located, for purposes of coding, as 
we did, for instance, in the decision:  RE 361829, of 12.13.2005. 
 
1086 This chapter addresses in limine decisions as a generic term. For the purpose of our research, we 
disregard the distinction between liminar, tutela antecipada, and cautelar, despite the specific provision of 
article 273, paragraph seven, of the Brazilian Code of Civil Procedure. For references on those distinctions, 
and further procedural specificities referring to claims against the government, see: Leonardo Carneiro da 
Cunha, A Fazenda Pública em Juízo (São Paulo: Dialética, 2011), at 264–280. 
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 Our dataset consists of 1,008 individual observations in reference to 119 decisions 
by the STF during the period from the proclamation of the Constitution of 1988 to 
December 31, 2010. The main statistics are: 54% of those individual votes were 
favorable to the state (548 votes) and 46% were favorable to the union (460 votes). 
 In figure 7.1, we present the percentage of individual votes favoring the union by 
justice and by presidential term. We can see that the distribution seems reasonably 
random with no general trend. With higher percentage of votes for the union, we find the 
justices appointed during the dictatorship (with the notable exceptions of Justice Moreira 
Alves and two other justices with too few observations in the dataset to be relevant for 
empirical analysis) as well as justices picked by Presidents Sarney (1985-1990) and 
Collor (1990-1992). Justices picked by later Presidents such as Itamar (1992-1995), FHC 
(1995-2003), and Lula (2003-2011) can be seen as relatively more clustered on the 
opposite side. Still, in relation to the justices appointed by President Lula, there is no 
clear trend (from Justice Ricardo Lewandowski with 36% pro-union to Justice Eros Grau 
with 61% pro-union).1087         
 As a preliminary empirical exercise, we analyze contingency tables that cross 
tabulate individual votes favorable and unfavorable to the union when the appointing 
president is and is not in power. Table 7.2 uses the entire dataset (119 cases and 1,008 
observations). It can be seen that a vote is favorable to the union in 53% of the cases 
when the appointing president is in power and only 42% of the cases when the appointing 
president is not in power. Hence, table 7.2 seems to suggest that there is some significant 
positive correlation between voting for the union and the appointing president being in 
power.           
 From table 7.1, we can easily notice that certain justices play a slightly different 
role within our dataset and period considered. All justices appointed during the 
dictatorship (eight justices) never served under their appointing president in our study 
(because we start in 1988).  
All justices appointed by President Lula (also eight justices) always serve under 
their appointer in our study (because we conclude the study in 2010). Table 7.3 replicates 
table 7.2 but including only justices serving in both periods, i.e., when their appointer is 
                                                        
1087 The data for Figure 7.1 can be found on Table 7.7. 
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in power and after their appointing president has left power (that is, justices appointed by 
Presidents Sarney, Collor, Itamar, and FHC).      
 As a consequence, the number of observations is significantly reduced (117 cases 
and 627 observations). However, the numbers go in the exact same direction: a vote is 
favorable to the union in 83% of the cases when the appointing president is in power and 
only 40% of the cases when the appointing president is not in power.  Therefore table 7.3 
confirms an important positive correlation between voting for the union and the 
appointing president being in power.        
 General assumptions about the vote of a given justice favoring the President-
appointer and potential future work in the federal government are not validated by our 
dataset. Technically, there was only one example of justice1088 leaving the STF earlier 
than his retirement in order to hold office immediately in the national government. It 
refers to Justice Rezek, who was appointed to the STF in 1983, during the military ruling, 
and left in March of 1990, to become President Sarney’s foreign minister – a position he 
retained during the controversial ruling of President Collor. Rezek left the chancellor 
office in April 13, 1992, and was reappointed to the STF in May 4, 1992. This time 
Rezek was appointed by President Collor, little before his impeachment from the 
Presidency. Rezek remained as justice of the STF until his retirement in 1997.  
 Justice Jobim, who coincidentally was the successor of Justice Rezek, may be a 
borderline case. Justice Jobim was appointed to the STF by President Fernando Henrique 
Cardoso, for whom he has previously been Minister of Justice, from 1995 until April of 
1997 – when he became Justice of STF. Justice Jobim retired from the STF, upon his own 
request, in March of 2006.  More than a year after, and following a political crisis, 
President Lula da Silva appointed Jobim for the Office of Minister of Defense in July of 
2007. Jobim served as Minister of Defense during the remainder of President Lula’s term, 
and was reappointed by President Dilma Rousseff, serving until 2011.  
 Because Justice Jobim had more than a sixteen months hiatus between his 
position in the STF and his nomination as Minister of Defense, his case is not one of a 
                                                        
1088 The information about the justices was gathered at the official website of the STF: www.stf.jus.br, last 
accessed April, 2015.  Table 7.1 portraits the terms of the Brazilian Presidents from 1964 until 2011. Table 
7.7 provides personal information about the Justices, such as their state connection, year of birth, age at 
appointment, President who appointed and dates the Justices entered and left the Court, respectively.
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justice leaving the STF to immediately hold political office. Moreover, President Cardoso 
appointed Justice Jobim for the STF, while President Lula (who was Cardoso’s successor 
and fierce antagonist) nominated Jobim for the Office of Defense. Therefore, technically, 
Jobim was not an immediately calculated exit from the Court to hold a national political 
office.          
 Nevertheless, even if we consider so for the sake of the argument, both cases 
(Justices Rezek and Jobim) are completely atypical and had occurred in distinct historical 
moments (justice Rezek immediately after the dictatorship; and justice Jobim during 
Lula’s government, despite being nominated by President Cardoso for the STF). Both 
cases are not representative and amount to isolated episodes during the period examined. 
Hence, justices have, in practice, little incentives to advance their careers outside the STF 
itself.1089 
V. REGRESSION ANALYSIS 
 In order to test our hypothesis and confirm the results indicated by the 
contingency tables, we need to investigate if there is a potential correlation between the 
behavior of a STF justice and the interests of the appointing president who nominated 
him or her. We investigate if a STF justice is more likely to rule in favor of the federal 
government when his or her appointer is in office.  
 As explained before, the dependent variable is a binary dummy that captures if a 
particular ruling is favorable to the union or to the states.   
 The independent variable we are interested in is another binary dummy that takes 
value “1” if the justice has been appointed by the President when the case was decided; 
and “0” otherwise, a variable designated Justice union.1090 Similarly, we control for the 
possibility that a justice is related to the state involved in the controversy by constructing 
a binary dummy that takes value “1” if the justice is related to the state and “0” 
otherwise.1091 This variable is called Justice state. Finally, we construct another important 
                                                        
1089 Arguing that there are low incentives for the STF justices to behave strategically with regard to future 
appointments in the government: Brinks, Faithful Servants of the Regime, at 139–140.  
 
1090 Notice that Justice state and Justice union are not mutually exclusive. 
 
1091 State connection is summarized on Table 7.7. It refers to the state where the justice was born and the 
state where the justice had her/his previous professional career (including where s/he went to law school). 
Notice that each justice can be associated with more than one state. 
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dummy variable by assigning “1” if the justice rapporteur has been appointed by the 
President when the case was decided; and “0” otherwise, a variable named Rapporteur 
union.           
 Other independent variables include the role played by the union (defendant and 
plaintiff) and by states (defendant and plaintiff)1092 with designations of Union defendant, 
Union plaintiff, State defendant, and State plaintiff, respectively; year of the decision 
(Y ear decision); age and tenure of the justice (Age and Tenure) as well as gender 
(Gender); whether or not the decision is in limine as explained before (Limine); and 
whether or not the decision relates to an agency (Agency, meaning if an agency or 
government-owned company is involved in the lawsuit). These variables are mere 
controls to avoid possible spurious results and, therefore, we do not comment on them 
extensively.          
 Finally, inspired by the contingency tables, we also introduce two other variables 
– Dictatorship and Lula – to control for those justices appointed during the dictatorship 
(mainly by President Figueiredo, but also Presidents Castello Branco and Geisel) and by 
President Lula, respectively. As seen before, in our dataset, justices appointed during the 
dictatorship never serve under their appointer while justices chosen by President Lula 
always serve under their appointer.  
 The model was estimated by logistic regression with clustering by case due to the 
possible non-independence of observations (we used STATA 11). The first specifications 
are presented in table 7.4 in terms of odds ratio (where a coefficient above one is 
associated with a positive impact while a coefficient below one is associated with a 
negative impact). We start by pooling all observations and running three regressions, 
where we vary the controls for Dictatorship and Lula.    
 Age seems to have a significant negative impact on voting for the union of around 
3% (which would be consistent with the idea that younger judges are more concerned 
with future payoffs albeit in a relatively small way).     
 Tenure, however, presents the opposite result – a positive impact on a voting for 
the union of around 2-4%. In this sense, judges with longer tenure might be less 
concerned with future payoffs, because they have also accumulated more prestige in the 
                                                        
1092 Notice that these four variables are not mutually exclusive. 
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STF and are likely to have a shorter horizon. Still the percentage is not large, with no 
need to advance potentially speculative accounts.         
 Y ear indicates a reduction in the likelihood of a justice voting for the union of 
around 8-11% (the union is more likely to win in earlier as opposed to later times in a 
reasonable percentage). This is consistent with the idea that the STF has been mitigating 
an overcentralization of powers in the union.1093 In this sense, the fact that states tend to 
have a better successful rate as time passes provides evidence that, in civil law 
jurisdictions, constitutional courts do not necessarily usually favor the union.1094 
 The variable Union plaintiff seems to multiply the odds of a justice voting for the 
union  (federal government) by a factor of three to four (it seems that justices are more 
likely to consider the interests of the union when the union is a plaintiff in significant 
ways). This is particularly important considering the potential effect regarding strategic 
litigation benefits, as it may impact in determining who should initiate actions in the STF. 
 Dictatorship is statistically significant and reduces by half the probability that a 
justice will vote for the union (we know this result is being driven mainly by Justice 
Moreira Alves, who dominates the number of individual observations for justices 
appointed during the military regime, and we have observed in figure one that he is less 
pro-union than average). This seems an important effect. However, the control Lula is 
positive but never statistically significant (we already knew from figure one that the eight 
justices appointed by President Lula vary widely in their behavior).  
 The coefficients for Justice union and Rapporteur union have the correct sign but 
they are not statistically significant – except Justice union in the econometric 
specification that controls for the justices appointed during the dictatorship, but not for 
those appointed by President Lula. Overall, the preliminary analysis suggested by the 
contingency tables does not seem to survive a more refined regression analysis.  
 In table 7.4, we report two more specifications for the sake of robustness. The 
fourth regression considers only those justices appointed by Presidents Sarney, Collor, 
Itamar, and FHC for the reasons explained before. The results are largely robust in this 
                                                        
1093 Werneck Vianna et al., Dezessete Anos de Judicialização da Política, although their findings were 
restricted to the administrative context. 
 
1094 Shapiro, Judicial Review in Developed Democracies. 
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limited dataset and the coefficient for Justice union is again positive, but not statistically 
significant. The percentages concerning the statistically significant variables are overall 
the same as before.         
 The fifth regression reports on further robustness testing. We limit the dataset to 
the cases that have a less controversial definition of “union.”1095 We obtain the same 
results as before, in terms of sign, percentages and statistical significance. Therefore, our 
initial results do not seem biased by the inclusion of more controversial definitions of 
“union.”          
 Considering the percentages mentioned above, a note is required concerning the 
Priest and Klein’s model for litigated disputes and for disputes that were settled before or 
during litigation in the United States.1096 The model argues how cases that settled are 
different from those that go to court. It applies to trial litigation as well as to appeals, and 
purports to be effective regardless of the issue litigated, predicting that plaintiffs’ chances 
of success are generally about fifty percent.1097 The model has sparked a wave of 
scholarship controversies.1098        
 The Priest and Klein model does not seem applicable to this research due to 
different factors related to the peculiar system of judgment by the STF. First, all the cases 
                                                        
1095 We have mainly disregarded cases that address conflicts between federal and state prosecutorial bodies 
concerning powers and jurisdiction. 
 
1096 George Priest and Benjamin Klein, “The Selection of Disputes for Litigation,” Journal of Legal Studies 
XIII (1984): 1–55.  
 
1097 Idem, at 13–20. We do note, however, that the Professors emphasize that in litigations involving 
antitrust (hence, the government), a higher chance for plaintiffs may be verified: at 52–54. This is relevant 
for our analysis, because the cases researched present at least one public entity directly involved. 
 
1098 An in depth discussion of this vast literature exceeds the scope of this chapter. Supporting the Priest 
and Klein hypothesis, see, among others: Daniel P. Kessler, Thomas Meites and Geoffrey P. Miller, 
“Explaining Deviations from the Fifty Percent Rule: A Multimodal Approach to the Selection of Cases for 
Litigation,” The Journal of Legal Studies XXV (1996): 233–261, where the authors find evidence based on 
the analysis of 3,529 cases to corroborate the model of Priest and Klein, as long as its fundamental 
assumptions are met; and Daniel Klerman, “The Selection of 13th Century Disputes for Litigation,” Journal 
of Empirical Legal Studies 9 (2012): 320–346. For an overview of the literature and general rejection of the 
model of Priest and Klein for civil litigation: Theodore Eisenberg, “Testing the Selection Effect: A New 
Theoretical Framework with Empirical Tests,” The Journal of Legal Studies XIX (1995): 337–358. There 
have been positions arguing the non applicability of the model for specific cases, such as to individual 
litigation in patent law, as contended by: Jason Rantanen, W hy Priest-Klein cannot apply to Individual 
Issues in Patent Cases (2013), available on line at ssrn, abstract number 2132810, last accessed: November, 
2013.  
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in our dataset involve a potential conflict between two different spheres of the Brazilian 
federalism: one state and the union; or states and the union. Accordingly, we are within 
the realm of Brazilian public litigation, whose corollary is marked by the supremacy of 
the public interest as well as by its non-disposable feature.1099 Settlements are generally 
precluded due to the public nature of the parties and the conflict involved.1100  
 Second, our dataset comprises cases that were decided en banc, as previously 
stated, presenting a new question of law that has not been decided yet. There is no 
discretion from the Court, and no single judge or jury is authorized to rule – only the 
Court deciding in its complete configuration has jurisdiction.  
 Third, our dataset encompasses cases of original jurisdiction as well as appellate 
jurisdiction of the STF. With regard to the appellate jurisdiction of the Court, several 
cases arrive due to a mandatory appeal procedure. Under this procedure, the public 
litigant who lost in the first instance must appeal – unless precluded to do so. Such 
mandatory appeal has also been translated as ex officio,1101 because even when the 
                                                        
1099 The supremacy of the public interest (used as manifestation closer to the French “puissance publique,” 
not to the general public interest as defended by justice Brandeis) and the non-availability of such interest 
by the public administration are foundational principles of the public administration in Brazil. The general 
conceptualization of public interest encompasses the powers of the public administration being exercised 
for the public interest – not the interest belonging to the tax collector agency, for instance. The non-
disposable (non-availability) feature of the public good refers how the public administration is subordinated 
to the public interest, having a duty to protect it, while being forbidden to neglect it or settle, because it can 
only act under the strict compliance with the principle of administrative legality: Celso Antônio Bandeira 
de Mello, Curso de Direito Administrativo (São Paulo: Malheiros, 2008), at 69–75. There have been 
specific permissions for public lawyers to celebrate settlements, as long as authorized by law: article 4 of 
the Complementary Law 73 of 1993. This act was regulated by article 1, of federal law 9,469 of 1997. 
According to this article, the possibility of settlements is only authorized during a judicial procedure, being 
limited to R$500,000, and so long as the expenses are not public revenues originated from taxes, which 
significantly reduces the scope of application of the article.   
 
1100 The mere fact that a federative state and the union are involved would be sufficient to characterize the 
public nature of the litigation, regardless if it was a contractual dispute, a tax claim, an environmental 
lawsuit, or other topic. This is a relevant justification for the non-application of the Priest and Klein model, 
to the extent that such model explains the selection of cases that actually go to trial versus the cases that 
settled. If settlement is not a real possibility due to the public nature of the involved parties, the theoretical 
framework of the model is not verified in the cases researched. 
 
1101 The Brazilian Code of Civil Procedure generally determines that all the claims in which public entities 
(union, states or municipalities) are defeated must be submitted to the tribunal that would have jurisdiction 
to decide a potential appeal. Noting that the mandatory appeal (also called necessary reevaluation) is a 
condition of efficacy of the award, but not technically an appeal: Cunha, A Fazenda Pública em Juízo, at 
208. It is noteworthy that the Code is binding at all levels – including the state sphere. We do note that this 
rule is not applicable to decisions of abstract control (Adin and ADC), nor the Action of violation of 
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defeated litigant does not appeal, the trial judge is generally obliged to appeal on behalf 
of the public entity defeated,1102 as long as the decision is not a preliminary injunction.1103 
If the decision is not final, other issues arise.        
 The concern is that the STF decides several injunction cases, procrastinating the 
final decision, because the Court has vast latitude regarding when it will reach the final 
decision.1104          
 Fourth, the model is based on the U.S. common law system, with parties and 
lawyers who are well informed about the courts’ decision and their biding effect.1105 In 
Brazil, the decisions of the STF in abstract control carry binding force, but if the case 
arises out of concrete jurisdiction that is not necessarily applicable.1106 Furthermore, the 
Brazilian judicial process is famous for delivering particularistic decisions, with 
judgments that are not broadly applicable.1107 A related consideration is the fact that the 
union would qualify as a repeated player1108 in comparison with the states, to the extent 
                                                                                                                                                                     
mandatory precept (ADPF), because the three are not subject to any appeals, according to article 26 of the 
law 9,868, of 1999; and article 12 of the law 9,882 of 1999, respectively. 
 
1102 The Code of Civil Procedure presents two exceptions for the principle of mandatory appeal in article 
475, paragraph 2, which determines that claims which are liquid and not superior to sixty minimum wages 
are not subject to the mandatory appeal. Article 475, paragraph 3 dismisses the mandatory appeal if the 
decision is aligned with the case law of the STF or higher courts. The latter paragraph would not be 
applicable to our research, because the cases decided present all new legal questions. 
 
1103 There are several important decisions held as injunctions, with some authors considering such 
preliminary decisions in Adin as being more important than the final decision on the merits: see, e.g., 
Taylor, Judging Policy: Courts and Policy Reform in Democratic Brazil, at 80. 
 
1104 Diana Kapiszewski, “How Courts Work,” in Cultures of Legality, ed. Javier Couso, Alexandra 
Huneeus and Rachel Sieder, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013), at 66, noting the vast 
discretion of the STF regarding when to decide cases, and emphasizing that there is no general order for the 
lawsuits to be decided. 
 
1105 Priest and Klein, The Selection of Disputes for Litigation, at 24. Because the model is based on 
common law, decisions of the higher courts have general binding force of stare decisis, which should 
facilitate the prediction of the outcome in future decisions. 
 
1106 See our discussion about the Constitutional Amendment 45 of 2004, supra, in this chapter. 
 
1107 Taylor, Judging Policy: Courts and Policy Reform in Democratic Brazil, at 77. We reiterate that 
binding súmulas (súmulas vinculantes of article 103-A of the Constitution), which must be approved for 
two thirds of the Court, have been very enacted sparsely by the STF. 
 
1108 Marc Galanter, “Why the ‘Haves’ Come out Ahead: Speculations on the Limits of Legal Change,” Law 
and Society Review 9, N.1 (1974): 95–160, at 97–107 for the concept of repeated players – RP. 
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that it has always to either initiate or defend itself in cases of federative conflict, while 
some states may have rarely litigated a federative conflict case in the current 
Constitution.1109         
 In addition to the above-referred factors, questions relating to settlement have 
been object of study by Professor Shavell, who argues that any litigation rate is possible 
when the parties involved have asymmetric levels of information.1110 This would be the 
case for the union, in particular, if we consider it as a repeated player.1111 As Professor 
Shavell notes when explaining the assumptions of the Priest and Klein model: “… the 
assumptions rule out all manner of situations, including those in which one or other party 
does not usually have very accurate information about trial outcomes and those which 
one or the other party has substantially superior knowledge to the other.”1112 
 With regard to our preliminary results, in summary, we find that the variables 
measuring political alignment frequently have the correct sign, according to the 
alternative account, but are not statistically significant in many econometric 
specifications. The most powerful results are obtained in the second regression (when we 
control for justices appointed during the dictatorship, but not for those appointed by 
President Lula). These results seem to indicate that there is more evidence to support the 
attitudinal model, or some version of the agency theory, rather than a pure legalist 
account or Shapiro’s conjecture.        
 In any case, our findings are different from previous empirical work about the 
STF according to which no evidence supporting the attitudinal model was found. In this 
context, our findings about Brazil show that the highest court is not very different from 
other supreme courts across the globe, thus dismissing exclusive legalist accounts. 
 
                                                        
1109 This is particular relevant due to the “federal government’s ability to delay almost perpetually and to 
outlast other legal players,” as observed by Taylor, Judging Policy: Courts and Policy Reform in 
Democratic Brazil, at 77. 
 
1110 Steven Shavell, “Any Frequency of Plaintiff Victory at Trial is Possible,” The Journal of Legal Studies 
25, N. 2 (1996): 493–501, at 495–498. 
 
1111 We do acknowledge that under the model of Priest and Klein, a party who is a repeated player will 
prevail more frequently in litigation, because it will have different stakes in the litigation: Priest and Klein, 
The Selection of Disputes for Litigation, at 28–29.   
 
1112 Shavell, Any Frequency of Plaintiff V ictory at Trial is Possible, at 499–500. 
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VI. CONCLUSION 
 This research tests for alignment between judicial behavior and presidential 
appointments in the Brazilian Supreme Court after the Constitution of 1988. Our 
empirical analysis focuses on conflicts concerning federal versus state powers and 
jurisdiction. We have explored our hypothesis based on the judicial politics literature. 
The results seem to point out that some alignment exists, but it is not as strong as 
suggested by some theories. Clearly, Brazilian justices do not behave purely on the basis 
of their judicial preferences, as suggested by attitudinalists. However, at the same time, 
our econometric results clearly undermine legalist accounts as well as Shapiro’s 
conjecture (suggesting that justices should always favor the union). 
 A possible explanation for these mixed results is the vast list of powers that are 
assigned to the union by the constitutional text of 1988. To some extent, justices appear 
to try to strike a balance between the many federal powers and the more limited powers 
of the states. It is worth noting that, conceptually, states have residual powers (as in the 
U.S. federal design). Nevertheless, the bulk of important powers is centralized in the 
union, which is the one competent to legislate on important subject matters varying from 
traffic regulations to energy, criminal, and civil matters, just to cite a few. 
 As with the general empirical literature on supreme courts, there is always the 
possibility that the results are influenced by a potential selection effect. However, unlike 
with U.S. Supreme Court data, this is likely to be a less serious problem with Brazil for 
three reasons. First, there is no certiorari mechanism.  Second, the vast workload and the 
legal practice show a tendency for generalized appeals in many cases (where the only 
goal is to delay the inevitable outcome that has already been established by a lower 
court). Third, given the vast underlying matters that cause litigation in the Brazilian 
Supreme Court, there is no ex ante perception to favor one side or the other; hence, it is 
unlikely that a particular actor systematically gives up litigation.  
 Notwithstanding the fact that judicial preferences matter in Brazil, the patterns of 
politicization observed in our dataset are weaker than in other similar courts. In our view, 
this was the case mainly due to the constitutional provisions regarding appointments for 
the STF. As discussed earlier in this thesis, the Senate approval is a formal rite only. A 
related explanation to the low politicization in the court refers to the long professional 
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tradition present in the Court.1113 Importantly, our findings are sufficient to dismiss 
merely legalist accounts of judicial behavior in the STF. 
 There are important implications for comparative judicial politics. Unlike 
previous research on Brazil, we show that there is some degree of politicization in 
decision-making at the Supreme Court. It is weak in light of the U.S. Supreme Court 
literature, but nevertheless important for the context of Latin American legal practice. It 
also shows that, although the union is significantly more powerful than the states, the 
prevalence of the former over the latter is tempered by direct political alignment 
(therefore undermining Shapiro’s conjecture). Finally, it identifies important time trends 
that are likely to reflect the transition from an initial building up of constitutional 
activism to a more solidified balance of competing legal doctrines.    
 In terms of theories of judicial behavior, it confirms the premise that, although 
general accounts based on American courts are exportable, they need to be tempered by 
local effects to make empirical sense. While the pure legalist model is clearly rejected by 
our results, the attitudinal and agency models need to be understood in the context of 
Brazilian redemocratization process and institutions.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                        
1113 Discussing the STF as a court composed by justices with strong professional background – regardless if 
the justices were appointed during the military ruling or not – and emphasizing that highly fragmented 
political parties in Brazil and their dynamics favored the professional appointments for the STF: 
Kapiszewski, High Courts and Economic Governance in Argentina and Brazil, at 100–109. The author also 
argues, at 106–108, that justices have weak political tights, albeit acknowledging that there was not much 
information for justices appointed during the military ruling. In our view, justices did have those ties, but, 
perhaps, they were more discrete in showing them. As a matter of fact, the censorship to the press did not 
help transparency or accountability, generally. 
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Table 7.1: Brazilian Presidents, their term and whether or not affiliated with military ruling.1114 
 
President Presidential 
Term 
Military 
Dictatorship 
Number 
of 
Appointed 
Justices in 
the 
Dataset 
President Presidential 
Term 
Military 
Dictatorship 
Number 
of 
Appointed 
Justices in 
the 
Dataset 
Humberto 
de Alencar 
Castello 
Branco 
 
1964-1967 Yes 1 José 
Sarney 
 
1985-1990 Not 
technically 
5 
Artur da 
Costa e 
Silva 
 
1967-1969 Yes 0 Fernando 
Collor de 
Mello 
 
1990-1992 
Impeached 
by Oct. 
1992. 
No. First 
directly 
elected 
President 
after the 
1988 Const. 
 
4 
Emílio 
Garrastazu 
Médici 
 
 
1969-1974 Yes 0 Itamar 
Franco 
1992-1995 No 1 
Ernesto 
Geisel 
 
 
1974-1979 Yes 1 Fernando 
Henrique 
Cardoso 
1995-2003 
Two terms 
No 3 
João 
Baptista de 
Oliveira 
Figueiredo 
 
1979-1985 Yes 6 Luís 
Inácio 
Lula da 
Silva 
2003-2011 
Two terms 
No 8 
Tancredo 
de Almeida 
Neves 
 
1985 Not 
technically 
0 Dilma 
Vana 
Rousseff 
Since 2011 No 0 
(4 new 
Justices 
were 
appointed 
since 
2011). 
 
 
 
 
                                                        
1114 Not technically: Directly elected President operating under the constitutional environment set up by the 
military dictatorship, pre-1988 Constitution (1985-1988). 
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Table 7.2: Cross Tabulation: Entire Dataset 
 
 Appointing 
President in Power 
Appointing 
President is not in 
Power 
 
Pro Union 165 (53%) 295 (42%) 460 
Pro State 148 (47%) 400 (58%) 548 
 313 695 1008 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 7.3: Cross Tabulation: Dataset Excluding Dictatorship & Lula Justices 
 
 Appointing 
President in Power 
Appointing 
President is not in 
Power 
 
Pro Union 45 (83%) 232 (40%) 277 
Pro State 9 (17%) 341 (60%) 350 
 54 573 627 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  283 
Table 7.4: Logistic Regressions; Dependent Variable: Voting for the Union 
 
 
 
The asterisk (*)/(**)/(***) indicates statistical significance at ten/five/one percent.  
Standard deviations in parentheses. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Regression I Regression II Regression III Regression 
IV: limited 
number of 
Justices
Regression 
V: limited 
number of 
obs
Number of 
Observations
1008 1008 1008 619 920
Clusters 119 119 119 117 107
Pseudo R2 0.113 0.117 0.117 0.156 0.128
Union 
Defendant
1.14 (0.64) 1.20 (0.67) 1.19 (0.70) 0.74 (0.34) 0.88 (0.50)
Union Plaintiff 3.45** (1.89) 3.59** (1.96) 3.59** (1.96) 4.76*** (2.66) 3.33** (1.98)
State 
Defendant
0.67 (0.45) 0.67 (0.46) 0.67 (0.46) 0.26** (0,17) 0.42 (0.30)
State Plaintiff 1.76 (0.97) 1.79 (1.00) 1.80 (0.99) 2.20 (1.30) 1.42 (0.87)
Year 
Decision
0.92* (0.05) 0.89** (0.05) 0.89** (0.05) 0.88** (0.05) 0.87** (0.05)
Gender 0.98 (0.15) 0.92 (0.14) 0.92 (0.14) 0.89 (0.18) 0.92 (0.15)
Agency 0.80 (0.39) 0.80 (0.39) 0.80 (0.39) 0.67 (0.37) 0.93 (0.49)
Limine 0.37* (0.21) 0.37* (0.21) 0.37* (0.21) 0.36* (0.21) 0.42 (0.26)
Tenure 1.02** (0.02) 1.04** (0.02) 1.04** (0.02) 1.04 (0.03) 1.04** (0.02)
Age 0.97*** (0.01) 0.97*** (0.01) 0.97*** (0.01) 0.97*** (0.01) 0.97*** (0.01)
Justice State 0.73 (0.20) 0.77 (0.21) 0.77 (0.21) 1.01 (0.30) 0.76 (0.23)
Justice Union 1.48 (0.42) 1.63* (0.48) 1.56 (1.02) 1.03 (0.76) 1.49 (0.97)
Rapporteur 
Union
1.77 (0.81) 1.76 (0.81) 1.76 (0.81) 2.19 (1.08) 1.80 (0.94)
Dictatorship 0.50*** (0.12) 0.49*** (0.13) 0.44*** (0.11)
Lula 1.07 (0.74) 1.30 (0.93)
  284 
 
 
 
Figure 7.1: Votes Favoring the Union by Justice and by President 
 
 
 
Dark blue: Justices appointed during the military dictatorship (eight); Red: Justices appointed by 
President Sarney (five); Light blue: Justices appointed by President Collor (four); Brown: Justice 
appointed by President Itamar (one); Orange: Justices appointed by President FHC (three); Black: 
Justices appointed by President Lula (eight). 
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Table 7.5: Decisions included in the dataset for this chapter
1115 
Decisions 
 
Dates Decisions Dates Decisions Dates Decisions Dates 
CJ6866 19881207 RE 323642 20020514 AC 39 20030911 ACO 622 20071107 
ACO 301 19890201 RCL 723 20020813 ADPF 33 20031029 RCL 3205 20071122 
CA 38 19891011 RE 274902 20020910 IF 164 20031213 ACO876mc 20071219 
CJ 6956 19891130 RE306005a 20020917 ADI 1399 20040303 AC 1006 20080409 
ACO 396 19900328 ACO 449 20021114 ADI 1557 20040331 ACO 1058 20080414 
ADI 338mc 19900924 IF 444 20030203 ADI 329 20040401 ACO 803 20080414 
MS 21041 19910612 IF 298 20030203 ACO 518 20040624 ADI 2832 20080507 
RE 136215 19930218 IF 1690 20030226 ADI 2847 20040805 RE 512468a 20080513 
RE 149955 19930819 IF 1466 20030226 RE 429171 20040914 AC 2032 20080515 
RE 148123 19931130 IF 2194 20030226 ACO 653 20041118 RCL 4661 20080625 
ADI 1140mc 19941219 IF 237 20030319 ADI 2587 20041201 ACO 1179 20080911 
RMS22021 19950418 IF 139 20030319 RCL 2833 20050414 AC 2156 20081002 
ACO 473 19950518 IF 317 20030326 ACO 765 20050601 ADI4167mc 20081217 
ACO 280 19951018 IF 171 20030326 CC 7204 20050629 PET 3388 20090319 
ADI 1499mc 19960905 IF 492 20030326 ACO 684 20050804 AC2327mc 20090429 
ACO 156 19960926 IF 449 20030326 RCL 3074 20050804 AC2317mc 20090429 
ACO 391 19961002 IF 1317 20030326 RCL 2646 20051006 RCL 6568 20090521 
RE 165865 19971103 IF 1952 20030326 ACO 251 20051117 ACO 1156 20090701 
ADI 1601mc 19971211 IF 2257 20030326 RE 361829 20051213 AC 2403mc 20090820 
ADI 1075 mc 19980617 IF 3578 20030508 RCL 2549 20060330 ACO 1431 20090916 
RCL 1061 19990602 IF 3292 20030508 ADI3395mc 20060405 RCL 2769 20090923 
ACO 519 19990902 IF 2975 20030508 ADI 3715 20060524 AC 2588 20100407 
ADI 1968 20000201 IF 2805 20030508 RCL 3331 20060628 ACO 1480 20100602 
ADI 2344 20001123 IF 2127 20030508 AC 282 20060817 ACO 1342 20100616 
MS23866Ag 20010524 IF 2737 20030508 ADI 3189 20061213 ACO 1576 20101023 
ACO 593 20010607 IF 2909 20030508 ACO 845 20070830 AC 2659mc 20100812 
ACO 487 20011018 IF 2973 20030508 ACO 1048 20070830 ACO 1405 20100818 
ACO 503 20011025 IF 3046 20030508 MI 670 20071025 PET 4680 20100929 
ADI 1600 20011126 IF 3601 20030508 MI 708 20071025 ACO 1281 20101013 
RE 305996 20020430 ACO 379 20030529 MS 26438 20071029   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                        
1115 The abbreviations used remained as close as those adopted by the STF. 
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Table 7.6: Decisions included in the dataset for this chapter with classification of the nature of the main 
claim related to the conflict of powers and competences.1116 
 
Decisions 
 
Nature of 
the Claim 
Decisions Nature of 
the Claim 
Decisions Nature of 
the Claim 
Decisions Nature of the 
Claim 
CJ6866 Fed. Jurisd. RE 323642 Civil Serv. AC 39 Damages ACO 622 Leg. Assbl. 
ACO 301 Taking RCL 723 Taking ADPF 33 Civil Serv. RCL 3205 Indig. bord. 
CA 38 STF vs STJ RE 274902 Civil Serv. IF 164 Fed. Interv. ACO876mc Environ. 
CJ 6956 Military J. RE306005a Civil Serv. ADI 1399 Education AC 1006 Indig. bord. 
ACO 396 Fed. Jurisd. ACO 449 Civil Serv. ADI 1557 Jud. Service ACO 1058 Publ. Min. 
ADI 338mc Taxation IF 444 Fed. Interv. ADI 329 Nucl. Energ ACO 803 Postal Serv. 
MS 21041 Borders IF 298 Fed. Interv. ACO 518 Traffic ADI 2832 Leg. Assbl. 
RE 136215 Tax: IR IF 1690 Fed. Interv. ADI 2847 Gambling RE 512468a Land border 
RE 149955 Tax: IR IF 1466 Fed. Interv. RE 429171 Criminal AC 2032 Fin. Cauac 
RE 148123 Tax: IR IF 2194 Fed. Interv. ACO 653 Land Title RCL 4661 Fin. Siafi 
ADI 1140mc Fisc. Adm. IF 237 Fed. Interv. ADI 2587 Leg. Assbl. ACO 1179 Fed. Jurisd. 
RMS22021 Indig. bord. IF 139 Fed. Interv. RCL 2833 Indig. bord. AC 2156 Fin. Cauac 
ACO 473 State org. IF 317 Fed. Interv. ACO 765 Postal Serv. ADI4167mc Education 
ACO 280 Indig. Com. IF 171 Fed. Interv. CC 7204 Labor Juri. PET 3388 Indig. bord. 
ADI 1499mc Indig. Com. IF 492 Fed. Interv. ACO 684 Education AC2327mc Fin. Cauac 
ACO 156 Fed. Asset  IF 449 Fed. Interv. RCL 3074 Environ. AC2317mc Fin. Cauac 
ACO 391 Fed. Jurisd. IF 1317 Fed. Interv. RCL 2646 Fed. Border RCL 6568 Civil Serv. 
RE 165865 Fed. Jurisd. IF 1952 Fed. Interv. ACO 251 Social Sec. ACO 1156 Publ. Min. 
ADI 1601mc Tax: ICMS IF 2257 Fed. Interv. RE 361829 Tax: ISS AC 2403mc Fin. Siafi 
ADI 1075 
mc 
Taxation IF 3578 Fed. Interv. RCL 2549 Sea/shores ACO 1431 Financ. PEF 
RCL 1061 Environ. IF 3292 Fed. Interv. ADI3395m
c 
Civil Serv. RCL 2769 Finance 
ACO 519 Indigenous IF 2975 Fed. Interv. ADI 3715 Leg. Assbl. AC 2588 Finance 
ADI 1968 Publ. Min. IF 2805 Fed. Interv. RCL 3331 Indig. bord ACO 1480 Land Title 
ADI 2344 Zoning IF 2127 Fed. Interv. AC 282 Tax:finance ACO 1342 Tax: ISSQN 
MS23866Ag Leg. Assbl. IF 2737 Fed. Interv. ADI 3189 Gambling ACO 1576 Fin. Siafi 
ACO 593 Environ. IF 2909 Fed. Interv. ACO 845 Leg. Assbl. AC 2659mc Finance 
ACO 487 Tax: ICMS IF 2973 Fed. Interv. ACO 1048 Fin. Cadin ACO 1405 Fed. Jurisd. 
ACO 503 Tax: Imunit IF 3046 Fed. Interv. MI 670 Civil Serv. PET 4680 Publ. Min. 
ADI 1600 Tax: ICMS IF 3601 Fed. Interv. MI 708 Civil Serv. ACO 1281 Publ. Min. 
RE 305996 Civil Serv. ACO 379 Damages MS 26438 Fed. App.   
 
 
                                                        
1116 As for the abbreviations of the claims: Fin= Finance Law; Leg. Assbl = Legislative Assembly of the 
states; Fed. Jurisd. =  Federal Jurisdiction; Indig. bord.= Indigenous border. 
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Table 7.7: Personal Information about the Justices 
No-
mi-
na-
tion 
Or-
der 
Name of the 
Justices 
State connection 
of the Justices: 
(born/career) 
Year of 
Birth  
 
Age at 
Appoint. (the 
date of App.). 
President 
who 
appointed 
Date of 
Appoint. 
1
st
 Day in 
STF 
Date Left 
STF 
(updated 
until 2012)   
  Dias Toffoli SP/SP 1967 41 Lula 20090917 20091023 - 
2 Menezes Direito PA/RJ 1942 64 Lula 20070828 20070905 20090901 
3 Carmem Lucia MG/MG 1954 52 Lula 20060510 20060621 - 
4 Ricardo Lewand. RJ/SP 1948 57 Lula 20060316 20060316 - 
5 Eros Grau RS/SP 1940 63 Lula 20040512 20040630 20100730 
6 Joaquim Barbosa MG/RJ,DF 1954 48 Lula 20030507 20030625 - 
7 Ayres Britto SE/SP 1942 60 Lula 20030605 20030625 - 
8 Cezar Peluso SP/SP 1942 60 Lula 20030507 20030625 - 
9 Gilmar Mendes MT/DF 1955 47 FHC 20020425 20020620 - 
10 Ellen Gracie RJ/RJ, RS 1948 52 FHC 20001031 20001214 20110805 
11 Nelson Jobim RS/RS,DF 1946 50 FHC 19970307 19970415 20060309 
12 Mauricio Correa MG/DF 1934 60 Itamar  19941215 19941215 20040507 
13 Francisco Rezek MG/MG,DF 1944 48 Collor 19920415 19920521 19970205 
14 Ilmar Galvao BA/RJ,AC 1933 58 Collor 19910612 19910626 20030530 
15 Marco Aurelio RJ/RJ 1946 43 Collor 19900502 19900613 - 
16 Carlos Velloso MG/MG 1936 54 Collor 19900528 19900613 20060119 
17 Celso de Mello SP/SP 1945 43 Sarney 19890504 19890817 - 
18 Sepulveda Pertc. MG/DF 1937 51 Sarney 19890314 19890517 20070817 
19 Paulo Brossard RS/RS 1924 64 Sarney 19890213 19890405 19941024 
20 Celio Borja RJ/RJ 1928 57 Sarney 19860319 19860417 19920331 
21 Carlos Madeira MA/RJ 1920 65 Sarney 19850903 19850919 19900317 
22 Octavio Gallotti RJ/RJ 1930 64 Figueiredo 19841105 19841120 20001028 
23 Sydney Sanches SP/SP 1933 51 Figueiredo 19840813 19840831 20030427 
24 Francisco Rezek MG/MG,DF 1944 39 Figueiredo 19830223 19830310 19900315 
25 Aldir Passarinho PI/RJ,DF 1921 61 Figueiredo 19820802 19820902 19910422 
28 Oscar Correa MG/RJ,DF 1921 61 Figueiredo 19670105 19820426 19890117 
27 Neri da Silveira RS/RS 1932 49 Figueiredo 19810817 19810901 20020424 
28 Moreira Alves SP/RJ 1933 42 Geisel 19750606 19750620 20030420 
29 Djaci Falcao PB/PE 1919 47 Castello 
Branco 
19670105 19670201 19890126 
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Table 7.8: Total votes per justice and total percentage per justice 
JUSTICES Pro Union Pro State Total  JUSTICES Pro Union Pro State Total 
Djaci Falcao 0 1 1  Djaci Falcao 0 100 100 
Oscar Correa 0 1 1  Oscar Correa 0 100 100 
Moreira Alves 14 19 33  Moreira Alves 42.42 57.58 100 
Neri da Silveira 16 8 24  Neri da Silveira 66.67 33.33 100 
Aldir Passarinho 3 3 6  Aldir Passarinho 50 50 100 
Rezek 83-90 2 2 4  Rezek 83-90 50 50 100 
Sydney Sanches 18 16 34  Sydney Sanches 52.94 47.06 100 
Octavio Gallotti 10 9 19  Octavio Gallotti 52.63 47.37 100 
Carlos Madeira 2 2 4  Carlos Madeira 50 50 100 
Celio Borja 4 2 6  Celio Borja 66.67 33.33 100 
Paulo Brossard 7 4 11  Paulo Brossard 63.64 36.36 100 
Sepulveda 33 37 70  Sepulveda 47.14 52.86 100 
Celso de Mello 34 54 88  Celso de Mello 38.63 61.36 100 
Carlos Velloso 26 45 71  Carlos Velloso 36.62 63.38 100 
Marco Aurelio 54 39 93  Marco Aurelio 58.07 41.93 100 
Ilmar Galvao 15 17 32  Ilmar Galvao 46.88 53.12 100 
Rezek 92-97 4 0 4  Rezek 92-97 100 0 100 
Mauricio Correa 21 33 54  Mauricio Correa 38.89 61.11 100 
Nelson Jobim 19 30 48  Nelson Jobim 39.58 60.42 100 
Ellen Gracie 31 43 74   Ellen Gracie 41.89 58.11 100 
Gilmar Mendes 27 44 71  Gilmar Mendes 38.03 61.97 100 
Cezar Peluso 23 23 46  Cezar Peluso 50 50 100 
Ayres Britto 19 33 52  Ayres Britto 36.54 63.46 100 
Joaquim Barbosa 24 20 44  Joaquim Barbosa 54.55 45.45 100 
Eros Grau 20 13 33  Eros Grau 60.61 39.39 100 
Ricardo Lewand. 12 21 33  Ricardo Lewand. 36.36 63.64 100 
Carmem Lucia 14 18 32  Carmem Lucia 43.75 56.25 100 
Menezes Direito 5 6 11  Menezes Direito 45.45 54.55 100 
Dias Toffoli 3 5 8  Dias Toffoli 37.5 62.5 100 
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Table 7.9: Member States, abbreviations and regions 
Member States Abbreviations Brazilian 
Regions  
Member States Abbreviations Brazilian 
Regions 
Acre AC North Paraíba PB Northeast 
Alagoas AL Northeast Paraná PR South 
Amapá AP North Pernambuco PE Northeast 
Amazonas AM North Piauí PI Northeast 
Bahía BA Northeast Rio de Janeiro RJ Southeast 
Ceará CE Northeast Rio Grande do 
Norte 
RN Northeast 
Federal District DF West Rio Grande do 
Sul 
RS South 
Espírito Santo ES Southeast Rondônia RO North 
Goiás GO West Roraima RR North 
Maranhão MA Northeast Santa Catarina SC South 
Mato Grosso MT West São Paulo SP Southeast 
Mato Grosso do Sul MS West  Sergipe SE Northeast 
Minas Gerais MG Southeast Tocantins TO North 
Pará PA North    
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CHAPTER EIGHT 
CONCLUSION 
This thesis researches the interplay between the current Brazilian system of 
judicial review and the federalism choices adopted by the Constitution of 1988, by 
investigating how those federative choices impact judicial review. Aiming at answering 
this central question, this thesis was structured in three sub-questions addressing specific 
constitutional options referring to all the different levels of Brazilian federalism, namely, 
the federal union, states and municipalities. The first sub-question focuses on the 
inclusion of local governments as autonomous constitutional agents. It compares the 
decisions of the Brazilian Supreme Court to its U.S. counterpart in annexation cases, thus 
understanding annexation law as a proxy for local powers. The second sub-question 
concerns the constitutional option granted to state supreme courts in creating specialized 
panels – and if differences across Brazilian state supreme courts when deciding cases of 
abstract review can ultimately be related to the existence of specialized panels. The final 
inquiry considers the appointment of justices to the Brazilian Supreme Court (which was 
transplanted from the U.S. Constitution) and its consequences for the adjudication of 
federative conflicts.         
 This thesis studies the impact of constitutional federal options defined in the 
Brazilian Constitution to judicial review, utilizing theoretical and empirical methods. It 
also resorts to comparative method. Political economy factors were considered in our 
assessment of the uniqueness of the federal scheme designed by the current Constitution 
and their practical consequences for judicial review. Historical experiences, culture, 
political and economical forces, the role of institutions (political parties, the Presidency, 
the Senate and courts, specifically) were addressed. In this context, we turn to the 
analysis of our preliminary findings for each of the sub-questions referred above.   
 Based on our evidence of the decisions by the USSC and STF in annexations 
cases, as discussed on chapter five, we argue that general-purposes local governments in 
the United States are more powerful than municipalities in Brazil. After two 
constitutional amendments and the current legal limbo where the annexation of 
municipalities (and any boundary changes for that matters) is in Brazil, we are left with a 
sense that little has changed despite the specific inclusion of local governments as federal 
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actors in the Constitution. We note that while the population involved was left out, such 
constitutional inclusion appears to have been instated for the benefit of local politicians 
who control the local sphere.        
 With regard to constitutional design, inclusions of municipalities as federal actors 
and mechanisms granting powers to them have shown to not be a panacea, according to 
the Brazilian experience. On the contrary, such inclusion has increased the litigation 
regarding federal unwanted (and often deemed unnecessary) influence in state and local 
spheres. The Brazilian Constitution offers evidence of how having several provisions 
granting power to municipalities led to unbalanced powers, to the extent that 
constitutional amendments had to be enacted to combat the abuses occurring in the 
annexation of municipalities in Brazil.      
 According to our initial findings based on annexation, we argue that the lack of 
provisions of local governments in the U.S. Constitution is consistent with the literature 
on constitutional design, including the absence of constitutional provisions dealing with 
controversial matters. Our preliminary data also shows that only recently has the USSC 
been more involved in litigation of federal rights in the context of annexation – after the 
enactment of the Voting Rights Act, in particular. Importantly, the results of the 
comparison with the STF are counter-intuitive, because we would suspect that the 
Brazilian Supreme Court would be more involved in litigation regarding the protection of 
fundamental rights.         
 We turn to the preliminary findings of chapter six. The main purpose of our 
inquiry was to determine whether or not there are significant variations in the outcome of 
the cases of abstract review as a function of a specialized panel across Brazilian state 
supreme courts. Because those variations were found, we moved to the second question, 
namely, whether such differences could be attributable to the existence of a specialized 
panel. It is worth noting that the Constitution of 1988 does not determine which states 
should have specialized panels or not. The Constitution merely grants discretion to each 
state supreme court to create such panels, provided the state supreme court has more than 
twenty-five judges.         
 The dependent variables researched are based on our review of the court 
specialization doctrine and related advantages. Thus, our dependent variables were the 
  292 
following: length (extension of the decision measured by number of words); lag (time lag 
from the beginning of the action until the decision – either final or in limine); rate of 
dissents among the judges of the state supreme court; whether or not the decision favored 
the plaintiff; and whether or not the court that issued the final decision cited other courts.
 We found some evidence that the existence of specialized panels matters for the 
likelihood and rates of dissent as well as the duration of procedures, but not for other 
variables. We also found that the STF was by far the most cited court with regard to state 
constitutional review, which is interpreted as the Court having achieved centralization. 
This centralization is linked to uniformity, with the STF being very influential for the 
interpretation of state law, as well.       
 In light of the above, our empirical analysis does not completely validate frequent 
advantages of the existence of specialized courts. Our results do not suggest that 
specialized panels necessarily produce better constitutional law than decisions en banc. 
Nevertheless, by finding some statistical variations in court performance (number and 
likelihood of dissents as well as duration), we contend that a particular institutional 
design (specialized versus nonspecialized) is relevant for litigation. Further studies need 
to be developed in order to investigate other factors that may affect the analysis of court 
specialization.          
 Our preliminary findings concerning federative conflicts, as discussed in chapter 
seven, are dismissive of the notion that the STF acts as “policing” the states, while only 
occasionally controlling the union. Actually, our data shows that the opposite occurs. 
According to our initial results, the STF attempts to balance an over-centralized system of 
powers and competences on the union, allowing states to be more successful when it 
comes to the litigation of federative conflicts. In this direction, our results corroborate the 
understanding of judicial review as an effective means to reach a balance between state 
and federal spheres of powers.        
 In addition, our research provides some evidence that judicial preferences are 
relevant for the outcome of cases. Specifically, our data shows that justices appointed 
during the military ruling tend to favor the union.   
 Notwithstanding the fact that judicial preferences matter in Brazil, the patterns of 
politicization observed in our dataset are weaker than in other similar courts. We 
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attributed that difference mainly to the general mechanisms of appointment for the STF 
(because the Senate confirmation is merely pro forma) and the long professional tradition 
existent in the Court. Importantly, our findings are sufficient to dismiss merely legalist 
accounts of judicial behavior in the Supremo, which are grounded on the Roman-
Germanic conception of judges being insulated from politics. Hence, this thesis 
contributes to new views about the politization of the STF and the Brazilian judiciary, 
more broadly.         
 Overall, our preliminary results are different from previous studies. It is worth 
reiterating that those studies were based on abstract review exercised by the STF. 
Accordingly, we can speculate, at this point, that the more concrete cases of judicial 
review are included in the dataset of future empirical research, the more politicized the 
achieved results might be.         
 In conclusion, this thesis concentrates on different instances of the influence of 
judicial review and federalism choices (in all the levels: union, states and local 
government), as defined in the Constitution of 1988. We expect to have contributed with 
valid preliminary answers to our central question. We also hope to have advanced the 
debate about the impact of constitutional federative choices for judicial review. More 
research needs to be done to investigate the remaining areas of mutual influence between 
judicial review and federalism choices determined by the Constitution of 1988. Among 
such areas, further research about comparative constitutional design of municipalities is 
encouraged. Their taxes and revenues should be targeted from a comparative perspective 
grounded on different federal experiences. In addition, more empirical research focusing 
on concrete cases of judicial review decided by the STF after the Constitution of 1988 
ought to be developed, including the investigation of lawsuits arising out of claims based 
on federal intervention on states. We also suggest the study of other high federal courts – 
in a similar fashion as we did with the state courts in this thesis. From a normative 
perspective, the focus of the Brazilian legal debate should change from denying 
politicization of the judiciary to investigations into this politicization, namely: where is it 
more intense and what are the relevant factors advancing it. 
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